


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The Iberian World

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THE IBERIAN WORLD 1450–1820

Edited by FERNANDO BOUZA, PEDRO CARDIM,
and ANTONIO FEROS

The Iberian World

The Iberian World: 1450–1820 brings together, for the first time in English, the latest research in Iberian studies, providing in-depth analysis of fifteenth- to early nineteenth-century Portugal and Spain, their European possessions, and the African, Asian, and American peoples that were under their rule.

Featuring innovative work from leading historians of the Iberian world, the book adopts a strong transnational and comparative approach, and offers the reader an interdisciplinary lens through which to view the interactions, entanglements, and conflicts between the many peoples that were part of it. The volume also analyses the relationships and mutual influences between the wide range of actors, politics, and centres of power within the Iberian monarchies, and draws on recent advances in the field to examine key aspects such as Iberian expansion, imperial ideologies, and the constitution of colonial societies.

Divided into four parts and combining a chronological approach with a set of in-depth thematic studies, *The Iberian World* brings together previously disparate scholarly traditions surrounding the history of European empires and raises awareness of the global dimensions of Iberian history. It is essential reading for students and academics of early modern Spain and Portugal.

Fernando Bouza is Professor at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, and a specialist in early modern Iberian culture and politics. He is the author of *Portugal no tempo dos Filipes. Política, cultura, representações (1580–1668)* (2000); *Communication, Knowledge, and Memory in Early Modern Spain* (2004); and *Hétérographies. Formes de l'écrit au Siècle d'Or espagnol* (2010).

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The Iberian World

1450–1820



Edited by

Fernando Bouza, Pedro Cardim, and
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
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Image 0.1 Map of the early seventeenth-century Spanish and Portuguese monarchies

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Introduction



Fernando Bouza, Pedro Cardim, and Antonio Feros

The objective of this work is to present the different facets of the *Iberian world* during the period between the fifteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. It aims to present this universe in all its diversity and complexity, to analyse in depth a space marked by many affinities and similarities, but also by innumerable differences, tensions, exclusions, and conflicts. In other words, the term Iberian world, which appears in the title of this volume, does not refer to a socially homogenous, harmonious, or conflict-free space. On the contrary, it is meant to stand in for the plurality of the peoples of the Iberian peninsula, a region characterised by considerable social, cultural, ethnic, jurisdictional, and political diversity. As the chapters of this volume demonstrate, this diversity persisted, in changing configurations, throughout the period analysed here. It partly explains the similar trajectories and common preoccupations of Iberian societies and polities, but also the abundant rejections, the ubiquity of intolerance, and the recurrent bouts of violence.

The term “Iberian world” is furthermore justified by its capacity to invoke the global dimension assumed by the Iberian polities beginning in the sixteenth century. That global dimension became especially prominent as the Portuguese and the Spaniards set about conquering and colonising territories in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. One of the consequences of this process—also marked by great effusions of violence—was to further augment the internal diversity of the Iberian world. This volume proceeds from the premise that it is impossible to comprehend the historical trajectory of the Iberian polities without taking into account their imperial projections. The colonial experience was profoundly transformative, for the Iberian peoples as much as for those who were subjected by conquest and colonisation. It was precisely for this reason that so much space in this book is dedicated to America, Asia and Africa. Indeed, in many of the chapters the perspective adopted is deliberately that of individuals, women and

men, natives of these continents who were affected by Portuguese and Spanish colonialism. The intention was to avoid constructing a Eurocentric narrative of the Iberian world and its peoples.

The present work was conceived as an exercise in comparative history. It is not, however, a binary comparison between Spain and Portugal, as if these were clearly delimited and static entities during the period covered. Instead, the comparison undertaken here is more ambitious, because it recognises the Portuguese and the Spanish worlds as realities that were internally heterogeneous and permanently in the making, because constantly on the move. It has been our aim, as editors of this collection, to avoid essentialist and teleological visions of the Iberian world, and so this volume traces the social construction of a world indelibly marked by diversities.

Alongside the comparative perspective, the present volume also insists on recovering the entangled character of Iberian history. It aims to tell the history of the mutual constitution of the various polities that existed in the Iberian peninsula. We consider that without taking into account the continuous interaction between these polities, marked by hybridity, mimicry and emulation, it is difficult to fully understand their historical trajectory. To do so, we have opted for transverse and transnational readings of Iberian social, political, and cultural realities.

It follows that these concerns weighed heavily in the choice of historians whose contributions would make up the various chapters that comprise this work. The options were enviably plentiful, given the enormous advances in the study of Iberian history in recent decades, in different historiographical fields. It was therefore necessary to make a careful selection. As the volume was to be published in English by Routledge, we naturally enlisted a good number of Anglophone historians. Nevertheless, since one of the aims of this volume was to be representative of the diversity of the historiographical traditions that have contributed to the study of the Iberian world, we have also included historians who write primarily in Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian. We have also sought to bring together historians with very different historiographical backgrounds, since we consider such plurality to be fundamentally enriching. In this sense, this volume represents an argument in favour of the diversity of historiographical languages and vocabularies.

We wanted to recover, as far as possible, the oral and visual richness of the vast and complex period covered by the volume. Therefore, we asked the authors to work with a wide range of

contemporary sources, both documentary and visual. We also asked our contributors to balance the use of widely known materials with the inclusion of documents that have been scarcely or not at all studied until now. It was our objective that the various contributions should not only stay abreast of the most recent historiography, but also be innovative in their own turn. Thanks to the extraordinary work of the historians who collaborated on this volume, this book not only sums up the state of our knowledge of each of the themes in focus, but also offers plenty of indications for future research.

The book is divided into four parts. The first sets out the historical dynamics of the Iberian peninsula from the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. This first part presents the basic coordinates—in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres—of the Iberian space in the course of that period. The second part is focused on the expansionary processes initiated by the Portuguese and the Spanish. The conquest of vast spaces in America, Asia, and Africa is analysed from different perspectives, including, of course, from the standpoint of the populations impinged upon by Iberian colonialism, men and women who suffered the violence perpetrated by the Portuguese and the Spaniards, saw their lands occupied, and many of whom were enslaved or coerced into forced labour. The third and fourth parts of this volume cover the period from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the Age of Revolutions. Their purpose is to delineate the major changes that occurred in the eighteenth-century Iberian world, culminating in the period of the great revolutions, American independences, and the establishment of liberal regimes in Spain and Portugal.

This is therefore a volume focused on the European dimension of the Iberian world, but keeping both eyes firmly on the Atlantic, and, to a lesser extent, Asia. In other words, while this book is mainly concerned with the European part of the Iberian world, it is not Eurocentric, and, what is more, it vindicates the insistence of recent historiography on seeing the imperial experience as a constitutive element in the formation of Portugal and Spain. A volume that shows that Iberian history was shaped by an extraordinarily wide range of actors, from members of the upper classes to more anonymous individuals, both men and women, many of them of Maghrebi, Amerindian, sub-Saharan, and Asian origin. A volume that conveys an integrated vision of the historical trajectory of the Iberian world, but does not strive to convey the image of a harmonious universe, not least because at the core of many of its chapters are differences,

tensions, conflicts, and forms of discrimination based on religion, race, and nationality.

Part 1

The Iberian peninsula (fifteenth–seventeenth century)



THE AVALON DRAMA TO THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1660)

John I = Philippa of Ghent
1355-1433

Edward I
1433-38

Peter

Henry the
Navigator

John

Edward

Elizabeth
m. Philip the Good

Alonso V
1438-81

Edward

Charles the Bold

John II
1481-95

Manuel I
1495-1521
m. Maria, d. of
Aragon and Isabella

James
Duke of Braganza

Catherine = John III
1521-57
sister of
Charles V

Isabella
m. Charles V

Louise

Beatrice
m. Charles II
of Savoy

Cardina
Henry
1578-80

Edward = Isabella

Theodosius
Duke of Braganza

Jeanne = John
d. of
Charles V

Maria = Philip
1580-88
(Philip II of Spain)

Antonio
(Prince of Crato)
(illegitimate)

Emanuel
Philibert
of Savoy

Sebastian I
1557-78

Henry II (Trastámara) = Joanna
1369–79

John I = Eleanor of Aragon
1379–90

Henry III
1390–1406

Ferdinand I
King of Aragon
1412–16

Isabella of Portugal (2) = John II = Maria of Aragon (1)
1406–54

John II of
Aragon
d. 1479

Alfonso the
Magnanimous
d. 1458

Henry IV of Castile

Juana "la Beltraneja"
d. 1530

Alfonso
1468

Isabella of Castile = Ferdinand II of Aragon
1474–1504 1479–1516

Juana = Philip I the Fair
d. 1555 d. 1506

Charles I of Spain 1516–56
(Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor)
1519–58

(1369-1379) ENRIQUE II (of Trastámara K. of Castile)

(1379-1390) JUAN I = ELIONOR (of Aragon)

ENRIQUE II = CATALINA of Lancaster
(K. of Castile 1380-1406)

FERNANDO (of Antequera) = LEONOR
(K. of Aragon 1412-18)

MARIA = ALFONSO V
(K. of Aragon 1416-58)

LEONOR = JUARATE (K. of Portugal 1433-8)

FERRANTE
(K. of Naples 1458-94)

ALFONSO V
(K. of Portugal 1433-81)

HONOR

FREDERICK III
(H.R.C. 1452-93)

CATALINA - ENRIQUE - BEATRIZ Pimen. of *

² ISABEL = JUAN II
of Portugal (K. of Castile 1406-54)

= MARIA ¹ Aragon
d. 1445

¹ BLANCHE
(Queen of Navarre)
d. 1439

= JUAN II
(K. of Navarre 1425-79;
K. of Aragon 1458-79)

= JUANA ⁴
Enriquez

JUANA = ENRIQUE IV = BLANCHE CHARLES OF VIANA ELINOR = GASTON, de Foix
(K. of Castile 1454-74)

JUANA 'la Beltraneja'

ISABEL (Queen of Castile 1474-1504)

PORTUGAL
AFONSO IV
(1325-57)

CASTILE
ALFONSO XII
(1312-50)

ARAGON
ALFONSO IV
(1327-36)

(K. of Aragon 1474-1512) FERNANDO II
NAVARRÉ

LOUIS X (of France)

PEDRO I
(1357-87)

PEDRO I
(1350-83)

ENRIQUE II
(1369-79)

PERE IV
(1336-87)

JEANNE
(1328-19)

FERNANDO
(1367-82)
= Leonor

..DAG I
(Master of Avis)
(1383-1433)
- Ph. of Lancaster

Constanza
- John of Gaunt

JUAN I
(1353-80)
- 1. Eleanor
- 2. Beatriz
of Portugal

1. Eleanor
JOAN I
(1387-93)

MARTI I
(1355-1410)

CHARLES II
(1349-87)

Beatriz
= Juan I of Castile

Catalina
(Catherine)

ENRIQUE III
(1390-1406)

FERNANDO (of Aragon)
(of Antequera)
(1412-18)

CHARLES III
(1337-1425)

..MARTI
(1433-8)

Pedro
"the Navigator"

Henry
"the Navigator"

Juan

ALFONSO V
(1416-68)
= Maria of Castile

Maria
= JUAN II
Enriquez
(K. of Castile)

Juan 2. = JOAN II
(1455-79)

1. BLANCHE
(JUAN, c. of Navarre)
(1425-41)

AFONSO V
(1438-81)

Fernando
c. of Visco

Joane = 2. ENRIQUE (V) =
(1454-74)

Isabel
= JUAN II
of Castile
= 1. Maria of
Aragon
- 2. Isidore of
Portugal

Ferrante (Ferdinando)
K. of Naples
(1458-94)

Alfonso XII

ISABEL
(the Catholic)
(1479-1504)

HELENDAND
(the Catholic)
(1479-1516)

JOÃO II
(1481-95)

MANUEL I
(1455-1521)

Juana
(la Beltraneja)


Juana

Carlos
of Viana

Blanche
of Castile
(annulled)

Leonor
de Foix





CHAPTER ONE

The shaping of the Iberian polities in the
late fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries¹

Introduction

Over the last third of the fifteenth century and the early years of the sixteenth, the kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula experienced major internal transformations, while at the same time emerging to take on a central role on the international stage and as pioneering powers in the age of discovery. Assertive and determined rulers entered into dynastic marriages that resulted in new, composite monarchies; royal authority was consolidated, bringing domestic peace in the wake of major noble uprisings, civil wars, and wars between the kingdoms; territorial consolidation in the peninsula and overseas expansion, which extended the limits of Iberian, Christian, and European presence as far as the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent, the Caribbean, and Brazil; active engagement in regions hitherto outside the sphere of interest of Iberian diplomacy, such as the Holy Roman Empire and Flanders; socioeconomic dynamism and the more visible preoccupation with social and cultural issues related to ethnic and religious minorities, both familiar (Jews and *judeoconversos*) and new (Moriscos and enslaved blacks). Some of these developments were not unique to Iberia, and were a feature common to Renaissance monarchies, while others were owing to particular circumstances and contexts, such as the completion of the so-called Reconquest with the capture of Granada, the last remaining Islamic kingdom in the southeast of the peninsula. In sum, there is no doubting the significance of the contribution made by the Iberian world to the opening of a new phase in world history.

As elsewhere, dynastic politics was a favoured instrument of the different peninsular kingdoms: Portugal, Castile, the Crown of Aragon (including Aragon proper, Catalonia, Valencia, Mallorca, Sardinia, Sicily, and, for a time, Naples) and Navarre (straddling both sides of the Pyrenees). With meticulous planning of marital alliances frequently disrupted by untimely deaths of spouses and heirs, dynastic politics necessitated the making and remaking of agreements with neighbouring and distant princes, alliances that significantly altered the geopolitical map of the region.

Thus, in 1468 Joan II of Aragon (the Catalan form of his name is used in this chapter to help differentiate him from Juan of Castile and João of Portugal) proclaimed Fernando, his son and heir, king of Sicily in view of his projected marriage to Princess Isabel of Castile, due to take place the following year. With this in mind, Joan Margarit Pau, bishop of Girona, humanist, and ambassador, dedicated his *Corona regum* to the young prince, a lengthy “mirror of princes” (*speculum principis*) in which, the author noted, Fernando would find “many examples of virtue” (Margarit 2007–2008, I, 119). Nearly half a century later, in 1513, Francesco Guicciardini remarked that Fernando had succeeded in joining virtue to good fortune. He did so in a written report addressed to the Florentine authorities following his diplomatic mission to the king the previous year. In his report, Guicciardini explained that Spain was divided into three parts: Aragon, in which he included Catalonia and Valencia, and where Fernando was king; Castile, ruled by Doña Juana, daughter of Fernando and the late Isabel; and Portugal, ruled by king Dom Manuel, “a small country known for the great concourse of merchants in Lisbon, and for the trade route to Calicut and other newly discovered lands, more than anything else.” He also mentioned the kingdom of Navarre, but emphasised that Aragon and Castile were “the principal parts” (Guicciardini 2017, 123–124, 142).

On the surface, little had changed between 1468 and 1513 in the disposition of the Iberian kingdoms, save that Granada and Navarre had been incorporated into the domains of the Spanish monarchs in 1491–1492: the peninsula was divided, as it had been almost half a century earlier, between three large polities, each one ruled by its own king. Yet, notwithstanding a war between Portugal and Castile (1474–1479), and boosted by a union of the Crowns of Aragon and Castile under Fernando and Isabel between 1479 and 1504 (the year of the queen’s death), their fortunes were now much more closely intertwined—not to mention the fact that Castile had in the meantime established its own foothold in the Caribbean. And yet the dynastic and political crises that had marked the beginning of this period appeared to have resurfaced at its end: in 1474, following the death of her father Enrique IV, Isabel had herself proclaimed queen of Castile in Segovia, at the expense of her half-sister, Juana; in 1516, on Fernando’s death, Charles of Ghent proclaimed himself king of Castile and Aragon in Ghent, in rivalry with his mother, also Juana. Both Juanas were subsequently removed from public life: the first entered a Coimbra monastery, whence she emerged from time to time to make

an appearance at the court in Lisbon, while the second, afflicted by a mental disorder, was secluded in a convent in Tordesillas, and both lived out the rest of their considerable days until their deaths in 1530 and 1555 respectively.

Great intrafamilial feuds, succession crises and profound uncertainty about the future marked the beginning and the end. However, while the Castilian-Portuguese war of 1474 became at once a Castilian civil war, both coming in the wake of the Catalan civil war (1462–1472), Charles' succession in 1516 did not trigger new wars or open conflicts. The upheavals of the mid-fifteenth century certainly gave no inkling of the great achievements to come.

Image 1.1Family tree showing the Avis dynasty to the Spanish Succession

Source: Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978

Image 1.2Family tree showing the house of Castile from the reign of Henry II of Trastámara to the Habsburg Succession

Source: Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978

Images 1.3a & b Family trees showing the Aragonese Succession from Jaume II to Fernando II (a), and the Castilian Succession from Juan I to Charles I (b)

Source: J. N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250–1516*, Volume 2, 1410–1516, *Castilian Hegemony*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978

Image 1.4Family tree showing the Houses of Trastámara and Antequera

Source: Alan Ryder, *The Wreck of Catalonia. Civil War in the Fifteenth Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007

Image 1.5Genealogical table showing the rulers of the Iberian kingdoms

Source: Christopher Allmand (ed.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Vol. VII, ca. 1415–1500, 1998

Civil strife and settlement, 1385–1481

Their borders settled since the thirteenth century, relations between Aragon, Castile, and Portugal remained rather ambivalent throughout the fifteenth century. They supported one another in campaigns of the Reconquista—an endeavour that had long since become bogged down—and occasionally closed ranks in the face of foreign incursions related to the Hundred Years War. Yet they also fought amongst themselves when the occasion arose. As elsewhere, these wars did not stand in the way of the respective royal houses marrying into one another, a practice that eventually led to or foreshadowed future

unions between the Iberian kingdoms. Thus in 1109 Castile and Aragon were united for the first time through the marriage of Doña Urraca and Alfonso the Battler, though the ensuing difficulties rendered this a brief association. The first of these tendencies—the spirit of cooperation between the kingdoms—is captured in the commentary of the great Catalan chronicler Ramon Muntaner, referring to a 1284 episode involving the rulers of Aragon, Castile, Portugal, and Navarre: “If these four kings [...] of Spain, who are one flesh and blood, could stay united, they would never lack resolve, and would look down on any other power in the world” (Muntaner 1971, 757).

The primary objective of these wars was not to wrest away territory from neighbouring kingdoms, but rather to gain a measure of peninsular hegemony by configuring an advantageous union, making the most of family ties between royal houses and the support of sympathetic factions. In this manner, Fernando I of Portugal tried unsuccessfully to incorporate Castile into his realms in 1369–1373, while Juan I of Castile likewise failed to seize Portugal in 1381–1385, despite the ongoing dynastic crisis in the neighbouring kingdom. Indeed, the decisive victory over the Castilians at Aljubarrota in 1385 paved the way to the consolidation of both the kingdom of Portugal and the new Avis dynasty. Not long after, in 1410, on the death of the heirless Martin I, the last in the line of kings of the Royal House of Aragon that had ruled the Crown of Aragon since 1137, another important dynastic change took place on the other side of the peninsula. The delegates appointed by the Cortes of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia resolved through the Compromise of Caspe (1412) that of the four main candidates vying for the vacant throne, the one with the strongest claim was the Castilian *infante* Fernando. A nephew of the late king, uncle to Juan II of Castile (during whose minority he had acted as regent) and the lord of one of the largest estates in the peninsula, Fernando had acquired the nickname “of Antequera” following his taking of that city in 1410, which had given new impetus to the Reconquest. His accession to the throne as Fernando I of Aragon meant that the same Trastámara dynasty now ruled in both Castile and the Crown of Aragon, in the latter case through its junior branch.

During the fifteenth century, each one of the Christian Iberian kingdoms pursued its own course in domestic affairs, while at the same time maintaining close relations with the others through dynastic, economic, and cultural exchanges. Meanwhile, the Nasrid

kingdom of Granada remained a vassal state and tributary of Castile, as it had been since 1246 (Elliott 1963, chs 1 and 2; Disney 2009, I, ch. 7; Hillgarth 1978, II; Ladero Quesada 1999; Ruiz 2007, ch. 5).

In Portugal, the long reign of the first Avis king João I (1385–1433) was one of changeable fortunes. Able to count on English support thanks to his marriage to Philippa of Lancaster, João renewed hostilities with Castile, at least until a truce in 1402 and a peace concluded in 1411 finally put an end to these wars for another half century. On the domestic front, he gradually managed to impose royal authority over the clergy, the nobility, and the cities. In a period when throughout Western Europe relations between the crown and the social elites were fraying, the Portuguese rulers managed to secure a considerable degree of control over the clergy, thanks to the *concordata* of 1427, and over noble estates through the *Lei mental* of 1434. That said, land disputes between the crown and the nobility continued, especially in the case of the houses of Braganza and Viseu-Beja. At the same time, João took the first step in the overseas expansion of the kingdom with the 1415 conquest of Ceuta, an important junction on the trans-Saharan trade routes. Although his son and successor Duarte subsequently failed to capture Tangier in 1437, the numerous offspring of the dynasty's founder and his spouse embodied a felicitous moment in the rise of Portugal: "illustrious generation, high royal princes," as they were eulogised by Luís de Camões in *The Lusads* (IV, 50).

Although the possession of Ceuta did not bring great riches, Afonso V (ruled 1438–1481) continued the expansion in the Maghreb. Before that, however, he had to face a challenge from his uncle and regent, Dom Pedro, who at the end of the young king's minority in 1446 raised an army against him, only to lose his life on the field of battle. Some years later, following Pope Nicholas V's call for a crusade in defence of Constantinople, Afonso prepared an expeditionary force, and, when the crusade failed to materialise, directed his forces southward, this time with greater success: between 1458 and 1471 he conquered the coastal outposts of Alcácer Ceguer, Arzila, and finally Tangier itself. Meanwhile, through individual initiatives under royal patronage, Fernão Gomes and other navigators continued to make headway along the African shore, reaching the equator in 1471. With the help of scientific and technical advances sponsored by Prince Henry the Navigator, these forward movements led to the growth of the traffic in slaves from the Gulf of Benin and West and Central Africa to Lisbon and, to a lesser extent, other parts of the peninsula.

To celebrate these extraordinary feats of exploration and conquest, Afonso titled himself “king of Portugal and of the Algarves, of these shores and beyond the sea in Africa (de aquém é além mar)”, earning the byname of “the African”. Yet thereafter he shifted his focus to the peninsula, and Castile, which in the final years of the reign of Enrique IV (1454–1474) was on the threshold of civil war.

Of weak character, Enrique had given away a substantial portion of the royal domain to the Castilian magnates through the famous “mercedes enriqueñas”. As a result, the crown lost not only economic resources but also quite manifestly its political authority, a situation that was only made worse by a dynastic struggle. Enrique’s only daughter, Juana, was proclaimed heiress by the Cortes on her birth in 1462. It was suspected however that she was in fact the daughter of the royal favourite, Beltrán de la Cueva, which earned her the sobriquet of “la Beltraneja” from the noble faction opposed to Enrique. Led by the Archbishop of Toledo and the marquis of Villena, this faction forced the king to revert the succession in favour of his half-brother Alfonso. This was followed shortly after by the so-called “farce of Avila” (1465), in which an effigy of Enrique was stripped of the royal insignia and thrown to the ground. The conspirators proclaimed the 12-year-old Alfonso as king, but as he was most likely their pawn, he was unable to attract wider support. His death in 1468 paved the way for a more far-reaching solution: by the accords of Guisando (Avila) Enrique was accepted as king by his noble rivals, who in return secured the succession of his half-sister Isabel (sister of the late Alfonso), though she would forego the customary title of princess of Asturias. With Alfonso dead and Juana supplanted, the prospect arose of a marital union between the two heirs, who were also second cousins: Isabel (born in Castile in 1451 to a Castilian father and Portuguese mother) and Fernando (born in 1452 in Aragon, to Castilian parents and grandparents).

More than one possible match had been mooted for Isabel: the widowed Afonso V, an option favoured by Enrique IV; the Duke of Guyenne, Louis XI of France’s brother; Fernando himself; and the Duke of York. Through a combination of genuine feeling and calculation, Isabel resolutely opted for Fernando, a choice that the groom’s father, Joan (king of Navarre since 1425 through his first wife Blanca, and of Aragon since 1458 having succeeded his older brother Alfonso V the Magnanimous) had been working towards with the aid of the Castilian faction that favoured the Aragonese solution. The figure of Joan II of Aragon, tireless and tenacious, and ably supported

by his second wife Juana Enríquez (Fernando's mother), a member of the powerful Castilian lineage of the same name, cast a shadow over this entire period. Indeed, in terms of gravity and duration, the difficulties faced by Afonso of Portugal and the Castilian king Enrique were of small account next to those faced by Joan.

In contrast to his brother Alfonso, who had left behind his peninsular dominions in 1432 and settled in Naples after conquering that city and kingdom in 1443, Joan's focus was always on the peninsula, and above all on Navarre and Catalonia. In Navarre, he clashed with his first wife's son, Carlos de Viana, whose family ties with the House of Anjou did not escape the attention of the French ruling dynasty, and father and son were duly installed as heads of two opposing local factions, the *agramonteses* and the *beaumonteses*, respectively. As for Catalonia, the principality had been in turmoil for some time: the *remença* peasant movement roiled the countryside, while in Barcelona there were ongoing tensions between two groupings, the *biga* and the *busca*, representing the interests of the urban oligarchy and artisans respectively. The king was not above the fray and seemed inclined to resolve the *remença* issue in terms favourable to the peasants. Towards the end of 1460 the main organs of government, the Generalitat (the standing committee of the Cortes between its sittings) and the Municipal Council of Barcelona instituted the so-called "Representative Council of the Principality of Catalonia", through which the ruling classes mobilised in armed rebellion against Joan. The king was forced to accept the humiliating Capitulation of Vilafranca (1461), the terms of which, among other things, barred him from entering Catalonia without permission, and obliged him to name Carlos de Viana as lieutenant general. Viana's death a few months later (which made Fernando heir), surrounded the late prince with a saintly halo, and had the effect of galvanising Joan's opponents. But divisions soon surfaced among them, and in 1462 a civil war broke out that also encompassed a genuine peasant war in the northern part of the principality, between Barcelona and Girona. The war lasted until 1472, and saw the intervention of Louis XI of France, during whose reign, which had also begun in 1461, large new territories were incorporated into the royal domain, including Burgundy in 1477, Anjou, and Provence (Ryder 2007, part II).

The Council of Catalonia deposed Joan, and in his place offered the principality (with the corresponding title of count of Barcelona) to Enrique IV of Castile, who accepted it, swearing, through his representative, to uphold the laws of the principality in exchange for

the oath of loyalty from his new subjects at the end of 1462. It was thus in the throes of a domestic struggle that the Catalan authorities for the first time instituted a dynastic union between Catalonia and Castile, both now ruled by the same monarch. They furthermore urged Enrique to also proclaim himself king of Aragon, a step that he was not prepared to take. The union was brief however, for less than a year later Enrique renounced his sovereignty over the principality as part of a series of agreements with Louis, who, worried by the possibility of a union between Castile and Aragon, made common cause with both kings at one time or another. Meanwhile, Aragon and Valencia prudently stayed on the sidelines of the Catalan conflict. Pressed by want of money, Joan negotiated the Treaty of Bayonne with the French king, securing military aid in exchange for the exorbitant sum of 200,000 gold *escudos*. The Pyrenean counties of Rosselló and Cerdanya, strategically bordering France, were pledged as collateral, though Louis promptly violated the agreement by annexing them militarily. Thus, while the rebels handed over the Catalan principality to the Castilian king, to regain control Joan had to resign himself to significant, and potentially irretrievable, territorial losses.

Following Enrique's renunciation and the agreements between Joan II and Louis XI, the Council proclaimed the Portuguese *infante* Don Pedro as the new count of Barcelona. When the latter died in 1466, the same honour was extended to René of Anjou, the French king's brother. Neither Pedro nor René were particularly effective rulers. Joan, on the other hand, though a septuagenarian and blinded by cataracts until a successful operation in 1468, continued his military advance from Aragon into Catalan territory, gaining adherents along the way, aided by suspicions that René was merely preparing the ground for the annexation of the principality by France, as had already happened with the Pyrenean counties. Joan finally prevailed in 1472, and, in contrast to the authoritarian tendencies that marked the early years of his reign, issued a general pardon for the rebels by the generous terms of the Capitulation of Pedralbes. He also confirmed the Principality's existing laws and constitutions, voiding in the process the Capitulation of Vilafranca, and entered Barcelona in triumph. The experience of these eventful years would leave a deep impression on the young Fernando, especially that of being besieged in Girona with his mother in 1462. Thus, thanks to both his parents, Prince Fernando was already seasoned in the struggle for securing the supremacy of the crown by the time of his betrothal to Isabel of

Castile.

No sooner had the marriage agreements been signed in Cervera, in March 1469, than other problems and perils presented themselves: Isabel, confined to a castle by her half-brother, the king, had to be rescued by a group of loyalists, while Fernando, coming from Zaragoza, crossed hostile Castilian territory with a handful of trusty followers disguised as merchants. The wedding, discreet and austere, took place in a nobleman's house in Valladolid on 19 October 1469. The degree of consanguinity between the bride and groom required a papal dispensation, absent which the Archbishop of Toledo supplied a fraudulent one. The genuine document would only be issued two years later.

Enrique IV's death in 1474 cleared the way for two opposing claims to the Castilian throne: while on the one hand Isabel had herself proclaimed queen, as mentioned above, a year later, Afonso V of Portugal, a widower, married Juana (la Beltraneja), his niece, with the intention of assuming the regency of Castile until his wife's coming of age. This would have paved the way for his ambition of establishing a dynastic union between the two kingdoms under Portuguese hegemony, an objective made more attainable by his being a cousin of the king of Aragon. Newly married, and to make good Juana's claim against Isabel, Afonso invaded Castile in 1475, but was forced to withdraw following the battle of Toro in early 1476—in which the Castilian army was led by Fernando—despite its inconclusive outcome. That would be the last attempt to bring about a union of Castile and Portugal by military means, and allowed Fernando to secure the Castilian throne for his wife. It was a fleeting moment of triumph however, for a Castilian civil war flared up between the supporters of Isabel and Juana, in which Afonso of Portugal duly intervened—having been dissuaded from his intention of abdicating and retiring to the Holy Land as a hermit. Beyond the dynastic dispute, the Luso-Castilian conflict was also a by-product of the growing rivalry in maritime expansion along the African coastline, the disputed dominion over the uninhabited Azorean archipelago, and even more so the Canary Islands (not yet completely subjugated).

The turning point came in 1479. Joan II died in January, making Fernando the ruler of the dominions of the Crown of Aragon; in the same month, peace was signed with Louis XI, by then too preoccupied with Burgundy, and a long-term truce was agreed with the now distant René of Anjou; and in September, the Luso-Castilian Treaty of Alcáçovas (ratified in Toledo the following year) brought an end to

the civil war and the war of succession. By the terms of the treaty, Afonso renounced his claims on Castile and the Canary Islands, but he reserved the right to mount crusading campaigns in the Fez region; Juana, the focal point of the conflict, was its biggest loser, to the extent that the papal dispensation originally issued for her marriage to Afonso was now revoked by Sixtus IV, and she had to resign herself to entering the convent of Coimbra; Castile recognised Portugal's claim to Madeira and the Azores, was granted rights over the section of the continent facing the Canary Islands (not as an extension of the Reconquest, but in recognition of the supposed Visigothic dominion over the former Roman province of Mauretania Tingitana) and renounced further maritime advances along the African coast, to the dismay of the merchants of Lower Andalusia. Finally, various marriages between the respective princes and *infantes* were projected based on an elaborate guardianship scheme known as “*tercerías*”.

Two further events helped to clear the air. The previous year saw the birth of Juan, Fernando and Isabel's second son, who became heir to both at the expense of the first-born, Isabel; and in 1481, Afonso of Portugal died and was succeeded by his son João II, who, having previously collaborated closely with his father, was now inclined to mend relations with his Iberian relatives and neighbours. These developments would prove to be the start of a new epoch for both Iberian monarchies, whose vigorous new rulers, ranging in age from 26 to 30 years, had enough experience of government to appreciate the need for strengthening the foundations of royal authority and justice.

Royal pre-eminence and territorial expansion, 1481–1494

The first question that Fernando and Isabel had had to face was how to approach the joint government of their respective kingdoms. To begin with, the Capitulation of Cervera clearly envisaged a subordinate role in Castilian affairs for Fernando. This was also manifest in the rituals of Isabel's proclamation as queen of Castile in Segovia unaccompanied by her husband: in the procession through the streets of the city (an act partly in lieu of the coronation, which had fallen into disuse in Castile) a courtier walked ahead of the queen bearing an unsheathed upright sword (Ruiz 2012, 316–322; Pérez Samper 2004, 142–147).

The sword was a symbol of the royal power to administer justice, and hence rarely flaunted by a married queen, it being held that, while she might be a vessel for the transmission of dynastic rights, a queen could not personally administer justice, a prerogative of the male consort. The debate that arose over the issue did not mitigate the gesture however, and subsequently upon Fernando's arrival in Segovia from Zaragoza, the so-called Concord of Segovia was concluded in January 1475. Isabel was thus acknowledged as "queen and proprietor" of Castile (in other words, she held full sovereignty), no less than Fernando was to be in Aragon; and yet he was not to be merely the Castilian king consort, but an acting king, while she would only be queen consort in Aragon. According to the established protocol, Fernando's name would precede that of Isabel, followed by the cumulative enumeration of their kingdoms and domains, while the arms of Castile and León would come before those of Sicily and Aragon in all official documents and coinage; appointments to Castilian offices would be Isabel's exclusive right, while justice would be administered jointly or separately depending on the circumstances. It is possible that Isabel considered it necessary to have an acting king given the urgent need to rein in a still restive Castilian nobility. Indeed, a few months later, with war against Portugal imminent, Isabel abrogated the accords in empowering Fernando to act freely and with full authority as if she were present herself. He returned the favour in 1481, on Isabel's first visit to the Crown of Aragon, issuing a similar patent authorising her to intervene in the affairs of those territories, although she scarcely made any use of it. Thus, a junior branch of the Trastámara line, engendered by Fernando de Antequera in Aragon, assumed the Castilian throne, hitherto occupied by the main branch.

Fernando was proclaimed "king of Castile and León" in Segovia, the fifth of that name. Both monarchs duly wrote to the cities of Castile and those of the Crown of Aragon to inform them of the new state of affairs: the respective kingdoms were henceforth "united and joined under one dominion and royal crown". Not long after, in July 1475, Fernando made his first testament, in which he asked his father that the Princess Isabel, his only daughter at the time (born in 1470), should succeed him in the kingdoms of Aragon and Sicily, "because of the great profit that ensues [from the said kingdoms] being joined to those of Castile and León" (Pérez Samper 2004, 166; Hillgarth 1978, I, 485).

The union was consolidated with Fernando's accession to the

thrones of the Crown of Aragon in 1479, as the second by that name. The municipal aldermen of Valencia celebrated the consummation of the union as “Spanya juncta”, while the Barcelona notary Miquel Carbonell, scion of a family of humanists and royal secretaries, referred to Fernando as “lord, king and prince of the Spains (las Spanyas)”. The chroniclers made frequent use of this expression in a laudatory sense, as in the case of the Castilian Diego de Valera in his *Crónica abreviada de España* (1482), in which he praised the king and queen for having brought into being “well-nigh the monarchy of all the Spains”, while the Catalan Joan Margarit dedicated his voluminous *Paralipomenon Hispaniae* (not published until 1545) to the royal couple, personifications of the Roman *Hispania Citerior* and *Hispania Ulterior*, now happily reunited. While the humanists thus harked back to Rome, the proponents of neo-Gothicism evoked parallels with the unity of Visigothic kingdom. Thus, if at the beginning of her reign chroniclers had lavished praise on Isabel for having restored justice following the disorders of Enrique’s reign, duly exaggerating the latter’s failings, thenceforth the royal couple were hailed as the restorers of ancient unity (Pérez Samper 2004, 236, 247–250; Tate 1955, 84–85, 1970, 148–150; Fernández Albaladejo 2007, 291–298; Kagan 2009, 43–47; Álvarez Junco y De la Fuente 2013, 65–72, 79).

The term “Spain” or “the Spains”, the vernacular form of the Latin *Hispania*, which had long since had geographic, historical, and cultural connotations, now acquired a distinctly political sense. To be sure, Portugal was not included. This deficiency was seemingly acknowledged when the Royal Council came to consider the proper title to be assumed by the monarchs. Hernando del Pulgar, royal secretary, and from 1482 the queen’s official chronicler, explained it thus in the *Crónica* that he began writing at that time on the subject of their joint reign, in a passage dealing with the immediate aftermath of Fernando’s accession in 1479:

The matter of their titles was also discussed in the King and the Queen’s Council: some members of the council were of the opinion that they should style themselves Kings of Spain, for having [he] acceded to the kingdoms and lordships of Aragon, they were lords of the greatest part of it. But in the end it was determined not to proceed thus, and in all their letters they titled themselves as follows: “Don Fernando and Doña Isabel by the grace of God, king and queen of Castile, of León, of Aragon,

of Sicily, of Toledo, of Valencia, of Galicia, of the Mallorcas, of Seville, of Sardinia, of Cordoba, of Corsica, of Murcia, of Jaén, of the Algarves, of Algeciras, of Gibraltar, count and countess of Barcelona, lords of Biscay and Molina, duke and duchess of Athens and of Neopatras, count and countess of Rosselló and of Cerdanya, marquis and marchioness of Oristano and Gociano, etc.”

(Pulgar 1780, 150–151)

This list enumerated the kingdoms and dominions without differentiating between those brought by one spouse or the other. The order was determined by rank or relative antiquity, and as it would be thenceforth preserved with only slight modifications, it constituted yet another indication that the disparate realms and domains formed a whole under the aegis of common monarchs. Yet there was an essential difference between the two aggregations. The kingdoms of the Crown of Castile shared certain juridical features: the same laws (notwithstanding various local privileges or *fueros*, such as those of Sepúlveda or Cuenca), the citizenship (*naturaleza*) of all their inhabitants, thanks to which all could aspire to offices in any one kingdom, and, finally, the fact that all the kingdoms or their representatives came together in a common parliament, or Cortes of Castile. The individual kingdoms existed as such only nominally. On the other hand, the dominions of the Crown of Aragon, both Iberian and Italic, had their own laws (as well as strictly local *fueros*, such as those of Teruel and Albarracín in Aragon), their particular *naturalezas*, and their respective institutions and parliaments.

In any case, the list did not include Portugal. Yet the marriage alliances foreseen in the Treaty of Alcáçovas-Toledo were designed to extend the dynastic union to the entirety of the Iberian peninsula in the following generation. Two of Fernando and Isabel’s daughters (Isabel and María) were matched with Portuguese spouses: Isabel, the first-born, married Prince Afonso (1491), and following his death, Manuel I (1495), who had spent two years of his youth at the Spanish court, in fulfilment of the terms of the above mentioned “*tercerías*”; he in turn married María, the last but one of the children, following her older sister’s death (1500). Still, the sought-after union would not materialise until 1580, when Philip II, the son of Charles V and Isabel of Portugal, also became king of Portugal. Even then, the long list of titles remained in use, with Portugal added to it. At the same time, the expressions *Hispaniarum rex* or *Hispaniarum et Indiarum rex* swiftly

made their way onto coins, seals, and other official documents.

Fernando and Isabel's monarchy was a composite one, the product of the aggregation of territories, which was nothing uncommon at the time. The late medieval Crown of Aragon itself was already such a polity, and the new monarchy resulting from their marriage was likewise assembled through accumulation: Castile and the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon were joined together through a union *aeque principaliter*, which meant that each one of the kingdoms preserved its own laws and institutions. Inheritances and conquests, or rather, the dynastic rights that were continuously invoked and frequently defended by military or other means were both the foundation and the organisational model of the monarchy (Elliott 2009; Cardim 2014, 29–47; Gil 2016, ch. 2).

Juridically equal under joint monarchs, Castile and the Crown of Aragon nevertheless differed noticeably in more than one sense. To begin with, there were demographic disparities: Castile's population of more than five million dwarfed those of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, which together added up to a million inhabitants (roughly also the size of Portugal's population). The economic divergence was just as striking, between the dynamism of Castilian cities and Catalan prostration, mostly caused by the protracted civil war. Finally, there were differences in political character. To be sure, all the Iberian kingdoms, Portugal included, had a common political culture firmly rooted in Roman law, with shared principles of authority, obedience, order, and the common good, as well as juridical instruments through which these were articulated; the only exception was Aragon, where Germanic law retained a vitality that was unusual in southern Europe. Even so, the difference between Castile and the Crown of Aragon was appreciable above all in the sphere of relations between the crown and the representative assemblies: royal prerogative was wider in Castile in relation to legislative and fiscal matters, while on the other hand the Cortes of the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon (especially those of Aragon and of Catalonia) had a significantly greater capacity to influence royal policy. The contractualist or “pactist” conception of power in the Crown of Aragon was a distinguishing feature and was pointed out as such by many local jurists and various foreign diplomats and observers (see [Chapter 2](#) of this volume).

Differences notwithstanding, both styles of government had experienced their travails during the preceding reigns, and it remained to be seen how they would evolve during the new era that beckoned. In Castile, it was quickly evident that the powerful municipal

corporations, eager to restrain the nobility and secure domestic peace that would promote economic development, supported the monarchs, so that the Cortes became an essential tool of government, especially in the opening years of their reign. The Cortes of Castile assembled successively in Madrigal (1476) and Toledo (1480) formulated a wide-ranging legislative programme: putting the depleted royal treasury back on a sound footing, the recovery of alienated royal incomes, the formation of a rural police to bring order to the countryside (the Santa Hermandad), and the reorganisation of the Royal Council, being among the most important measures. Between 1476 and 1494 Fernando also took advantage of favourable circumstances to assume the Grand Masterships of the wealthy military orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara, and tried and failed to do the same with the order of Montesa in the Crown of Aragon, an aim realised by Philip II a century later.

In Portugal, João II proceeded with the same basic objectives in mind. His complaint on assuming the throne, that his father's prodigality had left him in possession of nothing but the kingdom's highways, was undoubtedly an exaggeration in comparison with the depredations wrought upon Castile by Enrique's notorious handouts, but it was meant to signal a new era. Moreover, the king obliged all the nobles, the governing elites of the kingdom and the cities to swear an oath of obedience to him, which was done with all due pomp and ceremony at the first Cortes of his reign in Évora, in 1481. The very same parliament promulgated a series of anti-seigniorial laws, and shortly after, in 1484, the king acted resolutely to bring an end to the enduring resistance of the Houses of Braganza and Beja-Viseu, the respective heads of which had conspired against him: the first was executed, the latter assassinated by the king himself. The crown already boasted the mastership of the military order of Christ although it would have to wait until 1550 to secure those of Avis and Santiago (Cunha 1990).

Fernando and Isabel dealt harshly with those nobles who had opposed them in the War of Castilian Succession, ordering their castles and strongholds demolished, especially in Galicia. But they balanced this with a policy of favours and pardons, and facilitated the establishment of what would become the great noble houses of early modern Spain, the duchies of Alba, Infantado, and Medinaceli. They also endeavoured to be physically present in many of their territories as the best means of entrenching royal authority. Their long stay in Andalusia in 1477–1478 was only a foreshadowing of what would

become a characteristic feature of their reign, the constant movement across the length and breadth of their domains, above all Castile. Their court was never sedentary, unlike the Portuguese, which, although the itinerant habit could not be shed forthwith, was most frequently based in Lisbon.

In Catalonia, the most pressing problem was the question of the *remença*. A second peasant war broke out in 1484, once again in the region between Barcelona and Girona, which gave rise to two factions: a moderate one led by Francesc Verntallat, and a radical one led by Pere Joan Sala, which called for the abolition of all feudal dues. Fernando continued his father's policy, and with the backing of the former group issued the Sentence of Guadalupe (1486), which abolished the so-called "bad practices" (*mals usos*, abusive feudal labour obligations or *corvées*), allowed peasants to cultivate seigniorial land in exchange for long-term leases, and earmarked compensation for wartime losses. Conversely, in Aragon, where the peasant uprising was considerably weaker, Fernando confirmed the so-called absolute power of the lords over their vassals through the Sentence of Celada of 1497. Meanwhile, in Catalonia, the restraint observed in the *remença* issue also characterised institutional reform. The landmark Cortes of Barcelona of 1480 confirmed the constitutional character of the principality's juridical order and reinforced it with the law of the *Observança*. Moreover, Fernando established a system of sortition, or appointment by ballot for municipal officials in the City Council of Barcelona as well as the Generalitat.

Restoring the old institutions to good order and doing so while re-establishing the principle of royal pre-eminence is the best way to sum up the shared aims and comparable achievements of João, Isabel and Fernando. Resolve, political skill, and necessity all came together in this approach. Thus, the administration of justice was strengthened with the expansion of the system of law courts, staffed by educated jurists and *letrados*: the *Desembargo do Paço*, the *Chancillería* of Toledo (transferred to Granada in 1505) and the *audiencias*. Law codes were compiled with the same end in mind: the Castilian *Ordenamiento* put together by the jurist Alonso Díaz de Montalvo (1484) and the Manueline *Ordenações* (1512–1514), which replaced Afonso's *Ordenações* of 1446, being the most signal examples. A new special tribunal of the Holy Office was established in Castile and Aragon in 1478, though not until 1536 in Portugal. Finally, the Council of Aragon was created in 1494. With its seat at the court, it was the

supreme judicial and administrative body of the territories of the Crown of Aragon, and, enjoying the same status as that of Castile, it underlined the composite character of the Spanish monarchy. Both Councils were the kernel of what has been termed the polysynodial or conciliar system of government, which was completed with the extension of the office of the viceroy (an office with origins in Aragon-Catalonia) to the non-Castilian Spanish domains, and would also later be used by the Portuguese in India.

Image 1.6 Pillar called “Saint Augustin”, erected by the Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão in southern Angola, 1486

Source: Lisbon. Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga (MNAA)/Getty Images

For all of their complexity, political and administrative reforms did not prevent the territorial consolidation from following its course. Portugal’s extraordinary maritime expansion continued apace: in 1481, Diogo Cão placed the first *padrão*—the stone pillar with the arms of Portugal as a sign of taking possession of new dominions—in the region of the Congo River; in 1482, the fort of São Jorge da Mina was built in the Gulf of Guinea (thanks to which João could add “lord of Guinea” to his list of titles); in 1488 Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope; in 1498 Vasco da Gama reached Calicut; and in 1500 Álvares Cabral landed on the shores of Brazil. The spirit of conquest and the desire for territorial dominion were by no means absent from Portuguese thinking, and so it is significant in that respect that the acquisition of inhabited islands or lands was not officially designated as a campaign of “conquest”. To be sure, most these settlements were military or trading outposts, at least in part a consequence of the metropole’s scarce human resources. There was also an active Christianising mission, as well as diplomatic outreach: João II struck an agreement with the king of Congo, Nzinga a Nkuwu, who received military and technical aid, converted to Christianity in 1491 (taking the name of João I), and sent the sons of the local nobility to study in Lisbon. On the other side of the scale, the traffic in slaves increased exponentially, from the mainland as well as the island of São Tome (Cardim 2014, 34–37; Disney 2009, II, 66, 77–79, 110–114).

Spanish priorities lay much closer to home: the recovery of the counties of Rosselló and Cerdanya, the loss of which had so mortified old Joan II, and the conquest of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada, which would represent the consummation of the Reconquest. Fernando’s inclination was to turn his attention first to the northern

counties, and with that in mind he requested financial aid from the Cortes of Aragon convoked in 1484. However, on Isabel's insistence the royal couple finally resolved to direct their efforts towards Granada, as a joint Castilian-Aragonese enterprise. At the start of the century, it was the Portuguese who had their eyes on this prize, but it was the Castilian King Enrique IV who made the first foray in 1455–1458. Now, after the Muslims broke a truce in 1478, Granada, with its 350,000 inhabitants and rough, mountainous terrain, became the overriding objective, even more so once the Pope declared it a crusade. The war was long and costly: it lasted from 1482 to 1492, required the mobilisation of large military formations, and consisted mainly of a series of attritional sieges of towns and cities, in which artillery played an important role (as it had done in the Portuguese conquests in the Maghreb). It was helped along however by internal dissension within the ruling Nasrid family, between the emir Abul-Hassan, his brother and successor, Muhammad “el Zagal”, and the former's son, Abu Abd Allah (Boabdil). The Spanish monarchs finally entered the city of Granada on 2 January 1492. This event had a resonance far beyond the limits of Iberia, celebrated throughout Christendom, where it was perceived as compensation for the loss of Constantinople in 1453.

The nominally Christian kingdom of Granada was incorporated into the Crown of Castile and was given Castilian laws. In addition, Fernando and Isabel extracted from the Pope the right to nominate candidates for bishoprics in the newly conquered territory, a right they also secured for the Canaries and the New World, a cornerstone of the Spanish monarchs' regalist policy. However, the assimilation and conversion of the new Granadine subjects would be a far from straightforward process (Ladero Quesada 1989; Coleman 2003).

In the military encampment of Santa Fe, before the walls of Granada, the royal couple signed agreements regarding two Atlantic ventures: with Alonso Fernández de Lugo for prosecuting the conquest of the Canary Islands, and with Christopher Columbus, a navigator and adventurer of Italian origin who had come from Portugal, to follow through with his stubbornly pursued project of reaching Asia by sailing west. The couple proceeded thence on a triumphal passage across their domains as far as Barcelona. The time had come to turn their attention to Rosselló and Cerdanya, while also overseeing the government of Catalonia itself. However, their stay in the capital of the principality was marred by an attempt on Fernando's life in December 1492, which left him gravely wounded. The would-be

assassin was Joan de Canyamés, a peasant described as mentally unstable in the official sources, although it was believed in some quarters that he was linked to the *remença* movement, its flame apparently still flickering. Fernando survived, and promptly took advantage of a favourable international climate to recover the Pyrenean counties. The king of France, Charles VIII, wished to conclude treaties with the Holy Roman Emperor, England, and Spain in order to concentrate on his planned Italian campaign. That led to the Treaty of Barcelona of January 1493, which allowed Fernando to recover both counties without having to pay the sum agreed three decades prior, albeit at the cost of forsaking his Trastámara relative, Ferrante, Alfonso V's successor as king of Naples, who stood in the way of French ambitions in Italy. Meanwhile, news reached Barcelona in March that Columbus had achieved what he set out to do, or at least that is what the navigator himself claimed during his audience with the kings in that city.

Thus, scarcely had two long-sought objectives been attained—Granada and the Pyrenean counties—when new horizons, not only more distant but previously unimagined, hove into view. In 1493, as the preparations for Columbus' second voyage were being made, Pope Alexander VI, of Valencian extraction and sympathetic to Spanish interests, issued the bull *Inter Caetera*, supplemented by a further three in the months that followed. These papal bulls, following earlier precedents (those of Ireland, or Portuguese expansion along the African coast), entrusted the Spanish rulers with the evangelisation of the peoples of the newly discovered lands and those yet to be discovered, and by the authority vested in the pope as *dominus mundi*, granted them temporal dominion to facilitate that task. Furthermore, a line was fixed 100 leagues west of the Cape Verde islands, demarcating the Spanish and Portuguese zones of expansion, the Canaries being excepted. Building on this provision, a year later the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs signed the Treaty of Tordesillas that formalised the division of the overseas regions, moving the line of separation to 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde islands. For the moment, the astonishment produced by the news from the Caribbean paled before the far more lucrative trade in spices that the Portuguese had opened up with the Indian Ocean.

The Treaty of Tordesillas contained further provisions dividing up the region of the Maghreb, continuing in the vein of the delimitations of the peninsula itself into reconquest zones belonging to Portugal, Castile, and Aragon respectively, in the thirteenth and early

fourteenth centuries (Almizra, Monteagudo, Torrellas). The treaty essentially apportioned to Portugal the region of the kingdom of Fez, and to Spain that of the kingdom of Tlemcen, to the east. Portugal already had possessions in its allotted area, but Spain did not, since previous Catalan and Mallorcan incursions had not been followed up or consolidated. This mutually agreed demarcation had momentous consequences for both monarchies, and for the Spanish in particular it opened up a new frontier for expansion in a strategically important region. The first to be occupied was the abandoned settlement of Melilla (1497), followed by Mezalquivir, Orán, Algeirs, Tripoli, and other towns and islets in the period from 1505–1510 (Hess 1978, 31–44; Vincent 2013, 247–250, 255). At the same time, the conquest of the island of Tenerife by Fernández de Lugo in 1496 brought the entire archipelago under Spanish control, in this early flush designated as kingdom of the Canaries (Fernández-Armesto 1982).

Meanwhile, an accommodation was reached over Navarre, another regional and international flashpoint. After various vicissitudes following Joan II's death, the succession devolved to Catherine de Foix and Juan III de Albret (1494), who, by virtue of their possessions in the south of France, were subjects of the French king, and thus outside the Spanish orbit. Plans to form marriage alliances with Fernando and Isabel having been abandoned, the latter recognised Catherine and Juan as monarchs, which paved the way for their coronation in Pamplona in 1494. The kingdom thenceforth existed as a *de facto* Spanish protectorate as a means of ensuring its neutrality.

Dynastic crises avoided, new dominions secured, 1494–1516

The invasion of Italy by Charles VIII in 1494, to vindicate rights claimed by the Anjou over Milan and Naples, marked the start of a new era in European politics. In this new phase, Fernando II of Aragon would elevate himself into one of the principal actors on the international stage. If the short-lived Ottoman seizure of Otranto in 1480 had fleetingly drawn his attention towards Naples in support of Ferrante, now, in very different circumstances, he intervened directly in Italian affairs, thus reviving the old medieval Catalan-Aragonese tradition. To this end, and already assured of Rosselló and Cerdanya, he returned to the traditional anti-French policy of the Crown of Aragon, in contrast to the far greater understanding commonly found

between the French and the Castilians. Fernando proceeded thus on two separate fronts. On the one hand, he championed the Holy League formed in 1495 by the Holy See, the empire, Venice, and other states to counter the French invasion, which achieved its objective. On the other hand, his marriage strategy was designed to serve the same purpose. Thus in 1489 an agreement was reached for his younger daughter, Catalina, to marry the English Prince Arthur, and in 1495 a double marriage took place establishing a bond with the Holy Roman Empire: Prince Juan, the heir to the throne, married the Archduchess Margaret of Austria, while the *infanta* Juana wed Archduke Philip the Handsome, heir to the Houses of Burgundy and Austria. These were the foundations of a coherent foreign policy, based on the strengthening of diplomatic relations with England, Burgundy, and the empire with the aim of containing France—an approach that would prove enduring. The designs of both in-laws, Maximilian and Fernando, yielded fruit much earlier and had a more lasting effect on the future of Spain than any of the various marriage alliances formed with the Portuguese royal house.

It was then, towards the end of 1496, that Pope Alexander VI conceded to Fernando and Isabel the title of Catholic monarchs, which they would henceforward make their own. The title crowned a long series of signal achievements, summarised in the bull *Si convenit* as justification for the papal concession: pacification of their kingdoms, the conquest of Granada, the expulsion of the Jews, the conversion of the New World natives, and help rendered to the Holy See in the Italian Wars. The prestige conferred by the title only encouraged those who saw Fernando as the saviour of Christianity, the conqueror of Jerusalem, and even in messianic terms, as the emperor of the last days.

Image 1.7 Façade of the royal chapel in Granada, Spain, with the coat of arms of Ferdinand and Isabella. Includes Navarre

Source: Photo by Dorota Strzelecka (Own work)/Wikimedia Commons [CC BY-SA 4.0]

This heady climate was overshadowed by two Iberian royal deaths. In 1495, João II died and was succeeded by Manuel I (ruled 1495–1521), whose path to the throne was cleared by the deaths in turn of João's only son, Afonso, and of Manuel's five brothers, in addition to overcoming João's clear preference for his bastard son, Jorge. This remarkable series of events lent him an aura of divine protection, of being a new King David or "the Fortunate", as he was named by the chronicler Damião de Góis sometime later. Manuel, ably supported by

nobles and merchants, lived up to this image by promoting new conquests—especially that of Goa in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, which enabled him to consolidate the recently founded viceroyalty, now raised to the rank of the Estado da India. These triumphs fostered an imperial and universalist mind-set at the Manueline court and enhanced the king's reputation to such an extent that he, too, was expected to lead a final crusade to recover Jerusalem and deal a death blow to Islam (Cardim 2014, 36, 39, 50–53).

The situation faced by the Catholic monarchs was quite different, as years punctuated by family misfortunes led to various dynastic complications. In 1497 Prince Juan, their only son and heir, died at the age of 19, only six months following his marriage to Margaret of Austria. The first-born, Isabel, recently married for the second time to her cousin Manuel, once again became the heir presumptive. However, she died the following year (1498), immediately after giving birth to her only son, Miguel, in Zaragoza. Miguel was sworn heir by the Cortes of Aragon, Castile, and Portugal and was destined to complete the work of his maternal grandparents by uniting the Iberian peninsula under a single monarch. Yet, he in turn died before his second birthday, in July 1500, in Granada. The new heir was now Juana, married to Philip of Austria (the Handsome), lord of the Low Countries, both residing in Flanders. They already had a daughter, Leonor, when a son was born to them in March of that year, Prince Charles of Ghent, who, after yet more twists and turns of fortune, assumed the legacy of Fernando and Isabel. Finally, in 1502, Catalina, the younger daughter, was widowed following the death of Arthur, Prince of Wales, whom she had married a year prior. These personal calamities prompted Guicciardini to remark—in the abovementioned report of 1513—that if Fernando had indeed possessed both skill and good fortune, the latter abandoned him with regard to his progeny (Guicciardini 2017, 142).

These familial troubles served to highlight once more the personal and dynastic character of the union of crowns. In the first place, when the oath was administered to Prince Miguel as heir to the Portuguese throne in 1499, the kingdom's Cortes approved certain dispositions, known as the “Lisbon articles” or “King Manuel's clauses”, which guaranteed that Portuguese constitutional norms would continue to be observed once the kingdom was dynastically conjoined with Castile and the Crown of Aragon in the person of Miguel. As it would be a union *aeque principaliter*, Portugal would conserve its own institutions under a single monarch (Bouza 2000, 45–51; Cardim 2014, 26–27).

Miguel's death two years later rendered it a moot point however. This in turn meant that the succession of Castile and Aragon would take a different course, a situation that—and this is the second point—unleashed acute intrafamilial tensions that, in combination with developments abroad, placed at risk all that had been achieved hitherto, both in terms of internal pacification as well as territorial expansion.

As the heiress apparent, Juana travelled to the Iberian peninsula in 1502 in the company of her husband Philip, without their children. Her mental disorder manifested itself with increasing frequency. She was sworn heiress by the Cortes of Castile and those of Aragon, and, being pregnant, stayed behind while her husband, who maintained a pro-French stance, on his journey back reached an agreement under which Louis XII would have received the kingdom of Naples. This agreement put him squarely at odds with his father-in-law. Previously, in 1499, following a second French campaign against Naples—this time successful—Louis and Fernando had concluded the Treaty of Granada (1500), dividing the kingdom between them, the former assuming the royal title, the latter as Duke of Calabria. The terms were confusing, and the two found themselves at war. It was in this context that Philip came to an agreement with Louis XII. Juana meanwhile rejoined her husband after giving birth to Fernando, who was left in the care of his maternal grandparents. The matter of Naples was resolved in Fernando's favour, for in 1504 he defeated and expelled his enemy, thanks mainly to Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the Great Captain, who not only brought to bear his experience of the war of Granada, but also introduced crucial tactical innovations that rapidly became a standard feature of European military practice. Fernando had gained a new kingdom, albeit one that had previously belonged to the Crown of Aragon, and that, despite having been obtained in both cases by force of arms, preserved its own laws and institutions (Hernando 2012). However, on 26 November of that year (1504), Queen Isabel died. Fernando thus found himself alone, facing a grave family conflict, which was by extension a serious political crisis.

The queen's testament, composed a few weeks prior to her death, had been designed precisely to pre-empt such complications: it recognised Juana as the universal heiress, and stipulated that in her absence, or if she were deemed unfit to rule, Fernando would act as “governor and administrator” of her Castilian kingdom until Prince Charles turned 20—thus keeping the son-in-law Philip at arm's length.

The same concerns shaped Fernando's domestic and foreign policy. He convoked the Castilian Cortes at Toro, which swore Juana as heiress in early 1505, and moreover promulgated an important body of laws, including the establishment of entailed estates, or *mayorazgos*, in the succession of noble houses, not unlike the Portuguese *Lei mental*. In foreign policy Fernando sought to sideline Philip while at the same time strengthening his hold over Naples through the Treaty of Blois with Louis XII, signed in October that year, by which he committed himself to marrying 18-year-old Germaine de Foix, the French king's niece. The wedding duly took place in March 1506, in Valladolid.

Around the same time, Juana and Philip arrived in A Coruña to take possession of the kingdom, although an agreement had been struck that Fernando would continue to have a hand in its government. Before leaving Brussels, however, Philip had received pledges of allegiance from a number of Castilian nobles hostile to Fernando, and secured further support on the way to Castile. Following a rancorous meeting between the father- and son-in-law in Villafáfila, near Zamora, which raised the prospect of a renewed dynastic civil war in Castile, Fernando retreated to his patrimonial domains in the Crown of Aragon and visited Naples, where he was proclaimed king by its parliament. Juana and Philip for their part were proclaimed rulers of Castile, the former as queen regnant and the latter only as king consort. However, Philip died unexpectedly shortly after, in September 1506. His death led to a rapid deterioration in Juana's mental state, and descent into dementia, and so Fernando was asked to return to Castile to govern in accordance with Isabel's testament. He did not do so immediately, staying in Naples until the following year was well advanced, during which time the Archbishop of Toledo, Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, a close ally of the Catholic monarchs, governed in his stead. In due course, through a typical mixture of severity and clemency, Fernando calmed tensions in Castile, while his daughter Juana was shut away in a convent in Tordesillas. She was never formally declared unfit and retained her royal title until her death in 1555.

In 1509, a son born to Fernando and Germaine, Juan, survived for only a few hours. It has been noted that if the boy had lived, it would have meant the separation of the Crowns of Aragon and Castile. However, Fernando's intentions are unknown, and so, given that Juan had been born in Valladolid, it is not hard to imagine another possibility: that he was seen as a safeguard of the union of Castile and Aragon, Fernando's enduring ambition—to the detriment of the

Flemish succession by the children of Juana and Philip.

Be that as it may, Fernando then saw an opening in Navarre, or rather, created one. A schismatic council at Pisa (1511), condemned by the Pope, was supported by Louis XII, who also aligned himself with Juan de Albret and Catherine. These developments, along with the prospect of another military alliance in Italy, allowed Fernando to justify occupying the kingdom, conquered in 1512. Fernando was once more the king of Navarre, as his father had been. Three years later the kingdom was incorporated into Castile, albeit preserving its laws and institution—another case of union *aeque principaliter* despite being the fruit of military conquest (Floristán 2012). While Fernando was engaged in what would turn out to be his last great territorial annexation, Niccolò Machiavelli was in the process of writing *The Prince*, [chapter 21](#) of which lauded the Aragonese king’s “great campaigns”, and gave the often-cited verdict of his reign:

This man can be called almost a new prince, since from being a weak king has become by fame and by glory the first king of the Christians; and if you will consider his actions, you will find them all very great and some you will find extraordinary.

(Machiavelli 2005, 108–109)

Yet this “new prince” and his wife Germaine’s fervent desire for an heir would remain unfulfilled. Although at one time he had given thought to designating as governor in her stead Juana’s second son, also named Fernando, born and raised in Castile, in the final version of his will, made just the day before his death on 23 January 1516, he settled on the first-born, Charles of Ghent, who had been nurtured under Maximilian’s wing. The desire to forestall new factional struggles prevailed once again, and this was the outcome obtained by a king who had spent only four of the 37 long years of his reign in his patrimonial Aragonese domains. The testamentary arrangements of both Fernando and Isabel thus meant that the accumulated legacy of the Catholic monarchs was passed on to Charles of Ghent. To be sure, his delayed arrival in the Iberian peninsula, postponed until September of the following year, caused some strain and uncertainty. Yet, in contrast to his father Philip the Handsome a decade before, Charles was the indisputable and sole beneficiary of the whole inheritance.

Other milestones abounded at this time: in 1514, the fifth and last volume of the Manueline *Ordenações* was published, in 1515 Afonso

de Albuquerque seized Hormuz for Portugal, and in 1516 Juan Díaz de Solís ventured up the River Plate; meanwhile the period of Spanish advances in the eastern Maghreb was, by contrast, drawing to a close. Dynastic politics, the fashioning of the early modern state apparatus, and continued overseas expansion went hand in hand, and continued their onward march.

In the space of scarcely more than a single generation much had changed in the Iberian world. While in its outward aspect this world was now also Flemish, Asian, and Atlantic, inwardly it had undergone significant changes in the practices of government. A Portugal fully engrossed in its overseas ventures and a dynastically united Spain served as good examples of the combination of continuity and change that characterised the Renaissance monarchies: in their interaction with more dynamic societies, these new monarchies were simply the old monarchies imbued with a stronger principle of authority and a more clearly defined sense of purpose. Dynasticism, legitimacy, and the settlement of new territories were foundations that would only become more robust with time (Elliott 1963, 74; Allmand 1998, 835–838). Yet new tensions would soon emerge: early in his reign, Charles would face two serious revolts, the Comunidades of Castile (the Comuneros Revolt) and the Germanías in Valencia. Meanwhile, just as Hernán Cortés was securing new dominions for him on the American mainland, Francis I of France was on the way to becoming his main rival in Europe. In this context of rising stakes and tensions, in 1526 Charles married Isabel of Portugal, another step towards the much-desired peninsular dynastic union. The Iberian world, and the world at large, were on the threshold of a new epoch.

Note

¹Translated by Igor Knezevic.

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IESVS MARIA IOSEPH.

IVSTIFICACIO EN CONCIENCIA DE AVER PRES LO PRINCIPAT

DE CATALVNYA LAS ARMAS,

pera resistir als soldats, que de present la inuadeixen,
y als altres que amenaſan inuadira.

Ayn,

1640.



Per manament dels molt Illustres Senyors Deputats, y Oydors
de Comtes del General de Cathalunya: Estampat en Barcelona;
Per Gabriel Noguès, Estamper de la Generalitat
de Cathalunya, en lo Carrer e Sant
Domingo.



The political constitution of the Iberian monarchies¹



Pedro Cardim, Antonio Feros, and Gaetano Sabatini

Introduction

The creation of what are known as the Iberian (Spanish and Portuguese) monarchies was the more or less unforeseeable outcome of a series of political and dynastic processes. Despite their many individual peculiarities, the two monarchies had a parallel history, developing similar political and legal cultures, and, for 60 years between 1580 and 1640, they were united under the authority of the same Spanish Habsburg monarch. This chapter presents a summary of this parallel history and the gradual and interactive development of these traditions and forms of government. Although the period of the Union of the Crowns is dealt with in other chapters of this volume ([Chapters 6](#) and [14](#)), some attention here will be given to Habsburg Portugal. This chapter covers the period from the reign of Charles I of Spain and João III of Portugal (early sixteenth century) until 1700, the year which, in the Spanish case, marked the end of the Habsburg dynasty and its replacement by the Bourbons. This was a period marked by continuity, but also by debates about new forms of government of political entities characterised by their vast size and their unprecedented heterogeneity, and on the virtues of the Union of the Crowns.

As a result, this period was also characterised by enormous crises, caused by the introduction of new institutions or powers into the existing political system, but, above all, by the fraught relations between some of the territories (Aragon, Catalonia, Portugal, Flanders, and several territories in the Italian peninsula) and an increasingly assertive monarchy, progressively associated with the kingdom of Castile. The political history of the Iberian peninsula in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could thus be seen as a multinational history, in which Portugal, among others, played a full and active part. The central theme of this chapter is the continuously shifting

balance between the regions and the centre, and the relations between the various kingdoms and the monarchy. It does not seem premature to begin this chapter by recalling that both the Spanish and the Portuguese monarchies, and the former in particular, were “composite monarchies”, with their respective monarchs claiming sovereignty and jurisdiction over a diverse multitude of territories in Europe, Africa, Asia, and America. Although this chapter analyses the political processes that affected the European territories of these monarchies, the multiregional or composite nature of these monarchies was a central element in the forms of government and contemporary political discourses.

The creation of the Iberian monarchies

The creation of the two Iberian monarchies was, in the first place, the result of matrimonial alliances, and secondly of conquests of peninsular territories. The true beginning of what would later come to be called the Spanish monarchy (or the “monarchy of Spain”) was the matrimonial alliance between Isabel, queen of Castile from 1474 onwards, and Ferdinand, king of Aragon from 1479. Before their marriage in 1469, the Iberian peninsula was divided into various kingdoms or crowns that were independent from one another: the Crown of Castile, with territories in the north, northeast, centre, south and east of the Iberian peninsula—the old kingdoms of Galicia, Leon, Asturias, Old and New Castile, Extremadura, Murcia, the so-called Basque provinces, and all of Andalusia, with the exception of Granada, the last Muslim kingdom in the peninsula. In both territorial and demographic terms, the Crown of Castile was undoubtedly the hegemonic power.

The kingdom of Portugal, which occupied most of the western Atlantic seaboard, was a fully constituted kingdom (within more or less its present-day borders) from the mid-thirteenth century onwards, remaining independent until 1580, and again after 1640. Since opportunities for further territorial expansion in the peninsula were increasingly limited, in the fifteenth century the Portuguese turned their attention to the conquest of lands in North Africa and the Atlantic. However, the Portuguese kings always remained alert to the possibilities of forming dynastic alliances with Castile or Aragon as a way of acquiring greater political influence in the peninsular context. The Portuguese overseas expansion was therefore not incompatible

with closer Portuguese involvement in the Iberian political scene—on the contrary.

The other main political formation in the peninsula was the Crown of Aragon, comprised of kingdoms and territories in the eastern part of the Iberian peninsula and beyond the Pyrenees. These included Aragon itself, which had been a kingdom since the early twelfth century; Valencia, constituted as a kingdom in the mid-thirteenth century; the Principality of Catalonia, founded as such in the twelfth century; and the Balearic Islands, established as a kingdom in the fourteenth century. The territories of the Crown of Aragon had a long history of expansion in the Mediterranean, which accounts for the Catalan, and later Spanish, presence in Sicily, Naples, and Sardinia, from the fourteenth century onwards. Finally, straddling the northeastern fringes of the peninsula and present-day southwestern France was the kingdom of Navarre, the first Christian realm established following the Arab conquest, in the tenth century, and governed since the fourteenth century by a French dynasty, the House of Béarn.

The use of the word “Crown”, in the context of both Aragon and Castile, conveyed a certain idea of superiority in relation to the other Iberian territories, which continued to be classified as “kingdoms”, as in the case of Portugal, Navarre, and Granada. Significantly, the expression “Crown of Portugal” never came to be used in official documents. In any case, following the conquest of the Algarve in 1249 the Portuguese sovereigns began to title themselves as the “kings of Portugal and the Algarves”, a change that was undoubtedly a symbolic expression of the desire to emulate or match their Spanish counterparts.

The marriage between Isabel and Ferdinand dramatically changed the political situation of the Iberian peninsula. It brought about the union of the two crowns of Aragon and Castile, and although this initial union was only limited—in other words, the kingdoms that composed each of the crowns remained autonomous from one another—it paved the way for other subsequent unions in the sixteenth century. In 1492, the armies of Isabella and Ferdinand conquered Granada, the last remaining Islamic kingdom on Iberian soil. In 1512, eight years after Isabella’s death, Spanish armies conquered the territories of the kingdom of Navarre, at the other extremity of the peninsula (see Chapter 1). Charles was Ferdinand and Isabel’s grandson, the son of Juana of Castile and Philip the Handsome, and, from 1517, the first Habsburg ruler of Spain. His elevation to Holy

Roman Emperor, as Charles V, in 1519, succeeding his grandfather Maximilian, transformed the old monarchy created by Isabel and Ferdinand into a pan-European polity (see [Chapter 3](#)). Charles became the ruler of numerous territories scattered throughout the continent. In addition to the Iberian kingdoms, and being the head of the Holy Roman Empire, he ruled over a number of Italian territories—Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, and Milan—but also the Low Countries, the Franche Comté, and Burgundy.

The situation changed somewhat upon Charles' abdication in 1556. He left the imperial title and its possessions—with the sole exception of Milan—to his brother Ferdinand, and the rest to his son Philip II. At the beginning of his reign, Philip II controlled the Crowns of Castile and Aragon, Flanders and Burgundy, a number of Italian territories—Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, and Milan—and many territories in the Americas. He was also to claim sovereignty over the Philippines from the 1560s onwards, and in 1581 Philip II became the king of Portugal as Philip I. It was also on Philip II's initiative that what would turn out to be the last of the Spanish dominions in Italy was constituted—the State of the Presidi of Tuscany. It was from the reign of Philip II onwards that this union of kingdoms was converted into a composite monarchy, but that was also when this composite state came to be seen as Spanish, designated as the monarchy of Spain. Over the course of several decades, this monarchy was transformed into arguably the most powerful state in existence, with territories—albeit distant and, in some cases, disconnected from one another—in the four corners of the world (Elliott 2009; Fernández Albaladejo 1992; Gruzinski 2004; Thompson 2005).

The character of royal authority

There has been much discussion about the coherence of a monarchy such as the Spanish, comprised of a series of kingdoms that remained autonomous from one another. There has also been no lack of debate regarding the true reach of monarchical power and its effectiveness in the absence of institutional centralisation, as in the Spanish and the Portuguese political systems. In addressing the paradox of a system in which the monarch claimed absolute and supreme power, but lacked the instruments to implement that power, historians have increasingly focused on the symbolic power accumulated by the monarchs and their servants. A symbolic power which, expressed through images

and political discourse, allowed for the creation of powerful bonds of loyalty with the monarch, and a surprisingly stable political system (Hespanha 1994; Bouza 1998).

In the Iberian monarchies, for a period at least until the mid-seventeenth century, there was profound reflection on political life and its main actors—in philosophical and legal treatises, mirrors of princes, treatises in defence of the cities, or in theatre plays, novels, and other literary genres. Although the members of the School of Salamanca (Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and many others) are the best known internationally, there were many other original and highly influential authors—such as Jerónimo Osório, the Jesuits Juan de Mariana, Francisco Suarez, and António Vieira, as well as authors whose main concern was the good government of cities, such as Castillo de Bobadilla, Salas de Barbadillo, or playwrights such as Gil Vicente, Lope de Vega, and Francisco de Quevedo (Hespanha 1994; Fernández Albaladejo 1992; Cardim 2001; Gil Pujol 2007, 2016; Feros 2000, 2004; Truman 1999).

When analysing the world around them, the inhabitants of the peninsula in the early modern period found that the element that gave coherence to all creation was the all-pervasive principle of a hierarchical order. God, it was said, ruled over all creation alone and unchallenged; the sun dominated the planets; man had been created as the master of all other creatures, not excluding his wife and children. When observing the natural and cosmic world, it appeared evident that harmony was the product of unity, and both were the measure of perfection. From this point of view, monarchy was considered the most perfect form of government because power was concentrated in just one person, thereby avoiding the conflicts and divisions that would inevitably result if this power were shared by many.

Even more important was the idea that monarchical power was “natural”. In other words, political writers believed that in each community, from the family unit to the monarchy, there was always one individual who was situated at the top of the hierarchy and acquired authority over the rest. Nobody summed this up better than the humanist Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in the mid-sixteenth century:

The man rules over the woman, the adult over the child, the father over his children. That is to say, the most powerful and most perfect rule over the weakest and most imperfect. This same relationship exists among men, there being some who by

nature are masters and others who are by nature servants.

(Sepúlveda 1941, 83; Bodin 1590, bk. 1, chs 3, 4, and 8)

While the principle of hierarchy was the basis of the “ideological constitution” of each of the monarchies, for royal authority to be effective, in practice, some basic obligations had to be accepted by both the king and his subjects. The monarch was required to protect his subjects, to guarantee peace and order, to administer justice, and to protect the weak. To be sure, the king should be guided only by the desire to serve God, and greatest prestige would derive from his actions in defence of the Church. But, in early modern political discourse, the monarch was continually being reminded that royalty was not pleasure without duty, that his office was one that should be exercised with the same care and love that a father would bestow on his children.

The stability of the monarchy was thus based on the monarch’s good governance, but also on the subjects’ loyalty. The hierarchical constitution of authority justified the principle of loyalty and absolute obedience towards those who held authority at each level of society. In accordance with all laws, divine and human, the inferior owed obedience to the superior—the wife to the husband, the children to their parents, the subjects to their king—and no law or authority could “exempt” any subject, regardless of their position in the Commonwealth, from obedience to the king. Such theories had been in existence since the medieval period, but they would continue to be developed and extended from the sixteenth century onwards, to the point of being endowed with the most potent kind of symbolism: disobedience and rebellion against the king signified disobedience and rebellion against God. This sacralisation of the monarchy ensured that, as a substitute for God on earth, the monarch was owed complete loyalty and obedience, and any attempt to resist or, most gravely, to plot against the king’s life should be treated as a crime of *lèse-majesté* (Gil Pujol 2003).

Ruling a composite monarchy

As indicated in Chapter 1 of this volume, the two Iberian monarchies were distinguished by their contrasting constitutional structures: while the Spanish monarchy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was fundamentally composite in nature, the Portuguese monarchy had a more unified structure (although the lands it controlled in the Atlantic

and across Asia were not all equal in status). Despite this difference, in both the Spanish and the Portuguese case, the most important attribute was the dynastic nature of the monarchy. Dynastic, because the fundamental law of the monarchy was patrimonialist, which allowed the territories to be passed on to the successor through inheritance. The principal aim of the laws regulating royal inheritance was to maintain the unity and extension of the territories, obliging each monarch to leave them all to his heir, generally a male child, even if not the eldest. This rule could only be broken in agreement with the potential heir, as was the case in Portugal during the crisis of succession caused by the extinction of the Avis dynasty in 1580 (Cunha 1993). Or when Philip II decided to appoint his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia and her husband the Archduke Albert as the administrator and potential heiress of the Netherlands, something that he did only after receiving the consent of his son and heir, the future Philip III. The well-known tendency of the Spanish monarchs to marry members of the extensive Habsburg family, a predilection that could also be observed among the noble families of the peninsula, responded precisely to the need to preserve the family inheritance, limiting the number of pretenders from competing dynasties, and thus reducing the possibility of territorial division and dispersal.

The dynastic character of the monarchy influenced the policies of the various royal governments, whose principal aim was the defence of dynastic interests, and of the *status regis*—the “state of the king” (Amelang 2006, 43; Skinner 2002). In the case of the Spanish monarchy, this state was also a composite one. In other words, it was composed of autonomous territories, a theme that is explored in Chapter 1 and which we shall return to below. The non-existence of a united and centralised monarchy meant that the monarch was increasingly placed on a higher plane, occupying a supra-territorial position that afforded a global perspective and enabled him to act appropriately in all matters of government (Arrieta Alberdi 2006, 129).

This is why, despite its increasing role as a ceremonial centre, the Royal Household or Court gradually established itself as the real centre of power, or at least the centre from which the monarch’s wishes emanated. Those who served the king, especially in positions of greatest importance—Chamberlain, grand equerry, lord high steward, royal stewards—became the king’s spokesmen, his intermediaries with other government institutions. It was also in this context that the high nobility gradually began to gravitate towards the

royal court, to desire positions in the royal household, and generally to prize service to the crown. Everything indicates that this happened earlier in the Spanish context than in the Portuguese (Raeymakers 2017; Scott 2017).

From 1580 onwards, Spanish monarchs began to expand their authority, prerogatives, and influence over regional and local institutions by promoting an “administrative” system of government, which at least partially replaced a “judicial” system that had been previously dominant. This change reflected a new political discourse that was spreading throughout Western European polities, including the Spanish monarchy. Promoted by the ruling circles, this new way of conceiving political action, known as “reason of state”, was used to justify an increase in the ruler’s executive prerogatives and pre-eminence. The creation of executive institutions fully under the monarch’s control accompanied this change in ideology. Already under Philip II, numerous *juntas* (*ad-hoc* committees) were created and staffed by members of the monarch’s inner circle who were fully committed to implementing the king’s orders.

The most notable political reform at the time, however, was the appointment of a *de facto* prime minister, the king’s favourite. Especially from the mid-sixteenth century onwards and until the end of the following century, royal favourites became central figures in the governance of each of the two monarchies. Men such as Cristóvão de Moura during the reign of Philip II, the Duke of Lerma, during the reign of Philip III, the Count-Duke of Olivares and Luis Méndez de Haro y Guzmán, the Marquis of Carpio, during the reign of Philip IV, the Count of Castelo Melhor under Afonso VI, and various others during the reigns of Charles II and Pedro II, showed that the royal household, and the royal palace in general, were the centres of power throughout the early modern period. Although the rise of favourites was a European phenomenon, in the Spanish monarchy it was a strictly political and institutional one. The main function of the chief minister-favourite was to reinforce monarchical influence over regional and local institutions by appointing and promoting men of his confidence. It is not yet clear whether these reforms and initiatives were effective or whether they succeeded in making the government more “regal”, but they did create new tensions that would affect the monarchy until at least the late seventeenth century (Elliott 1984; Elliott and Brockliss 1999; Feros 2000; Escudero 2014).

There were other institutions whose primary function was the defence of royal prerogatives and interests. In the Spanish context, one

of these was the Council of State, originally created in 1521 at the behest of Charles I. The idea behind the creation of this Council was “to establish a Council corresponding only to the monarch’s universal role”. During the reign of Charles I, the Council of State was composed of subjects from several of his European kingdoms, but this council underwent a process of “Hispanisation” under Philip II. Whatever its composition, the Council was always the most important institutional embodiment of the king’s power and interests (Barrios 2015, 445). The second of the councils that attended to the king’s global interests was the Council of War. Originating in the Crown of Castile, and in existence from the reign of Charles I onwards, it became, along with the Council of State, a “supra-territorial institution above the kingdoms”, and once again its members were more interested in defending the interests of the king than those of each kingdom and territory that composed the monarchy (Barrios 2015, 469).

The Spanish and the Portuguese monarchs also had their representatives in each of the kingdoms and territories under their rule—viceroys or governors, depending on the importance of the territorial unit. The essential point is that viceroys and governors, men of the highest rank and women from the royal family, were again representatives of the monarch. “With the appointment of viceroys, the Spanish rulers had also tried to solve the problem of the absent king”, a problem that had existed since the beginning of the Portuguese and Spanish overseas expansion and, later, in almost all the kingdoms of the monarchy except Castile. Philip II was the last Habsburg king to travel outside the peninsula, and who visited almost all of the peninsular kingdoms at least once. The symbolic importance of viceroys was due to the fact that in this society “power was conceived of in a personal manner and the concept of the state as a sovereign and impersonal entity to which we owe our loyalty was practically non-existent ... Thus, while the Spanish monarch might always be absent” from many of his territories, he had viceroys and other representatives “to make himself present there” (Cañeque 2014, 145). The territories or kingdoms in which the Spanish monarch relied on the services of a viceroy until 1700 were: Navarre, because of its history as an independent kingdom before its union with the Crown of Castile through conquest; the three kingdoms that composed the Crown of Aragon—Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; Portugal (between 1581 and 1640); Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia in Italy, and New Spain and Peru in the Americas.

The king of Portugal established a vice-kingdom in India very early

on (1505) and chose to be represented in most of his territories by governors. In Brazil, for example, Portuguese royal authority was initially represented by governors-general (1548), but, after 1640, the Portuguese Crown began to appoint viceroys for that territory. As we have noted, Portugal, unlike Castile and Aragon, was not thought of as a composite territorial whole. However, this did not prevent the royal power in this kingdom from rapidly assuming imperial attributes, a phenomenon that was given impetus by its expansion into Asia (Marras 2011). At the very beginning of the sixteenth century, Francisco de Almeida and Afonso de Albuquerque, two central figures in the establishment of the Portuguese presence in Asia, had suggested to Manuel I that he should adopt the title of “Emperor”, alleging that the Portuguese sovereign deserved such an honour because he already counted several kings among his vassals. Further territorial conquests in Asia and the South Atlantic in the sixteenth century contributed to a more intense identification between the Portuguese royalty and the collective imperial imagination (Thomaz 1990). In any case, the image of the Portuguese monarchy was clearly bolstered by this atmosphere of imperialist triumphalism.

Although they all represented the king, the power and authority of these viceroys and governors depended very much on the specific political and institutional circumstances of each territory. Their powers were more important in those kingdoms or territories lacking a strong local tradition, either institutional or political. In the case of the Spanish monarchy, the powers of the viceroy were greatest in the Americas, relatively more restricted in Portugal, Valencia, Aragon, and the Italian territories, and weakest in Catalonia, where the local institutions had a longer history and a more firmly consolidated authority (Cañeque 2004; Hernando Sánchez 2004; Cardim and Palos 2012; Rivero Rodríguez 2011). In the Portuguese context, meanwhile, the Viceroy of Goa had much broader political powers than, for example, the governor-general of Brazil.

Ruling the kingdoms

The old historiographical paradigm that maintained that the kings had absolute power has been radically questioned by new generations of historians in the last two decades. These authors have drawn attention to the important limitations imposed on monarchical power by the nobility, the parliaments of each kingdom and the advisory councils

that supported the monarchs in the governance of the different territories. The traditional image which suggested that, in Portugal, royal authority had established itself at a particularly early stage has been questioned and attention has been drawn both to the extreme jurisdictional plurality that existed in the Portuguese kingdom and to the weakness of the royal power until the late seventeenth century (Jago 1981; Fernández Albaladejo 1992; Hespanha 1994; Thompson 1990; Amelang 2006; Feros 2004, 2014).

Thanks to these new historiographical perspectives, we can now understand the history of the Spanish monarchy as the history of a composite monarchy, made up of communities, and kingdoms that were not absorbed or eliminated by the monarchical-dynastic discourse and discipline. As far as its Portuguese counterpart is concerned, although it did not have a comparable composite structure, it was nonetheless internally heterogeneous, whether in jurisdictional and territorial terms or with regard to differences in individual status among its inhabitants. The assertive declarations of some monarchs who saw themselves as absolute rulers now appear more rhetorical and less convincing when seen from the perspective of the kingdoms, provinces, cities, and seigniorial institutions. We are now able to reconstruct the early modern period as a complex epoch in which those driving historical change may not be reduced to a few (monarchs and their leading officials) who dominated, and others who allowed themselves to be dominated. The most immediate results of this revision have been twofold: first, insistence on the autonomy and historical agency of formerly marginalised individuals and groups; and, second, deeper knowledge of “resistance” to the monarchical power, as well as of the possibilities and forms of that resistance, which were much more far-reaching than was previously considered possible.

From the sixteenth century—albeit building on older ideas—alongside the theories that defended the rights and powers of the monarch, another concept of “state” was being developed: the state of the Commonwealth, the *respublica*, the group of institutions that represented the kingdoms, provinces, and cities. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this more complex view of the state was the development of theories that considered the king to be a servant of the Commonwealth, who needed to take into consideration the interests of his subjects and respect the laws of the realm. In both the Portuguese and the Spanish case, the contemporary discourse about royalty insisted much more on the question of duties and responsibilities than

on the prince's powers and rights. It is fascinating to observe that the metaphors most frequently used to depict the roles of the Spanish or the Portuguese monarch were those of a father, a judge, and a protector. According to the theories of the time, a stable and harmonious commonwealth could exist only if the monarch inspired the love, respect, and obedience of his subjects, and recognised that the interests of the king, his kingdoms, and vassals needed to be in full accord (Gil Pujol 2009).

Perhaps even more important than these general ideas about the rights and duties of a ruler was the reality that the monarch, even when endowed with supreme authority, did not possess the same level of power in all the territories that composed his monarchy. Among the essential elements of the composite monarchies was the fact that each of the territories had its own particular status determined in most cases by the forms adopted on its union with the monarchy. One of the paradoxes of the structure of the Iberian monarchies, in James Amelang's words, is that

while the image of political organisation tended towards centralisation, through (often rather literal) incarnation in the figure of the monarch, reality headed in the opposite direction, towards considerable administrative decentralisation. The result of this paradox was, to use his term, a system of "pre-eminent monarchy", credibly represented and interpreted as both unitary and pluralist at the same time.

(Amelang 2006, 43–44)

We are therefore dealing with a system based on negotiation between the different components of the monarchy, rather than one based on the unilateral imposition of royal authority. The key—James Amelang wrote following Antonio Manuel Hespanha—for

the effective functioning (of the Spanish Monarchy) ... was the relations between central government, focused around but hardly limited to the figure of the monarch, and a wide range of elites located at both the centre and the multiple peripheries of the imperial system. This "wide range" should moreover be taken quite literally, as it comprises groups as diverse as urban oligarchies; all levels of the territorial aristocracy, whose principal bulwark of power continued to be the seigniorial regime; state bureaucrats; the Church; merchant and financial

interests; and the military, among others.

(Amelang 2006, 43–44, and 46)

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, authors defending the untrammelled power of the king believed that the government of the Spanish monarchy was a “regal government”, a government by one, and not a “political government”, a government by many. These views of the Spanish monarch, enjoying full authority and control over his government, stand in stark contrast with the views of many others. The main characteristic of early modern monarchical government was, according to the German author Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), its “irregular form” (*respublica irregularis*)—it was a type of government in which

we do not find that unity which is the essence of a completely established state, not because of a disease or fault in the administration of the country, but because the irregularity of its form has been, as it were, legitimated by public law or custom.

(cit. Feros 2014, 144)

The early modern Iberian monarchies were indeed *respublicae irregulares*: they were neither centralised, unified, nor uniform, and their government was not dominated exclusively by the king’s will.

Contemporaries shared the belief that none of the institutions, and certainly not the royal institutions, could monopolise the implementation of policies. In the Iberian political discourse, there was talk of a mixed government, which incorporated the plurality of institutions that represented distinct communities and powers. This type of government was made up of monarchical institutions (the ruler and his closest advisors, and those institutions that promoted monarchical interests), aristocratic institutions (members of the central elites—nobility and university-trained individuals also known as “*letrados*”), and popular or “democratic” institutions (parliament, city councils, etc.). In the early modern Iberian world, therefore, the maintenance of social order and the administration of justice, the principal functions of government, did not derive from the exclusive exercise of the monarchical authority, but it was fundamentally a negotiated order, one agreed upon between the monarchy, the various communities, social orders, kingdoms, and their representatives.

In the case of the Spanish monarchy, the other central institutions that did not form part of the “Royal Household and Court” were the

Consejos (Councils). During the early modern period, 14 Councils were created within the Spanish monarchy to manage public affairs and to serve as the main conduits between the monarch, his kingdoms, and his subjects. It would be a mistake to view these Councils as a part of the “executive” government and as being fully controlled by the monarch and his officials. Since the early sixteenth century, the Councils were perceived as autonomous from the royal will and as representing the interests of regional elites. Counsellors possessed many important prerogatives: although appointed by the king, they held their offices in perpetuity; they acted as supreme judges in their jurisdictions; proposed candidates for major and minor offices; and distributed patronage. They also served as an important link between the monarchy, the kingdoms, and the cities—responsible for communicating royal orders, and, on the other hand, gradually assuming the function of transmitting the needs, expectations, and complaints of lower authorities to the king (Tomás y Valiente 1990; Feros 2000 ch. 1; Barrios 2015). Although he was no doubt exaggerating to some extent, Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, a late sixteenth-century historian, described the counsellors of Castile as “absolute” ministers, who “made the government of royal monarchy a republic ... and out of habit they considered everything that they did not do or have command over to be an error” (cit. Feros 2000, 26).

The union between Castile and Aragon, established in 1479, had been based on the principle *aeque principaliter*, since the legal frameworks of these two political entities were maintained, including the status of the territories that belonged to the Crown of Aragon. In 1494, the Council of Aragon was established at the royal court. This body was later given the same status as the Council of Castile, created in 1385. Both councils were granted the status of “Supreme”, indicating that, at least in theory, they were presided over by the king. They had the exclusive right to rule on lawsuits in each of their territories and were endowed with jurisdictional autonomy, in the sense that the lawsuits were settled within their own jurisdictional area (not outside) and by magistrates born in those territories. The existence of these two councils was important, for it was the foundation of the future polysynodial (multiple councils) system.

The union between Castile and Aragon also allowed for the creation of some councils that were to have jurisdiction over all the territories of the monarchy, the Council of the Inquisition and the Council of the Crusade, both of which were concerned with ecclesiastical matters. The Council of the Crusade, created in the early sixteenth century, was

composed of several members drawn from other councils (the Councils of Castile, Aragon, and the Indies). With executive commissioners in each diocese, the Council of the Crusade was in charge of collecting various categories of taxes, including those granted by the papacy, which the Church paid in all the territories of the monarchy. The Council of the Inquisition, officially created at the end of the 1480s, was responsible for policing religious orthodoxy among all the subjects of the Spanish monarchs. This Council became the most powerful of them all if we consider the great influence that it had on the attitudes and behaviour of all those living under the aegis of the Spanish monarchs. The Council was at the top of a pyramidal structure composed of numerous religious tribunals or courts (Seville, Cordoba, Granada, Murcia, Llerena, Cuenca, Toledo, Santiago de Compostela, the Canaries, and Madrid in the Crown of Castile; Zaragoza, Valencia, Barcelona, Mallorca, Sardinia, and Palermo in the Crown of Aragon; Mexico, Lima, and Cartagena de Indias in the Americas), with hundreds of regional and local officials—and alongside them an even greater number of “*familiars* of the Inquisition”, able to infiltrate the population of all social levels. With the exception of the monarchs and the members of the dynasty, all those who lived in the territories of the Spanish monarchy could be investigated, arrested, and tried by the Inquisition.

In Portugal, a consultative structure was also developed based on the royal court, most notably the king’s advisory councils, as well as the royal tribunals created in the first half of the sixteenth century: the *Desembargo do Paço* (the Supreme Court of Justice), the *Casa do Cível de Lisboa* (the Lisbon High Court), the *Mesa da Consciência e Ordens* (a consultative body responsible for administering the property of military and religious orders), and the Tribunal of the Inquisition. As for the territories outside Europe that had been conquered by Portugal, these were initially administered by the pre-existing organs of government and administration based in Lisbon. The Casa de Ceuta was created early on in this process (1434), subsequently being transformed into the *Casa da Guiné e da Mina*. It was later followed by the *Casa da Índia*, by all indications created in 1500. The royal council, on the other hand, took somewhat longer to become firmly established in Portugal, and the Council of State also appeared relatively late, only being created in the second half of the sixteenth century, during the reign of Sebastião I (Cardim 2004).

The political, demographic, and economic importance of the Crown of Castile led to the creation of other councils to enable more efficient

administration of its kingdoms and territories. The most important of these was the Council of Finance (1523), responsible for “all income and expenditure, organising the collection of rents and duties” (Ladero Quesada 1973, 12). The Council of the Military Orders was created to regulate and administer these noble corporate bodies that had been fundamental in the conquests of the Muslim kingdoms during the medieval period (Postigo Castellanos 1987 and 1995). Yet perhaps the most important of these Castilian councils was the *Consejo de la Cámara de Castilla* (Chamber of Castile), a smaller council composed of members drawn from the Council of Castile. Its most important role was identifying suitable candidates for “the positions of temporal government ... and those of spiritual government” in the territories that formed part of the Crown of Castile and to presenting them to the monarch for election. The Council of the Chamber of Castile was also responsible for scrutinising and advising on all the petitions from royal subjects requesting favours and posts from the monarch. Historians have seen this council as “the greatest expression of royal absolutism”, but it can also be argued that the enormous scope of its jurisdiction and its ability to propose thousands and thousands of candidates to the monarch gave the council tremendous political and social influence (Barrios 2015, 507–514).

Without any doubt, from an institutional and political viewpoint the Crown of Castile was the best organised and structured territory of the monarchy. Like other kingdoms, Castile had a representative institution, the *Cortes*, which, from the mid-sixteenth century onwards, was composed only of representatives of the 16 most important cities. Representatives of the other two estates, the nobility and the Church, withdrew from the *Cortes* after Charles I's reign. The number of cities represented increased from 16 to 18 in the seventeenth century, and each of them sent two representatives elected by the members of the municipal governments. The important thing to remember is that the *Consejo de la Cámara de Castilla* was charged with summoning the *Cortes* in the king's name, and with setting the agenda and leading its debates. The main activity of the *Cortes* was the approval of taxes and funds requested by the monarchy. Between the 1580s and the 1630s, there is no doubt that the *Cortes* played a major role in the political and fiscal administration of the monarchy, but this changed after the mid-seventeenth century. Thereafter, the *Cortes* of Castile virtually ceased to meet, or did so only to confirm the royal heirs (Fortea Pérez 2008).

Historians have reminded us that, throughout the two centuries of

Habsburg rule, Castile was a community of “substantial, semi-independent cities”, each governed by its own time-honoured laws, jealous of its historic privileges and rights. To be sure, the monarchy and the Council of Castile exerted a powerful influence over the cities through the so-called *corregidores* (governors or chief magistrates), appointed by the king on the recommendation of the *Cámara de Castilla*, to serve as the link between the centre and the most important cities of the Crown of Castile. Yet it seems clear that in a territory with a relatively weak parliament and without any autonomous institutions as a kingdom in its own right, the cities continued to be important centres of political action and resistance. This even made it possible for certain republican ideas to take root centred on the political life of the city—further proof of the great richness and diversity of political thought and discourses circulating in the peninsula. Both in the Portuguese context and in Castile and Aragon, various civic republican discourses began to appear, defending the freedoms of the cities and the preservation of their form of government, which involved the active political participation of the members of the urban elites (Gil Pujol 2007; Herrero Sánchez 2017). In the case of the Crown of Castile, it was the cities—either individually or bound into urban leagues—that were most vehemently opposed to the monarchy’s taxation and political measures. From the Revolt of the *Comuneros* in the early sixteenth century to the revolts of Andalusian cities, especially Seville, in the second half of the seventeenth century, encompassing the revolts of the Castilian cities in the 1580s and the Basque cities in the 1620s, it was the urban communities, and not the regional authorities or the *Cortes*, that were responsible for the moments of greatest tension and resistance against the monarchy or the monarchical government (Mackay 1999; Knezevic 2017).

Although in some respects resembling its Castilian counterpart, and likewise composed of the native citizens of the various kingdoms that constituted the crown, the Council of Aragon did not have as much influence in these territories as the Council of Castile had in its own. However, this had less to do with the status of the Council, but rather the weakness of royal authority in those kingdoms, and the power and influence of the regional institutions and authorities. The *Cortes* or *Corts* in each of the kingdoms were more powerful and representative than the Castilian *Cortes*. Not only were the three social estates represented in these parliaments (nobility, clergy, and commoners), but they also had institutions (such as the *Generalitat* in the

Principality of Catalonia) that maintained the function of the *Corts* when the assembly was not in session. Most of the inhabitants of the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon had far more regular interactions with these local and regional bodies than the monarchical institutions themselves. It was the former institutions that many considered to be the real Fathers of the community, the defenders and protectors of the subjects and kingdoms. Nothing could be done without their involvement, certainly not the imposition and the collection of taxes. There were also important cities in the Crown of Aragon, but, unlike in Castile, the monarch could not rely on a network of *corregidores*, and we know that the cities were more closely linked with the regional institutions, once again, especially in Catalonia (Casey 1979; García Cárcel 1985; Gil Pujol 1989).

During the reigns of Charles I and Philip II, many other councils were created that had as their mission to help the monarch to govern other kingdoms and territories, while their members acted as representatives before the king and court of the interests of the different commonwealths. During the reign of Philip II, the Council of Flanders and Burgundy was established to help the monarch administer the territories that had originally belonged to the Habsburgs (Lecuppre-Desjardin 2016). This was a Council that suffered through the vicissitudes of these territories, as we shall see further on. Other territories were also administered with the help of Councils. The Council of Portugal was created in 1581, after Philip II became the first Habsburg monarch of that kingdom. The Council of Indies, on the other hand, helped to administer territories that were not kingdoms juridically speaking, but which were considered as such due to their size and the wealth that they produced, namely the Indies (Luxán Meléndez 1988; Barrios 2015, 533–538). The history of these two Councils, of Portugal and of the Indies, is recounted in other chapters of this volume.

In the reign of Philip II, other steps were taken to clarify the way in which the various parts of the Spanish monarchy were linked with one another in political and jurisdictional terms. Thus, the king ordered the creation of the Council of Italy, under whose purview were the affairs of Naples, Sicily, and Milan (Rivero Rodríguez 1998; Sabatini 2012) There is no doubt that the monarchy's influence over its Italian territories was less direct and far-reaching than in Castile. With regard to the three largest territories, the most immediately striking feature is the consistency in the Spanish government's behaviour towards the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and the Duchy of Milan, in terms of

maintaining respect for their institutions, exhibiting familiarity with the forms of representation in each territory, the evident concern with reconciling tensions, actively searching for counterbalances through the concessions made to the different territorial bodies, and confirming the privileges of the cities and the urban classes, while at the same time maintaining the feudal prerogatives untouched (Ruiz Ibáñez and Sabatini 2009).

Yet, the respect for the institutions of each kingdom notwithstanding, the Spanish government did not renounce the possibility of exercising more direct forms of control in the political, administrative, and military spheres. The aim of reconciling these two apparently incompatible demands gave rise to a strategy that almost never required any direct interference with the existing state administrative bodies, but instead involved the creation of parallel structures, or that were superimposed on existing ones, as also happened in the government of Castile (Musi 1991). It was precisely in the administrative and financial spheres—less delicate than the political or military ones—that this strategy of juxtaposing instruments for the control of already existing institutions was combined with a policy for the integration of the territories into the larger structure of the monarchy. As a result of this monarchical policy, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the *Consiglio Collaterale* was established in Naples, which was the highest advisory body to the viceroy. Also created around the same time was the *Scrivania di Razione*, an office that, without introducing any formal changes in the pre-existing administrative structure, was superimposed on the already consolidated organs of control, following a blueprint that had been successfully tested in Sicily during the preceding century (Giannone 1723, 377–390; Cernigliaro 1983). An analogous structure was also created towards the middle of the century in Milan, above all for managing the complex procedure for the new cadastral survey of the duchy (Zappa 1991).

Equally crucial for defining the constitutional profile of each of the Iberian kingdoms was the institutionalisation of their legal systems. Since the end of the fifteenth century, a network of tribunals, courts, and chancelleries had been gradually built up in each of these territories. In Aragon, one of the most notable bodies was the *Justicia de Aragon*, a tribunal that served as the court of appeal for cases relating to this kingdom, having also performed the important role of reconciling royal regulations with the legal framework in force in that territory (Arrieta Alberdi 2006).

In Portugal, the judicial network also became more complex with the creation of royal courts of appeal (*tribunais de relações*), while, at the same time, a procedure was developed that was equivalent to that of the *Justicia*: the *chanceler-mor* (high chancellor) could refuse to seal those royal charters that ran counter to the legislation already implemented. From the late fifteenth century onwards, Portugal experienced a significant growth of its royal jurisdictional mechanism, in the shape of a series of new courts (the *Desembargo do Paço*, the *Casa do Cível de Lisboa*, the *Mesa da Consciência e Ordens*, and the Court of the Inquisition).

The Castilian judicial network also became more complex during this period. Various courts and chancelleries, often very different in their nature and function, were created, and Castile developed a legal framework that was common to all of its different territorial components. Moreover, Castilian institutions and legal norms began to extend into and make themselves felt in all of the Iberian kingdoms. In the case of Portugal, its juridical interaction with Castile was conducted above all through the *lex regni vicinoris*, the legal principle that provided for the extension of “particular” laws to adjacent territories without this calling into question the independence of each of them (Clavero 1983).

Union and disunion

In various studies published in the 1990s, Sir John H. Elliott drew attention to the durability of the royal authority in the different kingdoms that formed the Spanish monarchy. Only Portugal and the United Provinces were able to break away from the monarchy from the late fifteenth century onwards. To explain this phenomenon, Elliott insisted on the need to deepen our knowledge of the different resources that had made this longstanding stability of the monarchy possible: “its administrative organisation, its capacity for coercion, and other more intangible resources—such as its capacity for maintaining the loyalty of its subjects through a combination of ideological persuasion and appealing to individual and collective interests” (Elliott 1992, 722). There has been a great deal of discussion about the fact that the Spanish monarchy, just like the Portuguese one, showed greater stability than other European monarchies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although popular revolts and dissent among the local or regional elites were

common, until 1640 no revolt had called into question either the monarchy in general, or its nature as a composite monarchy. The main question is therefore why there were no major revolts in the Spanish monarchy, at least until the final decades of the seventeenth century?

Some historians maintain that the existence of a repressive apparatus, such as the Inquisition, promoted social and political order by suppressing the religious diversity and dissent that created civil and military conflict elsewhere in Western Europe. Yet this explanation of monarchical stability does not take into consideration other features of the Iberian political system. One of the keys to this stability seems to have been the loyalty to the monarchy demonstrated by a sizeable portion of the local social elites. We are now beginning to gain a better knowledge and understanding of the mechanisms and ideology that enabled the monarchs to maintain a profound cohesion between the many distant territories over which they claimed authority without any need for the creation and expansion of overtly repressive institutions. The main factor behind this was the existence of an important group of individuals who, in the course of their service in the different territories of this world monarchy, working at all levels of government, and in all sectors of the administration, defended the pre-eminence of the monarch and his interests, and advocated the continued permanence of the monarchical order. These individuals formed part of an extensive system of patronage that, through various hierarchical networks, united the monarch with all his servants in the various kingdoms that constituted the monarchy. Equally important was the existence of an army that included soldiers from almost all the kingdoms, which took part in conflicts both within and outside the peninsula. The copious literature on what has come to be called the “Spanish soldier” enables us to understand the importance of this army in the cohesion of individuals from various kingdoms, identifying with the monarchy of Spain and the interests of the Spanish monarchs.

No less decisive was the type of relationship that was established between the royal power and the noble, ecclesiastical and administrative elites. The synergies that these groups developed with the crown also help to explain the longevity of a social order that was profoundly inegalitarian and discriminatory. Both the king and the elites were also aware that leading and supporting more radical protests could pave the way for more egalitarian demands from the “popular” sectors of society. For this reason, whenever such a prospect arose, the king and the elites closed ranks to avoid a transformation of

the social order that could call into question the existing *status quo*: the domination of a tiny minority over a vast subordinate majority, impoverished and practically deprived of the means for participating in the process of political decision-making (Casey 1979). These territorial elites had few doubts that their defence and support of the monarchical project would bring political stability, honour, and economic benefits for themselves (Piola Caselli 2008; Sabatini 2012).

But all this does not explain another reality: the numerous territorial crises, some with dramatic results, arising from the difficulties of incorporating the different territories or kingdoms that composed this global monarchy. It would be a grave mistake to judge the political situation of the monarchy by observing it only from its centre, from the royal court. As several historians have stressed in recent years, the Spanish monarchy was a polycentric political formation, which means that it should of course be analysed from the centre, but also from the perspective of the different kingdoms, starting with those that were less well integrated (Cardim et al. 2012). Not all of the kingdoms felt themselves to be equal partners in the construction of the Spanish monarchy, and not all of them wanted to be subsumed into a more unified and harmonised whole (Feros 2017, ch. 1).

The problems of integration and union were already evident in the Crown of Castile in the early sixteenth century. The well-known Revolt of the *Comuneros* (1519–1522) was an expression of the resistance of the citizenry to Charles I's imperial project, which was perceived to have reduced Castile to the status of a marginal kingdom. Castile's urban elites took Charles' election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519 as a sign that their kingdom would lose its pivotal position in the new order, in addition to its identity as a kingdom in its own right. The rebellion was essentially Castilian and urban, a reminder of the great influence of the Castilian cities within the monarchy created by Ferdinand and Isabel, but also an attempt to demonstrate the pre-eminence of Castile within the peninsular union (Sánchez León 1998). As I. A. A. Thompson has demonstrated, the defeat of the *Comuneros* in 1522 did not put an end to the Castilian-centred project—the desire of the Castilian cities to be given power and a central role in the design and preparation of monarchical political projects—as well as the development of what has come to be called a Castilian identity, or the feeling that Castile was the “*patria natural*” of its inhabitants (Thompson 1995). The defeat of the *Comuneros* enabled the transformation of Castile into the nerve centre and unifying agent of

the monarchy. From this point on, the vast majority of the highest officials of the monarchy would be Castilians (natives of one of the various territories that formed the Crown of Castile), and the centres of royal authority would be established in Castile. This was especially so during the reign of Philip II (1556–1598), who chose a small Castilian town, Madrid, situated near the geographical centre of the Iberian peninsula, as the seat of his court and capital. After overcoming some relatively minor crises in the late sixteenth century, Castile would become the most loyal and royalist kingdom in the Spanish monarchy. And, more importantly, the kingdom of Castile gradually came to see itself as synonymous with Spain and tried to transform its Castilian identity into the genuine Spanish one.

The difficulties of political and territorial integration were most clearly apparent precisely at one of the weakest points in the composite monarchy, the territories of Flanders or the Netherlands. Of course, the disagreements and subsequent conflicts in this case were not only the product of the monarchy's political and institutional structure, but also of the growing confessional divide throughout Europe caused by the Protestant reformation. Indeed, of all the territories under the control of the Spanish Habsburgs, the Netherlands was the area where Protestant reform had spread most widely among the nobility and the urban elites. The reforms introduced by Philip II, which included the creation of new dioceses and the implantation of the Inquisition "in the Spanish style", triggered the resistance of the nobility and the cities, who took these actions as confirmation that Philip II did not respect their privileges and liberties, or the role that the nobility played in the governance of these territories. Headed by William, Prince of Orange-Nassau, formerly Charles I's vassal, the nobles became increasingly vocal in their criticism of a government that, ruined by the latest wars against France, lacked the means to impose royal policy or to expand its trade.

Although initially, between 1568 and 1570, the Spanish monarchy was able to pacify the Netherlands by sending a force of Spanish *tercios* led by the uncompromising Duke of Alba, its hold over the territory began to slip in 1572. Not even Alba's replacement with other, more conciliatory governors was enough to arrest the disintegration of royal authority. Unable to maintain any longer the fiction of a rebellion against the royal government, but not against the king himself, the States-General of the Northern Provinces led by Orange officially deposed Philip II as the sovereign in 1581, while

actively looking for new external allies against the formidable Spanish military power, turning first to France, and then in 1586 with England. The failure of Philip II's attempts to resolve the conflict in the Netherlands by military means was recognised in 1598 when he decided, with the agreement of his son and heir, the future Philip III, to hand over the government of the loyal southern provinces of the Netherlands to his daughter the Archduchess Isabella Clara Eugenia, and her husband and first cousin, Archduke Albert of Austria. Philip II yielded to them the temporal sovereignty over the Netherlands, which could be made permanent if Isabella and Albert were to have any descendants. In 1609, the Twelve Years' Truce brought a provisional end to the conflict in the Netherlands and in Europe in general. The Truce also confirmed the separation of the Netherlands into two entities that would then gradually become more and more differentiated from one another. The United Provinces were emerging as a de facto independent, prosperous territory, with a high degree of local autonomy, led by a dynamic commercial elite and a noble military elite. The lands that remained part of the Spanish monarchy were officially Catholic, although there were pockets of Protestants where the recovery from the war took a little longer. The relative autonomy of these territories ended when Albert died without descendants. The definitive (formal) separation of the Netherlands however did not take place until the beginning of the eighteenth century, as a consequence of the War of Spanish Succession (1700–1714), after which the territories of Spanish Flanders came under the control of the Austrian Habsburgs (Parker 1972; Esteban Estríngana 2002; Echevarría Bacigalupe 1998; Duerloo 2012).

But the most profound political and territorial crises were provoked by the more assertive and intrusive approach taken by the monarchy from the reign of Philip IV onwards, above all during the ascendancy of the king's favourite the Count-Duke of Olivares (1621–1643). For the crown and its agents, the problems facing the monarchy were so urgent that they required a vastly expanded executive power attainable only through the increased presence and influence of the monarchy in each one of the kingdoms. This sense of political urgency led many to advocate the strengthening of royal authority as a *sine qua non* for the salvation of the monarchy. In other words, the only means by which the Spanish monarchy could maintain its power in Europe was a more centralised system of control and network of institutions that privileged the executive power that allowed for faster decision-making. This in turn required a definitive break with an

ideology that postulated that the king was obliged to consult his subjects or follow their advice, and, even more importantly, it required the different kingdoms to renounce their rights and privileges and place themselves at the full disposal of the monarch and his programme of government (Elliott 1986).

The Count-Duke of Olivares, Philip IV's chief minister, best articulated this monarchical frustration with the non-Castilian kingdoms: "Damned be the nations, and damned be the national men", a reference to non-Castilian subjects who were fundamentally loyal to their own kingdoms and commonwealths. Such sentiments notwithstanding, Olivares offered proposals for the unification of the kingdoms under the royal aegis. He did not intend to transform the Spanish composite monarchy into one that resembled the French system of rule, with more integrated regions under royal authority. Instead, he and his allies wished to unite the various kingdoms behind their king. The problem, or fatal flaw, in his strategy was that the model for his new monarchy could only be Castile. In the famous "Gran memorial" (1624), Olivares wrote of "reducing the kingdoms in the style of Castile", in what promised to be a major reconfiguration of the form of union on which the monarchy was based, especially in two main spheres: the military and taxation (Elliott 1986; Fernández Albaladejo 2009).

Olivares' main goal was to furnish his king with political structures that would enable him to maintain Spain's power in the world. Olivares was clearly prepared to negotiate with the kingdoms over the implementation of this new policy, and moreover he was under no illusion that these negotiations would be fraught. The king and his prime minister initially tried to impose a rather less ambitious scheme, unveiled by Olivares in 1625, and baptised as the Union of Arms. It was a "programme for mutual defence" of sorts, to which all kingdoms—peninsular, European, and American—would be obliged to contribute. Each kingdom would be committed to "providing and maintaining a fixed number of paid men, who would constitute a common military reserve for the monarchy as a whole". Each individual kingdom's quota of men was also determined (Castile and the Indies, 44,000; Catalonia, 16,000; Aragon, 10,000; Valencia, 6,000; and so on).

The consequences of this political assertiveness of the royal government under Olivares were different in each of the kingdoms. Some years ago, John Elliott drew attention to the "absence of revolution" in Castile in the mid-seventeenth century, and his question

to other historians was a simple one: why did Castile not rebel if on the surface the same “pre-revolutionary” conditions prevailed in that kingdom as elsewhere? There were certainly debates in Castile on the reforms that were being introduced, and about the increasing pressure of taxation on the Castilian people, while important popular revolts did take place in the Crown of Castile. Yet neither the debates nor the revolts led to a *general* rebellion in Castile. However, rather than being a consequence of the absence of a culture of resistance in the kingdom, this seems to be at least in part due to an increasing identification of the future of Castile with the future of the monarchy as a whole. Another factor that has been highlighted is the political disunity within the Crown of Castile, which impeded collective action (MacKay 1999; Gelabert González 2001; Knezevic 2017).

Other kingdoms also succeeded in remaining relatively tranquil during the seventeenth century. This was the case with the kingdom of Aragon, which remained loyal to the monarchy during the great crises of the mid-seventeenth century, after being the epicentre of an earlier serious crisis, in the late sixteenth century (Gil Pujol 1989). Valencia was another instance of a stable and loyal kingdom. In the first decades of the sixteenth century, it was shaken by a series of popular revolts known as the *Germanías*, contemporaneous with and in some respects resembling the Castilian Revolt of the *Comuneros*, but the kingdom remained loyal and politically calm during the rest of the early modern period. It is, however, not very clear why this kingdom remained loyal, although everything seems to suggest that, unlike the Catalan principality, Valencia never developed strong “national” ideologies and institutions, and historians have shown that the links between the central elites and their Valencian counterparts were much closer than in any other kingdom apart from Castile (Casey 1979, 1995).

As for the regions of the Italian peninsula that were subject to Spanish sovereignty during the sixteenth century, uprisings were few and far between, and inconsequential in comparison with the “revolution” of the kingdom of Naples in 1647–1648. The political handiwork of the Count-Duke of Olivares was evident here, more precisely the tendency to solve the problem of the crown’s depleted resources, and the difficulty of raising or imposing new taxes in the non-Castilian kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula, by shifting the burden onto Naples and Sicily, especially the former of these two territories—even though in both cases the fiscal burden imposed on them was already relatively heavy. In the peripheral territories of the

monarchy, there was an autonomist tradition that determined the point of political equilibrium between the crown and the local ruling classes—an autonomy that was essentially based on respect for the traditional prerogatives and freedoms of the nobility. Thus, before the crisis that was set in motion by the extraordinary demands necessitated by its military commitments, the monarchy's financial needs were not in conflict with Neapolitan autonomy. The revolt of the kingdom of Naples in 1647–1648 was a complex phenomenon that went beyond a popular anti-feudal uprising, but is also not reducible to an independence movement for the separation of Naples from the Spanish monarchy. The revolt was rather driven by the desire for a realignment of the balance of power, a return to the order prior to the crown's drive for greater centralisation in the years leading up to the uprising, during which it had reclaimed the autonomy lost to the ruling elites of the Viceregal capital—through the repressive activities of the viceroy and the hegemonic position granted to some nobles, bureaucrats, and members of the capital's commercial and financial bodies (Galasso 1972, 1994; Villari 1973; Ribot García 2004).

In the same way, the revolt of Messina in 1674 took place at the end of roughly three decades of changes in the political situation of the kingdom of Sicily within the “Spanish imperial system”, and the redefinition of the balance of power inside it. The string of revolts in 1647–1648 had reinforced the role of Messina as the true and proper locus of power on the island, capable of guaranteeing order and loyalty. In 1674, the two capitals had exchanged roles: Palermo was converted into a bastion of loyalty to the crown, while Messina had become a treacherous enemy (Villari 1979; Ribot García 2002).

However, despite the violence of the revolts in Naples and Messina, and other moments of great tension in Sardinia and Milan, in the last quarter of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Italian territories appeared to have been largely pacified, and their bond with the crown repaired. This relatively harmonious relationship may be seen as a consequence of three factors, which worked in conjunction with one another: first, once the repressive phase had come to an end, on the one hand, the jurisdictional prerogatives of the kingdoms' own institutions were restored, while, on the other hand, the pressure on the periphery for the transfer of resources to the centre was reduced. At the same time, the traditional financial networks and mechanisms that closely involved the Italian territories in the management of the monarchy's public treasury were reactivated. The longstanding nature of this collaboration accounts for

the fact that the most notable anti-Spanish conspiracy in the early eighteenth century, the so-called Conspiracy of the Prince of Macchia in Naples, was not followed up in any way, while, on the contrary, Philip V's visit to the capital of the largest of his Italian possessions greatly consolidated the new sovereign's relationship with the kingdom, despite the fact that its detachment from the monarchy's political orbit was imminent, and in fact occurred in 1707 (Granito 1861).

The tension between kingdoms' rights and attempts to create a united monarchy was very pronounced in Portugal (fully discussed in [Chapter 6](#)) and Catalonia, and particularly in the latter. Already by 1600, the Catalans, or at least their elites, had begun to see the Spanish monarch as an absentee ruler (Spanish kings generally did not visit kingdoms other than Castile and lived mostly in Madrid or the Escorial) as well as a Castilian one, surrounded by Castilian advisors and steadfastly intent on Castilianising the monarchy. The main result was an increasing in the tensions between the kingdoms in Aragon and a monarch that Catalans started to be as Castilian. That, indeed, is what happened in 1640. A movement that began as a peasant uprising against the royal troops stationed in the kingdom, in anticipation of a French invasion during the Thirty Years War, was quickly transformed into a struggle to defend the kingdom and its liberties against a king accused of acting tyrannically. Not all Catalans aspired to independence, and even in the years following the 1640 revolt, many Catalans publicly proclaimed their loyalty to Philip IV and Spain. But the crisis of 1640 crystallised opposition to the crown's centralising policies and encouraged the idea that the most important civil conflict was that of kingdom against kingdom. Perhaps more importantly, even if heretofore scarcely conceivable, it became possible to imagine a separate Catalan community, distinct from the other communities in the peninsula. This imagined community enjoyed unique political rights and freedoms and was also increasingly conscious of being a nation of Catalan people, not just a kingdom (Torres i Sans 2008).

Image 2.1A pro-Catalan pamphlet contemporary of the 1640 crisis *Iustificacio en conciencia* (Barcelona, 1640).

Source: Courtesy of Universitat de València. Biblioteca Històrica

The most consequential outcome of the revolt in 1640 was the separation of a significant part of the kingdom and its immediate integration into the French monarchy as a province without the rights that the kingdom had enjoyed within the Spanish monarchy. Although

militarily defeated and reconquered by the Spanish monarch's armies in 1652, Catalonia was reincorporated into the monarchy without formally losing any of its privileges, rights, or institutions. From 1640 onwards, internal divisions began to appear between Catalans who wanted to protect the rights and the separate identity of the kingdom and those who opposed any suggestion of independence and were prepared to publicly demonstrate their loyalty to Philip IV and Spain. The Catalan elites drew another lesson from this experience: the French monarchy was far more centralising and homogenising than the Spanish one (Elliott 1963).

Image 2.2*L'Espagnol despoillé*, satirical engraving about the conquest of Perpignan by the French.

Source: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, France

The second half of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century were marked by major changes in both Iberian monarchies. In Portugal during the Braganças, the *Cortes* or parliament—which was larger than that of Castile—continued to play an important role in the government of the realm, having been summoned in 1641, 1642, 1645, 1653, 1668, 1673, 1679, and, finally, in 1697. Furthermore, from 1645 onwards, the representatives of Goa, Salvador da Bahia, and later São Luís do Maranhão, were authorised to participate in the *Cortes* of Portugal. In parallel with the lengthy debates being held about the jurisdiction of the *Cortes* in the area of taxation, the “assembly of the three estates” continued to intervene intermittently in matters relating to the succession. Its presence was felt at some of the key junctures for the crown, such as, for example, the coronation of each new king or the oath-taking of the princes and heirs. The royal circle were tolerant of the assembly's occasional intervention in such an important sphere, although they also sought to underline that such participation was a limited and localised matter. Whenever the debate touched on more sensitive issues, royal officers rapidly intervened, doing everything possible to direct the discussion and limit the meddling of parliamentarians (Xavier 1998). In any case, for many of those involved, an active *Cortes* was not incompatible with strong royal authority. Furthermore, in Portugal, as in most of the peninsula, there continued to be many more who were critical of the authoritarian and “absolutist” style of the kings of France—disparagingly referred to as “despotic”—than those who were inclined to praise the French monarchs.

Image 2.3*The Immaculate*, protector of the Portuguese in their struggle against the Spanish monarchy, ca. 1648

In the late seventeenth century, there were many who noted that the Spanish monarchy lacked a common institution capable of fostering internal unity. The fact that each peninsular kingdom continued to have its own parliament or *Cortes* tended to be seen as yet another factor contributing to the internal disunity of the Habsburg monarchy, and the enveloping crisis only reinforced the idea that the assemblies of each kingdom made little contribution to the internal cohesion of the political body (Forteza Pérez 2001). Regarding the Crown of Aragon, after 1645, the parliament of Valencia never met again, but the kingdom's other representative bodies were relatively active. In Aragon, after a gap of 31 years, the *Cortes* was once again convened in 1677, following the coup of John Joseph of Austria (Gil Pujol 2002). In Catalonia, in the 1670s and 1680s, one of the main bones of contention was precisely the role played by the *Cortes*. In 1684, the *Cortes* of Catalonia finally assembled and, throughout the 1690s other representative bodies remained in session, often clashing with the royal officers.

Despite these tensions and problems, the Spanish monarchy during the reign of Charles II (1661–1700) continued to function in a manner that allowed it to preserve its unity without significant territorial losses, while at the same time establishing the conditions for a degree of political and economic recovery. In this period, attempts were made to preserve the unity of the monarchy, above all by augmenting Catalonia's role and participation. It was also a period in which a number of political initiatives were introduced, aimed at strengthening the royal government, and this during the reign of a monarch was considered to be the weakest in the history of early modern Spain.

Conclusion

The problems of the political and territorial composition of the Spanish monarchy were paradoxically resolved (at least in temporal terms) in the midst of what was the greatest crisis of the monarchy since the end of the fifteenth century. Charles II, the last of the Spanish Habsburg kings, died on 1 November 1700, at 39 years of age. The problem was not that the king had died young, however, but that he had died without leaving a direct heir. This precipitated an

unprecedented dynastic crisis for Spain: the emergence of two foreign candidates for the throne and the outbreak of a military conflagration of more or less global dimensions known as the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713). Lacking a composite structure comparable to that of the Spanish monarchy, Portugal managed to avoid the dynastic and constitutional crisis that occurred in Spain. Nevertheless, many of the measures introduced in Portugal in the early eighteenth century reveal that it was also heading towards a more authoritarian conception of royal power (see [Chapter 23](#)).

Note

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
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CHAPTER THREE

The Iberian polities within Europe

Politics and state building¹

José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez

Introduction

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, political competition gave rise, among other things, to a political system that incorporated several smaller powers under the leadership of the Spanish kingdoms. By the middle of the century this new construction, the Spanish monarchy, successfully limited the expansionist aspirations of its main international rivals, the Turkish empire and the kingdom of France, thus conserving its political, juridical, and territorial integrity. In the second half of the century, a number of circumstances and factors—the political crisis engulfing many neighbouring countries; the

confessional breakdown; the relative efficacy of the monarchy's structure, due to its flexible and hierarchical organisation—allowed the king of Spain to claim European hegemony, and to come to be seen as the political leader of the Catholic world. As a consequence, requests for intervention and assistance soon multiplied and surpassed the monarchy's available resources. The allies of the Catholic king were defeated in most of the conflicts that took place after 1586, frustrating the possibility of further large-scale expansion of the monarchy. By the end of the century, the possibility of indirect domination over the continent had completely vanished. New rivals (especially the United Provinces) and old ones (the kingdom of France) consolidated themselves and challenged the supremacy of the Spanish monarchy as the main political power, eventually displacing it after 1635 (Bennassar and Vincent 1999; Elliott 2006).

A new geopolitical order

The last years of the fifteenth century and the first of the sixteenth witnessed the rise of a new power in Europe, one that would show itself capable of even more radical transformation in subsequent decades. Until this juncture the Iberian peninsula did not feature prominently in the continental imagination, except as a distant theatre of conflicts against Muslim states, interminable civil wars between the different Christian kingdoms, and—most importantly—an active player in Mediterranean politics. The expansion of the Crown of Aragon into the south of Italy from 1282 did not seem to suggest the subordination of this territory to a foreign power, since the kingdom of Sicily retained considerable autonomy. When, in the fifteenth century, the Aragonese banished from Naples a junior branch of the French royal house, their king, Alfonso V, chose to establish his court in the capital of his new kingdom, almost neglecting his patrimonial dominions. Following his death, it would fall to his illegitimate son to pursue his ambition of further conquest, thus creating a local dynasty and separating the kingdom from the Aragonese inheritance that passed to his brother Juan II.

The aggregation of new territories by the kings of Castile and Aragon proceeded in two distinct stages: 1492–1504 and 1512–1525. The year 1525 saw the end of the Muslim rebellion in Valencia (Pardo Molero 2001b), the last of the civil wars to take place during the period of the consolidation of these new sovereigns' authority. In most

of the newly acquired territories and zones of influence of the recently crowned Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V (Charles I of Spain), royal power had been imposed through violence. Civil wars and conquests had been as important as rights and inheritance in the imperial territories (Arrieta Alberdi 2009; Floristán Imízcoz 2012; Mazín Gómez and Ruiz Ibáñez 2012; Gil 2016, ch. 2). Charles and his local allies were able to carry on where his parents, the monarchs of Castile and Aragon, had left off, emerging victorious from a series of internal and foreign conflicts (Ruiz Ibáñez and Sabatini 2009). The extension of their dominions brought the Spanish rulers into the very heart of the European and Mediterranean power struggle, so that the Iberian local elites had to adapt their old strategies to the new global needs of the monarchy (Garavaglia, Braddick and Lamoroux 2016).

The need for stability in this process of integration was a clear consequence of the change in the magnitude of the challenges that they had faced individually during the last third of the fifteenth century (Boucheron et al. 2009). The kingdom of France had imposed its power over England's traditional allies in its vicinity, incorporating the Duchy of Brittany (1491) by a marriage allegiance, the lands of some of the great feudal lords, like the Armagnac (1473) or the Anjou of Provence (1481–1487). Finally, the French kings vanquished their main rivals, the House of Burgundy, whose defeat by the Swiss (1477) led to the inclusion of the western half of the Burgundian dominions into the kingdom of France in 1482 (Potter 1993; Lecuppre-Desjardin 2016). To the east, the Ottoman Turks had overcome their own crisis of sustained growth and had consolidated their presence in the Balkans, Syria, and Egypt (1515–1517) (Sallmann 2003, chs 2–4). The pressure exerted by these blocks in different regions made it essential that the territories of the emergent Iberian monarchy be formed as a counter-weight and an entity capable of confronting Ottoman power (Ruiz Ibáñez 2014).

The French king and the Ottoman sultan would dispute Spanish Habsburg control over several regions, threatening the hold of the king-emperor and his allies over these dominions. Nonetheless, despite their great military might, neither the Turks nor the French could prevent the consolidation of the Habsburg monarchy as a polycentric and multi-territorial structure (Cardim et al. 2012). In fact, the looming threat of the Ottoman menace in particular served to accelerate the incorporation of some territories into the monarchy.

Most of the political strategies pursued by the Spanish monarchy in the 1520s and in the years between 1559 to 1578 were a consequence

of the twin menace of France and the Ottoman Empire. This generated a geopolitical situation in which the interests of the incorporated territories dovetailed with those of the monarchy, which paved the way for a joint military effort. The intersection of the French and Ottoman axes that expanded towards the South of Italy made the local elites welcome the protection afforded by Spanish military power. For the Crown of Aragon, it meant the ability to mobilise Castile's greater resources to wage its old conflict against the expansionist kingdom of France. Aragon thus gained an undoubted advantage in the opening phases of the protracted wars for the control of the Italian peninsula (1494–1504) and achieved a degree of security on its northern frontiers with the inclusion of Roussillon and Sardinia (1493). The Italian wars also prevented a possible French incursion into the Low Countries. The Flemish elite were in no doubt that their forces, even combined with those of their English and imperial allies, would not be strong enough to withstand a determined French offensive. Likewise, the Muslim principalities from Fez to Tripoli that enjoyed Spanish protection came to appreciate this military presence as a counterbalance to their traditional internal instability as well as protection against the incursions of the two new expanding powers that threatened them directly.

To the west, the new Saadi dynasty replaced the Watasi in Morocco, while in the east an even greater menace was emerging. From their strongholds in Egypt and Greece, the Turks were now poised to enter the struggle for the central Mediterranean. Their fleet had been reinforced, and by the second decade of the sixteenth century they had reached an agreement with the Barbarossa clan, the Barbary coast pirates who were proving a thorn in the side of Spain and its allies. As imperial agents backed by Ottoman resources, the Barbarossa and their local partners displaced each one of the local Muslim leaders in the region and presented a serious threat to the Hispano-Italian fleet. Even the Ḥafṣids of Tunisia were unable to resist them. Within just a few years, the north of Africa, hitherto a vassal territory of the monarchy, had become a space of imperial conflict.

The Turkish threat thus materialised in another sphere of action, in this case far from the hereditary dominions of Charles V. However, the Battle of Mohács (1526) and the Ottoman conquest of most of the Hungarian kingdom showed that the Sublime Porte was ready to attack the territories of the Holy Roman Empire directly. Ferdinand of Habsburg (1503–1564), Charles' brother, inherited the title of king of Hungary through his marriage with the sister of the late king, also

thus obtaining rights over the Crown of Bohemia. If on one hand the dynasty found itself in a stronger position on the Danube, on the other the proximity of the formidable forces of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (or “the Lawmaker” as he was also known) (1494–1566) reduced their chances of success. The Turks were ready to advance against the Holy Roman Empire as would become clear very soon.

The Holy Roman Empire was a convoluted conglomeration of dominions under the emperor’s feudal control, which in many cases was lacking any practical authority. The great nobles (the Dukes of Saxony, Brandenburg or Bavaria, the Elector of the Palatinate), the ecclesiastical territories, the free cities, the Teutonic Order, and many small and medium-sized states competed with each other, making and breaking allegiances while paying little or no attention to imperial authority. The emperor’s power depended in great measure on the wealth and importance of his personal estates, while the elective nature of his position meant that the question of dynastic continuity was open to interpretation. In any case, the prestige of the imperial title would not defeat the Ottoman troops, who presented an especially difficult dilemma for the monarchy given that the empire’s defensive front line was made up of Habsburg hereditary territories in the Danube valley. The small duchies of Austria, Carinthia, or Styria could not ever dream of stopping the Turks by their own means.

In order to understand the Spanish monarchy, one must consider the variety of forms of allegiance based on which different territories were incorporated, many of them not under the direct dominion of the king-emperor. There were many small territories, similar in kind to the North African sultanates, whose own interests and needs led them to seek or welcome being incorporated into the monarchy—to protect themselves or reinforce their internal stability (Ruiz Ibáñez 2014, 936–943). The leading princes of the empire were equally conscious of the dangers that French or Turkish expansion would bring, so their incorporation into the Habsburg imperial system seemed an attractive option. Sometimes the choice was a simple one—either accepting the superiority of the monarchy and its protection or integrating into its system of patronage and defence. These emerged as the means of preserving a recently acquired power or—more simply—to avoid being overcome by the Spanish forces.

Throughout the sixteenth century a number of smaller powers conserved their nominal sovereignty and a great part of their political autonomy, while operating under the monarchy’s aegis. These included the bishopric of Liège, the Duchy of Lorraine, the republics of

Genoa, and, in certain respects, Ragusa (Herrero Sánchez 2016), the Duchy of Savoy, Milan, Lucca, and Parma, the knights of the Order of Saint John of Malta and the Sultanate of Tunisia or Tlemcen. Some of these polities were especially important for the Spanish monarchy, since they ensured a measure of spatial continuity between otherwise geographically dispersed dominions, while others were important due to their strategic location. To guarantee their safety (and ensure their fidelity), the Spanish king maintained fortified garrisons (*presidios*) in some of these regions, which boosted Spanish influence over the local governments.

This imperial presence entailed the effective incorporation into the monarchy of some dominions, the most important of which would be Lombardy in 1535 and the coast of Tuscany (the State of the *Presidi*, or the “presidios of Tuscany”). Generally speaking, the coincidence of interests was the basis of the stability in these allegiances, thus reinforcing the local position of an elite that would benefit from the opportunities afforded by the imperial structure. The case of the Genoese bankers is eloquent in this regard. After hesitating about whether to offer their allegiance to either Spain or France, both the Republic and the admiral Andrea Doria (1466–1560) finally decided to form an alliance with the Spanish king (1528). They collaborated in his naval actions against the Turks, allowed the passage of Spanish troops through their territory to the north of Italy, actively participating in the credit system which sustained the Spanish monarchy and profiting from it, thus obtaining a privileged position in the Spanish economy.

This coincidence of geostrategic interests with the Genoese did not seem evident from the perspective of Castile. Notwithstanding its close economic relations with Flanders and England, the rulers of Castile had traditionally aligned themselves with the French kings. The conflicts in the Pyrenees between the latter and the Crown of Aragon appeared distant, and the war against the Ottomans in Central and Eastern Europe even more so. Had the Castilians wanted to wage a crusade, they could have done so against their Muslim neighbours.

The policies of the new Spanish monarchs changed all that. Traditional conflicts with Portugal were allowed to abate, paving the way for a marriage alliance between the ruling houses. Lisbon and Madrid negotiated over their respective spheres of influence, resulting in the Treaties of Alcáçovas (1479) and Tordesillas (1494). The limited incorporation of the kingdom of Navarre by Castile after its conquest in 1512 was King Ferdinand’s attempt to involve the

Castilian Crown in his imperial geopolitical strategies (Floristán Imízcoz 2012). Members of the Castilian nobility had already glimpsed during the Italian wars the opportunities that might arise if they participated in the construction of this new Spanish monarchy. Yet the funnelling of the kingdom's resources into foreign policy commitments nevertheless elicited strong opposition from the nobility and the cities, even after the Revolt of the Comuneros (1520–1522). The Castilians could easily appreciate that the protection of northern Africa served their cause, but the need to defend the interests of the Crown of Aragon, the Flemish territories, or the German principalities was not so obvious to them. The reward for being able to use Castile's enormous resources in the service of this expansive foreign policy was meant to be the tacit respect of the other parts of the monarchy and their allies for the Castilian commercial monopoly in the Americas, but even this was insufficient. Thus, Castile's commitment to the reinforcement and extension of the Spanish monarchy would lead to changes in its very definition.

The princes' wars and the imperial means

The 1520s established the framework for the next half a century. The Spanish monarchy was not without its problems, but it was sufficiently sturdy to rebuff the various attempts at expansion by the king of France in Flanders and the Iberian peninsula. In Italy, the imperial forces not only consolidated their possessions in the south of the peninsula, but also forced the French out of Lombardy and repulsed Francis I's subsequent offensives aimed at this territory and Genoa. The victory at the Battle of Pavia (1525) was the crowning success of this new policy. The king of France was captured, and the Treaty of Madrid forced him to make a number of major concessions to Charles V (Hamon 1995). To the east, the combined forces assembled by the emperor were able to resist Ottoman attacks in and beyond Hungary, fighting back two sieges of Vienna (1529 and 1532). The concentration of his rivals' resources on specific fronts relieved the tension in other frontier regions (Flanders or the Pyrenees), which was evidence of the effective use of the military resources at the king-emperor's disposal.

There were, nonetheless, other lessons to be learned in this decade. Imperial power was maintained in those territories where the pact with the elites was solid enough and the king could mobilise enough

resources. This was the case in Naples or Austria, and even in Milan, where the ducal house, the Sforza, was completely dependent upon imperial power. Yet, in those territories where the accord was more limited in nature or unstable, the monarchy was sometimes barely able to maintain its presence or to provide support to its allies. The Turks, their defeats at Vienna's gates notwithstanding, remained entrenched in Hungary. Furthermore, the monarchy showed little capacity for weakening its principal enemies from within. This underlined not only the limited nature of imperial resources but also the internal cohesion that the kingdom of France and the Ottoman Empire had developed.

The king of France was able to maintain his authority despite some major setbacks—the rebellion of the leading French nobleman, which was encouraged by Charles V in 1523; the king's own imprisonment after Pavia; and the terms of the peace treaties (Jouanna 2013). The triumph at Pavia had set off alarm bells in the small Italian states, and the subalpine peninsula was once again shaken by war between the French and the imperial forces—although after 1530 it seemed clear that the Spanish monarchy, still under the leadership of Emperor Charles, was solidly entrenched in both the southern kingdoms and in the Po Valley. The possession of the imperial title had allowed Charles, once the Sforza dynasty had been extinguished, to give the Duchy of Milan to his son, Prince Philip, in 1535. This feudal superiority allowed the king-emperor to appropriate other dominions to give more cohesion to the Low Countries, under the same policy of concentration used previously by the House of Burgundy.

Besides consolidating its hold on these crucial territories, the Spanish monarchy nevertheless seemed incapable of inflicting lasting damage on its rivals. The attempts to recuperate the Duchy of Burgundy after the peace of Madrid, the expedition to Provence in 1535, and the intention to reclaim Metz were all failures. To be sure, the incursion into Champagne in 1543 forced the king of France to sign the peace and to renounce his ambitions beyond the Alps as well as his claims on Flanders. However, since French royal power remained entirely intact, it was only a question of time before the king again forged allegiances with Charles V's rivals with the aim of challenging imperial supremacy in certain key territories. As late as 1557, the French army, with the support of the Pope, tried unsuccessfully to evict the Spanish from Naples. Things did not turn out any better with the Ottoman Turks. While it was evident that the Habsburg monarchy was losing control over the central Mediterranean

(Battle of Preveza, 1538), the attempts to retaliate by striking at the Sultan's own territories and promote a Greek-Albanian rebellion did not succeed in either Coron in 1532–1534, or in Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi, Montenegro) in 1539. The Turks not only preserved their forces and domains in the Balkans, but they also seemed unstoppable in the Maghreb. The emperor personally led two expeditions to try to impede this advance and to help his weakened allies. Following a victory in Tunisia in 1535 and a defeat in Algiers in 1541, Charles never recovered the military initiative. Meanwhile, the Hafsids in Tunisia and the Saadis in Morocco were involved in continual disputes that hindered any assistance they might otherwise have offered against the Sultan's forces. By the beginning of 1560s, Iberian power in the north of Africa appeared to have waned considerably. And things would only get worse.

Nevertheless, we should not disregard the triumphs of the Habsburg monarchy. Despite bringing to bear all their respective resources against it, the Turks and the French were unable to prevail. Their frustration was so great that they endeavoured, between in 1536 and 1542, to join their forces against Charles V. This collaboration can be seen as a clear recognition of their own military limitations and of the capacities of the Spanish monarchy. The so-called "Unholy Alliance" paradoxically reinforced the Habsburgs' *ethos*, as Charles V could henceforth present himself and his subjects as the true leaders of Christendom against the "common enemy", a tactic that also adversely affected the prestige of his French rival. Yet even when the Ottoman fleet wintered in French ports and cooperated with their navy (1543–1544), this collaboration did not bring about a real change in the balance of power. In reality, both emperor and sultan faced too many problems to think of extending their disputes beyond the Mediterranean. Both were trying to encourage or incite the enemies of their rival so as to preserve their own resources.

The decreasing threat in the Danube valley, despite the sporadic skirmishes between the Habsburg and the Ottoman armies, reduced the need for the German princes to unite their forces. The great nobility resented the attempts by Charles V to fulfil his imperial mission. He was the first emperor in centuries who had both the military force at his disposal and the desire to impose his feudal authority. These political tensions were compounded by religious divisions, since the Protestant Reformation had been supported by a part of the high nobility that did not accept the emperor's right to interfere in their dominions. The war of the Schmalkaldic league

(1546–1547) ended in a decisive triumph for the imperial forces that vanquished a confederation of Protestant nobles in the Battle of Mülbergh (1547). However, the sense of victory, and with it the prospect of reuniting Catholics and Protestants, as well as the possibility of turning the empire into a monarchy less dependent on nobility very soon dissipated. In 1552, a part of the German nobility stirred up a rebellion with French backing. Lacking the resources to prolong the struggle, the emperor had little choice but to recognise the nobility's autonomy, and his successor had to accept, by the Peace of Augsburg (1554), their right to define religion in their dominions. By this point, the transformation of the empire into an effective monarchy was an almost complete failure.

Constructing a monarchy

Already by the end of the 1550s, the Habsburg monarchy seemed to have established a solid territorial base. The kingdom of France, conscious of its vulnerability to the north after the Spanish victory at Saint Quentin (1557) had to renounce its Italian aspirations in the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559). The Spanish monarchy was constituted by three major spaces, separate but interconnected: the Italian regions, where imperial power was reinforced by the subordination of a series of minor powers; the Low Countries that, though they were part of the empire as the Burgundian Circle, had achieved a greater juridical and political unity under Charles V; and finally, the territories of the Iberian peninsula, with a structural alliance with the Crown of Portugal, that had a shared interest with Castile in maintaining their respective Atlantic monopolies. The loss of the imperial title in favour of a junior branch of the House of Habsburg was in fact a relief for the Spanish monarchy, now able to extradite itself from some of the confessional strife that plagued the empire and focus instead on the Turkish menace on the Danube and elsewhere.

Image 3.1 The siege of Saint Quentin (1557)

Source: Sebastian Münster, *Cosmographie: das ist, Beschreibung aller Länder, Herrschafften und fürnemesten Stetten des gantzen Erdbodens, ...* (1598). Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain

The defence of the monarchy's interests in these different territories was possible due to the mobilisation of resources by the king-emperor as sovereign of each region. Yet there were limits to this mobilization.

It is crucial to remember that in most parts of the monarchy the system of defence was organised by the local powers, by the nobilities and the cities through their armed corporations. The reliance on local forces meant that military requirements were defined according to the vulnerability of each dominion to external assault, and thus limited the offensive capacity of the monarchy (Ruiz Ibáñez 2009; Prak 2015). The king's armies were made up of professional troops, recruited from his subjects and under noble leadership, as well as by mercenaries of the most varied origin (Martínez Ruiz 2008). The navy was made up of ships financed directly by the royal government, by squadrons hired from major entrepreneurs (Genoese, Ragusan, Flemish, among others), and by private fleets mustered for the occasion. War was expensive, and ideally the royal armies would have been maintained with the fiscal contributions collected by the sovereign from his subjects, or, more commonly, loans advanced against such future contributions. It is not surprising that in all the territories of the monarchy there was significant resistance to the fiscal burdens imposed in order to finance the king's global policies, just as there was usually opposition to contributing to wars that did not directly benefit the particular territory in question. There was a constant fear that each new fiscal concession would destabilise the local balance of power in favour of the prince (Pardo Molero 2001a).

The imperial government had little choice. Even during the first half of the sixteenth century, war among princes was seen as an exceptional state of affairs, and so contributions were also understood to be "extraordinary". Consequently, military effort could only be sustained for a short time, and confrontations against the French and the Turks were thus interrupted by truces and periods of peace. Despite the great quantity of resources mobilised, the various contenders had to repeatedly reconstruct their credit systems. This situation generated intermittent but perennial conflicts. None of the great powers had the force to deal a decisive blow to their rivals, and each individual triumph was offset by a change of allegiance among the minor powers, such as the kingdom of England, the republic of Venice, the Papacy or even German nobility. The imperial needs brought about an expansion of the fiscal regime and this had direct political consequences.

The continuous mobilisations of Charles V were due in part to the need to renegotiate frequently the concession of new services or the total sum of taxation. The sovereign's presence brought about a political dialogue with the elites through which these groups agreed to

new fiscal concessions, albeit reluctantly. The monarchy was usually able to hold firm in these negotiations. In contrast to what happened in Germany, in the Low Countries the government of Charles V could withstand resistance as it was dispersed. On the one hand, the city of Ghent was ruthlessly repressed (1539); on the other hand, the resistance of the Dukes of Güeldres (Charles d'Egmont and William of Jülich-Cleve-Berg) ended with the annexation of their lands into the Habsburg domains in the Low Countries (1543).

The need to secure a constant flow of income in order to mobilise the necessary military resources forced the monarchy to redefine itself, especially after the 1530s. After the War of the Comuneros, the emperor redoubled his efforts to consolidate his relationship with his Castilian subjects, still uneasy with their integration into his global geopolitical strategy. Charles V took a decisive step of shoring up the entente with Portugal through his marriage (1526), and subsequently entrusted his wife, the capable Empress Isabel, with the governorship of the peninsula. During his stays in Spain between 1525 and 1539, the emperor could negotiate with the Cortes of Castile a fixed sum of taxes (*alcabalas*), which allowed him to maintain a firm and consistent international policy. It seemed clear that along with Italy, Castile, with the Indies duly integrated, would become the main purse of the monarchy. To effectively mobilise the resources in the service of this joint imperial enterprise, the government had to transform itself.

The way to involve Castile in this project, and by extension to encourage the three other Iberian Crowns to do so, was to Hispanise the monarchy, appointing Spaniards—not only Castilians, but also Aragonese, Catalans, and after 1580, Portuguese—to high offices. The royal entourage, the diplomacy, and the upper echelons of the central and territorial administrations thus boasted an increasing number of Spanish office holders. This was an unmistakable tendency from the 1520s onward. There was a gradual homogenisation of the principal agents of the king-emperor, as the posts of royal counsellors, viceroys, ambassadors, and (not to be forgotten) city governors were granted to his Spanish subjects. Even the royal household became more Hispanic, especially after Charles' son and successor fixed his residence in the Iberian peninsula after 1560. A phenomenon that became clearly perceptible in the last decades of Charles' reign and would thus intensify under Philip II.

The use of Iberian resources to support imperial hegemony had been evident since the beginning of the Italian wars. But during the conflicts of the 1540s, the backbone of the king-emperor's armies, in

France and in the empire, was the Spanish infantry, organised in *tercios*. The *tercios* were professional troops, recruited voluntarily from all ranks of society. These soldiers were more trustworthy and more effective than mercenaries and even more reliable than armed nobility. The limited number of these seasoned veterans meant that the “old infantry” was transferred from one front to another, from one war to another, and contributed to creating a global perception of a monarchy led by the *Spanish nation*, which included the inhabitants of all the kingdoms of the peninsula. The term “King of Spain” became common outside of the monarchy’s frontiers and soon defined not only the sovereign but monarchy itself.

This transformation enabled the growth of the fiscal system in Castile, whose population was in turn compensated with opportunities in the global management of the monarchy. Yet in the medium term, the result was devastating. The flow of resources out of Castile towards Europe, and the assumption of debts, contributed to the decapitalisation of Castile—a region that at the beginning of the century had been one of the most economically dynamic areas of the continent.

By 1560, two key processes had been completed: the conversion of the Habsburg monarchy into the Spanish monarchy and its consolidation as a stable political and military structure. The resources extracted from Spain and the Indies maintained a vast military network, linked by the fleets of Mediterranean galleys and the vessels of Flanders that moved troops between the Flemish and the Italian theatres of war (Yun Casalilla 2004; Marcos Martín 2006).

One of the outcomes of this process was the large-scale circulation of royal servants and officers of all ranks across the territories of the monarchy—and these figures in turn gained experience of government and military organisation in different regions and circumstances (Yun Casalilla 2008). Yet a mechanical model of a central power projecting itself over the *peripheries* has to be questioned. The king’s decisions were applied by local elites and their collaboration was dependent upon the extent to which royal policy matched their own interests, this in turn being necessary to maintain a modicum of consensus among their own populations. In these vast territories, there were many centres of decision-making, and the effective government of the monarchy depended on the maintenance of this polycentric arrangement (Cardim et al. 2012).

Following its disentanglement from the Holy Roman Empire in 1554, and the peace with France, the Spanish monarchy once again

had to face the Turkish menace in the Mediterranean from the 1560s. The long conflict between the two empires was finally settled in the centre of the Mediterranean. The Sultan and the Catholic king reaffirmed their supremacy in the regions each one controlled (the conquest of Cyprus in 1570, and around the same time, the repression of the Morisco rebellion of the Alpujarras). Again, neither of the two powers could inflict lasting damage on its rival, so, from 1578, both having reached a state of exhaustion, they had to find a *status quo* that would allow them to pursue other political priorities. Nevertheless, the great prestige gained by the Spanish King Philip II due to his triumphs over the Turks should not be overlooked. The lifting of the siege of Malta (1565) proved that the latter could be checked, while the battle of Lepanto (7 October 1571) showed that they could even be defeated—and that a Christian power could confront them directly and survive. For Philip II's subjects and for many Europeans it left no doubts regarding who had the right to claim the true leadership of Christendom. Moreover, this was taking place at a time when this leadership would be defined not only by Christendom's external enemies, but also by its internal ones.

Imperial ebb and flow

By the middle of the sixteenth century, the expansion of the Protestant Reformation and the tensions generated by the growing fiscal demands of the monarchies had weakened the internal stability of the states. As the religious function was considered to be the central characteristic of royal dignity, these sovereigns could not, in principle, tolerate dissidence. The success of the German nobility had demonstrated that religion was a means of generating sufficient unity to articulate political rebellions against a sovereign power that acted against local privileges. These tensions sprang up everywhere, weakening the effective power that kings had. The Habsburg-Valois wars had ended with the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. A new period now began in which European politics would be settled in civil wars. In these conflicts, the Catholic king would emerge as a powerful ally that would link his help to prospective rebels with the monarchy's program of expansion. In European politics, confessionalisation would be the vehicle of a new form of supremacy that would lead to greater Spanish influence in the continent, but also to its failure.

The Spanish monarchy was not without internal tensions of its

own. The rebellion in the Low Countries from 1566 to 1568 and the War of the Alpujarras showed the monarchy's desire for rigid control of the religion of its subjects, a situation that would eventually generate dynamics of rebellion. For the elites in these regions, royal actions were seen as an abuse of power, an intolerable interference well outside their authority and power. The so-called *Alteraciones* of Aragon (1591) showed that these opposition movements did not necessarily have a confessional dimension, but they conveyed the dissatisfaction of the local institutions against the exercise of royal authority in their territory.

Political instability became a generalised phenomenon. In France, after the death of Henry II (1533–1559), the government of his sons and widow was unable to put a stop to the conflict between the great Catholic and Protestant noble coalitions. In Scotland, Queen Mary Stuart (1542–1587) was forced by the Protestant nobles in 1567 to abandon the country, while in England, the ascension of Elizabeth (1533–1603) to the throne compelled the Catholics to enter the ranks of the opposition, strengthening the position of Irish nobility. Political weakness and instability in France allowed the Spanish monarchy to present itself as the political leader of the continent. In Italy, an important part of the dominions strived to maintain good relations with the Catholic king. Rome and Venice reluctantly accepted this situation since they had common interests with the monarchy, and in any case could not compete against it, and had no other options. As a result, in the second half of the sixteenth century the Iberian and Italian peninsulas enjoyed an extraordinary period of stability.

The forces of the Spanish monarchy were nevertheless very limited. The royal armies had to move between the Mediterranean wars and the desperate attempts to subdue the “rebels” in Flanders. By 1578 the results seemed limited and frustrating: the royal forces had almost vanished from the Low Countries, while in the Mediterranean a cessation of hostilities against the Turks now seemed urgent, with the loss of influence over Tunisia. Yet, freed from these burdens, the king could concentrate his resources in Portugal. After the death of the King Dom Sebastian in the Battle of Ksar el-Kebir, Philip II had strong hereditary rights over the kingdom. Thanks to both diplomacy and the force of arms, Portugal and its empire were incorporated into the monarchy between 1580 and 1583 (Bouza Álvarez 2010, ch. 1; Cardim 2014). Next it was the turn of the Low Countries, where the king's nephew, Alessandro Farnese (1545–1592), at the head of the army in Flanders, re-established royal authority in the Southern

Provinces (1583–1586) (Soen 2012).

These Spanish triumphs alarmed neighbouring rival monarchies, who tried to impede them: two French armadas were sent to help the enemies of Philip II in the Azores islands, while the Duke of Anjou (1555–1584), the heir to the French throne, accepted the title of sovereign in the Low Countries, consented to by the rebels resisting the Spanish forces (1580–1584). But it was all in vain. The pirate attacks, although a nuisance, never caused serious harm to the Spanish imperial structure outside Europe, just as the English expeditionary force—sent by Elizabeth to the Low Countries after the Treaty of Nonsuch (1585)—could not defeat Farnese's troops.

What made this string of military successes possible? The incorporation of Portugal, the reintegration of the southern Low Countries, and the repression of the Aragonese uprising were accomplished thanks to the assent of a notable segment of the local elites, and in some cases their active collaboration. As a result of this, the territories incorporated into the monarchy retained their privileges and autonomy. The pacts thus formed were so enduring that when their respective territories were once again attacked (Portugal in 1589 and Flanders after 1594), the actions of the local armed forces were the decisive factor in maintaining these territories under the control of the Catholic king.

The monarchy's protective aegis was not only welcomed by the territories that were traditionally associated with it. From 1578, a series of dynastic crises in Western Europe, in some cases coupled with religious conflicts, created new opportunities. The deaths of Dom Sebastian, the Duke of Anjou, and Mary Stuart—executed on the order of her cousin Elizabeth—left few alternatives from the perspective of many Portuguese, (Catholic) French, and English. For many Catholics, the Protestant kings or the heirs to the thrones of England (and Ireland), Scotland, and France were considered illegitimate. This situation offered new possibilities to the Spanish monarchy to influence the succession of those crowns, or even to secure them for a member of the Habsburg royal family and incorporate the territories directly into the monarchy.

The appeals for help directed at the Catholic king came from as far afield as the Balkans and North Africa. From the second half of the 1580s, external intervention as a means of imperial expansion seemed quite feasible, and not only offered Madrid a unique political opportunity but also the resources to control the rebels' lands of origin. The various resistance movements and civil war factions were

coalitions whose aims were often different, and in many cases even opposed to one another's. Each group saw Spanish help as a way of achieving its own objectives, seeing the monarchy's potential role from the perspective of their own political culture and context (Gil 2002, 2004, and 2009). The image of the monarchy was that of a liberating power, a necessary partner to win their own civil conflicts and develop their political projects, which did not necessarily coincide with those of the Spanish king (Hillgarth 2000; Ruiz Ibáñez 2014, 947–948).

The forces of the Catholic king proved to be incapable of satisfying so many demands. The army of Flanders could provide up to 35,000 highly trained soldiers for the battlefield. It was as impressive as it was expensive, but clearly not enough to impose Spanish supremacy in the northern Low Countries or put an end to the French civil war that began as a succession conflict in 1589, or indeed to conquer England. The Spanish intervention in France (1590–1594) could not defeat the army of Henry IV of Bourbon and decide the outcome of the war. The monarchy's fleet could not destroy the English navy, nor could it land an army in England (Armadas of 1588, 1596, and 1597). The small Irish-Spanish contingent could not prevail over the English forces on the island (Kinsale, 1601). Moreover, the need to redirect its resources to these engagements meant that the Spanish army had to cease its offensives against the Dutch.

Even worse, Spanish influence accelerated the disintegration of resistance movements as the expectations of many of their members were frustrated. The active anti-Spanish propaganda successfully labelled them as nothing but the agents of a foreign power. The apparent strength of the Spanish monarchy reinforced the ties of allegiance between its enemies leading to an agreement of military collaboration (Treaty of Greenwich, 1596). In their counterattacks they were sustained by the Papacy, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the republic of Venice, the sultan of Morocco, and the Ottoman Empire. The monarchy, whose military capabilities remained robust, stood up well to the attacks, and despite some notable victories, such as the Anglo-Dutch seizure of Cadiz of 1596, its enemies were not only unable to harm the imperial structure, but suffered a number of defeats at the hands of the Army of Flanders (1595–1596).

A series of peace agreements between 1598 and 1609 led to a cessation of hostilities on these different fronts. The regimes consolidated in the British Isles, the United Provinces, and France had been able to stabilise their countries and incorporate most of the

dissident forces. The most radical elements had been marginalised, tainted by association with the Spanish monarchy, and in many cases forced into exile.

The communities of refugees in the monarchy, quite visible in the 1570s, were consolidated thanks to a system of assistance set up by the Catholic king. After 1600, the numerous French, English, Irish, Scotch, and Dutch exiles no longer expected to reconquer their territories with Spanish help, but simply tried to reassess their own political projects as subjects of the Catholic king and help their coreligionists in their lands of origin. It was in these communities of foreigners where the most universalistic and radical discourses developed, ones that depicted what the Catholic king should be like (Janssens 2014; Ruiz Ibáñez and Pérez Tostado 2015).

The Spanish monarchy had survived as the principal continental power, and this situation would continue without much change until 1635, though the Spanish power was no longer considered to be a global force that was a threat to the territorial integrity of its main rivals. The cost of the great power politics of the period 1580 to 1600 for Castile and Italy had been overwhelming and accelerated the problems of excessive indebtedness, decapitalisation, and, consequently, the complete exhaustion of society. A sense of grandeur and a longing of glory would still weigh heavily in Spanish culture in the following century (Marcos Martín 2006).

For the duration of the seventeenth century the monarchy would have to confront old and new enemies that were not only capable of mounting effective resistance, but now actually began to encroach on its spheres of influence. The Ottoman Empire no longer appeared as an aggressive rival, but the United Provinces and England had not only foreclosed the possibility of integration into the Iberian territories and their diplomatic networks but had begun to challenge the Spanish overseas monopolies. France was still the most populous kingdom of Europe, and so once it finally overcame its internal divisions it would resume hostilities until its triumph in 1659. The monarchy's resources and structure would prove to be insufficient to maintain its preponderance in Europe. A process of disintegration began, above all in 1640–1660 and 1700–1714, with the separation from the Portuguese empire and the division of territories that had once belonged to the Spanish monarchy.


¹This study represents one part of a broader research project entitled “Hispanofilia IV: Los mundos ibéricos frente a las oportunidades de proyección exterior y a sus dinámicas interiores”, HAR2017-82791-C2-1-P, Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades. Translated by Gabriela Vallejo Cervantes.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Religious identities in the Iberian worlds (1500–1700)



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In the setting of religious confrontations that marked the European world of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in support of the imperial undertaking that justified itself by its proselytising, the Iberian monarchies made adherence to the Roman Catholic faith a central element of their identities as realms composed of disparate territories. For which reasons it became one of their main political goals the establishment of confessional uniformity in their peninsular and European territories, while at the same time, the promotion of religious conversion among the peoples encountered in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Based on some interpretations in recent historiography on the character of modern Catholicism and its global spread, this chapter analyses the manner in which, within the Iberian peninsula, in the Atlantic world and in Asia, societies were characterised by their adherence to the Roman Catholic faith. Their members ended up identifying themselves as Catholics, despite the

margins of “creativity” that are expressed in the ways of indoctrination, and their various expressions of a religiosity that did not always conform to the models defined by orthodoxy, and by their innumerable daily transgressions of norms. In this sense, this analysis shows the configuration of multiple cultural Catholic identities within the different Iberian worlds; or, if you prefer, of diverse expressions of a modern Catholicism, that, despite its undeniable intolerance and violence, was also characterised by a certain flexibility.

Image 4.1 Portable altar, Japanese manufacture, with a portrait of Ferdinand III, king of Castile and Leon (possibly based on a portrait of John IV of Portugal).

Source: Museo Nacional de Artes Decorativas, Madrid, Spain

INTRODUCTION

With Europe embroiled in religious confrontations, and amid imperial conquests justified by their evangelising mission, Portugal and the Spanish monarchy played a fundamental, albeit not unique, role in spreading the Catholic faith across the world, and thereby contributed to the global dimension of early modern Catholicism (Banchoff and Casanova 2016; Marcocci et al. 2014; Catto, Mongini, and Mostaccio 2010; Ditchfield 2010). Indeed, the Iberian monarchies made the Catholic faith a central element of their identity as kingdoms and as composite political entities. They promulgated policies to uphold religious uniformity in their peninsular and European territories, simultaneously sponsoring religious conversion among people in America, Asia, and Africa. The initiatives adopted, which involved many actors beyond the royal and ecclesiastical authorities, contributed to the construction of societies within and beyond the peninsula which came to identify themselves as Catholic. Over and over again, these societies found creative ways of introducing Catholicism; their expressions of religiosity and their customs did not always align strictly with the models defined by ecclesiastical authorities. With this in mind, this chapter seeks to analyse the way in which, within different Iberian worlds, multiple Catholic identities were forged during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, contributing to different expressions of early modern Catholicism, which, despite its indisputable intolerance and violence, also showed a certain degree of flexibility and a certain capacity to adapt.

Even today, few studies addressing issues of religion and religious identity have encompassed both the Portuguese and Spanish worlds

(Hsia 2005, 187–198; Maldivsky and Palomo 2018). There are abundant studies on the kingdoms as separate entities, which treat them almost as autonomous and unconnected spaces, despite their political integration between 1580 and 1640. As Charles R. Boxer pointed out in his day, many synergies existed (in terms of both confessional and missionary strategies) between the two monarchies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Boxer 1978).

The following pages, therefore, seek to articulate a connected, rather than comparative, vision of the way in which different expressions of early modern Catholicism were formed in territories where the Spanish and Portuguese were present. Rather than aligning our reading along imperial borders, we highlight the differences in the processes of religious conversion which existed in three different contexts: first, the territories and communities under the control of the Iberian Crowns; second, the territories located at the border of the two Empires; and, third, the territories in which missionaries' undertakings lacked any sort of imperial (Iberian) political support and were conditioned by the wishes of the local powers. In turn, we deem it essential that our approach overcome and rethink the “cultural geography of Catholic expansion”, which has traditionally been considered from a Eurocentric, unidirectional viewpoint (from the centre to the periphery), paying little attention to the ways in which the non-European worlds shaped Catholicism (Ditchfield 2010). From this starting point, it also seems natural to explore the links between metropolitan and colonial contexts. As Allan Greer and Kenneth Mills have pointed out, far from considering them closed and isolated, as traditional historiography has done, we should focus on the connections which emerge between the religious dynamics developed in European contexts and those developed in American and some Asian regions. These dynamics could follow similar logic and, above all, were shaped by a vast and multidirectional circulation of experiences (Greer and Mills 2007). To that end, the geographical scope adopted in this study will not prevent an analysis which considers the continuities and connections which were naturally produced between the peninsula and the Atlantic and Asian territories where the Spanish and Portuguese were present.

The domestic Indies

The Counter-Reformation Church's efforts to indoctrinate rustic

peasants and the illiterate population, the result of a widely held image of them as irrational and ignorant people, are well known. This translated into the discovery in the second half of the sixteenth century of a kind of “domestic Indies”, that is, of a world inhabited by people whose simplicity and barbarity was equal to that of indigenous Americans. Like them, European peasants needed to be changed into more civil people through teaching of doctrine and good customs. The identification of the European peasant with the indigenous American is perhaps one of the clearest expressions of the links which were created between the missionary worlds of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans and that of Europe, which, in parallel, was perceived as superficially Christian (Prosperi 1982). Thanks to this consciousness of a “domestic Indies”, intense missionary activity directed at believers emerged in parts of the Iberian peninsula and in other parts of Europe which remained faithful to Rome—activity which found its analogue in the missions directed at the gentile and pagan peoples of Asia, Africa, and America. Indeed, this domestic mission became one of the most unique disciplinary means deployed by the ecclesiastical authorities in the context of the confessional politics of the Iberian monarchs (Palomo 2003; Rico Callado 2006).

In sixteenth-century Europe, confessional affiliation acquired a clear political value. The requirement to adhere to the sovereign’s faith was extended to all subjects, in order to guarantee harmony and the preservation of the State; religious dissidence was seen as a potential threat. From the middle of the century onwards, different strategies were deployed aiming to control orthodoxy and spread doctrine and moral norms. In the Iberian peninsula, the ambition for religious uniformity began to materialise in the final decades of the fifteenth century, when both the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns attempted to expel Jews and Muslims from their respective territories. Alongside the expulsion, they promoted violent campaigns of conversion. The forced baptism of Jews in Portugal in 1497 was mirrored in the forced conversion of the Muslims in the kingdom of Granada in 1502 (Soyer 2007). The latter ended a decade of religious policies which, through strategies of persuasion (Hernando de Talavera) or force (Jiménez de Cisneros), consistently sought to transform the old Muslim kingdom, conquered in 1492, into a Christian land (Coleman 2003). Indeed, the religious integration of Jews and Muslims had political, social, and cultural consequences which ended up affecting the whole of Iberian society—from the establishment of the Inquisitions to the emergence of new identities,

new socio-political categories (*converso*, *morisco*, *cristiano viejo*), new forms of otherness (but also of familiarity), and a new definition of Iberian Catholicism itself (García-Arenal 2014). But because the conversions were forced, the new converts were never accepted as true and sincere believers. As a result, tools of exclusion were created, best demonstrated through the laws of *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood). Both experiences of conversion, in fact, became references for what would later happen in the Iberian “conquests” of Asia and America; the status held by Jewish and Muslim converts in peninsular societies found its parallel in imperial territories where the indigenous people, while brought into the colonial order through baptism, never shook off their status as subalterns.

Alongside the challenges raised by the presence of *moriscos* and *cristãos novos* were the threats emerging from the religious crisis in Europe. As religious frontiers became more clearly defined from the middle of the sixteenth century, so did accompanying confessional policies. Some people and groups linked to the *recogimiento* and the mystical spirituality which had emerged in the first half of the century as a response to reformist ambitions came to be seen as focal points of Lutheran heresy or suspected of heterodoxy. In the 1550s, the first inquisitorial cases were brought against professors at the University of Coimbra, such as João da Costa, Diogo de Teive, and Jorge Buchanam (Brandão 1948–1969). The same years in Spain saw the first prosecutions against reformed circles in Seville and Valladolid amid accusations of Lutheranism. The *autos de fe* which took place in 1559 marked the beginning of a hardline religious politics which found one of its most powerful instruments in the Inquisition. The arrest in the same year of the Archbishop of Toledo, Bartolomé de Carranza, was a clear expression of the Inquisition’s long shadow, and opened the way for persecution, censorship, and suspicion which would be cast upon other religious people and their writings (such as Francisco de Borja, Luis de Granada, and Diego de Estella) as well as specific groups like the Jesuits, who eventually reshaped their forms of spirituality (Tellechea Idígoras 2003–2007; Pastore 2004; Civale 2008; López Muñoz 2011; Boeglin 2016). With the end of the Council of Trent in 1563, all the dioceses in Castile and Aragon adopted its decrees (albeit with some nuances), and the provincial synods and councils, held under the attentive gaze of the Spanish monarch, established the foundations for the episcopacy to enact controlling and disciplinary policies (Fernández Terricabras 2000).

In Portugal, the Inquisition, created in 1536, also played an

essential role in the confessional policies implemented by the Portuguese political and ecclesiastical authorities. At the heart of this was Cardinal Henry, later King Henry I of Portugal. In his role as Inquisitor General, legate *ad latere* and even regent, he laid the foundations for Catholic confessionalisation in the Portuguese kingdom. He also established an inquisitorial power which, as in Castile and Aragon, came to cast its shadow over the relatively cooperative Portuguese episcopacy, which had efficient instruments of control in pastoral visits, and over the religious orders and specifically their confessors (Marcocci 2004; Palomo 2006; Paiva 2011).

Alongside coercive apparatus like the Inquisition, censorship and episcopal officials' control over the religious and moral life of the faithful, peninsular Catholicism liberally employed more persuasive and/or pedagogic tools which, subtler, helped to disseminate and shape the Counter-Reformation imagination. These tools encompassed all sorts of apostolic and pastoral activities: preaching, administering sacraments, spiritual direction, teaching the *rudimenta fidei*, assisting the poor, and the aforementioned rural missions. But there was also a vast arsenal of religious images, dramatic performances, and liturgical festivals, as well as books, papers, and an endless stream of printed and manuscript devotional texts which flooded early modern communities with doctrinal principles, models for living, and guidelines to regulate the behaviour of the faithful in their relationships with God, with other members of the community, and with ecclesiastical and secular authorities.

Beyond their liturgical, doctrinal, and spiritual functions, these tools served to articulate a religious and political language which often sought to extol the figure of the monarch, the kingdom, the city, the patron saint, or a specific image. They thereby confirmed the established order, engendered conformity and reinforced corporative, local and royal identities. The religious element was also an effective means of legitimation and consensus-forming for royal authorities as well as other actors, playing a central role in the development of an emerging public sphere. The role of preachers in the Portuguese succession crisis in 1580 is well known, as is their role 60 years later as a legitimising tool during the *Restauração*. The Spanish monarchy was not indifferent to the debates about the Immaculate Conception which unfurled in 1615 and which, to a great extent, lasted throughout the rest of the century. In what became a kind of battle of (written) words, the controversy generated no end of sermons, images, treatises, notices, and leaflets full of prayers and verses, through

which the defenders of the *opini3n p3a* persuaded different institutions, and above all the faithful (and certainly the Iberian monarchs) to adhere to their cause. Indeed, the monarchy took on the cause of the Immaculate Conception as its own, and made it into an expression of its providentialism in the face of Roman authorities battling Spanish meddling in questions of orthodoxy (Prosperi 2006; Broggio 2009, 171–203).

Throughout, there was a clear objective to reinforce a peninsular Catholicism against Rome. To that end, saints, martyrs, images, and relics came to acquire particular importance beyond their strictly religious functions. In 1652, during the Portuguese *Restaura33o*, Jorge Cardoso commissioned the printing in Lisbon of the first volume of his *Agiologio Lusitano*, a monument of sacred scholarship, a compendium of *Lives* which sought recognition for Portuguese sanctity (Fernandes 1996). Whole territories, communities, institutions, orders, and social groups found, in the figures of saints and martyrs, a vehicle for their respective ambitions; promoting specific figures as saints could be an effective way of reinforcing social and political links and identities. Theresa of Jesus, Ignatius Loyola, and Francis Xavier had a determining role in the spirituality and identity of their respective congregations, but also outside them. It was no coincidence that the Iberian monarchs supported many of these processes of canonisation (when not directly promoting them), fully aware of how significant the recognition of holiness could be in political and even dynastic terms. The Spanish monarchy mobilised actors and resources in Rome during the first half of the seventeenth century to promote Ferdinand III of Castile and Queen Elizabeth of Portugal or of Aragon (1271–1336) as saints. The canonisation of the latter would serve as a reminder of the links uniting the Spanish monarchs with the two territories (Serrano Mart3n 2005; Vincent-Cassy 2002, 2011b; 3lvarez-Ossorio 2006).

The end of the sixteenth century saw a growing interest in peninsular martyrology. Although emerging from different roots, the phenomenon was not unrelated to the discovery in 1578 of the paleo-Christian catacombs in Rome. The catacombs had become a symbol of a “Roman”, pontifical, Christianity, which was proposed as a genuine reflection of primitive Christianity. Within the Iberian peninsula, bishops, cathedral chapters, and town councils also encouraged the recovery of relics of saints and martyrs from the period of Hispania’s Christianisation and its first bishops, and from the era of Muslim rule. The veneration of figures like Saints Ildefonso and Leocadia in Toledo,

Saints Justus and Pastor in Alcalá de Henares, and Saint Euphrasius in Jaén was promoted. In 1592, Archbishop Theotonius of Braganza ordered for a fragment of the arm of Saint Mantius († 100), martyr and first bishop of the diocese of Évora, to be brought to the Portuguese town. Often, these relics were used as a tool to assert the authority of the bishops who had been put at the centre of Church reform by the Council of Trent. But, at the same time, they emerged in opposition to the Roman world as an expression of a “Hispanic” (i.e., Iberian) holiness which, like the Roman one, was also a reflection of a primitive and martyrial Christianity (Vincent-Cassy 2011a).

In general, the worship of relics became an affirmation of the Catholic faith against the Protestants, and thereby gave rise to collections like those at the monasteries of El Escorial, São Roque in Lisbon and the Encarnación in Madrid. Missionary enterprises played a unique role in this, facilitating a global circulation of relics by connecting metropolitan and colonial spaces. Not only were relics sent from the Old World to the colonies; as ideals associated with martyrdom were revitalised, the remains of those who had been persecuted and perished for their faith on missions in places like England acquired particular value (Pérez Tostado 2017). The relics of the Martyrs of Japan spread from Macao and Manila to Mexico, Rome and the Iberian peninsula, becoming sought-after and exalted objects in churches and private collections. The presence of a relic of the Japanese martyr Diogo Kisai in the mid-seventeenth century, in Viana do Alentejo in Portugal, reveals how important they were in Iberian contexts, helping to establish concrete connections between the two worlds which were thousands of miles away. The trials and tribulations of a martyred Christianity were projected across the world and, as a result, the remains of a particular native Japanese saint could now be venerated in the remote south of Portugal (Palomo 2016).

Although saints, images, and relics acquired new meanings in Tridentine Catholicism, the desire to promote their worship also reinforced forms of religiosity which historiography would typically class as traditional. The Tridentine model favoured more personal devotional practices, based in the sacraments, the liturgy, and the worship of more abstract and universal figures and invocations (such as Christ, the Virgin, or modern saints). But, at the same time, *ancien régime* Iberian societies continued to observe practices taken from more local and communal Catholicism. Many communities continued to express their devotion and identity through old images, vows,

rogations, hermitages, and sanctuaries, and kept them as their main tools of intermediation with God and the saints (Christian 1981). These were, most likely, not incompatible models of religiosity. Indeed, fluidity and permeability between them was probably the norm, with early modern communities integrating moral and devotional patterns established by ecclesiastical authorities, and the latter in turn showing some flexibility by accepting, or even openly promoting, expressions of religiosity which were rooted in local communities (as long as they did not openly contradict orthodoxy). Cults of the Virgin Mary and Christ grew, but this did not prevent images like the Virgen de la Salceda (Guadalajara) or the Santo Cristo do Outeiro (northern Portugal) from taking on a votive nature. Therefore, instead of playing a simply reminiscent role, evoking the figures they represented, the objects led to the rise of vows and pilgrimages, attracting huge numbers of the faithful from surrounding regions. Attributed even greater powers as intermediaries thanks to their capacity for miracles, many other sanctuaries sprung up (or attracted new attention) throughout the Iberian peninsula during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, often gaining the patronage and protection—and control—of bishops and religious orders.

A new type of Catholicism thus emerged, which would neither fully become the religion established by the ecclesiastical powers, nor fully leave behind the pre-reform traditions. More personal expressions of devotion developed, made up of, for example, meditations, spiritual exercises, and examinations of conscience. Countless texts—confessionary manuals, prayer guides, sermons, hagiographies, and so on—circulated, offering standards of moral conduct and guidelines of spiritual life which, inspired by the monastic world, advocated for frequent recourse to the sacraments (particularly confession), and methodical prayer practices (especially meditation and contemplation). These texts were read in different ways, and subject to multiple forms of appropriation. In any case, many of them laid out different models of exemplary life and religiosity, tailored to different public and social groups. Just as princes, nobles, married couples, widows, clerics, nuns, merchants, and farmers played different roles within society, so the path to salvation—and sometimes the forms of piety they had to observe—was different for each of them (Caro Baroja 1978). This is not to say that models of piety traditionally confined to monastic life did not spread among the humbler people: for example, the Franciscans and Oratorians introduced meditative practices in rural Portuguese communities during the seventeenth

century. People from across the spectrum of society could adopt ways of life based on religious perfection and more elevated methods of prayer. Ultimately, these ambitions led to the emergence of expressions of holiness which did not always sit well with the inquisitorial authorities' interpretation of orthodoxy (Tavares 2005).

The reception of devotional practices, norms of conduct, and doctrines across the peninsula was far from homogeneous. The solutions which emerged were varied, and often negotiated. Transgressions from the norm were widespread, ranging from those related to the sixth commandment to those which forayed into the world of superstition or heterodox spirituality. In the Iberian peninsula, Catholic reform did not look the same from region to region (Nalle 1992; Poska 1998) or from group to group. In truth, discussing the success—or lack thereof—of confessional processes is a somewhat futile exercise, subject to endless casuistry and contradictory evidence. Lack of discipline and transgression were, undoubtedly, completely normal within the peninsular Catholic world, but conformity, observance of precepts, and adherence to orthodox religiosity were too. In figures like the Spanish carder Bartolomé Sánchez, the Portuguese farmer João Pinto, and the Portuguese-Brazilian settler Pedro de Rates Henequim we see how norms could be avoided or subverted (Nalle 2001; Ribeiro 2005; Gomes 1997). But, at the same time, we can see them as individuals not completely alien to the Church's reformist objectives. They took on an active role in incorporating and internalising religious practices, guidelines for conduct and so on, opening up a wide field within which both orthodox forms of religiosity and idiosyncratic appropriations and interpretations of texts, doctrines, and observances could sit side by side. In the mid-eighteenth century, João Pinto compiled a unique eschatology which included the end of Hell through a needle through which the Virgin of Mercy would save each soul one by one. The farmer's ideas, his exorcisms, and the powers attributed to him led to the congregation in the Portuguese hamlet of Mondim de Basto of a group of followers who eventually joined the community's religious festivals (Ribeiro 2005). In contrast, Isabel Miranda, an illiterate weaver-woman, exemplified the "orthodox" path taken by many women and men who were considered to live a holy life (Fernandes 1999).

The paths taken by these figures demonstrate a reality crossed by multiple influences, from both above and below. They show that different forms of religiosity and conduct were defined by exercises of

creativity and negotiation. In contrast to the perception of a uniform peninsular Catholicism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the religious landscape was in fact far more diverse, with communities and people—regardless of their overall more or less orthodox or heterodox attitudes—defining themselves in confessional terms, all recognising themselves as Catholic. This diversity would go on to be even stronger and more telling in the monarchies' colonial territories, where, in the Atlantic, the mixing of indigenous communities, people of Iberian origin, Africans, *mestizos*, and *mulatos* naturally gave rise to unique forms of Catholicism.

The emergence of a Catholic Atlantic

As is well known, the papal bulls which acted as the juridical foundation for the Iberian Crowns' imperial projects imposed a requirement to convert gentiles. However, evangelisation was initially carried out somewhat off the cuff—and indeed sometimes not at all—during the first commercial and colonising journeys in the Atlantic. The first explorations of the African coast in the fifteenth century were not accompanied by any concerted efforts of proselytism, never going beyond nominally baptising slaves. Only in the 1490s did a more concrete project emerge, when members of religious orders were sent to the kingdom of Kongo, although even this did not last long. The colonisation of the West Indies, which began at the same time, similarly lacked any systematic attempts to convert the natives. In the Atlantic, the process of evangelisation became clearer during the 1520s, when the conquest of Mexico allowed the Spanish to shape an empire with different characteristics. Less than a decade before the evangelising projects in Portuguese India, the mendicant orders, imbued with millenarian ideas and elements of Christian humanism, sought to establish a new Jerusalem—a new Christianity – in Mexico (Ricard 1933; Phelan 1956). Furthermore, beyond its role legitimising imperial power itself, conversion acquired an explicitly political significance. Through baptism, indigenous peoples were brought into the new colonial order. In the long term, the adoption of their conquerors' faith contributed to the cultural transformation of the peoples and to their “westernisation” (Gruzinski 1988), and led to the establishment of long-lived forms of power. Ultimately, and mirroring the criteria used in metropolitan contexts, making the natives “good Christians” opened up the path to making them “good subjects” (Díaz

Serrano 2012; Xavier 2008).

As noted, the pursuit of a “spiritual conquest” in the territories which the Spanish and Portuguese brought under the command of their respective crowns found a precedent in the evangelisation of Granada and in episodes of forced baptism of Jews and Muslims. In colonial contexts, although native peoples were converted to the Christian faith and included in the new political order through baptism (which was initially understood in Pauline terms as a transformative element *per se*), this did not prevent forms of exclusion that in many ways mirrored those used against *moriscos* and *cristãos novos*. The indigenous people were reduced to eternal minors, whose conversion—always doubted and suspected anyway—was considered ever incomplete. In turn, this accentuated the liminal position which, for the most part, they occupied within the colonial order (Estenssoro 2003; Xavier 2008).

In Mexico, the Franciscans immediately adopted strategies which combined violence and persuasion alongside mass baptisms. They sought to eradicate all ritual and supernatural elements from the indigenous imaginary and build in its place a new Christian one. Just as had happened in Granada and as would happen later in Goa and Peru, they destroyed temples and idols, prohibited celebrations, and worked to discredit—or even banned—traditional intermediaries. In their place, they built churches, introduced new rites and a liturgical calendar, crafted tools to indoctrinate the natives (written, visual and so on), and introduced new moral and social norms. But they also found room to adapt and, as we shall see, to establish continuities between the Catholic and indigenous worlds, searching for elements which could be used to inscribe the “new humanity” of the Americas into sacred history. But above all, they gave new meanings to rituals, spaces, and figures, thereby enabling the persistence of expressions of the pre-Conquest religious world.

Beginning in the 1560s and 1570s, while significant changes were taking place in the political and ecclesiastical fields, the initial methods of conversion and the features which had tinged them with Christian humanism came into question. The College of Tlatelolco, founded to educate Mexican nobles, went into decline. It was a period in which “colonial orthodoxy” came to be defined (Estenssoro 2003). In this sense, the American world was not isolated from the changes which were going on at the same time in European and metropolitan contexts. The period saw the founding of the inquisitorial tribunals of Mexico and Lima (1569), and the first visits of the Portuguese

Inquisition to Brazil (1591). It also saw the introduction of Tridentine reforms in colonial contexts and, alongside this, the reinforcement of episcopal authority (over that of the religious orders). In sixteenth and seventeenth century Portuguese America this process was rather specific, in large part due to its weak episcopal and parochial framework (Souza, 2014). In Spanish America events such as the Third Council of Lima (1582) and Third Council of Mexico (1585) were held, which became particularly prominent in missionary terms, aiming above all to standardise the doctrine to be taught and to define more clearly what would be considered idolatrous. In this sense, the image of the submissive native, which presented them as particularly disposed to embrace the Catholic faith, took on darker tones, painting them as a seemingly indomitable people. In one sense, the native passed from being a mere pagan to being a guilty idolater (Estenssoro 2003, 440). This reimagining of the native justified their isolation and differentiation from the rest of the faithful and sustained the idea of permanently unfinished conversion. For Bernardino de Sahagún, many of the Christian devotions which the indigenous people observed were no more than the continuation of pre-Hispanic ancient worship. More pointedly, the Jesuit José de Acosta distinguished two types of idolatries: those associated with natural elements (the sun, rivers, mountains, trees, and so on) and those which came from human invention (idols, mummies). Both types, though, were the work of the devil, and needed to be eradicated. The years from 1611 to 1660 saw successive campaigns to eradicate idolatries within the Andean world, the bishops and (Jesuit) priests acting together—for once—in an attempt to control indigenous religiosity and end all expressions which were considered idolatrous (Duviols 1971; Mills 1997). Similar, although far less intense, campaigns took place in New Spain and even in Portuguese America, where, in 1591–1592, the inquisitorial visitor Heitor Furtado de Mendonça had no qualms acting against Jaguaripe's so-called *Santidade* (Vainfas 1995).

The introduction of Christianity and, with it, the colonisation of the native mind was not a homogeneous process. Not only was it subject to significant variation as times changed and as Catholicism changed; the contexts, the strategies undertaken by missionaries and the groups they targeted were also determining factors in the highly complex processes of cultural conversion. In this respect, historiography traditionally oscillated between two conceptions, one arguing that Christianity was passively and wholly adopted by the indigenous peoples, and the other focusing on different forms of resistance and

the persistence of traditional expressions of belief. This false dichotomy must be superseded by more nuanced understandings of the phenomenon: on the one hand, considering the interactions between those who were involved in conversion processes, such as missionaries, indigenous people, and so on (and with them the adaptations, mediations and negotiations which took place); and, on the other, bearing in mind the real complexity of the transformations which religious practices underwent in colonial contexts, particularly in the Iberian Atlantic world (Wilde 2017, 135).

In this respect, it has been noted that missionaries devised a variety of responses depending on the different political, social, and cultural realities they faced. They showed in these responses a vast capacity to adapt to and accommodate different native worlds, ultimately following an evangelising strategy that was not confined—as historiography has traditionally argued—to certain Asian missionary contexts (in spite of the quite different solutions adopted in those contexts). In Mainas and among the Mapuche, the Jesuits almost took on the mantle of the exorcist to counter the shamans' power; they incorporated elements from indigenous rites into Catholic rites, such as adorning the paths of processions with votive living animals and fruits; they often tolerated polygamy; and they allowed the natives to continue burying their dead as their ancestors had done (Carvalho 2016; Boccara 1998).

The variety of methods adopted by the missionaries clearly demonstrates how practices were adapted to accommodate different indigenous realities. In many cases, apostolic activity, originally intended to be itinerant as it had been in the medieval era, had to become stable. Thereafter, missions were established around villages or settlements where different native groups could be often brought together. The mendicant orders attempted such methods in New Spain and later in the Andean region. The Jesuits, who debated the solution at some length, tried out and eventually implemented a system of *aldeias* in Portuguese America in the 1550s (Castelnau-L'Estoile 2000), which would later be adapted in other places. Essentially, *aldeias*, missions, the *doctrinas de indios*, and *reducciones* were all responses to a parochial model in which natives remained under the protection of priests and friars, although not necessarily isolated from colonial society or from contact with other indigenous and unconverted groups. They were spaces which transformed indigenous populations and changed the elements which defined their conceptions of the world and social order. But, more than being spaces of complete

domination, they were above all places of adaptation and negotiation (and also of conflict), where, in a sort of process of ethnogenesis, indigenous identities were reconstructed in a Christian context and new “missionary cultures” were created (Wilde 2009).

The conquest’s effects on the indigenous populations and the ensuing demographic collapse, transformation of political and socioeconomic structures, and loss of their public expressions of worship and intermediaries all undoubtedly contributed to the transformation of the indigenous imagination and of their religious identity. This does not mean, however, that the native Americans were reduced to mere passive subjects within an inexorable colonisation of their understanding of time, of their forms of expression and memory, of the ways in which they understood reality and the supernatural. On the contrary, they had the ability to select, incorporate, and use concepts and objects which were imposed on them from the missionary world, thereby showing a significant level of agency in the reception and internalisation of the Catholic worldview.

Conversion to Christianity was often a result of strategies of political and social integration in the new societies. In New Spain, indigenous elites saw adherence to the conquerors’ faith as a tool to maintain their status, as was the case for the majority of *caciques* who with their communities joined the *reducciones* in Paraguay. For many, conversion at first simply consisted of incorporating the Christian God into the indigenous pantheon. Many different interpretations of the Catholic faith emerged, different versions of a Catholicism made up of juxtaposition, syncretism, and ambiguity. Elements from indigenous rites and beliefs permeated the natives’ Christian practices, often revealing deep-rooted ways of understanding reality and connecting with the supernatural world (Gruzinski 1988). In turn, many indigenous expressions of religion, such as ancestor worship, forms of prophecy, and so on, were transformed into “colonial idolatries” and often integrating elements of Catholicism such as words, prayers, and intercessors. Even the most explicit rejections of colonial power and the conquerors’ faith (such as the *Taki onqoy* movement or the *Santidade* of Jaguaripe) incorporated aspects of the Iberian religious imagination. In reality, these were not hermetic worlds. Many continuities were established—to many of which missionaries themselves contributed. Along with the links which first arose from the placing of churches, monasteries, and sanctuaries in ancient sacred locations, certain figures from the Christian pantheon came to be identified with specific indigenous deities: *Santiago Matamoros* to

Illapa, the Andean god of thunder; Jesus Christ to the myth of the Sun among the Mayan Tzotzil people; or Saint Bartholomew with Viracocha, for example. In Peru, many images became associated with ancient *huacas*, whose rituals at times were continued in Christian celebrations, such as that of the Virgin of the Assumption. In Mexico, the feasts in honour of the god Huitzilopochtli were mixed up with those for Corpus Christi. Sometimes, the difficulties arising from attempts to translate the names of figures, terms, and doctrinal principles into local languages which did not have such concepts gave rise to misunderstandings and unique interpretations of Catholicism. Furthermore, the indigenous people's reception and comprehension of Catholicism was often conditioned by mental habits and visions of the world which gave unexpected meanings being attached to concepts, objects, rules, and sacraments. Among the natives of the region of Mainas, for example, some attributed magical powers to baptism, associating it with bodily health or with death (Carvalho 2016, 119–124).

In this way, different practices and beliefs were brought together which the natives did not see as necessarily incompatible or contradictory. In the Andes, many of those accused as idolaters considered themselves to be good Christians. The Catholic world of the sacred and the supernatural continued to penetrate the native imagination, “impregnating their senses with a Christian piety” (Bernard and Gruzinski 1999, II: 314). Baroque religiosity helped to establish points of contact upon which different expressions of indigenous Catholicism could be built. In this regard, images, saints, and miracles played a determining role from the middle of the sixteenth century and especially during the seventeenth century. The Catholic understanding of saints as intermediaries, and the role often allotted to them in the resolution of everyday problems, no doubt facilitated their integration into the natives' frames of reference, who found in them something relatable, a type of relationship which was not too distinct from the relationships between people and divine forces in the pre-Hispanic world (Mills 2007). Under the (not always consensual) patronage of bishops and religious orders, stories of apparitions, images, and crucifixes proliferated. Their miracles and unique curative faculties validated the power of Christian intermediaries, and thereby encouraged natives (and also other social groups) to venerate them. Our Lady of Guadalupe in Tepeyac, Our Lady of Remedies in Mexico, the Totolapan Christ, the Sacromonte of Amecameca, Our Lady of Copacabana, and the Virgin of Pucarani

were some of the most significant examples of a phenomenon which, sometimes combining elements of indigenous worship (such as locations and deities) with forms of Baroque piety, led to the proliferation of local and regional devotions. The number of Marian and Christological sanctuaries grew rapidly. They contributed to the “Christianisation” of the lands and, as happened in European contexts, they became centres for veneration, personal prayer, pilgrimage, vows, processions, and other religious celebrations. Stories of miracles, printed prayers, and engravings also led to the greatly increased presence of the images associated with those sanctuaries and multiplied their effects (Taylor 2016).

This hybrid or mixed character of Christianity among the native American peoples was mirrored even more uniquely among subjects of African origin. In the Atlantic, the development of an African Catholicism had its origins in the evangelising mission in the kingdom of Kongo, which stemmed from the Portuguese presence there and the conversion of King João I (Nkuwu Nzinga) in 1491. The sovereign’s and the elites’ conversion to Christianity was not without political significance; but, more than anything, it shaped a form of Catholicism with unique traits, in which visual, religious, and political aspects from the indigenous culture combined with others from the Christian world. People adopted Christianity to different extents, and interpreted it in their own way. Just as in the American world, some simply incorporated the Christian God into their own pantheon or attributed particular meanings to sacramental practices. Baptism was often associated with the consumption of salt (which was given out when the sacrament was administered), considered to be an instrument of protection. Crosses and crucifixes barely retained their Christian meaning, instead becoming associated with local ideas about the movement between life and death; churches, often built in cemeteries, became places for ancestor worship (Fromont 2014).

In the New World, the integration of the Catholic world into populations of African origin took place in very different conditions (see [Chapter 20](#)). Alongside some forms of resistance, the evangelisation of a majority slave population was not without obstacles. Missionaries and priests continually complained about the lack of indoctrination; only in urban contexts was the incorporation of Catholicism more intense. The “black saints” played a fundamental role in the process of constructing religious identities within these communities, which were often made up of people with varied geographical origins, and therefore a range of beliefs, political

traditions, and social structures (Rowe 2016). In turn, the brotherhoods of black and *mulatto* people, which increased in number from the end of the seventeenth century, could reinforce specific ethnic and cultural traits, especially when only admitting individuals from the same origin or “nation”. This was the case in the eighteenth century for the Brotherhood of Saint Elesbon in Rio de Janeiro, which brought together Mahi slaves (Soares 2011). However, the brotherhoods also gave rise to forms of “Africanisation”, bringing together individuals from different cultural origins and capable of assimilating and exchanging practices and rites, thus creating a sort of common *corpus* (Sweet 2003; Soares 2011).

In this sense, elements originating from the Christian world were not incorporated at the expense of the slaves’ beliefs and cosmologies. Catholic practices and doctrines were reinterpreted, while forms of belief which had clear African roots were conserved, reshaped, and brought together. Many turned to divinatory and curative practices—reshaped for colonial realities and slavery—from western Africa, the Mina Coast, and Central Africa. In Portuguese America, divination ceremonies evoking Central African *jaji* were adapted to the realities of slavery, just as were *calundús*, rituals of possession which were held in high esteem not only by subjects of African origin, but also by settlers of European origin (Sweet 2003). In fact, neither American practices nor those observed by African people and their descendants were always alien to colonial settlers.

Notwithstanding these aspects, the religiosity of the Spanish and Portuguese settlers replicated to a great extent that of their counterparts in Europe. Saints, images, and relics continued to be used as foundations upon which local and group identities were built, seeking often to build visions of the Iberian empires which differed from those perceived through metropolitan eyes. The aim was to “sanctify” an American space which was often represented as a subaltern world, ruled by the devil, in which souls, bodies, and temperaments became weakened and corrupted. Many texts exalted America’s geography and nature, with rhetorical intentions, but also showing vast knowledge of the natural world and erudition, attributing to the continent an Edenic quality and highlighting its health and its fertile, metal-bearing land. This “chosen” character of the region’s nature was then reflected in the continent’s inhabitants. Natives, especially *criollos*, could be only wise, hard-working, and virtuous (Cañizares-Esguerra 2006, 178–214; Rubial García 2010, 209–239). Furthermore, the “sanctification” of America was supported

by the discovery of miraculously appearing images and relics; interpreted as yet another expression of divine election, they gave rise to an ever-growing number of devotions and sanctuaries, which, as noted above, came to be an effective place for dialogue between the indigenous and missionary worlds (or between the Afro-American and missionary worlds), as well as often reinforcing an urban *criollo* patriotism.

In this context, claims were likewise made for an “American” holiness. The *Lives* of men and women who had been born or lived their lives in America were disseminated—individuals who were known for their perfection and virtue, and for the miracles which they had worked in life and in death. Often, they became objects of veneration and local protectors—but very few had canonical recognition (Rubial García 1999). The most noteworthy case was that of the *criollo* woman Rosa de Lima, who was canonised in 1671 and who was worshipped far beyond the Andean world. In New Spain, many cities granted her a prominent position in their temples. Beside her, the Franciscan Felipe de Jesús, another *criollo*, had a different impact, devotionally and geographically. A New Spaniard and a missionary in Japan, he was one of the Twenty-six Martyrs of Nagasaki murdered in 1597. His beatification in 1627 gave rise to the rapid global diffusion of a cult which was made up of the group of friars who had died with him. But, at the same time, it led to the *criollo* community in New Spain claiming him for their own; he became an object of worship for the *criollos* and was chosen as patron of Mexico City, where great festivities were held in his name in 1629 (Rubial García 1999, 65–66).

Asia

The degree of control determined the religious identities of the Iberian Crowns in Asia. In the Philippines (foremost in Luzon) and in the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* (centred on Goa and its hinterland), the Iberians succeeded in reproducing the religious institutions that shaped the profoundly Catholic religious identities at home. Here we find monasteries, confraternities, *misericórdias*, and the Inquisition (more effective in Goa than in Manila); here, episcopal authority and the parochial structure coexisted with the strong evangelising impulse that sent missionaries into territories ruled by non-Christian rulers. In the Philippines, the Spaniards faced no serious challenge to their rule

despite their small numbers. Even though Catholic evangelisation proceeded slowly in the islands, the capital Manila served as a centre that sent missionaries to China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. The Portuguese faced a more complex political landscape in their Indian holdings. Having established effective rule over a string of coastal fortifications and their hinterlands on the western coast of the Deccan Plateau, they had to deal with regional Hindu and Muslim rulers as well as the powerful Mughal Empire to the north. The following pages will describe the progress of Catholicism and the nature of religious identities respectively in the two major Iberian Asian colonies.

In 1521 Ferdinand Magellan, commissioned by the Spanish Crown, landed in Cebu in the Central Philippines after an epic voyage across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Befriending and baptising a local chieftain, Magellan erected a cross and persuaded the hastily baptised natives to destroy their statues of gods and sacred objects. Lending his military firepower to this one local headman in his conflicts with neighbouring villages, Magellan introduced violence simultaneously with evangelisation and paid for it with his life in one of the skirmishes. Four decades later, when the Spaniard Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1502–1572) reached Luzon from Mexico, establishing in 1565 a permanent Spanish claim on these islands, the same combination of violence and evangelisation was imported from the New World.

Compared to the large-scale destruction of Mesoamerican culture and peoples, the Spanish conquest of the Philippines was much less violent due to the absence of large indigenous states and centralised religious cults. Nevertheless, coercion was present in Christianisation at least until the end of the seventeenth century. To a large extent, Christianisation was Hispanisation. These processes came with missionaries, soldiers, and administrators, and emanated from the centre of Spanish power in the Philippines, the walled city of Manila on Luzon. As the furthest outpost of the far-flung Spanish Empire, the Philippines, without mines of precious metals, failed to attract mass immigration from Iberia. The small Spanish presence was concentrated in Manila; its presence in the provinces and outlying islands represented only by missionaries and a few administrators. Christianisation was wholly in the hands of the religious orders, the diocesan structure being especially weak. Accompanying Legazpi's first expedition were Augustinian friars, whose order was assigned the choicest territory as their mission. The Dominicans, Franciscans, and Jesuits soon followed, each assigned their own missionary territories,

with the Blackfriars also entrusted with the conversion of the large Chinese community in the Philippines (Phelan 1959; Boxer 1978).

When Spanish rule was established in the 1560s, Islam had been firmly implanted on the southern island of Mindanao by Malay traders sailing from Borneo. Mohammedan monotheism had even made inroads in the central Viscayan Islands and would prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to the complete Christianisation of the Spanish Philippines. Other than these two external monotheistic faiths, the local religions of the Philippines were animist, despite the great ethnic and linguistic diversities of its peoples. Worshippers of nature and spirits, the Filipinos relied on shamans in communicating with the spiritual and ancestral worlds. Drawn from noble families and overwhelmingly female, the shamans were usually older women in the village communities who had learned the rituals and secrets from their female relatives, although a few men, dressed in women's robes, also served in this role (Brewer 2004). Despite structural similarities in their beliefs and ritual objects, animist religion was highly local and tied to the village, which was the basic social unit. Unlike in Mexico, the Spaniards found no urban settlements. The basic social unit was the *barangay*, simultaneously a kinship and geographical unit comprising between 30 and 100 households. Drawn from the leading noble families, the headman was chosen both for his lineage and his charisma. Under the noble families in which we find the headman and the shaman was a class of common farmers, beneath whom were indentured servants, some in debt servitude, others captives in wars (Phelan 1959). A society with a balanced distribution of power between the sexes, religious life was firmly in the hands of women. Also, to the astonishment and disapproval of the Spaniards was a sexual regime that held no social values for virginity or monogamy, and readily allowed for divorce, which could be initiated by either sex.

For Catholic missionaries, Christianisation implied the eradication or at least the modification of Filipino social habits and religious beliefs, a task that faced three immense difficulties: distance, diversity, and dispersion. Since the first half-hearted attempt to train a native clergy was not attempted until 1677, when a royal decree promoted the ordination of indigenous clerics, the Christianisation of the Philippines fell on the shoulder of the regular clergy, the vast majority had to travel from Spain (due to early conflicts between Mexican Creoles and Iberians in Manila) across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans at the expense of the royal treasury. Despite the heroic effort of some

clerics, there were simply too few of them. In 1655, for example, the Church could muster only 304 priests (254 regulars and 50 seculars mostly Filipino) for a Christian population of several thousand Spaniards and Chinese converts (called *Ladinos* in Spanish sources) and upwards of 500,000 Filipino converts, widely dispersed in the thousands of *barangays* on many islands. Moreover, the unchallenged authority of the missionary over his converts created a milieu that gave rise to scandals: in 1607, the superior of the Augustinian order in Manila was removed due to financial corruption; ten years later, his successor was murdered by disgruntled fellow religious. None of the four religious orders was clear of sexual scandals, especially in the provinces where missionaries enjoyed complete and full power over their flock. Dominating the mission, the religious orders fiercely resisted the imposition of ecclesiastical authority in the form of diocesan visitations, which might have acted as a check on abuses. There were simply not enough qualified secular priests, who were almost exclusively Filipino. As late as 1750, there were still only 142 Filipino priests in all of the islands. An effort in the 1760s to replace the regulars in parishes with the Filipino clergy ended disastrously because the indigenous clergy was entangled in numerous local and family webs of interests (Phelan 1959).

To this is added the vast linguistic diversity of the Philippine islands. Aside from the main linguistic group of Tagalog speakers concentrated in the plains and coastal regions of central Luzon, Bikol was spoken in southern Luzon, and Cebuano in the Visayan Islands, not to mention many other smaller languages in the geographically diverse and dispersed country, or the Minnan dialects spoken by Chinese immigrants. The territorial division of Catholic missions was a result: few Spanish priests could be expected to master more than one Filipino language in their posting; and many clerics stationed in Hispanophone Manila never acquired a mastery at all of any indigenous language.

Geography itself opposed evangelisation. Separated by water, Islamic Mindanao not only resisted Christianisation but launched numerous raids on the Christianised villages of the Visayan Islands. The Spanish religion followed the contours of the land: it was concentrated disproportionately in Manila and radiated out to the fertile rice fields of the central Luzon plains and along the maritime coast. Further, in southern Luzon it established a strong presence in the Bohol province as well. But even on the main island, Christianity ran up against the forested mountains of central Luzon, where the

original inhabitants, driven out from the plains a long time ago by the Malay settlers, fiercely resisted both Hispanisation and Christianisation. Even in geographically more accessible areas, the Spaniards failed by and large to duplicate the resettlement pattern of Mexico. Fiercely attached to their land (and rice-cultivation), most Filipinos resisted “reduction”, that is the concentration of far-flung settlements into consolidated large town-villages more amenable to Spanish political, military, and religious control. The mountain tribes resisted the reduction to Christianisation for the longest, and many only came down from their high forested dwellings into planned villages after punitive military expeditions in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Due to the paucity of personnel, churches and clergy were only found in these main villages, with their central squares serving as ritual space where outlying villagers came for market and religious festivals. Rarely travelling to more remote settlements, the Spanish clergy played by no means the most significant role in the Christianisation of the Philippines, their reputation occasionally sullied by financial and sexual scandals, and by inter-order quarrels.

But the Philippines eventually became a Catholic country in a long process that only ended in the nineteenth century. Unlike Mexico, however, Hispanisation did not always accompany Christianisation. Despite the ubiquity of Spanish baptismal names, only a tiny Filipino elite spoke Spanish, and primarily in Manila. Christianisation succeeded in the Philippines in some ways despite the Spaniards. We shall examine briefly the elements of coercion and volition that made this possible. Although far less violent than the conquest of Mexico, the Spaniards readily employed violence to crush opposition, such as the suppression of the 1585 Pampanga revolt. In subsequent centuries, only two large revolts challenged Spanish rule, in response to excessive exploitation, but neither the 1660 revolt in the provinces of Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Ilokos nor the 1745 revolt in the Tagalog provinces targeted Catholicism. The only anti-Christian uprising was a short-lived one in 1621 in Cebu, when villagers followed a shaman in a revolt against Spanish-Christian rule in a vain attempt to recover their ancestral religion. Ever ready to employ violence, the Spaniards and their Christian Filipino auxiliaries were engaged in a long war of raids and enslavement against the Muslims of Mindanao.

For the majority of Filipinos, Spanish coercion came in the form of taxation and forced labour, especially harsh in the early seventeenth century, which were levied on all households, except for the village

headmen (called *principales* in Spanish), their oldest sons, the fiscal officials of the village, and the sacristans of the parish church. The most Hispanised among the Filipino populations in the provinces, these local elites were real stakeholders in the maintenance of a Christian Spanish regime. The headmen received insignia and clothes to signify their rank, being addressed as Don; their families enjoyed fiscal privileges and benefited from the actual system of exploitation since they carried out the actual collection of taxes and organised the forced labour rotations, allowing them plenty of opportunity to exercise influence and increase their own income. Spanish rule increased considerably the power of the village male elites by giving their authority an institutional and religious foundation of support. No longer was the headman merely the *primus inter pares* in a barangay, but his authority was linked to a far more extensive network of power in the Spanish Empire and the Catholic Church (Rafael 1988). Conversely, as Caroline Brewer has demonstrated, the suppression of indigenous animist cults undermined the traditional religious and social authority of women, who constituted the overwhelming majority of shamans (Brewer 2004).

Despite the condemnation of Spanish missionaries, the majority of converted Filipinos probably did not experience a contradiction in Catholic and animist rituals: one being a public, the other a household religion. Catholic icons, sacred objects, and rituals were readily used for healing, just as the traditional ritual objects associated with animist cults. The low density of the clergy on the ground and the absence of the Inquisition (which functioned in the Philippines theoretically out of Mexico City) implied that religious conformity was left largely in the hands of the local Filipino elites. There is ample evidence that the Augustinians in the province of Bolinao tolerated the mixed use of traditional and Christian rituals until this missionary territory was ceded to the Dominicans in 1679. A more rigorist order, the Dominicans smelled idolatry; between 1679 and 1685 they carried out a series of investigations that discovered the widespread, albeit clandestine, practice of animist rituals, as well as a prevailing sexual regime that still deviated substantially from the rules imposed by Tridentine Catholicism. Significantly, of the 236 locals questioned by the friars on idolatry in these years, 217 were women. In their combat against traditional religion, the Spanish clergy deployed effectively devout young boys who had been entrusted to their care and education (Brewer 2004). This was the age cohort that had played an effective role in the early conversion of the Filipinos and would

continue to play in the subsequent Christianisation of the convert population. Baptised, schooled, and shaped in a Hispanic Catholic culture alien to their own family traditions, boys and young men were enrolled in confraternities and distinguished by the Spanish clergy in their “civilising campaign” against indigenous traditional religion. The struggle between generations represented also a shift of power between genders, as young men gained in influence at the expense of mature women, with grandsons denouncing the animist rituals of their grandmothers. This pattern of Christianisation, so effectively deployed in the Spanish America, achieved a similar long-term result in the Philippine Islands as well.

In the first decades after the conquest of Goa, Portuguese authorities used a divide-and-rule policy, favouring their Hindu subjects while expelling the Muslims. The “Old Conquest” consisted of the islands of Bardez, Tisvadi, and Salcete, which had a combined indigenous population of ca. 600,000. Until the 1540s, the inhabitants in the villages outside of the city kept their ritual practices and social hierarchy. The presence of Catholicism was represented by a thin veneer of *casados*, soldiers, and clergy, the last consisting of Franciscans. Inspired by a similar élan as their brethren in Mexico, the Minor Friars also came from those provinces in Spain that had undergone reform. Their vision of spontaneous conversion, based on Christian love and charity, however, won few converts. The numbers reported in widely enthusiastic letters—6,000 converts in 1514 and more than 10,000 in 1518—seem highly exaggerated (Xavier 2008).

Beginning in 1540, royal policy signalled a new direction. To consolidate territorial control and Portuguese rule, it was imperative not only to colonise, but to evangelise. The aim was to turn the indigenous populations of the villages into Christian subjects, loyal to crown and church, who would reinforce the military ranks of the *Estado da Índia*, which faced powerful regional rulers in Bijapur and the Maharati. To absorb Goa into the Portuguese realm, political and ecclesiastical institutions from the Metropole were duplicated: in addition to the viceroy, a municipal council and a Misericórdia were established, two institutions that marked the identity of Portuguese cities. More importantly, Goa was elevated to an archdiocese, with spiritual jurisdiction extending as far as Ethiopia to the west and Japan and China to the east (Boxer 1978; Sá 1997; Xavier 2008). The foundation of colleges, churches, and schools provided a positive push for Christianisation, while the establishment of the Inquisition served as an institution of fear and coercion for the Christian converts. To the

ranks of the Franciscans came other missionary personnel, chief of whom were the Jesuits, an order founded in 1540 and strongly supported by the Portuguese Crown. Francisco Xavier, the first Jesuit missionary, laboured in Goa before embarking for missions in Japan. In addition to the Friar Minors and the Jesuits, Augustinian and Dominican friars also came to Goa. While a Spanish presence was felt in the ranks of the mendicant orders, the fathers of the Company included many Italians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By 1635, more than a century after the establishment of Portuguese rule, there were 639 clergy of religious orders, who outnumbered the secular clergy: 220 belonged to the various Franciscan families, 149 were Jesuits, followed by 125 Augustinians, and 102 Dominicans (Xavier 2008). They outnumbered the Spanish clergy in the Philippines, who were ministering to a vastly more numerous flock.

The main thrust of Christianisation was transforming the rural hinterland of the three provinces of Bardez, Tisvadi, and Salcete into parishes. Beginning in the 1540s and continuing into the 1560s, the Portuguese authorities used force to stamp a Catholic identity on the hinterland and its inhabitants. These decades coincided with the span of the sessions of the Council of Trent, which defined the identity of the post-Reformation Catholic Church and strengthened its resolve to score spiritual victories over Protestants and non-Christians. Priests and soldiers were dispatched to the countryside; hundreds of Hindu temples were destroyed. The income from these temples (and the land that belonged to them) were transferred to the Catholic Church and supported both the parochial structure and a flourishing convent life. Christianisation met with three responses: flight, resistance, and acquiescence. The village elites faced the heaviest pressure. If they refused to convert, they lost positions of leadership in the village councils as well as guardianships of the temples, which were, of course, rededicated as Christian churches. Resistance to conversion also implied exclusion from the lower echelons of the Portuguese colonial administration, which could bring considerable financial rewards and support for their elite status. The 30 years between 1540 and 1570 witnessed an upheaval in the rural society of Goa. Almost one-third of the population left Goa to migrate to neighbouring Bijapur in order to be able to worship their ancestral gods. For the rest of the population, it would be impossible to determine the number of genuine Christian converts as opposed to those who submitted for political, economic, and social advantages or those who practiced outwardly Christian rituals but remained devoted to their old gods in

domestic setting. The pantheon of deities in Hindu beliefs, especially the presence of many goddesses, allowed for a certain degree of religious syncretism as the local population gradually accepted the new politico-religious regime. There were relatively few moments of violent resistance. The most notable was the 1583 revolt of the inhabitants of Cuncolim against Portuguese repression and the subsequent killing of five Jesuit missionaries, including Rodolfo Acquaviva, the nephew of the General of the Society of Jesus (Xavier 2008; Souza 2014).

Despite voices of optimism, many missionaries were doubtful of the long-term success of this Christianisation. The visitor of the Jesuit provinces in Asia, the Italian Alessandro Valignano, expressed his scepticism as to the worth of Indian converts. The term “rice Christians” was freely used by the Portuguese, reflecting the reality of a racial hierarchy, in which the Indians, even if converted, stood at the bottom of a society that had Portuguese from the metropole, those born in the colonies, and *mestiços* all ranked above them. This was reflected, for example, in the education of converts. Indians were excluded from the study of theology at the Jesuit college of São Paulo in Goa, for example, as many Jesuit superiors, including Valignano, considered them of inferior intellectual capability. Despite racial inequality—notable in the case of Mattheus de Castro, a cleric from the Brahmanic caste who was consecrated bishop in Rome in 1625 and nominated as vicar apostolic to Bijapur, and whose authority was contested by the Patriarch of Ethiopia, the Jesuit Afonso Mendes—the Portuguese succeeded in training a native Goan clergy, recruited mainly from the upper castes, who filled the ranks of the parish clergy (Boxer 1978). Many of the sermons and writings on Christianity extant in Konkani and Marathi are the results of this dedicated clergy. They constituted the ranks of the Order of Santa Cruz, founded in 1691, which was pivotal in sustaining the Catholic communities in Ceylon and Malacca after the Dutch conquests because they blended in more easily with the local inhabitants than European missionaries travelling in disguise. While the subaltern position of the Goan clergy improved during the seventeenth century, it was not until the reforms of Pombal that they were made equal to Europeans and Creoles (Boxer 1978).

Cultural prejudices notwithstanding, notable works of Christian ethnography and Christian works in Indian languages were created. Some were written by non-Portuguese missionaries, examples being the English Jesuit Thomas Stephens (active 1579–1619), composer of the first Christian *purana* (sacred literature in the Hindu tradition) in

Marathi (1616) on the birth of Christ, or the work of Roberto de Nobili (1577–1656), which will be discussed below. Others were Portuguese, examples being the Jesuits Sebastião Gonçalves (1561–1640), the fierce critic of Nobili, author of *A History of Malabar*, the first work introducing Hindu religion to a European readership or Gonçalo Fernandes Trancoso (ca. 1520–1596), who also composed a work on Hinduism in 1616. With the conquest of Ceylon after 1597, this endeavour extended to the Sinhalese language, when the Franciscan Antonio Peixoto (fl. 1620) composed a popular play on the martyrdom of John the Baptist. These works of grammar, ethnography, and Christian literature in South Indian languages remained, however, in manuscripts until the modern era (Boxer 1978). The failure to print and propagate these works obscured the important and pioneering role missionaries in Portuguese Asia played in creating the foundation of Asian studies, a role that the Dutch, French, and British counterparts would eagerly assume in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

It is important not to see this process of Christianisation as only a coercive process. The social upheaval of conversion brought real benefits to large segments of indigenous society that were hitherto excluded from power. Portuguese law allowed female converts, including widows and orphans, the full right of property inheritance, which was not the case before. The social advancement for members of the shudra castes, deemed untouchable in Hindu society, speaks for itself. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the success of Christianisation was overwhelming, if we judge by the numbers: there were 100,000 converts in Goa with only 3,000 non-Christians (Xavier 2008). However, coercion did play its part, one of its chief instruments being the Inquisition.

Established in Goa in 1560, the tribunal there exercised jurisdiction over all of Portuguese Asia from the Cape of Good Hope in the West to Macao in the East. It was one of four Portuguese tribunals of the Holy Office, the others being Lisbon (with jurisdiction over Brazil and Africa), Coimbra, and Évora. Except for the sixteenth century, the annual averages of cases prosecuted in Goa surpassed that of the other three tribunals, as we can see in the table below. In the period 1606–1674, Goa led by 99 cases per year on the average, followed by Évora (97), Coimbra (71), and Lisbon (46). For 1675–1750, Goa led by 51 (compared to 17, 40, and 37 for the other three tribunals in order listed). In absolute numbers of cases, Goa again was at the top with 13,667 cases, surpassing the second place Évora tribunal with 11,050

cases (Bethencourt 2000).

Figure 4.1 Annual averages of cases in the Portuguese Inquisition

Source: Adapted from *História Religiosa de Portugal*, Vol. 2, 129

The Goan Inquisition differed substantially from the other three tribunals in the Portuguese homeland: the largest category of offenses (44%) pertained to Hinduism, while cases against crypto-Islam and crypto-Judaism constituted 18% and 9% respectively; another 1.5% concerned Protestants. Altogether, religious cases constituted 72.5% of the workload of the Goan Inquisition. Offenses against Catholic doctrine, infringements of Christian morals, and obstructing the work of the Holy Office constituted 10, 8, and 7% respectively. The singular importance of Hinduism reflects of course the geographical fact of Goa, but it also renders the Inquisition in Goa different from the tribunals in Spanish America, where indigenous converts were generally exempted from their jurisdiction. The most intensive period of the Goan operation during the seventeenth century also coincided with the definite triumph of Catholicism in the *Estado da Índia*. Intended as a measure of religious discipline, the Inquisition in Goa relapsed very few Hindu converts to the secular arm, unlike those condemned for crypto-Judaism, who constituted 9% of all condemned but 71% of all sentenced to death. Here, the religious identity of the Portuguese *Estado da Índia* followed the priorities of the metropole, where merchants, physicians, and professors with converso background became prioritised targets of the Holy Office (Amiel and Lima 1997).

Not all conversions followed this colonial model of Christianisation/Lusitanisation. Outside of the core territory of the *Estado da Índia*, missionaries adopted other ways of evangelisation. The greatest success of Christian conversion lay to the south of Goa, along the Tamil-speaking Malabar coast. Two groups—the Thomist Christians following Syriac rites and the fisher-folk of the Fishery Coast—furnished the largest numbers of converts to Roman Catholicism. The success of these missions depended on the ingenuity and willingness to adapt on the part of exceptional Jesuit missionaries, who operated outside the structure of colonial rule and ecclesiastical control. Instead of banning indigenous languages and repressing local rituals, these pioneer missionaries learned Indian languages and adapted to local cultural customs. The Italian Jesuit Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607) laboured for six months among the Tamil-speakers in 1573, learning enough of the language to be able to hear confession.

He was then summoned by Valignano to the China Mission, where he became the first missionary to successfully learn the written Chinese language to make an impact on the new mission there. Another such figure was the Portuguese Jesuit Henrique de Henriques (1520–1600), himself of New Christian (Jewish) background, who composed Christian catechism and literature in Tamil and compiled the first Tamil grammar. But the most famous example was the Italian Jesuit Roberto Nobili, who learned Sanskrit, put on Brahmanic robes, and conceded certain Brahmanic rites to converts in order to attract followers from the upper caste. Nobili's example, while celebrated by many of his confreres, was harshly criticised by some Portuguese Jesuits, who remained firm in their vision of Christianisation within the colonial framework. The tension would continue to play out throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Zupanov 2004).

Given the two modes of Christianisation—the first within the colonial structure and aiming at Iberianisation (names, language, mentality) and the other with greater degrees of cultural adaptation to indigenous conditions—one should be careful about drawing hasty conclusions about the durability of religious identities. To a large extent, the combination of rewards and punishments that the Portuguese exerted in Goa worked. By the late seventeenth-century native Goan converts constituted the majority of the population of the Estado da India, who identified with the political, religious, and cultural goals of the Portuguese Empire.

Goa represented the epitome of military and spiritual conquest. Goa became the model in two other Portuguese enclaves in Southeast Asia: Ceylon and in Malacca. In Ceylon, the alliance between the Portuguese and the Sinhalese rulers tipped the balance more in favour of persuasion rather than coercion. In Malacca, where the Portuguese overthrew the sultan in 1511 and imposed Catholicism, a small community of *mestiço* and indigenous Christians developed. When these possessions were lost to the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the indigenous Lusophone and mixed-race Catholic communities successfully resisted attempts at Calvinist conversion, thanks in part to the somewhat desultory effort invested by the Dutch East India Company in missions and in part to the clandestine Catholic missionaries dispatched from the Estado da India who paid periodic visits to these communities.

Malacca, a major entrepôt seized by the Portuguese in 1511, remained under Lusitan rule until its takeover by the Dutch in 1641. Christianisation followed the Goan model: the destruction of mosques

and the expulsion of non-Christians to the suburbs (Muslims in the case of Malacca, Hindus in the case of Goa), the concentration of Christians in secure zones, and the exclusive and public exercise of Catholicism, such as urban processions. Again, similar to Goa, after 1540, the Portuguese adopted a more aggressive policy of conversion. But the similarities ended here. Unlike Goa, where a mixed policy of enticement and expulsion resulted eventually in a majority convert population, the Christian enterprise was more precarious in Malacca. First, Malacca was a fortified port, without an extensive hinterland. Surrounded by the Malay-speaking, Islamic-animist world, Malacca itself had a much more mobile and diverse population of Europeans, *mestiços*, Malays, Sumatrans, Javanese, Chinese, and South Asians from different religious, regional, and linguistic roots. Christianity made little headway amongst the Malays, who had successfully synthesised Islam with their traditional animist beliefs and rituals. The Catholic population consisted of Europeans, *mestiços*, and a sprinkling of other ethnic groups, and remained a minority of the city's population, unlike in Goa. When evangelisation succeeded, it was most likely on a pattern first established by Islamic conversion: the heroic Catholic missionaries who won converts by their ascetic and holy behaviour were successors to the Sufi mystics and saints who first converted the Malay world to Islam. This older pattern persisted even in the sacramental life of the convert community: Christian women seldom attended mass. This marginalisation of women in public ritual life in Catholic Malacca seemed to have followed upon earlier Islamic practices. Despite the constant complaints of European clerics about the lack of spiritual fervour, Catholicism survived the Dutch conquest and subsequent periods of Protestant rule by the Dutch and English. Sacred objects—relics and holy images—became important holdovers and remainders of communal identity, one strengthened by clandestine visits of European Jesuits and Goan priests in the course of the latter seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Alberts 2013).

This seeming paradox of military conquest and spiritual resistance observed in Malacca characterised also Ceylon, today Sri Lanka. Christianity came with the Portuguese in 1505, who were initially interested in commerce, not conquest. Having established their fortress at Colombo on the west coast, the Portuguese became embroiled during mid-century in the dynastic strife of the kingdom of Kotte, and later in conflicts with the kingdoms of Jaffna and Kandy. King Dharmapala of Kotte (reign 1551–1597) was the first ruler to allow evangelisation. Becoming a Christian himself and baptised as

Dom João Dharmapala, he antagonised his subjects by the donation of Buddhist temples and their lands to the Catholic Church. The dynastic strife and civil wars that followed dethroned Dharmapala, who donated his kingdom to the Portuguese and lived out the rest of his life under their protection in Colombo. After his death in 1597, the Portuguese inherited Kotte and subsequently conquered Jaffna. Resistance to Portuguese rule, especially by the inland kingdom of Kandy, rendered Christianisation a slow and difficult process. The pattern was similar to that of Malacca: Catholic communities concentrated in littoral communities and Portuguese strongholds and consisted of Europeans, mestiços, and a small indigenous community. Despite the labour of a few missionaries who used Sinhalese, Portuguese became the dominant language of Christianisation for this minority population. The failure of indigenisation produced again a paradoxical effect, similar to Malacca: once Portuguese colonial rule was eradicated, again by Dutch victory, the minority mixed-race Catholic community clung onto their rituals and beliefs to reinforce communal boundaries against a new colonial master. Although the Dutch East India Company made some attempts at Protestant conversion, that effort proved equally ineffectual as in Malacca. When Ceylon passed onto British rule, the new colonial regime found a minority Christian population in which the majority remained steadfast to the Catholic faith.

In regions outside of Portuguese colonial control, Catholic evangelisation also scored considerable success in Japan (until the persecutions of the seventeenth century) and in China. The common factor for the success of the Catholic mission in these two East Asian countries was that Christianisation did not equate Lusitanisation. This was clearest in the case of sixteenth-century Warring States Japan, where the Jesuit missionaries completely depended on the goodwill of Japanese daimyo (lords) on the island of Kyushu, who welcomed the trade with Macao. Even in Macao, which the Portuguese developed into a mini-Goa, with a municipal council (Senado), a *Misericórdia*, a Jesuit college, and several convents, their presence depended on the toleration of local Chinese magistrates, who maintained jurisdiction of the land right up to the city walls that were only built in the early seventeenth century (Sá 2008). Unlike in Goa, there is no question of forcing the local Chinese population to convert, although a small community of mestiço and Macauese Christians would grow in time and became culturally and linguistically Portuguese. In the case of Japan, the fishing village of Nagasaki was conceded by the local

Japanese Christian lord to the Jesuits. But it was to be more of a Jesuit town than a Portuguese fort. In both the Japanese and Chinese missions, Italians constituted a significant minority of the Jesuit personnel. And after a first period of Christianisation in the Iberian model in Japan, the direction of evangelisation was changed under the leadership of Valignano to separate Christianisation and Lusitanisation. This tendency expressed itself strongly in the composition of Christian literature in Japanese and Chinese, and by the support and first attempts to train an East Asian clergy, unlike the reluctance in India. In time, Italian Jesuits would dominate the leadership of the China Mission, which provoked some tensions with Portuguese pride. The real conflict, however, arose between the two Iberian modes of Christianisation. When mendicant friars from the Philippines were sent to Japan and China, they were often faced with hostility from the Jesuit missionaries. With a method of Christianisation well-rehearsed from their conquest of Mexico in the early sixteenth century, the Spanish missionaries identified Christianization strongly with Hispanisation, which clashed with the missionary strategies of cultural accommodation developed in the Portuguese dominated Jesuit missions in Japan and China (Tremml-Werner 2015; Ollé 2000). In time, those conflicts in part would provoke the first waves of persecution against Christianity in Japan (fear of the global Spanish Empire) and to the Chinese Rites Controversy that led to the decline of that mission.

Note

¹Federico Palomo's contribution represents one part of a broader research project entitled "Trópicos letrados: textos y prácticas eruditas del clero en los espacios del Imperio portugués de la Edad Moderna (1580–1750)." HAR2017-84627-P. Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (Spain). Dr. Palomo's contribution translated by Matthew Stokes.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Iberia, North Africa, and the Mediterranean¹



Fernando Rodríguez Mediano

Chronological framework

The conquest of Ceuta by the Portuguese in 1415 was the first chapter in the latter's imperial expansion. From that point on and for more than a century, the Iberian powers carried out an aggressive policy of military and economic expansion in North Africa. Portuguese expansion took place throughout the fifteenth century and reached its peak during the reign of Afonso V, who conquered Arzila, Larache, and Tangiers. Spanish expansion in North Africa began later, after the conquest of the Nazarid kingdom of Granada in 1492. Melilla was occupied in 1497; Mazalquivir and the rock fortress of Vélez de la Gomera were taken (in 1505 and 1508, respectively) in the lead-up to the campaign against Orán (1509), which was one of the greatest military and political episodes in Cardinal Francisco de Cisneros' career. Spain went on to take Béjaïa and Tripoli, but the campaign

against the island of Djerba in 1510 ended in a resounding defeat. Thus, we can say that this date marks the end of the period of Iberian expansion in North Africa. In fact, in 1516, shortly after the debacle in Djerba, Aruj Barbarossa seized power in Algiers, placing it under the Ottoman Empire's sphere of influence, which was definitive in making the Mediterranean a frontier in the conflict between the two empires. After that date, there were a few important developments—such as Charles V's campaign against Tunis in 1534—that make sense in the context of that border conflict. Moreover, at that point in the sixteenth century, Spanish and Portuguese resources were being directed elsewhere in the empire, toward the Americas, Italy or Asia, at the expense of the North African strongholds, which were too costly to maintain. Thus, the reign of João III (1521–1557) saw Portugal's gradual withdrawal from its Moroccan strongholds, which it was economically impracticable to keep up, in order to focus on her American silver mines. But this abandonment had consequences for Portugal, among them the thousands of Moroccans who, between 1520 and 1540, emigrated for economic reasons to the Portuguese fortified enclaves and later made their way to Portugal, establishing a community of *mouriscos*, who—unlike Spanish Moriscos—were of North African origin (Mendes 2011).

For Spain, the frontier with the Ottomans functioned as one of the empire's most important political horizons. It is no coincidence that, following the Spanish victory at Tunis (1534), Emperor Charles V made his triumphal entry into Italy, passing first through Sicily (where the imperial visit left its mark on Palermo) and arriving finally in Pope Paul III's Rome. This link between Spain's Italian policy and the conflict with the Turks reached its peak in the 1570s, when Spanish diplomacy succeeded in organising the Holy League against the Ottomans, which led to the victory at Lepanto (1571). This victory had relatively little military significance; shortly after their defeat, the Ottomans were able to rebuild their fleet and reconstitute their naval power in the Mediterranean. However, from a political standpoint, Lepanto marks the greatest consolidation of Spain's power in Rome, where the legacy of the battle would long remain as part of the political imaginary (Dandeleit 2001, 95).

After this point, the strategic situation changed radically. A new enemy, the Safavid Empire in Iran, threatened the eastern flank of the Ottoman Empire, which was thus obliged to divide its military forces between two fronts. Spain lost Tunis and La Goleta in 1574, and at the end of that decade the Portuguese king, Don Sebastião, organised a

crusade against Sa'di Morocco. This expedition (preceded by a previous attempt in 1574) was undertaken for a series of reasons, both religious and political. Morocco had become an important aspect of the Ottoman Empire's strategy to expand its influence into the Atlantic and was, therefore, one of the axes of the Iberian struggle against the Ottomans. Inspired by passionate religious zeal, the Portuguese crusade was in fact an anachronistic move that did not take account of the existing balance of power, and it culminated in the disastrous Battle of Alcácer Quibir (1578), which extinguished a good part of the Portuguese nobility and took the life of the king himself. Portugal was annexed by the Spanish monarchy two years later. D. António, Prior do Crato, who had participated in the Battle of Alcácer Quibir, became the main Portuguese rival of Philip II. Together with other enemies of Spain, like England and France, he tried to create a great alliance with the Ottomans and the Sultan of Morocco to attack Spain. However, such an attack never took place, and the military frontier with Islam was definitively stabilised from the 1570s onwards.

From this moment the violence engendered by the conflict between the Ottoman empire and Spain continued by other means—especially privateering and piracy. In fact, after the Battle of Lepanto there was a remarkable increase in corsair activity, with all its political, economic, and sociological consequences. Establishing the mechanisms for regulating this activity—and the exchange of goods and peoples that it gave rise to—was the focus of relations between Iberia and North Africa during this period. At the same time, a larger change took place that would lead to the emergence of new imperial actors and a new scheme for world domination: colonialism.

The status of North Africa within Iberian imperial expansion is, thus, ambiguous: on the one hand, it represents the first stage in that expansion; on the other, in terms of territory, North Africa made up only a very small part of the Iberian empires at the middle of the sixteenth century. We can say that, from the standpoint of Spain and Portugal, the North African dimension was important for numerous reasons beyond territorial occupation. From the perspective of constructing an imperial narrative, there seemed to be a connection between imperial expansion and the confrontation with Islam: indeed, João de Barros begins his *Décadas* with the Hegira and the history of the origins of Islam (Thomaz 1994, 11). Moreover, if we consider the Iberian empires not as a project already defined at the beginning of the fifteenth century but as a complex process that developed gradually and that gave rise to various political, administrative, and

economic solutions, we can say that it was precisely the North African experience wherein some of the essential features of those empires took shape, and that these features help to explain the later phases of expansion (Mendes 2014).

In the first place, 1415 marks a radical change in the history of the western Mediterranean. During the fourteenth century, the Strait of Gibraltar had had great strategic importance, and control over it had been at the centre of the military and diplomatic dispute between the foremost political actors in the region—the Naṣrids in Granada, the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and so on—and even more remote powers such as the Mamlūks in Egypt. One of the earliest circumstances that favoured Iberian expansion was the weakening of the Muslim political formations in North Africa, from the Merinids in Morocco to the Ḥafṣids in Tunis. This process can largely be explained with reference to the evolution of the trade routes for sub-Saharan gold. For multiple reasons, in the fourteenth century these routes shifted to the east, to areas under Mamlūk control, which weakened the Maghreb states (Devisse 1972). In the *longue durée*, the evolution of African trade explains major traits of medieval Mediterranean history, such as the intervention of Italian and Aragonese merchants in North Africa, and gave rise, in the end, to an essential development beginning in the thirteenth century: the displacement of naval and commercial hegemony from the south to the north of the Mediterranean. The forms of Italian and Aragonese mercantile and financial colonisation that were established in the western Mediterranean illustrate a special economic dynamic that will be essential in the first stages of Atlantic expansion, such as the conquest of the Canary Islands, which was supported largely by Genovese interests (Fernández-Armesto 1987). The opening of the Atlantic prompted the first substantial change in the structure of Iberian trade: the Portuguese conquered enclaves on the west coast of Africa by taking advantage of the extreme fragmentation and political weakness of the Maghreb states, but they also gained direct access to the African gold trade.

The example of Ceuta shows that, beyond territorial expansion, the management of the new possessions prompted significant changes in the configuration of the Iberian empires. The conquest of Ceuta meant—and this is true for Spanish expansion in North Africa as well—the triumph of new aristocratic families that supported an aggressive policy toward Islam, both within and beyond Portugal. In Iberia, the Crusade constituted an opportunity for collaboration between the

Church and the monarchy, as is shown by the creation in Spain of the “Council of the Crusade”, which managed the resources granted by the Holy See, in a not-always-balanced attempt to establish fiscal collaboration between the two entities. On the level of the economy, the first economic benefit of the North African conquests was control over the sub-Saharan gold trade, but the exponential growth of another kind of trade soon became clear: the trade in slaves and captives. The enormous profits involved in human trafficking led the monarchy to become actively involved in overseeing the rescue of captives, which thereby was transformed from a private concern into a matter of foreign policy (Barata 2008). Ceuta is an example of how important the African stage was in transforming decisive aspects of the construction of the new Atlantic space.

From ideology to *presidios*

Iberian imperial expansion did not follow a pre-established and coherent ideological agenda. The link between the Reconquest and imperial expansion has been studied from many different angles: the early development of dynamic state administrative structures in the Iberian peninsula during the Middle Ages; the formation of a military aristocracy with an aggressive ideology based on chivalrous ideals; the moral and financial alliance of the Church with the monarchy. These elements would be merged into the ideology of the Crusade, which inspired the occupation of the African strongholds (Rosenberger 1993a). This ideology also provided the first instruments of imperial legitimacy, which were forged in the context of the rivalry between Spain and Portugal, which was mediated by diplomatic treaties and, above all, by the authority of Rome. In this sense, papal bulls were the first programmatic documents to legitimise the Iberian empires, and they reflect, moreover, the political tensions being played out in a three-character drama with Portugal, Spain, and the Church, as well as the basic legal issue of jurisdiction over infidels and slavery (Marcocci 2011, 28ff; Avalos 2014).

North Africa—like the Americas—was part of the division of the world between Spain and Portugal; the kingdom of Tremecén was granted to the former, and the kingdom of Fes to the latter. Given this context, Pope Alexander VI’s bulls have been interpreted as an attempt by a Spanish pope to promote the interests of the Reyes Católicos in Africa to the detriment of the Portuguese. But these bulls also reflect

the construction of an imperial ideology in which the pope arrogated to himself the authority to concede to the kings of Castile and Portugal the right to conquer territories and populations. At the same time, the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies made political use of the legitimising value of the struggle against Islam. This political and economic opportunism had, also, an eschatological dimension. A clear example is the ideology of the crusade that fuelled the North African campaigns organised by Cardinal Cisneros, whose ultimate objective was the conquest of Jerusalem, in which he attempted to involve the Portuguese themselves (Pérez 2014, 146–147). What we see here is a reprise of the same Franciscan millenarian spirit that had inspired Columbus' voyages—a spirit that prophesied the conversion of Muslims and Jews, and all of humanity unified under a single monarch (Milhou 1983). The Portuguese, for their part, never entirely renounced the “dream of conquering Fez” (Bataillon 1945). The persistence of this dream throughout the first half of the sixteenth century was supported by very powerful religious memories—after all, the old Marinid capital was where the Holy Prince (“o Infante Santo”) Fernando had been martyred, after being captured in the siege of Tangier in 1437 and after the Portuguese refused to relinquish Ceuta in exchange for his release.

At the end of the fifteenth century, the messianic impulse linked to these conquests crystallised in a new formulation: the Jews were expelled from Spain in 1492, and the Muslims were forced to convert in 1502; in Portugal, both Jews and Muslims were expelled in 1496–1497. The relationship between the two events is clear: with the expulsion, Manoel I of Portugal proclaimed himself the “defender of Christianity”, in a political gesture clearly intended to compete with the Reyes Católicos, Isabel, and Ferdinand. It is clear that for the Iberian powers, foreign expansion—whose eschatological horizon was the conquest of Jerusalem—was connected to the problem of managing societies characterised by religious pluralism, a problem that at this point took on the dramatic features of expulsion and mass conversion (Barros 2014). This connection can be seen, for example, in the development of similar methods of evangelisation in Europe and in the colonies. A single monarch and a single flock, united under a single faith: on the basis of imperial political thinking, discursive devices were introduced that created the modern categories of exclusion: the Jew, the Infidel, the Savage (Prosperi 2012). These categories were organised around various fundamental issues during the whole of the sixteenth century: the legal status of conquered

peoples and the development of a theory of natural rights; the slave trade, which became one of the main profit-making enterprises of the Iberian empires; the management of vast populations of converts, in which ideas of race were at odds with theological principles.

The survival of the ideology of the Crusade among certain political circles coincides to a large extent with the experience of the impossibility of territorial occupation in North Africa, which imposed its own practical imperatives. The mentality of the early conquerors linked the ideology of the Crusade to the old spirit of chivalry, whose themes permeate the historical narratives. Thus, the chronicles that narrate the history of the Portuguese in Safi, for example, recount the exploits of Captain Nuno Fernandes d'Ataíde and his knights and give a detailed account of all the battles and the names of their protagonists (Lopes 1939). In one of their razzias, the Portuguese got as far as the walls of Marrakech. In these histories, the reader perceives a tension between the agendas of military conquest and territorial occupation, on the one hand, and the more concrete goal of maintaining control over specific areas.

In the end, following the first attempts to conquer territory, this tension was resolved in practice by the occupation of specific coastal enclaves that ensured control over trade routes or strategic military points but that in principle did not seek continued, sustained territorial expansion. Portuguese occupation of points on the coast of West Africa gave it control over African trade and the logistics for the great imperial voyages to the East. For their part, the Spanish made successive incursions into North African cities in order to gain strategic control over Mediterranean navigation and to thwart corsair activity and the growing power of the Ottomans. This kind of partial, coastal intervention gave rise to a distinctive form of occupation expressed by the Spanish word *presidio*: a military fort under constant threat from the hinterland whose survival depended on provisioning from Spain or on plundering surrounding areas in search of booty and slaves. The word *presidio* also refers to a prison and thus suggests the jail-like nature of these cities, where condemned criminals ended up being sent and which thus became one of the worst possible places for a soldier to be sent (Bunes 1988).

Among the North Africans a singular figure emerged, known as “*moros de paces*”—in other words, a local person or population who collaborated with the *presidios* in some way. The trajectory of some of these figures that had dealings with the Iberian conquerors illustrates the ways in which the occupied cities influenced local politics. A good

example is Yahyā-u-Ta'fūft, who attempted to impose his political authority in the region during the final decades of the fifteenth century largely on the basis of his relations with the Portuguese and with the Waṭṭāsid dynasty in Fez (Rosenberger 1993b; Subrahmanyam 2011). Thus, the role played by the occupied cities—the *presidios*—was not merely predatory but also political, in that they sometimes constituted a decisive factor in local power struggles.

Corsair, conversion, and ransom

Up to this point, I have been using the concept of frontier in a strictly military sense. The proposed chronological framework is based on the vicissitudes of armed conflict and has a clear focal point in the 1520s, when the consolidation of the so-called “Berber Regencies” strengthened the hand of the Ottoman Empire, which wielded enormous naval power in the Mediterranean and also threatened the eastern fronts of European Christendom and of the Habsburg monarchy. The military frontier is the violent expression of the consolidation of the two great empires that gave shape to the Mediterranean in the early modern period: Spain and the Ottoman Empire. From the European standpoint, there is a clear awareness of this confrontation on multiple levels: from the soldiers who participated in imperial campaigns to overarching strategic conceptions and concepts in political philosophy, the “Turk” functions as a measure of military experience or as a category of cultural difference and political thought.

Image 5.1 Re-enactment of a naval battle in the Mediterranean, by Jacopo Tintoretto, *The abduction of Helen*, 1578–1579

Source: Museo del Prado, Madrid, Spain. Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain

All of these circumstances can be seen as coalescing around one phenomenon—captivity—which was a familiar experience in the lives of the inhabitants of the early modern Mediterranean world, in addition to be a fundamental economic factor in its development. Anyone who undertook a sea voyage or who lived on the coast and was therefore potentially prey to an armed incursion lived in anticipation and fear of corsair attacks. Some of these attacks were spectacular, and the number of prisoners taken contributed to the idea that the corsairs enjoyed a certain degree of impunity and increased the fear of and hatred toward them. Many of the Muslim corsairs were converts, former Christians who had converted to Islam and moved to

North Africa, and thus could act as guides to other corsairs because of their familiarity with the territory. Many others were Andalusians or Moriscos who had fled or been expelled from Spain. The fear of these corsair incursions led by former coreligionists who had converted to Islam was accompanied in Spain by the perception of the Morisco population as an internal threat, a community that was impossible to integrate and could potentially act as a fifth column facilitating an Ottoman attack (Vincent 2006).

The impact of Mediterranean corsair activity is astounding—in the first place, because of the sheer number of people affected by human trafficking (Kaiser 2008). Although it is difficult to quantify with precision the number of victims, it has been estimated that there were well over a million slaves in the Mediterranean world between 1530 and 1780. Given that both Christians and Muslims carried out the corsair activity, the phenomenon was distributed—though not evenly—over both the sides of Mediterranean, unlike what happened in the Atlantic, where human trafficking only affected Africans (Fiume 2009, 4). The slaves and captives—who were basically treated as merchandise for exchange or as labour—represented a major stimulus for the European economy, as objects of a trading system based on the logic of growth and distribution of wealth at the expense of the victims. While the dominant propaganda insisted on religious animosity and recited the need to inflict economic harm on the enemy, human trafficking served to cover up or legitimise other kinds of dealings with that same enemy and gave rise to new types of business ventures, such as marine insurance.

The experiences of those captured by corsairs varied and included a whole range of situations depending on the captives' social class or wealth, on the possibility of ransom, and on where they served out their captivity, whether they were used as goods to be exchanged, as royal possessions, or as manpower assigned to more or less hard labour in the cities (Martínez Torres 2004). The greater or lesser harshness in living conditions depended on those circumstances and frequently led to the conversion to Islam in cases where the captive hoped that doing so would provide relief from harsh treatment, or even would allow him a rise socially and politically in the service of an Ottoman or Moroccan lord. One of the main centres of corsair activity in North Africa was Algiers. This city's huge jails, which the Spanish called "baths", held a great number of captives of diverse origins and varied status in common spaces with chapels where Christians could worship, taverns, and hospitals. The baths in Algiers

are well known because one of their prisoners was Cervantes, whose status as a captive had far-reaching literary repercussions (Garcés 2002), as well as because of the *Topographía e historia general de Argel*, by Antonio de Sosa, one of the main sources of information for European readers on life in Algiers.

Not all North African jails were like the baths in Algiers; the testimony of captives held in Morocco, for example, attests to much more gruelling experiences. The accounts written by those who returned to Europe describe the cruel conditions of their captivity, which were frequently given as a justification for conversion to Islam. European archives are full of accounts by captives who converted to Islam and then returned to the Christian fold following an interrogation by the Inquisition that did not tend to be particularly arduous (Bennassar and Bennassar 1989). Many of those interrogated claimed that their conversion had been only superficial and that they had continued to be Christians at heart. This was a credible argument as far as the Inquisition was concerned, given that it was precisely this question of the distance between external practice and internal conviction that was being sounded in the Inquisition's own trials of converts. It was an urgent question, because of its intractability: How can the sincerity of religious faith be established? In answer to this question, various solutions were considered. On the one hand, there emerged a radical legal equivalence between lineage and religious creed; in Spain, this took the form of the statutes of blood purity. On the other hand, and from the point of view of the construction of the modern subject, the distance between internal and external became yet another factor in the construction of dissimulation as a moral and political category. Among Muslims, the status of the Moriscos was also the subject of legal debate, as is shown by the important *fatwā* (legal opinion) issued by the *alfaqū* al-Wahrānī in Fez, which permitted Moriscos in Spain to conceal their Muslim faith and to adapt externally to the Christian religion; this debate invokes the precept of *taqiyya*, according to which a Muslim could legitimately conceal his or her religion when not in the *dār al-islām* (Stewart 2013). The issue demonstrates how difficult it is to reduce to comprehensible categories a complex world in which confessionalisation, violence, and corsair activity put individuals in the position of having to conceal their beliefs.

Although there was by far a greater number of converts from Christianity to Islam, there was also a significant number of Muslim converts to Christianity, besides the Moriscos. This was the case of the

many members of North African royal families that fled to Europe out of fear of the political situation in their kingdoms (Alonso Acero 2006). These princes, who ended up being used as a political and diplomatic weapon, met with different fortunes. Many converted and became loyal vassals of the Spanish monarchy, such as Gaspar Benimerín and Carlos de África, a Zayyānid prince who became a knight of the Order of Saint James. A unique figure is Felipe de África, a Sa'di prince from Morocco who converted to Christianity in 1593 during the pilgrimage of the Virgen de la Cabeza, was the godson of Philip II (whose name he adopted), settled in Madrid, and befriended writers such as Lope de Vega, who recounted his conversion in his *Tragedia del rey don Sebastián* (Oliver Asín 1955).

The case of Portuguese *mouriscos* is a special one. They were mainly of African origin and often crypto-Muslims, who kept their observance of Islam hidden. An example is the religious brotherhood of Lisbon's church of São João, where *mouriscos* created a way to become integrated into Portuguese society through a kind of *mimesis* of their own crypto-Muslim practice with the Catholic cult (Ribas 2004, I, 199).

Christian conversion to Islam was undoubtedly a much larger phenomenon and constitutes an important feature of the history of North African societies. The trace of the majority of these converts in *dār al-islām* is impossible to follow, but many others secured important posts in the courts or in the armies of Moroccan or Ottoman lords. The status of these converts was ambiguous: despite not being assimilated within the local populations, their factions, or their forms of religious authority (or rather because of this), they represent in a structural way the political figure of the foreigner who is directly dependent on the monarch and to whom he can therefore look for support. The foreigner is thus a central character in the descriptions made by Europeans of Muslim political systems, and specifically those of North Africa: a political world that, from the European perspective, is centred on the closed universe of the court, which is ruled by passions and in which the relationship between the sovereign and his favourite is the core of Oriental despotism—a lasting theme in Orientalist representations. It ought to be asked, to the contrary, whether the inclusion of foreign converts in Muslim courts should actually be understood not as a symptom of the passions of the despot's hermetic inner circle, but as an expression of the permeability of North Africa's political world to different practices and representations, since it was capable of absorbing these apostates, who operated at different levels

of the political apparatus and the social order and whose real impact on North African culture has yet to be established (Dakhliya 2005).

The degree to which these apostates were integrated into North African societies had its limits. Hierónimo de Mendonça, for example, recounts how the Moroccan sultan ‘Abd al-Malik al-Sa’dī would go into churches with his *elches* (i.e., “converts”), and, to mock them, would sometimes douse them with holy water, saying that it was pointless to deny that their conversion was not altogether sincere, since the only thing he was interested in was people who served him well and the soul meant nothing to him (Rodríguez Mediano 2001). This is a crude expression of the indeterminate nature of the religious status of these converts. In fact, endogamy was frequent among them, and we know that many of them kept up relations with other captives from their own nations or made use of their influence to help them. On the other end of the Mediterranean, in the Ottoman Empire, conversion to Islam made it necessary to redefine the category of the Rūm, which had a decisive influence on the gradual confessionalisation and disciplining of Ottoman society (Krstić 2011, 6).

One of the most important consequences in Europe of Mediterranean captivity was the mobilisation of resources for redeeming captives. Philip II did not establish an institution dedicated to redemption and instead relied on the “redemptive orders”, the Trinitarians and Mercedarians, to carry out most of these efforts. It was a system of collaboration between the monarchy and these orders that required the economic and logistical support of the general public. To that end, the redemption campaign set in motion a propaganda machine that included everything from preaching to public ceremonies and processions for redeemed captives, whose goal was to mobilize the support of the general population, which was essential for both the economic and symbolic maintenance of the system (Martínez Torres 2004). This political, ritual, and religious apparatus, however, cannot hide the existence of other actors and interests engaged in the ransoming of captives. Frequently, redemption was used as a way to conceal or justify other kinds of economic exchanges between Christians and Muslims by mobilising intermediaries of different sorts, who facilitated the negotiations, cultivated credit (in both senses of the word), or derived some economic benefit. We know, for example, of private companies that specialised in ransoming captives or insuring Mediterranean voyages. Moreover, a good part of the releases obtained were not negotiated by

the redemptive orders. After all, a delay in redeeming captives could mean economic loss, and for this reason in many cases, ransom was decided immediately following capture, through a type of brief negotiation called *alafia* (Andújar Castillo 2008). The redemption of captives in Spain and Portugal can be considered, in fact, a “pious business”: an economic affair in which the activities of the “redemptive orders’ had to compete with other actors, private merchants and even the crown, which wanted to control a process that involved the mobilisation of vast administrative, economic and political resources” (Alberto 2010).

Negotiation and diplomacy

These types of negotiation and mediation allow us to look at the phenomenon of corsairs and captivity from another perspective: it was not only a form of economic warfare, a sort of low-level confrontation between Christianity and Islam in the Mediterranean that intensified after open military conflict came to an end with the Battle of Lepanto. It was, in reality, an economic and cultural exchange phenomenon that fluctuated throughout the seventeenth century but that functioned because of the reliability of a series of informal intermediary institutions whose efficacy was backed by a centuries-old practice. Corsair violence can therefore be interpreted as belonging to a wide range of forms of negotiation going from official diplomatic contacts between kingdoms to more or less informal contacts at the local level. Ever since the Middle Ages, the gears of Mediterranean trade had been greased by regular diplomatic contacts between the Crown of Aragon and different North African and Andalusí powers (Salicrú 1998). Iberian archives preserve many of the letters that the Sa’dís in Morocco, the Ottomans, the Ḥafṣids in Tunis, and the ‘Abdelwādids in Algiers exchanged with Spanish monarchs or other authorities. This correspondence reflects the different political and linguistic contexts in which it was produced. The letters written in the royal chancelleries in Marrakech, in Tunis, or of the King of Cuco reflect the elegant style of classical Arabic, with the complex, knotty epistolary formulas characteristic of courtly tradition. This correspondence helps us to understand the genesis of bilingual diplomatic accords, in Arabic and Castilian, such as those that were signed by Charles V and the Ḥafṣid caliphs (Mariño and Morán 1980). Other kinds of relations, however, did not directly involve the royal

chancelleries but rather other agents who moved on different levels of political or linguistic competence: governors of cities, tribal sheikhs, agents with commercial interests, spies, etc. As a result, what we have is a jumble of documents in which political negotiations are entangled with the circulation of information and the construction of forms of knowledge, and which marshal a variety linguistic resources: the registers of Arabic range from highly cultured to closed dialects. We know of the case of the Moroccan sultan ‘Abd al-Malik al-Sa’dī, who spoke Turkish and Castilian perfectly, and local governors who appear to have retained Portuguese Jews in their service and whose correspondence is in a Castilian strongly influenced by Portuguese (García-Arenal, Rodríguez Mediano, and El Hour 2002). Sometimes, the Arabic letters are translated into Castilian or Portuguese at their place of origin, which testifies to the work of translators in the North African courts. Many letters, however, are translated in the Iberian peninsula by people whose identities are often hard to make out, such as Alonso del Castillo, a Morisco doctor and translator of the Arabic inscriptions at the Alhambra (Cabanelas 1991). At the informal end of the spectrum, we have the correspondence that Alvar Gómez de Horozco, known as El Zagal, *alcaide*, and captain of Bona, exchanged with local Algerian sheikhs. These communications are in Algerian dialect and lack the formality associated with the court, but they illustrate an immediate kind of negotiation, exchange of goods and information, and, in short, the integration of the Spanish occupiers into the networks of local North African society.

One of the greatest diplomatic missions of the early modern period was led by Pedro Mártir de Anglería to Mamlūk Egypt in the name of the Reyes Católicos (1501–1502), an account of which was published in 1511, at the time of Cardinal Cisneros’ great African expeditions (Álvarez-Moreno 2013). This was an especially interesting delegation, led by a humanist who, in addition to this African experience, was also a chronicler of the conquest of America. He was, therefore, a figure at the centre of the construction of the first ideological representations of Spanish imperial expansion. The mission was a response to complaints lodged by the Mamlūk sultan over the treatment of Spanish Muslims (at the time of the great forced conversion), but Anglería’s text largely expresses the forms of the representation of alterity, constructed in a parallel fashion on the basis of his American and African experiences. Anglería provides a detailed description of the interpreter Tangaribardino, a Valencian apostate who worked as a translator and envoy for the Mamlūks. Looked at

from the perspective of the processes of circulation of information, the pair Anglería-Tangaribardino illustrates the dual nature of translation and religious polemic, based on the work of two people (patron and slave, bishop and convert, theologian and *alfaquí*) who operate on separate linguistic, cultural, and political levels.

Diplomatic missions in both directions were plentiful. Pedro Venegas de Córdoba was dispatched as ambassador to Morocco in 1579 to negotiate, among other things, the possibility of Larache being ceded to Spain, an issue that would culminate in 1609–1610 with a visit by the Moroccan sultan himself, Muḥammad al-Shaykh, to Spain for talks with Philip III. The first stop in al-Shaikh's visit to the peninsula was Vilanova de Portimão, in the Portuguese Algarve, where he engaged in negotiations with the Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo, before moving to Carmona (Seville), where he arrived at the very moment when the Moriscos were being expelled from Spain. Shortly thereafter, the Morisco Aḥmad b. Qāsim al-Ḥajarī, from Extremadura, travelled to France and the Low Countries as an envoy of the Moroccan sultan Mūlāy Zidān to negotiate the ransom of some Morisco captives (al-Ḥajarī 2015). The extraordinary account of his visit relates, among other things, his meetings with prominent European Orientalists such as Thomas van Erpen, which places him at the inception of a new way of understanding the Orient on the part of European scholars (Wiegers 1988). Another Moroccan ambassador who wrote an account of his voyage was the vizier 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Ghassānī, who travelled to Spain at the end of the seventeenth century to negotiate, among other things, the ransom of Moroccan slaves (al-Ghassānī 1940).

From the practices of exchange, ransoming, and trade at the local level up to large official diplomatic missions, the Mediterranean border can be defined, not just as a military boundary but as a network of economic, political, and cultural relations whose focal point is corsair activity and the mercantilisation of human beings, which propels and mobilizes all manner of resources. A good index of this complex mixture of political and economic interests with religious and ideological issues is the polemic about the lawfulness of doing business with Muslims. In Portugal, for example, uneasiness over trading with infidels and its moral implications gave way, by the end of the fifteenth century, to seeing trade as a possible tool for religious evangelisation under the auspices of the crown. The African experience was essential for forging the alliance between trade and religion that defined the Portuguese colonial project (Marcocci 2011,

As has been mentioned, the intensity of corsair activity is inversely proportional to that of military confrontation. In fact, beginning in 1633 there was a significant increase in redemptions, proof of the European states' growing political and economic investment in ransom activities. However, paradoxically, this increase was accompanied by a decrease in the number of Christian captives, who were gradually replaced, in North Africa, by populations of slaves from sub-Saharan Africa (Martínez Torres 2004). By the end of the eighteenth century we see the culmination of a process by which the procedures based on traditional practices were gradually replaced by the imposition of the system of European public law as a way to regulate diplomatic relations. The imposition of the French-inspired consular system (the Ottomans set up diplomatic representation in the major European capitals starting in 1790) culminated in the secularisation of diplomatic practices, which no longer appealed to the old principles associated with the Crusade against the infidel (Windler 1999). This fact testifies to an important change in the balance of power in the Mediterranean and functions as a precursor to the colonial era, which began with Napoleon's campaign in Egypt in 1798 and the mixture of military, political, and scientific objectives that is characteristic of the next stage of European imperialism.

Diasporas

The conception of the Mediterranean defined basically as a communications network has generated notable historiographical interest in the figure of the intermediary: a person who is capable of moving among different settings, wielding many languages, buying and selling, translating. "Passeurs", "cultural brokers" are terms that attempt to capture the distinctive attributes of these mediating figures. This interest has turned the focus onto communities that seem to have played a crucial role in the different types of Mediterranean negotiation, such as the Jews. The Jews were a community scattered all over Europe, Asia, and Africa, with a long tradition of establishing communication and trade networks. Historiography on this subject makes reference to communities that were able to secure credit (both economic and moral) for long-distance commercial exchanges, that had a particular legal relationship to the different political authorities in the Mediterranean region, and whose geographic distribution

throughout this region increased as a result of the diaspora brought about by the expulsion of Spanish Jews in 1492. The expansion of the Iberian empires also produced various phenomena that lent new currency to this intermediary function: many converts of Jewish origin settled in the North African enclaves in order to escape inquisitorial repression; here they made contact with important Jewish communities in North African cities such as Fes and thus became an essential factor in the region's commercial activity (Tavim 1997). In addition, North African cities under Iberian rule had legally established Jewish communities that in many cases were quite numerous.

An example is the Jewish community in the Spanish-ruled city of Orán. Among its members were the well-known families of the Cansinos and the Sasportas, who worked as translators and played a crucial role in the relations between the Spanish and the surrounding areas (Alonso Acero 2000, 202ff; Schaub 1999). We know the names of other Jews who worked as translators in the North African courts, such as the Rute and Senanes families in Fez. The way in which Jewish families constructed networks of relationships and mediation is well illustrated by the example of the Pallache family. This Jewish family from Fes acted as mediators between Morocco, Spain, the Low Countries, and the Ottoman Empire, developing strategies to diversify their market that included, in some cases, the religious conversion of family members. The history of the Pallache family brings into play a number of resources that raise questions about the modalities of identity manipulation and the introduction of the techniques of incipient mercantilism—a series of questions that can be summed up in the issue of the establishment and the value of credit (in both the moral and economic meaning of the word) in modern Europe (García-Arenal and Wiegers 2014).

Another large diaspora out of Iberia was brought about by the expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain in 1609. This exodus of 300,000 people was the culmination of a long process of emigration of Andalusians, essentially to North Africa, that began during the final days of the kingdom of Granada. The expulsion of the Moriscos was an especially traumatic moment for many people, who were deprived of their possessions, forced into exile and received—often with hostility—in North Africa. The diaspora gave rise to a network of aid and communication throughout the Mediterranean region (García-Arenal and Wiegers 2014). Over time, “Andalusi” identity became a recurrent cultural reference point in North Africa and was especially significant

in places like northern Morocco or Tunis. In spite of this, it is difficult to define with any precision what constituted Andalusí identity, given that the term could be used to refer to the participants in many different movements of population between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries. It is impossible to equate the Andalusí community in Tetuan, refounded by the emigré Andalusí al-Mandārī in 1483, with the extremely populous community of Moriscos that settled in Tunis. One of these Tunisi Moriscos was able to reproduce verses from Lope de Vega and fragments from Quevedo's *Sueños* from memory (Oliver Asín 1933). Elsewhere in North Africa, Moriscos in Salé, many of whom hailed from a town in Extremadura called Hornachos, established what has come to be called a corsair republic that preserved its political independence vis-à-vis other authorities in Morocco. These corsairs continued referring to themselves by their Spanish names, and for a long period they were in negotiation with the Spanish monarchy, even contemplating a possible return to Spain; at the same time, the Salé case exemplifies how Muslim corsairs established ties with European powers such as the Dutch who—thanks to their technical innovations—could intervene in North Africa to counteract Spanish interests (Maziane 2007).

Religion and representation

The fate of these communities raises the question of religious categories when defining the Mediterranean frontier. Historiography has largely understood the military border as an extension of a cultural and religious boundary, adopting as its own the assumptions of the ideology of the crusade and the confrontation with Islam belonging to the so-called “Reconquista”. From this perspective, the relationship between Christianity and Islam would have been expressed mainly through religious polemic. Medieval Christian polemicists had neither the interest nor the means to assemble a rigorous knowledge of Islam, so their polemic was focused on certain theological, scriptural, and character-based features that were reiterated within the polemical tradition itself. Islam became, then, an essentially ahistorical phenomenon, and around it an immutable and hostile anthropology was constructed (Bunes 1989). The expression of this hostility would unify, under a religious heading, a series of political, ritual, and cultural representations whose function would be to construct a strong identity boundary with Islam based on a specular

view of the Christians' own identity and that would find the perfect genealogical articulation in the statutes of blood purity. One of the works that encapsulates all these representations of Muslims and Jews is the *Fortalicium fidei* (1464–1476), by the Franciscan friar Alonso de Espina, a book that was widely disseminated throughout Europe. The relationship between the Franciscans and Islam as a target of evangelisation evoked a reference to the foundational history of the encounter between Saint Francis of Assisi and Sultan Malik al-Kāmil, which legitimised the missionary vocation of the Franciscans and therefore their longstanding medieval tradition of voluntary martyrdom in North Africa—yet another example of this cultural and religious border (Tolan 2007).

Yet, the issue of the frontier and the representation of alterity does not seem sufficient to comprehend the religious complexity of the Mediterranean world. Rather than a place of alterity, we might say that North Africa becomes a privileged space where the religious categories of the modern world undergo mutation, where forms of religious thought circulate, take on new meanings, and become resources for expressing new forms of spirituality. This is a space not only where syncretic phenomena arise (for example, shared sanctuaries), but that also permits the spread of certain phenomena such as messianism that seem to have an enormous potential for transmission and contagion (García-Arenal 2003).

These slippages of meaning, this appropriation of religious resources within different contexts, are a testament to processes of transmission that are incomprehensible if we fail to keep in mind the conflict between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. A text composed in Spanish in 1583, *Los Diálogos de Marruecos*, recounts how a young Flemish man, Andrés Antonio, discovers that his brother Bernardo has converted to Judaism in Marrakesh, adopting the name Obadía Ben Israel. Andrés goes to Morocco to find him, and there the two engage in a religious dialogue in which Obadía narrates, among other things, his conversion to Judaism, which began on a ship en route from Flanders to Morocco, where he heard some Protestants speaking about the Bible. When he undertakes to read it, Bernardo discovers inconsistencies in the sacred text. By the time he arrives in Africa, what began as a voyage made for reasons of trade has also become a personal journey toward truth. The author of the work has been identified as Estêvão Dias, a member of a Portuguese family of crypto-Jews who was persecuted by the Inquisition, was in contact with Protestant reformers in the Low Countries, converted to Judaism,

and travelled to Morocco (Wilke 2014). The *Diálogos* allows us to reconstruct not only the connection between trade and conversion but also other processes of far-reaching cultural significance, such as the movement of Portuguese Jews through the Iberian peninsula, Morocco, and the Low Countries; the different kinds of contact between Judaism, the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and Islam; and the configuration of a culture in which we observe, in Spanish, the transformation (in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries) of the dialectic and dialogue forms from an emphasis on scholastic rhetoric to the expression of sceptical perplexity.

The same phenomenon can be found in a number of Morisco texts. We know, for example, that *La Apología contra la ley cristiana*—written by a Morisco from Pastrana, Aḥmad Alguazir, who later fled to Morocco—was known in Europe—in England and the Low Countries, for example—at the same time that it was being read in Tunis and Algiers. Also, the text known as *Evangelio de S. Bernabé*, a forged Morisco gospel, was used by the English freethinker John Toland in his critique of religion (Champion 2010). This example demonstrates not only that information circulated but also that the features of this information were appropriated and reused by different people in different contexts.

In 1594, Cipriano de Valera published his *Tratado para confirmar en la fe cristiana a los cautivos de Berbería* in London. This treatise is unique among others by Spanish religious writers in that Valera was a Protestant who had fled Spain and was one of the translators of the Castilian Bible that is still today the canonical Spanish version for Protestants. In his *Tratado*, Valera invoked the sufferings of the captives in Barbary Africa, but at the same time he denounced the errors of the papists and the need for direct reading of sacred scripture. It is not difficult to see in his description of the suffering of Christian captives in Africa an allusion to the persecution of “true Christians” in inquisitorial Spain and a plea for their liberation. Thus, the work makes use of a rhetorical device similar to that used by the anonymous author of the *Viaje de Turquía*, an autobiographical tale of debatable authenticity that expresses religious anxiety by means of the estrangement induced by a journey through Islamic lands.

These examples make clear the problematic nature of religious identity, which was being threatened by the widening gap between inner experience and outer appearance, by the experience of mass conversion, and by the need to conceal one’s faith in the face of ever greater instruments of ideological homogenisation. Thus, in the sequel

to Lazarillo de Tormes' adventures, he participates in the Conquest of Tunis (1534), but his ship sinks and the soldiers—abandoned by their commanders—drown; only Lázaro survives, though he is transformed into a tuna fish (that is, he converts to Islam), in a perfect metaphor for conversion and concealment as a means of survival (Delpech 2014, 150).

Living in exile, Valera was able to criticize the mechanisms for controlling conscience introduced by modern confessionalisation—not only the Inquisition but above all the relentlessness of preaching. Popular preachers saw their own countrymen as targets of evangelisation not unlike Indians or Muslims. In 1665–1668, during his popular missions in Spain, the future superior general of the Society of Jesus, Tirso González de Santalla, met some Muslim captives whom he attempted to convert. This encounter with Islam later led him to write a large manual on conversion of Muslims, *Manuductio ad conversionem Mahumetanorum* (Madrid, 1687), which was later translated into Arabic (Colombo 2007). It is a very different kind of text from Alonso de Espina's *Fortalicium fidei*; from its very beginning it makes use of the improvements in the historical and theological knowledge of Islam made by European Orientalism, including the use of the printing press with Arabic characters. The work also draws from the Jesuits' own agenda and their view of contact with and evangelisation of other peoples, which vacillated between the Rome's centralisation of the missions through the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith and the problematic strategy of accommodation to other cultures.

The construction of knowledge

The experience of religious contact is, to a certain extent, an experience of subjectivity but also a narrative experience. As is well known, constant contact with Muslims in Al-Andalus spawned a prolific Maurophile literary tradition—tales of romance and chivalry about life on the frontier with Islam—that ended up permeating European literary taste, in the salons of absolutist France, where the novel as a genre was being codified and where it was being debated whether the origin of the novel was to be found in the Arabic literary tradition (Carrasco Urgoiti 1956). This long-lasting controversy included a discussion of the role of *Don Quixote* in the history of literature but can also be understood in terms that have nothing to do

with the issue of origins, but rather with the processes by which cultural forms take on new meanings: for example, the sublimation of the age-old themes of the “discovery of islands” and “captivity” in Byzantine novels (González Rovira 1996, 139–142).

But the crisis of narration also affects historical narrative and its methodological foundations. An example is Leo Africanus. Born in Granada, he emigrated to Morocco at the end of the fifteenth century. There he worked for the Waṭṭāsid sultans and travelled throughout Morocco and North Africa before being captured in 1519–1520, taken to Rome, and baptised as a godson of Leo X. Among other works, Leo Africanus wrote a *Descrizione dell’Africa*, in which he described the kingdoms, regions, cities, rivers, and mountains of North Africa, many of which he had personally visited. The manuscript of the *Descrizione* circulated among Italian humanists and geographers even before it was published, and the work’s influence is obvious, for example, in the representation of Africa found in the maps that Jacopo Gastaldi drew for Pietro Andrea Mattiolo’s translation of Ptolomy’s *Geography* (Zhiri 1991, 51)—an attempt to correct the erudite tradition in geography through an insertion onto old maps of “i nuovi nomi” (new names).

An attempt was made to combine the new African place names with the Ptolemaic tradition, but in the end this tradition was abrogated, and the new toponyms came to constitute the image of North Africa that would predominate in Europe until at least the eighteenth century. Contributing to the remarkable dissemination of Leo Africanus’ book was the use made of it in Spain by Luis del Mármol, whose *Descripción General de África* was a very important link for the knowledge of Africa in Europe in the early modern period. Mármol defined the intention of his work as being absolutely original in Spain, in that it incorporated ostensibly distinct categories—the history of Islam and of Al-Andalus and the description of Africa (following João de Barros and Damião de Góis)—in a single representation of history that culminated in the Battle of Lepanto. For his *Descripción*, Mármol claimed to have used Arabic sources. Whether or not this claim is true, it indicates the emergence of greater historiographical concern for the role of Al-Andalus in a providential history of Spain (Rodríguez Mediano 2009).

For Mármol and other historians, the old ideology of the Crusade and religious confrontation was insufficient to the task of constructing a complex historical narrative, in the same way that the accumulation of motifs from polemical literature was inadequate for developing a

rigorous knowledge of Islam. The possibility of considering Arabic as an ancient language like Latin, Greek, or Hebrew opened the door to a reflection on the role of the East in Spain's providential history. Cervantes had dealt ironically with this possibility through his Cide Hamete Benengeli. This famous character in *Don Quixote* may have been inspired by the Morisco physician and translator Miguel de Luna, the author of *Historia Verdadera del rey d. Rodrigo*, a bogus translation of a non-existent Arabic source text about the Muslim conquest of Spain in the year 711 (García-Arenal 2010). This work—considered by many to be an authentic chronicle of the conquest—enjoyed great success and was translated multiple times into Italian, French, and English throughout the entire seventeenth century.

It is true that Miguel de Luna's work was strongly criticised by his contemporaries for being an especially clumsy and ill-composed falsification. It was obviously not a real Arabic chronicle, as historical criticism quickly established. However, in the dialectic between falsification and criticism, documentary and historical materials were being collected that made it possible to construct an Orientalist body of knowledge that highlighted the presence of the Arab past in the history of Spain: between the end of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, various Oriental and North African chronicles in Arabic were translated into Castilian (García-Arenal and Rodríguez Mediano 2013). Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, European learning had transformed the *topoi* of alterity into forms of historical knowledge that amounted to more resources for thinking about the past. Many of these resources used by modern Orientalism had to do with the representation of the origins of the nations of Europe and the projection of this representation into the present in political terms. Thus, Guillaume Postel was able to imagine an "Israeli-Gallic" monarchy, and Benito Arias Montano, who signed his name in Arabic as *al-tilmīḍ* ("the student"), could envision a biblical and Oriental past for Spain that had a decisive influence on the conception of sacred history and geography in Europe, in the course of the long process of developing a properly secular history (Shalev 2012).

In this sense, the relationship between Iberia and North Africa, or better yet, the Mediterranean space defined by Iberian globalisation cannot be characterised only as a network of exchanges where agents involved in mediation and translation—"passeurs" or "cultural brokers"—move about; the idea of mediation itself implicitly entails the reification of (cultural or political) spaces among which these

brokers move. A radical critique of these cultural categories might be the definition of the Mediterranean as a “cultural continuum” (Dakhliya and Kaiser 2013).

Note

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The union between Portugal and the Spanish monarchy (1581–1640)



Jean-Frédéric Schaub

Two close societies

To understand the political and social processes that transformed relations between Portugal and Spain during the period of the Union of the Crowns, it is essential to turn our back upon the question of national identity and sovereignty. If we were from the outset to imagine this period as a kind of Babylonian captivity for the Portuguese soul, it would be no use pursuing historical research on the matter. Our interpretation would be simple: the union of 1581 was a political and institutional aberration and the separation of 1640 signalled the inevitable return to normality. Such a version of history mistakes the effects for the causes. In the teleological version that all nationalisms share, two distinct—if not incompatible—identities are bound to engender two different sovereignties. In such a scenario, the passing of time is divided into three stages. A period of socio-genesis for the two nationalities; then a union imposed unilaterally by one side to the detriment of the other; finally, a process of liberation giving way to the creation of a situation that fits the results of the aforementioned socio-genesis. As a working hypothesis, we can imagine another scenario, also in three stages. A period of institutional distinction and, simultaneously, intense social, cultural, spiritual, and even political interpenetration from the start of the sixteenth century; a Union of the Crowns resulting from the Aviz family's dynastic exhaustion and Portugal's profound weakening in the wake of the tragedy of Alcácer-Quibir (1578); a period of profound tearing of the secular links woven between the two societies due to the length and brutality of the so-called Restoration War (1640–1668), and to other conflicts of interest between the two monarchies, for instance regarding the demarcation of the two empires in southern Portuguese America.

In the architecture of this book, the imperial and colonial issues are

dealt with in specific chapters. For this reason, the present chapter focuses almost exclusively upon the peninsular dimension of the Union of the Crowns. It is clear, however, that the European and non-European dimensions of the issue are not dissociable (Bethencourt 2013). Nevertheless, its subject centres on the moment of the Union of the Crowns. It is worth recalling some of the instances of interpenetration between the two societies of Portugal and Castile-Aragon. There were the intermarriages of the early sixteenth century (Manuel I of Portugal married successively two daughters of Isabel and Ferdinand, Isabelle of Aragon and Maria of Aragon; Charles V married Isabelle of Portugal, daughter of Manuel I; Dom João III was married to Catherine of Austria, sister of Charles V, who was Queen Regent during part of Sebastian I's minority; Philip II's first wife was Maria Manuela of Portugal, eldest daughter of Dom João III), which show that the two dynasties, Aviz and Habsburg, were linked even more tightly at the time than the Habsburgs of Spain and the Bourbons during the seventeenth century (Drumond 2001). The dynastic links were so tight between the House of Aviz and the descendants of Isabel and Ferdinand that the ordinances of King Manuel I specified that the charges and offices of Portugal could only be conferred upon natives of the kingdom, as if to guard against the potential arrival of other pretenders (Terassa Lozano 2012).

In both polities, dynastic legitimacy was founded on the saga of the Christian conquest of the Iberian peninsula's Islamic territories, as demonstrated by the existence of military orders. From the fifteenth century onwards, there was a strong strategic convergence and tactical support in the deployment of the Iberian presence in North Africa, from the capture of Ceuta by the Portuguese in 1415 to that of Orán by the Castilians in 1509. We can also point to the significant participation of the Portuguese in the conquest of Tunis by Charles V in 1535. At the time, the imperial ideology consisted of a collection of common links shared by lettered elites and governors from the two societies, who drew upon the same political language (Rodrigues 2011). A demand for exclusivity regarding overseas conquests was included in the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. This issue should be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, the two Iberian empires stood together to defend their common right to overseas conquest, to the exclusion of all other European powers; on the other, they developed a certain rivalry, as could be seen at the archipelago of the Moluccas in the mid-sixteenth century, for example (Valladares 2001; Lobato 2013). There was the common experience of a brutal treatment

of the Jewish question, followed by the segregation of New Christians, as well as the presence of a Holy Office of the Inquisition in both countries (Marcocci and Paiva 2013). In addition, there existed a great linguistic fluidity between the two societies, at least among educated circles, as shown by the usage of Castilian as a language of *haute culture* in the Portuguese printed book production and the royal courts, or by the reception of Gil Vicente's theatre in the court of the King of Spain (Buescu 2004).

There was also a strong flow of professors and students, especially in the universities of Salamanca—where there was a highly significant “nation” of Portuguese students—and Coimbra, where Martín de Azpilcueta and Francisco de Suárez both taught. Between them, as with other kingdoms, Portugal and Castile shared sources of law such as canon law and *ius commune*. Both the compendiums of laws adopted by the Cortes and each of the kingdom's royal ordinances were individual to them, although only to a certain extent, as was demonstrated by the frequent usage in Portugal of the *Siete Partidas* of King Alfonso X of Castile. More generally, though, in instances where the rules remained silent over some unprecedented case or other, there existed a mechanism for borrowing the laws of the neighbouring country. For this reason, the situation prior to 1581 was marked by a great permeability of the two juridical systems. On the other hand, the Union of the Crowns led certain Portuguese juriconsults to come up with a more solid definition of the kingdom's law, by emphasising all that distinguished the latter from the one in effect in Castile (Clavero 1982). In the documentation of the Consejo de Castilla, prior to the union, the category of foreigner (*extranjero*) refers to countries like France, England, and Rome, but also to four kingdoms: Aragon, Catalonia, the kingdom of Valencia, and the kingdom of Portugal. For the magistrates of the council, the foreign nature of Portugal was of the same type as the foreign nature of Aragon. During the period of the Union of the Crowns, a number of Portuguese publicists and jurists—among them Pedro Barbosa de Luna, Manuel Severim de Faria, João Salgado de Araújo, and Lourenço de Mendonça—sought to demonstrate that the Portuguese were the best “Spaniards” in the peninsula (Cardim 2014). This theme has a dual significance. On the one hand, it indicates that the notion of a common, and perhaps even unified *Hispania* was not absent from the political imagination in Portugal. On the other hand, it shows that the influence acquired by the Crown of Castile at the heart of the Iberian cluster inspired the emulation of the other realms and dominions, who hoped that

belonging to Spain would amount to more than an alignment with Castile. The fanciful notion of a definitive relocation of the capital of the Spains from Madrid to Lisbon surfaced numerous times. It was buoyed up both by the wilful beliefs of certain Portuguese subjects and the double language of the royal entourage (Bouza 1994).

The process of dynastic union

The period of the Union of the Crowns is bracketed by two identical phenomena. Philip II in the early 1580s and John IV in the early 1640s each had the opportunity to hand out a large number of titles of nobility (Monteiro 1998; Monteiro and Cunha 2006). Because of this, each of the two monarchs was able to forge an elite that owed him their noble standing and would therefore be loyal to him. In 1580–1581, Philip II inherited the tragic situation resulting from the disaster of Alcácer-Quibir. In 1578, it was not only King Sebastian who was missing from the scene. With him were hundreds of nobles, heads of families, who had either perished or been taken captive as prisoners. As pretender to the throne, Philip II had proved himself generous in the activity of buying back these captives. Numerous families, nonetheless, had lost their head of house. For this reason, once installed upon the throne of Portugal, the monarch was in a position to raise an entire cohort of middle-ranking gentlemen to the rank of titled nobility. Likewise, when John IV seized power in 1640, numerous aristocratic families chose fidelity to the Habsburg King (Bouza 2000). They were in exile in Castile, awaiting a reconquest by the King of Madrid. They had lost titles, land, and inheritance to the Portuguese crown. In his turn, then, the Braganza King found himself distributing goods and honours to new families thereby attached to the new dynasty. In 1581 and in 1640, each of the two monarchs was able to forge a new elite that was dependent on their royal grace. In both cases, this was a decisive factor that accounted for the stability of the two regimes: that of the Habsburgs in Portugal for some 50 years at least, and that of the new dynasty of Braganza following the uprising of 1 December 1640.

The Union of the Crowns occurred in the wake of a troubled period. Two kings died in a year and a half: Sebastian on 4 August 1578, then his successor and uncle, Cardinal Henry, General Inquisitor of Portugal, sexagenarian and heirless, on 31 January 1580. With the death of Henry, midway through the sessions of the Cortes of

Almeirim, a dynastic crisis was unleashed. Because he sensed his imminent death, the Cardinal King named a commission of five governors who were charged with resolving the question of his succession. A regime of five intermediary governors took charge of the process of designating the new king. This college was formed by Jorge de Almeida, Archbishop of Lisbon, João de Mascarenhas, High Commissioner of Finance, Francisco de Sá de Meneses, Grand Chamberman to King Henry, Diogo Lopes de Sousa, President of the Tribunal of the Casa do Cível, and João de Telo Meneses, who had been Ambassador to Rome. Three pretenders stood out among the others: Philip II, direct descendant of Manuel the Fortunate by his mother Isabel of Portugal, wife of Charles V; Catherine Duchess of Braganza, also a direct descendant of Manuel by her father Dom Duarte; and António Prior of Crato, another descendant of the same king but as an illegitimate son of Dom Luis. João de Telo de Meneses was the only one of the five governors who opposed the candidacy of Philip II. Undoubtedly, numerous peoples favoured the Duchess of Braganza, but she was a woman. Others wanted to rally around the Prior of Crato, but he was a bastard.

Image 6.1 Genealogy of António, Prior of Crato, candidate to the Portuguese Crown in 1580. His portrait in oval is at the centre, half-length, face to the right, looking at the viewer, wearing ruff, with his genealogical tree around him, linked by tree branches and leaves; three coats of arms above, ca. 1580–1583

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Ambassador Extraordinary of Philip II to King Henry, Cristóvão de Moura was a Portuguese gentleman. He had wended his way into the heart of the Prudent King's court as a member of the house of Doña Joanna, daughter of Charles V and Isabel of Portugal. During the entire period of the dynastic transition, by means of seduction, conviction, threats, and the distribution of enormous amounts of money to buy loyalty, Cristóvão de Moura won over a growing number of Portuguese figures who were crucial to Philip II's cause. The king led a campaign to capture the inheritance of the Aviz dynasty, which mobilised all the political resources of the period. His jurists hammered out legal arguments to demonstrate that he could outweigh his competitors in the legitimate order of succession of King Manuel I's descendants. His ideologues evoked the unification of the old *Hispania* with a view to constructing an empire the likes of which had never been seen before. His agents in Portugal and his administrators in Spain bought back the gentlemen being held captive in Morocco, multiplied their promises of promotion, and corrupted

those who showed reticence. But the partisans of the Prior of Crato demonstrated their ability to organise armed resistance against Habsburg's ambitions. The Duke of Alba was sent at the head of an important expeditionary force to crush the opposing side. The Duke of Alba's military intervention was successful—unlike the situation with the rebellious Dutch. However, the operations that he led were no “cakewalk”. António's partisans defended themselves at various points. The victory of the Castilian army at Alcántara in August 1580 put an end to the hopes of those supporting António, who was nonetheless acclaimed as king during a meeting of the Cortes at Santarem in June 1580. After this defeat, Philip II's rival pulled back to the Azores. There his partisans converted the island of Terceira into a miniature kingdom loyal to António, until its conquest by Philip II's army in the summer of 1583. To these various tactics we must add the most spectacular one of all: the king's arrival in his new kingdom and negotiations with the Portuguese Cortes assembled at Tomar in April 1581 (Bouza 1987). This assembly permitted Portugal to retain jurisdictional autonomy under a Union of the Crowns, which was comparable to the agreements between Isabel and Ferdinand in the late fifteenth century, and to the circumstances from which Scotland would benefit 20 years later following King James VI's accession to the throne of England. The ecclesiastical order received assurances with regards to royal patronage (Palomo 2004). After a long negotiation, Philip II of Castile and Aragon was hailed King of Portugal by the Cortes under the Portuguese title of Philip I.

Contract and compromise

The installation of Philip I (II) in Lisbon between 1581 and 1583 had a significant political impact. Through this long sojourn, the new King of Portugal demonstrated to his subjects that he assumed his role as Portuguese monarch, thereby guaranteeing that the kingdom and its empire would remain intact and not be confused with other territories. In this respect, the illusion was nonetheless short-lived. From 1583 onwards, the Prudent King returned to Castile and entrusted the government of Portugal to his nephew the Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria, with the title of viceroy and the function of General Inquisitor of Portugal. In doing so, he abided by one of the fundamental rules established at Tomar. If the king was absent from Portugal, he could only be represented by a member of his lineage

with the title of viceroy, or failing that by a council of five governors, all of whom had to be Portuguese, like the one that had formed an interim government following the death of King Henry I (Olival 2012). After 1583, the King of Portugal's presence in his kingdom declined. King Philip II (III) did not visit the kingdom until 1619, 20 years after his ascension to the throne and even then he did not remain long in the capital of the Portuguese empire. For his part, Philip III (IV) was taken unawares when the Duke of Braganza seized power in December 1640, before he had been able to make the trip to Lisbon, as his father and grandfather had done.

The agreements forged with the institutions of the Portuguese monarchy served principally to ensure that the new King of Portugal observed the kingdom's jurisdictional autonomy. Unlike with the Crown of Aragon, the institution of the Royal House of Portugal was not abolished. The titles of court officials continued to be attributed to Portuguese figures (Labrador Arroyo 2009). The system of councils established during the second half of the sixteenth century (like in Castile) was maintained: a final court of appeal (notwithstanding the royal grace) relating to all matters ruled upon by the tribunals (the *Desembargo do Paço*); a council of finances (*Veedoria da Fazenda*); a council of religious affairs with jurisdiction over patronage, diocesan justice, and military orders (*Mesa da Consciência e Ordens*); a council of the Holy Office of the Inquisition; and a State Council that oriented the king's decisions in all matters concerning the kingdom's expansion and its relations with other powers. These were the pillars of the exertion of royal power in Portugal. When the monarch was absent from the Portuguese kingdom, which was around 57 years out of 60, the Council of Portugal had to sit in close proximity to him, wherever he might be. This council had, in principle, to be composed of noblemen, prelates and high magistrates, all of whom should be Portuguese. Its basic function was to embody and represent all of the other councils of the Portuguese monarchy—who sat in Lisbon—to the king while he resided at Madrid, the Escorial, or in Valladolid.

The principle of Portugal's autonomy must therefore be understood in the sense that the jurists attributed to the term at that time. The hierarchy upon which the entire internal system of jurisdictions rested could leave no place for interventions from the Castilian jurisdictions. In principle, the neighbouring kingdom's currency and language had no value whatsoever in Portugal. Religious patronage and the affairs of the Inquisition, like military orders, could only be decided via the Portuguese councils. Yet this king was also King of Castile-Aragon,

thanks to the Union of the Crowns. In this respect his concern for Portuguese issues was inscribed within a geostrategic framework that applied to all of his crowns. Of course, an institution like the State Council of Madrid was invited to pronounce upon problems emerging in the Portuguese empire from the reign of Philip I (II) onwards. This council commanded no administration, nor did it have any jurisdiction, but it provided the king with advice over decisions concerning the preservation of the monarchy's integrity, its potential expansion, and diplomatic relations with other powers. Yet this function, to the extent that it concerned Portugal, was also carried out by the State Council that sat before the viceroy in Lisbon, as well as by the Council of Portugal in Madrid, which embodied all of the Portuguese councils, in close proximity to the king. In other words, in the context of the Union of the Crowns, the creation of strategic decisions over the empire's future rested upon several royal institutions that were not exclusively Portuguese.

In an even clearer example, the management of the defence of Portugal and its possessions was not the sole purview of institutions of the Portuguese Crown. In this regard the situation was ambiguous from the very outset of the Union of the Crowns. The acclamation of Philip I (II) was presented as the result of a harmonious agreement between the new king and the assembled body of Portuguese society. But this did not detract from the fact that Portugal was also conquered militarily by Philip II. In light of this, the king could have placed the kingdom of Portugal under the juridical regime reserved for conquered territories—that is to say, the abolition of the local jurisdictional system. We know that nothing of the sort occurred. However, the military dimension of the process of the Habsburg's recognition was not forgotten. In fact, this conquest was not completed until the summer of 1583, when the Marquis of Santa Cruz crushed the partisans of the Prior of Crato who exerted control over the island of Terceira. The use of arms in the new king's takeover process resulted in the installation of Spanish garrisons (*presidios*) at various points along the Portuguese coast, as well as in the Azores and Madeira. The presence of these troops remains ambiguous. As in other European countries during the same period, the establishment of a garrison presented a double façade: to protect and survey. Three points are worth highlighting if we wish to avoid interpreting this phenomenon by contemporary criteria. On the one hand, in the seventeenth century the presence of troops stationed in a town or a town's outskirts was regarded as an attack on urban liberties and

privileges, including in Castile. This is why in both Portugal and Castile the municipal authorities, as an assembly of magistrates, defended the distinction of ordinary laws over any form of military privilege when conflicts broke out between citizens of the town and soldiers from the garrison. On the other hand, the financing of Spanish garrisons established on Portuguese coasts and archipelagos was meant to be funded by the Castilian treasury, without Portuguese subjects having to contribute. This principle was generally respected, except in case of supply crises or delays in salary payments, which could lead to mutinies. Therefore, Portugal found itself protected more or less by a kind of permanent army that existed in addition to the urban militia system, but without having to pay for it. Ultimately, the dissentious texts from immediately before the Restoration of 1640 and the justificatory ones from immediately after did not give a particularly significant place to the question of the existence of *presidios* as marks of a loss of sovereignty. As we shall see below, there were other matters that fuelled the partisans' arguments for a regime change.

An uncertain evolution

The historiography formed from the nineteenth century onwards under the influence of Luis Augusto Rebelo da Silva created a presentation of the evolution of the Union of the Crowns that was organised around the three reigns: Philip I (II) from 1581–1598; Philip II (III) from 1598–1621; Philip III (IV) from 1621–1640. It is presented as a three-part cycle—love, indifference, divorce—that corresponds to the arc of the three Habsburgs' attendance of their Portuguese subjects. That is to say, the period is characterised by an evolution stretching from a maximum of adhesion to a maximum of rejection, or from a scrupulous respect of the pact of Tomar to the systematic violation of the latter. Research conducted over the course of some 30 years in the archival collections of the two monarchies continues to offer contradictions to this overly simplistic scenario. Certainly, the popular revolts that broke out in the provinces of Alentejo—particularly in Évora—and in the Algarve in 1637 and 1638, took place at the end of this period, at the time of the “divorce” between Portugal and Philip III (IV). However, large-scale revolts also broke out under the reign Philip I (II) (Bouza 2010). Undoubtedly a large part of the elite adhered to the new dynasty in 1581. Yet a number of

high-profile families, and others of lesser status, chose fidelity to the Habsburgs in 1640, at the price of permanent exile in Castile.

If we examine the formation of ideological and political alternatives to the *de facto* situation created by the Habsburgs' acclamation, the love-indifference-divorce model does not fare any better. Indeed, it was during the first three decades of the new regime that António Prior of Crato, and later his sons, embodied a dynastic alternative from their exile to the European courts (London, Paris, the Hague) and via networks of correspondents in Portugal. Likewise, it was at the start of this period, and not at the end, that the myth of King Sebastian's possible return produced concrete repercussions in the form of the appearance of false Sebastian(s) (Hermann 1998). Thus, the Habsburgs' opposers drew upon alternative solutions that were founded upon on solid and operative ideological corpuses, at the beginning of the Union of the Crowns, rather than during the final decades. This situation was delicate at the time of the Restoration in 1640. Indeed, the choice of the Duke of Braganza as founder of the new dynasty required a formidable effort to justify his ascension to the throne (Costa and Cunha 2006). The latter was neither a supporter of António, nor was he the reincarnation of Sebastian: how could he profess to be the king "yearned for" by the Portuguese for 60 years, in the depths of their hearts? The avalanche of books published in the aftermath of 1st December 1640 was intended to explain and justify the self-evident nature of the Restoration, as well as the legitimacy of the new dynasty. This intense textual production should be interpreted as an effort to provide some political, ideological, spiritual, and juridical substance to the change. It masked the simultaneously improvised and unexpected nature of the Restoration and conferred an air of providence upon him.

Nor does the degradation from love to divorce coincide with the distribution of strategic and military failures and successes during the 60 years of the Union of the Crowns. Indeed, it was precisely under Philip I (II) that the Spanish Armada set sail, after its assemblage in Lisbon, with a sizeable Portuguese fleet whose lead vessel was commanded by the Duke of Medina-Sidonia. It was still under the reign of the first Habsburg of Portugal (1589) that the English pirate Francis Drake anchored his fleet at Peniche and launched an assault on Lisbon, after attacking Coruña in Galicia. The presence of the English troops, on land and at sea, was an astonishing humiliation for Philip II. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Drake had the intention of sparking an uprising in favour of the pretender Dom António Prior

of Crato, and that, in spite of Drake's assistance in men and arms, Dom António was supported by almost no one in Portugal. The capitulation of the French at the hands of Portuguese troops in Maranhão put an end to the project of an "equinoctial France" in the Amazonian region in 1615, and this was under the reign of Philip II (III). Yet the seizing of territorial control from the Brazilian colony in that region was decided upon and organised from both Lisbon and Madrid (Marques 2005). Likewise, when the Luso-Castilian armada chased the Dutch from Salvador da Bahia in 1625, under the reign of Philip III (IV), the dream of a strong strategic and political integration between Castile and Portugal seemed more likely than ever (Schwartz 1991; Marques 2011). Undeniably, however, two authentic disasters occurred precisely under the reign of the third and last of the Habsburgs of Portugal. These consisted firstly of the loss of Hormuz—the key to the Persian Gulf—to an Anglo-Persian coalition (Almeida Borges 2015) in 1622, and then the conquest of the Brazilian sugar region of Pernambuco by the Dutch in 1630 and the installation of Maurice of Nassau in 1637.

Institutional variations

The Council of Portugal was always meant to sit as close to the king as possible. It represented the kingdom and its institutions to their legitimate sovereign. For this reason, the council's activities were followed carefully from within Portugal. Whatever befell the institution served as a measure of the status retained by the kingdom of Portugal under the Union of the Crowns. The council members attempted to avoid any changes being made to the initial state of operations of the council, which could have no other president than the king himself. When a proposal was made in 1601 to designate a president other than the king in order to improve the council's functioning, a number of Portuguese figures protested. They saw this change as signifying Portugal's demotion to the rank of a mere province (Schaub 1998). The council owed its existence to the sole fact that the King of Portugal did not reside in his kingdom. But if the sovereign were ever to come to Lisbon, the Council of Portugal would lose its very reason for being, since business would be undertaken directly with the councils of the Portuguese polysynody in the capital. In 1612 it was proposed that Philip II (III) should come to Lisbon to convoke the Cortes and receive the oath of the three estates. In

accordance with the principle described above, the council's duties were suspended. As it transpired, however, the departure was delayed from one month to the next. When it became evident that the trip would never take place, certain Portuguese magistrates and gentlemen demanded that the council resume its duties. In effect, the combination of the king's absence and the council's retirement spelled the political end to the status obtained in 1581.

Not only could the Council of Portugal be formed solely of Portuguese figures (unlike the Council of Italy, where half of the members were Castilians), but the King of Portugal had to be represented in Lisbon by a member of his family. This was the case at the start of the period with the Archduke Albert (1583–1593) and at the end, with the Duchess of Mantua (1635–1640), cousin of Philip III (IV). Between these two figures, the rule of the five Portuguese governors was not frequently respected. Thus, it was the Portuguese favourite of Philip I (II), Cristóvão de Moura, Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo, who exerted the role of viceroy under the reign of Philip II (III) from 1600 to 1603, and then again from 1608 to 1612 (Martínez Hernández 2011, 2013). This was also the case, under Philip III (IV), for Dom Diogo de Castro, Count of Basto, who was sole governor in 1630 and 1631 then again from 1633 to 1635, this time under the title of viceroy. Installing a viceroy who was unrelated to the king constituted a breach of the rules established at the beginning of the Union of the Crowns. Yet it was also impossible to designate a viceroy who was not Portuguese. The most problematic case was undoubtedly that of Diego de Silva y Mendoza, upon whom Philip II (III) conferred a portion of the presidency of the Council of Portugal from 1605 to 1616, and later the Viceroyalty of Portugal from 1617 to 1621. With regards to this great figure, it was the question of nationality that was raised most frequently. He was born in Castile to a Castilian mother, Ana de Mendoza de la Cerda, and a Portuguese father, Ruy Gomez da Silva, who had accompanied Isabel of Portugal to Castile when she married Charles V and become one of the main favourites of the Prudent King. Could Diego de Silva y Mendoza, known by his title of Count of Salinas, be taken for a Portuguese aristocrat? In order to root him firmly within the Portuguese nobility, Philip II (III) in his role as King of Portugal attributed him the title of Marquis of Alenquer in 1616. Even so, voices murmured that his Portuguese nationality remained dubious (Gaillard 1982; Terrasa Lozano 2012; Dadson 2015). Only Philip I (II) respected the rules over the designation of the person (or group) to represent the king in his absence. In naming his

cousin Margaret Duchess of Mantua in 1634, Philip III (IV) came up with the most honourable possible solution for the kingdom of Portugal (Schaub 2001).

Rising tensions

The 1630s were marked, like almost everywhere else in Europe, by rising tensions. The general growth of fiscal pressure was the main cause of conflict between societies and their princes. Portugal was no exception. In Castile the estates negotiated step by step at the Cortes of 1626 and 1632, to accept the financial demands presented by the king's favourite, the Count-Duke of Olivares. In Portugal, the stated goal in 1631 was to extract a steady annual revenue of 500,000 *cruzados* (the *renda fixa*) from the kingdom, without negotiation. Indeed, King Philip III (IV) had strongly resisted convoking the Cortes, out of fear that they would demand more in favours than they would consent to in new taxes. Nonetheless, the era of the Count-Duke of Olivares was characterised less by the level of fiscal pressure than by the production of a coherent ideology. This was aimed at levelling the status of the monarchy's different territories in order to force them to contribute to the combined effort of their collective defence. Despite being reserved for the king alone, the "union of arms" memorandum (1624) (Elliott, de la Peña, and Negredo 2013) was known about at least in part by others. The increasing demands that Olivares was directing at Portuguese cities and institutions were interpreted as steps in a plan that was aimed at reducing Portugal's autonomy to nil. The closest collaborators of the Count-Duke of Olivares had to come up with all sorts of strategies for obtaining new financial resources: demands for donations from the kingdom's main cities; taxation on all sorts of products from meat to wine (*real d'agua*); deductions on the annuities of offices accorded by the king (*media annata*). Those who objected to paying these sums could rely on the chance to assign them a negative political and ideological signification in light of the rank that the kingdom of Portugal had been awarded in 1581. The outcome was a series of anti-fiscal revolts—such as the so-called Maçarocas revolt in Porto in 1629—followed by a kind of generalised revolt in Alentejo in 1637, whose epicentre was in the town of Évora, and all across the Algarve in 1638 (Oliveira 1990, 2002). These events have been interpreted, retrospectively, as an augury of the "revolution" that took place on 1 December 1640. Such an interpretation is hardly

useful; it is enough to appreciate the breadth, the spread, and the duration of these protest movements to understand that entire swathes of the Portuguese population were disposed to launch into dangerous political combats.

The malaise that had descended upon part of the kingdom and its king was also fuelled by the disastrous consequences of the war that Castile was determinedly waging against protestant Holland. On this account, we can say at this point that Olivares was led astray by optimism or even blindness. He had certainly not taken stock of the difficulty of the task in hand. Behind the brilliant taking of Breda in 1625 lay a multitude of difficulties. The objective became increasingly unattainable as Olivares gathered other powers around him by virtue of his politics, starting with Richelieu's France, which entered into the war in 1635. For Portugal, the interminable "war of Flanders" had two very weighty consequences. In the colonial domain, solidarity with Castile made Portuguese overseas territories the targets for Dutch and English navigators and corsairs. The Azores—a stop-off for transatlantic crossings and vessels returning from the Indies—paid the price. But above all it was Maurice of Nassau's takeover of the region of Pernambuco that struck hardest at spirits and revenues, since the Dutch seized a large number of sugar plantations whose products were habitually sent to the principal ports of Portugal (Cabral de Mello 1998). To this initial loss, we should add that of the slave trading post of São Jorge da Mina in 1637, also to the Dutch (Ferreira 2010). In Portugal itself, the embargo on all commerce with the Netherlands had very negative consequences upon one essential economic sector: the production and exportation of sea salt from Aveiro, Setúbal, and Alcácer do sal (Schaub 2001). Maintaining solidarity with Castile in her political confrontation with the Dutch was a catastrophe for Portugal's economic interests.

The crisis of the late 1630s

If the rejection of fiscal pressure and the absurdity of the confrontation with the Netherlands constituted the two structural motors of the quarrel, it was a set of particular political circumstances that led to the uprising in 1640. Aside from the anti-fiscal revolts, the decade of the 1630s was also marked by the rise to power of two political figures who concentrated the intensity of all the resentments: Miguel de Vasconcelos and Diogo Soares. The former was successively

brother-in-law and father-in-law of the latter, with Soares taking the role of Secretary of the Council of Portugal in Madrid, and Vasconcelos that of Secretary of the Council of State in Lisbon. As a result, correspondence about subjects of the utmost sensitivity passed through their hands, in direct communication between the two. They were placed at the service of the political programme designed by the Count-Duke of Olivares. Their *savoir-faire* consisted in pressuring influential Portuguese figures into accepting financial and strategic decisions made at the court in Madrid. To bend their interlocutors to their will, in both Lisbon and Madrid, they availed themselves of a formidable weapon that no one before them had previously dared to use. They knew the exact state of the abusive alienation of the crown's assets from which several hundred families of gentlemen, prelates, and magistrates were benefiting. They did not hesitate to carry out a kind of blackmail against the heads of these families, demanding support from them over certain decisions and, in exchange, shelving inquiries into ill-gotten goods acquired to the detriment of the throne. To the brutality of this process they added an insulting tone, which they employed even against aristocrats of a higher rank than their own. The loathing kindled by Miguel de Vasconcelos was the reason behind the failed firearm attack launched against him in 1634 (Oliveira 2002). Then, at the time of the takeover of the royal palace of Lisbon on 1 December 1640, partisans of the Duke of Braganza put him to death in his study. His body was thrown out of the window, stripped naked, and dismembered in the public square.

Without risk of being anachronistic, we can suggest that the Count-Duke of Olivares launched a particular political regime. His position as favourite to the king placed him above the councils of the monarchy and modified institutional procedures. His actions were also accompanied by a specific ideological output. He conceived of the government as a mission aimed at transforming the order of things and overcoming inherited situations. As a result of this, the king's favourite and the latter's close confidants became the object of highly disparate complaints. To name but one example from among all of the grievances directed at them: Olivares' rumoured Judeophilia. This accusation rested on the fact that, following the royal bankruptcy in 1627, Portuguese businessmen of *converso* origin were welcomed with open arms as the new financiers of the king (Sanz Ayán 2013). The charge also led to a resurgence of tensions born under the reign of Philip II (III), in response to the negotiation of a royal pardon for Jewish *conversos* who had been condemned by the Inquisition (López-

Salazar Codes 2010). Therefore, not only did Olivares' regime jeopardise the political tradition that assured Portugal's autonomy and its rank in the monarchy, but it also opened the door to all sorts of religious turpitude. It still remains for us to examine what occurred for the uprising to take place, and for support to be garnered in its favour.

Understanding the success of John of Braganza

The rejection of the olivariist project and the abhorrence of the favourite's closest confidants were not enough to instigate a change of dynasty. The evidence of this lies in the fact that the revolts in the two large provinces of Alentejo and the Algarve were brought under control, by negotiation and by force. As for the Duke of Braganza (who became John IV after 1 December 1640), he did not associate himself with the revolts, despite the fact that the eye of the storm was situated in his seigniorial lands. Furthermore, over the course of the following year, he accepted the role of captain general of the armed forces stationed in Portugal under the authority of the Vicereine, Margaret of Mantua. In spite of all the combined skill and brutality of Soares and Vasconcelos, the *renda fixa* did not find its way back into the royal treasury. The king was faced with an unsolvable dilemma: it was impossible to obtain a fixed and unconditional sum without negotiation with the Cortes of Portugal, yet it was too risky to convoke an assembly that would haggle over every aspect of the financial negotiation. Those Cortes, if they had been convoked, would have been marked by the fact that Philip III (IV) had not seen fit to make the trip to Lisbon, almost 20 years after his accession to the throne, and by the state of tension in which the cities, the clergy, and part of the aristocracy could currently be found. To avoid this dilemma, Olivares' Portuguese confidants suggested that he convoke Portuguese aristocrats, prelates, and magistrates to Madrid on an individual basis. The idea was to force them to stay for a period at the king's court and to draw out of them, one by one, a promise to support his fiscal demands once they were back in Portugal. This manoeuvre had the effect of forcing dozens of important Portuguese figures to migrate to the capital of Castile. Because of this, during the years 1639 and 1640, Portugal found herself deprived of numerous influential and power-wielding families. The resulting situation allows us to understand two phenomena. The first is the large number of members of the Portuguese elite who, finding themselves in Castile at

the time that John of Braganza seized power, chose fidelity to the Habsburg King (Bouza 2000). The second is the freedom of manoeuvre that was therefore afforded to partisans of the rupture who, having remained in Portugal, found themselves freed of the presence of influential opponents.

On this basis, the success of John of Braganza's coup d'état finds a certain number of rational explanations. The new king took power of a kingdom that was partially emptied of its authorities. In these conditions, it is barely surprising that his seizure of power was applauded in the kingdom's main cities when his envoys announced the news. On the one hand, he confiscated the inheritance and title of those figures who chose fidelity to Philip III (IV), to gratify new title-holders who had been won over to his cause. On the other hand, in the summers of 1641 and 1642 important political trials were launched against aristocrats, magistrates, and bankers suspected of gathering intelligence for Spain; their execution in the public square served as a warning for others. In handwritten form during the months that preceded the coup, and in published format thereafter, there flourished an abundant literature aimed at explaining and justifying the change of dynasty (Torgal 1982; Curto 1988). Here, we must be careful not to mistake the effect for the cause. Therefore, the production of arguments aimed at legitimating the rupture of the Union of the Crowns contributed decisively to the definition of a Portuguese identity that was different from the Castilian identity, if not from the Spanish one. To this we must add the considerable impact of the extremely onerous war of attrition upon the frontier populations, in terms of creating among the latter a shared sense of solidarity against an enemy that was increasingly regarded as external to them. The combination of these factors allows us to appreciate more keenly why Portuguese society seemed more disposed to hand over the funds demanded by the Braganza King than they had been with the Habsburg. It was political and social processes, rather than a pre-existing feeling of nationhood, that provided the keys to the new dynasty's success.

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Chapter Seven

Iberian society



Mafalda Soares da Cunha and Igor Knezevic

Introduction

The Society of Estates endured as the dominant ideal throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but what was in theory a rigid system of social distinctions masked a considerable degree of flexibility in practice. Already by the fifteenth century, an increasingly complex social reality meant that the ordinary language of social description was unmoored from the simple functionalism of the tripartite system of estates—the *bellatores*, the *oratores*, and the *labradores*—if indeed that system was ever fully congruent with reality. The ensuing “terminological promiscuity” rendered any strictly hierarchical system virtually impossible to fix (Thompson 1992, 58; Monteiro 2006, 258). The terms endured, but their meanings expanded to accommodate new realities, groups, and outlooks. In a general sense, it may be said that the sixteenth century was a period of accelerated social mobility, during which wealth paved the way to social ascent, while the seventeenth century was one of consolidation in theory and practice, with a greater emphasis on blood and lineage—seemingly more immutable characteristics, though in practice open to challenge and manipulation.

The nobility

At the apex of the nominal hierarchy was the nobility, a term that obscured stark inequalities of power, status, reputation, and wealth, among other things. Its geographic distribution was also uneven—a legacy of the various stages of the medieval Reconquista. It was more densely concentrated in the north of the peninsula, where in certain regions the entire population claimed the legal status of nobility and

thinning out towards the south. This was partly due to the largely rural character and lower average estate rents in the northern regions, in contrast to the more urbanised south where great lords of vassals dominated vast landed estates, enjoyed high rents, and extensive resources.

In fifteenth-century Portugal, the nobility or *fidalgia* constituted almost 1% of the population and was made up of the scions of known lineages whose origins were mainly in the north of the country (Marques 1982, 312–313). This relative homogeneity was gradually eroded over the subsequent centuries. The growth of the state, and of the crown's resources, from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries contributed to the growth of the nobility as a whole, but above all its lower ranks, including the secondary branches of the great landed nobility, various minor lineages of medieval origin, as well as the recently ennobled. The younger sons of the great noble families were relegated to the lower reaches of a more stratified hierarchy as a result of a preference for impartible inheritance that favoured older sons through entail, and new rules governing the transmission of royal patrimony outlined in the *Lei Mental* (1434).

Similar processes are evident in Spain, where the nobility represented a larger proportion of the population, estimated at roughly 10% of the total, albeit unevenly distributed (Domínguez Ortiz 1992, Vol. I, 167–170). The number of secondary or cadet branches excluded from entailed family property also multiplied, although unlike in Portugal, royal grants were not subject to the right of reversion or forfeiture in the absence of a direct male heir. This meant that the Spanish nobility enjoyed far greater scope for social reproduction.

In both Spain and Portugal, the chief source of patronage and thus the agent of social mobility was the crown. Although the Portuguese kings in the course of the fifteenth century became the chief arbiters of social distinction, the criteria and the categories remained flexible enough to ensure the permeability of the boundaries of social groups, and the existence of parallel internal hierarchies. At the top of the pyramid this flexibility was due to the vagueness regarding the hierarchy of the titles granted by the crown, and the fact that the Avis dynasty (1383–1580) did not have a monopoly on awarding these; at the base of the noble estate, on the other hand, mobility was a product of the social status that was increasingly attached to government and military offices, in Portugal and in the overseas territories. The same ambiguity in the internal stratification of the nobility was evident in

early modern Spain, where the situation was rendered even more complex by the aggregation of different peninsular kingdoms and their European territories (Álvarez-Ossorio Alvaríño 2006, 161–163). The plurality of legal frameworks made it extremely difficult to identify proper equivalents between the various forms of classification used in the different territories.

The diversity and the different historical traditions of the territories of the Spanish monarchy account for sometimes vast discrepancies between the territorial possessions of their respective nobilities. Thus, the area under the jurisdiction of the Aragonese nobility at the beginning of the sixteenth century is estimated at around 28.5%, increasing to 40% by the early nineteenth century (Abadía 2017). In Valencia, the numbers were even higher, perhaps as high as three-quarters (Casey 1979, 105–106). In Portugal, meanwhile, the share of seigniorial jurisdictions rose from 38% in the early sixteenth century to 44% in 1640, thereafter declining sharply as the vast majority were absorbed into the royal domain (Monteiro 1996, 54).

The upper or titled nobility—the barons, viscounts, counts, marquises, and dukes—were a far more exclusive group in Portugal than in Castile, due to the avarice of the Portuguese kings in granting titles. It is significant that the creation of new titles tripled between 1580 and 1640, when Portugal was part of the Spanish monarchy (Cunha and Monteiro 2010). This helps explain the steadfast support of the titled aristocracy for the Habsburg cause in 1580 and 1640 (Bouza 1994, 91). An early attempt to designate a more exclusive category within the Spanish nobility was Charles V's creation of the Spanish *Grande*s (*Grandes de España*). Yet over the subsequent two centuries the expansion of this group—from the original 25 *Grande*ships to 113 in 1707, and continuing to grow in the eighteenth century—was such that it became necessary to create three degrees within the *Grande*e class, the highest being the most ancient (Soria Mesa 2007, 69).

The sale of titles was a major difference between Spanish and Portuguese titled nobilities. In Portugal, titles and lordships could never be purchased, but were exclusively granted as a royal favour (*mercê*). Yet this did not prevent jurisdictional rights and lordships exchanging hands between individuals, transactions that were on rare occasions confirmed by the crown. On the other hand, in the territories of the Spanish monarchy even *Grande*ships were sold at the right price during the reign of Charles II (Soria Mesa 2007, 49–55). Nevertheless, in Spain by the seventeenth century the *Grande*es

as a group were distinguished from the rest of the nobility by their relatively exclusive social origins. Dozens, if not hundreds, of titles of nobility below the rank of Grandee were granted. They were open to members of the upper levels of the urban patriciate, merchants, and bourgeois, as the expansion of commerce coincided with an increase in the crown's financial needs.

The Portuguese landed gentry held jurisdiction over geographically fragmented territories. This dispersion obviated the establishment of a form of government based on regional units, and thus noble houses were not able to consolidate their power on a regional level, or to forge identities rooted in specific regions or provinces. This situation was mirrored in the Spanish monarchy, both in its peninsular and European possessions. This was partly due to the marriage strategies of the principal noble houses in the different kingdoms but was also a consequence of the wider distribution of Castilian honours, such as the order of Santiago. The phenomenon was especially evident in Aragon and Catalonia, where many of the most important local families became associated with the houses of the Castilian Grandes, assuming the latter's titles and surnames as their main identifying marks (Abadía 2017; Molas 1997). Although some authors have designated this process as the Castilianisation of the noble elites, in truth marriage alliances were also forged between families from the other dominions of the Spanish monarchy, with the consequent dispersion of jurisdictions across the various territories (a process in which Portugal, Milan, Naples, and the Low Countries were not exceptions). The more nuanced, and arguably more appropriate, concept of a transnational nobility better explains the emergence of elites more directly linked to the political interests of the monarchy, without obscuring the particular advantages thus acquired by various nobles (Redondo Álamo and Yun Casalilla 2009; Cunha 2009; Terrasa Lozano 2012).

Another difference was the Spanish landed aristocracy's right of sale of local offices. Furthermore, the accumulation of patrimony in different kingdoms through expansive marriage strategies—paralleled to some extent in Portugal, though only between 1580 and 1640—translated into various degrees of authority over dispersed regions of the monarchy, with all the strategic value this entailed. Moreover, when these families began to leave their estates for residence at court during most of the year, where there were greater opportunities for rendering services in exchange for royal favours, they continued to exercise their power at the local level, in contrast to what occurred in

Portugal after 1640, with the definitive “courtisation” of the Portuguese nobility. In this way, the Spanish aristocracy managed to combine personal service with the exercise of authority on the periphery through local agents, such as noble families of lower rank, or younger relatives linked through patron-client relationships (Carrasco Martínez 2010; Salas Almela 2008; Iglesias Blanco 2009).

In Portugal before 1640, seigniorial lordship and control over local government through officials based in a head town were the basis as well as the distinguishing marks of noble status (Cunha and Monteiro 2010). After 1640, and in stark contrast to Spain, there was a significant shift. In addition to the reduced number of new grants of seigniorial titles, there was a near total “courtisation” of the existing upper nobility with the growing monopolisation of the most important posts in the royal government by the titled aristocrats. Ascent to the upper ranks of the nobility would only be possible thenceforth as a reward for direct service to the crown, which signified the nobility’s renewed dependence on royal favours as the foundation of its socioeconomic status (Monteiro 1998).

Another significant difference relates to what might be referred to as the “government of others”. Notwithstanding that in a corporate society, as António Manuel Hespanha has pointed out, the exercise of political authority was always in some sense the government of others, in Portugal the hierarchical power relations extended to the overseas territories, unlike in Castile (Xavier and Silva 2016). The Portuguese *fidalgua* circulated widely throughout the overseas territories, discharging military and administrative posts, and familiarising themselves with the world beyond Europe, which during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was extremely unusual among the nobility in the Spanish kingdoms, more accustomed to carrying out diplomatic missions or serving as viceroys in the different kingdoms. In both cases the rotation of aristocrats in the various higher offices of state in the different territories should have contributed to the greater territorial integration of the two monarchies.

Partly as a consequence of the greater material dependence of the Portuguese nobility on the monarchy, the direct association between the aristocracy and the exercise of power at the centre endured far longer in Portugal than in Spain, to the end of the eighteenth century. On the other hand, the nobility’s power in the provinces, the exercise of seigniorial authority or the lords’ extractive capacity declined in Portugal during the eighteenth century, which was not the case in the other territories of the Spanish monarchy. Some authors even point to

the bolstering of seigniorial rights, and even speak of a “refeudalisation” beginning in the seventeenth century. The kingdom of Valencia was exemplary in this sense (Casey 1979).

It should be noted that the Castilian nobility was no longer summoned to the Cortes of Castile after 1538–1539, while the Portuguese nobility remained a part of the kingdom’s representative assembly, much like their Aragonese, Catalan, and Valencian counterparts until the eighteenth-century Nueva Planta decrees. However, this should not be taken to signify greater participation in the business of government, since the nobility were well represented in the decision-making bodies in both Spain and Portugal, and exerted a preponderant influence on government everywhere.

Despite these differences, the Iberian nobilities had many things in common, besides their Catholic faith. The porousness of the frontier also had the effect of reinforcing a shared aristocratic culture thanks to the circulation of courtly models, as well as the use of Castilian in oral and written communication, especially among the lettered elites. However, it is equally true that the frontier regions could leverage their strategic importance to extract certain advantages from the political centre, such as the reinforcement of their privileges or *fueros*. On the other hand, if the peripheral regions were well endowed with material resources, this could prompt more coercive policies and the strengthening of fiscal and repressive mechanisms. This twin phenomenon was evident in all the domains of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies.

Perhaps ironically, the years of Iberian union from 1580 to 1640 seem to have been crucial in crystallising particularities, and the construction of separate identities among the Portuguese and Spanish nobilities. The absorption of Portugal into the Spanish Habsburg monarchy created the need to clearly define and distinguish the rights of the native Portuguese from those of non-natives. It was a defensive reaction when suddenly joined to a larger and more powerful neighbour, subject to a foreign and distant new king and centres of authority. Such concerns however suggest that the Portuguese nobility was more concerned with preserving or augmenting its privileges rather than differentiating itself from the Castilian aristocracy. This was evident at the Cortes of Tomar, when the Portuguese nobility demanded—and was denied—seigniorial rights in the manner of Castile, as well as the abolition of *Lei Mental*, in recognition of Portugal’s value and importance for the Habsburg king. Monopoly over offices was not always respected in practice, but the union with

the Spanish monarchy also created new opportunities for some Portuguese nobles, who took up posts in the central government or in the Spanish armies, particularly in Flanders and Italy.

The complex political allegiances of the Catalan nobility during the revolt of 1640 also advise against simple interpretations and overly schematic historiographic approaches. Some general tendencies in factional allegiances are nonetheless discernible: the aristocratic elites, closely intertwined with the upper echelons of the Castilian aristocracy, were more likely to identify with Philip and the Spanish cause, while the middling strata (urban magistrates, *caballeros*, or gentry) tended to favour the French. What is striking above all, however, is the primacy of particular interests, local contexts, and contingency in determining allegiances, rather than grand political strategies of the groups involved. Later, during the War of Spanish Succession, opposing factions would once again split along family lines, not unlike in the 1640s, whether for reasons of political opportunism or the sheer complexity of the ties that bound individuals and groups to the political community.

Iberian nobilities, and especially their lower ranks, experienced greater social mobility and expansion in the early modern period. For the upwardly mobile commoners, noble status not only had symbolic value, but also brought tangible material advantages: exemption from taxes, debtors, prison, torture, forced recruitment, and labour. Social promotion was eased both by the crown's largesse in dispensing offices and titles, the amplification of the concept of nobility to accommodate the claims—albeit contested—of personal virtue and wealth as well as those of birth and lineage, and finally the possibilities for refashioning or inventing the latter, often with the aid of professional genealogists (Soria Mesa 2004; Figueiroa-Rego 2011). Yet the ambiguities, the manipulations, and the expansion of the nobility, especially in the sixteenth century, also led to intense social competition, greater internal stratification, and eventually a closing of the ranks by blocking avenues of access to the most privileged group.

In Portugal, where the possession of local office was key to noble status, the accretion of fiscal and judicial privileges by the social elite was paralleled by more exacting criteria for access to municipal government posts. The result was a sharpening of distinctions between the rulers and the ruled at the local level, between the commons at large and the oligarchic elite—judges and aldermen—sometimes designated as the “*nobreza da terra*” (local gentry), reinforced by greater endogamy. Thus, while in the sixteenth century town councils

were relatively open to new members, the seventeenth century saw greater closure (Coelho and Magalhães 2008). The members of the urban oligarchies thus belonged to the lower nobility, although they represented the commons in the Portuguese Cortes, as the deputies of the cities and the towns. It is notable that, in contrast to Castile, the Portuguese local magistracies were filled by a process of election that was subject to confirmation by the crown, and these offices were never sold. Moreover, these were unpaid, voluntary positions. The lesser civic offices on the other hand were salaried, inheritable, and sometimes, though rarely, sold by the Portuguese monarchy.

The progressive aristocratisation of municipal offices was also evident in the Crowns of Castile and Aragon, although this process was offset to some extent by the large-scale sale of *regimientos* (city councillorships), that at least in the sixteenth century left the way open to “wealth, more than nobility or virtue” (Fortea Pérez 2004, 252; Fortea Pérez 2012). Many of these posts had initially been granted to individuals as royal favours (*mercedes*), but through sales, transfers, or inheritance they came to be monopolised by a narrow oligarchy of families linked to one another by kinship ties. The first large-scale sales of offices took place under Charles I and Philip II, but the practice would become even more widespread by the mid-seventeenth century. Despite the continued insistence of the cities and their representatives on the application of strict social criteria—living nobly without public taint of commerce or mechanical work, being a *hidalgo* of pure blood—in practice many exceptions were made, and many more relied on false instruments and testimonies of their suitability.

The crown’s exclusive right of granting favours (*mercedes*), and especially habits of the military orders, played an important role in the social disciplining of the Portuguese nobility, as well as in reinforcing a sense of noble identity (Olival 2001). Following the crown’s annexation of the orders of Avis, Christ, and Santiago (1551), the award of habits became a crucial mechanism for controlling access to knightly status at the base of the noble hierarchy, just as the distribution of *encomiendas* (more than 600 in total) was a primary means of creating distinction at its summit. However, the key development in the process of imposing greater social exclusivity was the introduction of purity-of-blood statutes and prohibitions against the taint of mechanical labour in 1570, with manual work and racial impurity formally declared antithetical to the quality of nobility. These processes took place earlier in Castile, where the Grand

Masterships of the military orders were incorporated into the crown in 1493, with the creation of the Council of Orders (Postigo Castellanos 1987). In both Portugal and Castile these new socio-professional and ethnic requirements shaped the nobility's self-representations. It should be noted however that in Castile prohibitions against the taint of "mechanical" work were introduced much later than blood purity requirements for nobility, which suggests a greater emphasis on ethnic-religious purity than noble lineage. In Portugal, on the other hand, the fact that both forms of exclusion were introduced at the same time reinforced the association between nobility and distinct lifestyles. The spread of these practices in the seventeenth century undoubtedly contributed to restricting access to the lower echelons of the nobility in both Castile and Portugal.

Nevertheless, it is worth repeating that the Portuguese and Castilian-Aragonese nobility were never closed groups. With the passage of time, increasing social complexity, the pressure for rewards based on military service, and the sale of noble distinctions and honours all contributed to the greater porousness of the noble estate. Even if exclusionary statutes remained in force at the institutional level and in the sphere of social representations, in practice effective mechanisms were developed, such as genealogical fictions and effacement, that made it possible to evade the stigma of social and ethnic-religious impurity. These in turn provided scope for considerable fluidity and the continued renewal of the upper ranks without undermining the formal values of the hierarchical system of estates, which helps explain the relative stability of both monarchies (Soria Mesa 2007; Olival 2001).

The clergy

The clergy was in theory another privileged social group, although in practice equally heterogeneous. There were vast differences in the social origins of its members, the power and influence they wielded, their education, doctrinal positions, and lifestyles. They were imbedded in myriad institutions that varied greatly in character and function—dioceses, cathedral chapters, religious orders, the Holy Office, educational and charitable institutions, among others. Far from united in pursuit of a common goal of promoting Catholic and Church doctrine, these were more often engaged in pursuing particular interests that often placed them at odds with one another. The clerical

estate was thus composed of men and women who possessed ecclesiastical dignity and the various privileges associated with it, as well as a more or less direct relationship with the distant seat of the Church in Rome. On the other hand, the churches in Portugal and Castile-Aragon also shared a dependence on their respective monarchs, which took on a somewhat different aspect in each kingdom. It is little wonder, then, that the social space of the church was riven by multiple tensions, both internal and with different powers, born of different understandings of its priorities, as well as the means and resources necessary for the fulfilment of its mission.

In both Portugal and Spain, it nevertheless seems possible to identify two similar tendencies from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. In the first place, there was an undeniable rise in the number of ecclesiastics, in conformity with the rise in religious fervour as well as the institutional proliferation instigated by Catholic Reform. Precise numbers remain elusive, but the size of the Spanish clergy is estimated between 90,000 and 100,000 at the end of the sixteenth century, although unevenly distributed across the various kingdoms and territories, for the Crown of Aragon accounted for less than 20% of this total. As a group, the clergy made up around 1% of the total population of the monarchy, rising to roughly 2% over the subsequent century and a half, a trend that was reversed only in the second half of the eighteenth century, when their numbers fell back to 1.5% (Domínguez Ortiz 1992, Vol. 2, 6; Barrio Gozalo 2010, 48–49). For Portugal, the best estimate is 25,000 ecclesiastics in the mid-sixteenth century, of whom at least 30% were secular clergy, and possibly more (Bethencourt 1997, 150; Paiva 2000, 208). In Spain the proportion of the secular clergy was significantly higher, estimated at around 45% of the ecclesiastical estate (Barrio Gozalo 2010, 49). Although the numbers are not exact, they represent a similar proportion of the total population in both Spain and Portugal.

The trajectory of episcopal rents in the Spanish monarchy reveals a similar pattern of long-term growth, although with a pronounced spike in the second half of the eighteenth century. There were nevertheless significant differences at the regional level. Between 1600 and the first half of the eighteenth century the rise in episcopal rents in the Crown of Castile was evident above all in the Canaries and Murcia, while Catalonia stood out in the Crown of Aragon. Moreover, towards the end of this period it was the dioceses of the Aragonese Crown where rent extraction was most pronounced, especially in Catalonia, Valencia, and Mallorca (Barrio Gozalo 2014, 222–223). In

terms of the territory under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, according to some authors, 25% was in the hands of the secular church, while the larger part, around 27.5%, belonged to the military order of San Juan. Overall, the noble domain was somewhat larger than the ecclesiastical, and this difference was more accentuated in Valencia (Abadía 2017, 461; Casey 1979, 105).

The continued growth of the clerical population in Iberian societies over the course of the early modern period may also be inferred, albeit indirectly, based on other indicators such as the number of new monasteries and convents, especially abundant in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries thanks to the establishment of new religious orders, and even the number of religious professions (Atienza 2008). Most of these new foundations were in urban centres, where the wealthiest and most exclusive monasteries and convents were concentrated. Among the regular clergy, men were always more numerous, although the number of women taking religious vows increased with the diffusion of the new Tridentine religious sensibility as well as obstacles to marriage imposed by paternal authority. The same was true of many younger sons. This steady rise in the membership of religious orders began to subside in the second half of the eighteenth century, but until then it constituted a means of escape, a way of overcoming the constraints imposed by the spread of *mayorazgo/morgadio*, and in Portugal also the *Lei Mental*—mainly for the upper and middling strata of Iberian societies. Another source of attraction was the founding of new religious orders and the insistence on the importance of missionary work after Trent. The evangelising effort had its greatest expression in overseas territories, in particular through the efforts of the Society of Jesus, the Franciscans, the Carmelites, and Mercedarians.

The growth in the number of secular clergy was another measure of the positive resonance of Trent in Iberian societies, which was a major reason behind the greater uniformity of religious practices and of social disciplining. This greater efficacy in turn may be attributed to improved clerical training, and greater control over the priests' pastoral work, namely through the obligation of residence, diocesan constitutions, and regular visitations and inspections. Although Trent raised the bar in terms of the social criteria for membership of the clergy—including age, education, legitimacy, blood purity, moral attributes, and physical capacity—along with the costs of the necessary checks and inquiries, in practice these requirements were not always enforced, and numerous New Christians, as well as

indigenous or *mestizo* individuals—above all in the overseas territories—entered the church. But aspirants were also required to possess the means of supporting themselves, such as an inheritance or a dowry. If this requirement deterred some from pursuing an ecclesiastical career, the expectation of upward mobility and improved social status encouraged many among lower income families to find ways to gather the necessary funds and dowries to ensure that at least one of its members would be able to take holy orders.

The second tendency mentioned above is the growing interference by the monarchy in ecclesiastical matters. The process was complex and involved numerous disputes and conflicts, not only between the crown and the church hierarchies in both Spain and Portugal, but also with Rome. An emblematic example of the Portuguese Crown's greater involvement in ecclesiastical affairs was the establishment of the *Mesa da Consciência e Ordens* (1532) to oversee royal pious bequests, social welfare institutions, the royal *Padroado*, the reform of religious orders, the University of Coimbra and the already mentioned administration of the military orders.

The right of royal patronage over the church played a key role in this process in both Portugal and Spain and was claimed by both Crowns around the same time (Paiva 2006). The kings of Portugal obtained *de iure* control over ecclesiastical appointments in the conquered territories in 1514–1515, and *de facto* authority over the kingdom as a whole during the reign of king Manuel (a concession that was not legally and officially sanctioned until 1740). In Castile the process began in 1486 with the papal concession of rights of appointment in the bishoprics of Granada, the Canaries, and the Indies, and in 1523 extended to all of Castile, having already been granted in Navarre. Royal control over ecclesiastical appointments had a number of important consequences including the progressive aristocratisation of the upper ranks of the clergy, and the transformation of bishops into royal agents dependent on the king's favour for appointments and promotions in return for services rendered. It should be emphasised that in Catalonia this tendency was less pronounced, given that scarcely 50% of its bishops were of noble extraction (García Oro and Portela Silva 2000; Barrio Gozalo 2010). In any case, it seems that Castilian-Aragonese bishops were recruited mainly from the middling nobility, in contrast to Portugal, where the upper aristocracy monopolised the appointments from the seventeenth century (Monteiro 1998; Paiva 2006). Finally, analysis of the origins of Catalan and Valencian bishops provides further evidence that non-

natives were preferred in royal appointments. From the second half of the sixteenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth century less than half of the bishops appointed to Catalan dioceses were natives of the territory, and this phenomenon was still more striking in Valencia in the sixteenth century (Fernández Terricabras 2009, 86).

Finally, it should be noted that relations between the monarchy and the Iberian church, alternating between conflict and cooperation, were shaped less by particular ideologies (regalism or ultramontanistism) and more by complex and volatile jockeying interests of individuals, families, groups, and institutions. The immense opportunities offered by the church in both Spain and Portugal to a wide range of social actors, in the form of access to material, social, and symbolic capital, led to a rise in conflicts over honours and dignities, the award of jurisdictions and the defence of privileges. It also enabled the accumulation of power by individuals and social mobility, albeit within limits, given that one's original social status invariably determined the upper limit of one's social ascent—even if the clerical estate was, despite everything, more open to the rise of those below than the lay sphere. Observing the world of the clergy, it is possible to identify a plurality of vertical and horizontal solidarities which, in addition to being the source of internal cohesion, also extended the boundaries of the group and of the Iberian peninsula itself. These solidarities articulated geographic spaces and interests of different social strata, becoming an essential sphere in the symbolic representations of the Iberian societies. In Castile, however, the clergy, like the nobility, were not represented in the Cortes, in contrast to Portugal, Aragon, and Navarre.

The third estate

The third estate was not a formal category in the Spanish kingdoms; rather there was a cluster of terms used to describe all those who were neither nobles nor churchmen—the *estado llano*, the *común*, or the *pecheros* (tax payers). After 1539 the Castilian Cortes was no longer a representative assembly of the three estates, but of the kingdom's 18 most powerful cities, and thus the third estate was stripped of its constitutional function, which it retained in Portugal throughout the early modern period. As in the case of the lower tiers of nobility, the status of commoner was primarily a juridical distinction, indicating little more than one's lack of fiscal exemptions and other statutory

privileges of nobility. Beyond that common denominator—and powerful urban oligarchs frequently made exceptions of themselves even in this respect—the third estate was the largest and most variegated group, in theory comprising everyone from a simple labourer to someone like the sixteenth-century Sevillian merchant Juan Antonio Corzo Vicentelo, whose legendary wealth and munificence evoked comparisons with Cosme de Medici and Alexander the Great (Vila Vilar 1999, 46–48). Yet it was neither a static nor an amorphous group. Wealth, literacy, purity of blood, occupation, and corporate membership were some of the principal means of distinction, albeit highly mutable through fortune or craft.

The majority of the Iberian population lived outside the largest urban settlements, in small towns and villages. The sixteenth-century price inflation of agricultural staples drew many peasants into the urban-based market economy, and patterns of debt-financed investment and consumption that proved to be unsustainable in the long term. As structural limitations—especially in the arid and impenetrable interior of the peninsula—and conjunctural crises began to slow down agricultural growth in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, peasant indebtedness became widespread. Some fared better than others during the boom years, and rural society, although less socially differentiated than in the cities, became more polarised. In Castile in particular, a relatively small number of wealthy farmers imposed themselves over a growing majority of wage labourers and landless peasants. In Portugal, more than half of agricultural workers by the later seventeenth century were day labourers (*jornaleiros*). The peasantry in the south and centre of the peninsula, in Castile and Andalusia, were particularly vulnerable to agricultural crises and encroachment on commons and wastes by their more prosperous neighbours, by members of a late-feudal urban aristocracy, or by large seigniorial landholders. Contributing to the relatively greater precariousness of peasant life in much of the Crown of Castile was a tradition of land-tenancy based on smaller plots and short-term leases, in contrast to the more secure forms of peasant proprietorship that were the norm on Spain's Mediterranean periphery. Rural dispossession and impoverishment throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nourished migration to the towns and cities, rapidly overwhelming their capacities to absorb the influx.

Rural society—and Iberian society in general—was highly mobile, judging by the motley procession of itinerant merchants, pilgrims, bandits, and vagabonds crossing paths with the famously errant Don

Quixote. Historians, however, have only relatively recently begun to dispel the myth of the quiet and timeless Castilian village (Vassberg 1996). Villagers and townsmen travelled near or far in search of markets, seasonal employment for themselves or their children, or in response to economic downturn. They were lured further afield by the promise of the expanding frontier, from the newly conquered city of Granada after 1492 to the Americas in the sixteenth century (Coleman 2003; Altman 1989). In the opposite direction came soldiers, tax collectors, lawyers, and magistrates. Yet despite this, a sense of identity rooted in a stable local community of neighbours (*vecinos*) continued to be a salient feature of Iberian life. Indeed, the relative acceleration of life and greater mobility, which brought communities in closer contact—and competition—with one another and with the world beyond, may have also led to renewed emphasis on communal boundaries and jurisdiction, on “immemorial” local customs, and on peculiarly Iberian notions of citizenship or *vecindad*.

It was for all that not always clear where the village ended, and the city began. The peripheral neighbourhoods of even the largest cities were distinguished by a preponderance of market gardeners and agricultural labourers, while family and kinship ties extended across town walls. In another sense, too, there was no distinction between city and country in early modern Iberia, or rather, it was not a distinction of quality, but status and associated privileges (Herzog 2010). One essential difference was between those who were incorporated in a community, regardless of its specific charters and privileges, and those who were not; those who claimed the rights, and accepted the obligations, of citizens, and those who were free of the latter but also denied the former. The difference between *vecinos* and *forasteros* was one of the basic structuring principles of Iberian society, which—at least in theory—spoke of neither birth nor wealth, but one’s demonstrable commitment to a locality. It is therefore inaccurate to speak of urban and rural worlds as such, but rather a hierarchy of communities enjoying different corporate privileges.

The sixteenth century was a period of demographic expansion in both Portugal and the Spanish kingdoms, and this was most obvious in the cities. Lisbon and Seville were the great crucibles of fortunes, truly global cities that ranked among the largest and most dynamic in Europe (Lowe and Jordan-Gschwend 2015). They were soon joined by Madrid, after 1561 the capital of the Spanish monarchy, which from 1580 to 1640 also included Portugal and its overseas empire. This vertiginous growth, the dizzying extremes of opulence and misery, the

constant flux and social heterogeneity of the two Iberian capitals, and of the great trading entrepôts like Seville, were a source of endless fascination and anxiety for poets and magistrates. Yet it was the protagonism of the smaller towns and cities that has been singled out as a distinctive feature of Iberian social, economic, and political reality.

Iberian cities were prizes of the Reconquest, that drawn-out and rarely single-minded struggle against the Muslim kingdoms in the south. In this process the cities served as frontier strongholds as well as exercising control over an extensive surrounding countryside and smaller towns—the rough equivalent of an Italian city-state's *contado*. The Iberian monarchs' continued reliance on cities for local administration, tax collection, and military recruitment, which extended into the period of the fifteenth-century civil wars, accounts for the special character they had acquired by the close of the Middle Ages—neither independent city-states nor simply creatures of the monarchy, but quasi-autonomous urban republics. One of the distinguishing features of the Portuguese and Castilian landscape in particular was the proliferation of chartered towns, most of them small to middling, which exercised lordship over their hinterlands—a privilege that in Castile, like titles of nobility and offices, was sold by an indigent crown (Nader 1993). In the long term this process helped bind individual communities directly to the monarchy, but also contributed to the consolidation of local elites, who profited most from the quasi-feudal power of the urban corporations they governed, ostensibly in the common interest. However, the price of autonomy proved too high for many smaller communities from the 1580s onward, assailed more or less simultaneously by bouts of plague and famine, as well as war and fiscal exactions—the wages of empire.

Spanish and Portuguese transoceanic voyages and conquests, which had, to paraphrase Pérez de Oliva, so dramatically and suddenly thrust the Iberian kingdoms from the edges to the very centre of the known world—and its networks of trade and credit—enabled the consolidation of an enterprising mercantile bourgeoisie. In Portugal, the merchants of Lisbon took the lead in imperial expansion, but many of the smaller urban centres played a part. In the Crown of Aragon, the cities of Valencia and Barcelona, which had been vibrant commercial centres in the Middle Ages, would begin to recover some of their former lustre in the second half of the seventeenth century—and even the reports of their intervening demise seem to have been somewhat exaggerated. In Castile, the suppression of the Comunero

Revolt (1519–1521) did not sound the death knell of the bourgeoisie; rather, the sixteenth century brought prosperity to the wool merchants of Burgos and Segovia, the silk merchants of Toledo and Granada, and the great *Cargadores a Indias* of Seville who were the lynchpin of the American trade. Even the royal capital, Madrid, may not have been the parasitic consumer of resources and luxuries as some historians have previously argued (Nieto Sánchez 2006).

Prominent among the merchant and banking dynasties were foreigners and New Christians—Spanish and Portuguese converts from Judaism, referred to as *conversos* or *marranos*. Among the former, the Genoese were the first to settle in the Iberian Atlantic ports, followed by numbers of Flemish, French, and other European traders—groups that became more or less integrated into local society over the course of the sixteenth century (Crailsheim 2016; Herrero Sánchez 2014). The New Christians, like the foreigners, could draw upon a mercantile tradition that predated the late medieval transformation of Spain and Portugal from predominantly frontier warrior societies into vital conduits of world trade, as well as extensive networks of contacts and clients across the widening and increasingly polycentric Iberian world. The *conversos* and *marranos* however also bore the stigma of impure blood, and many were driven out and resettled in other parts of Europe and beyond as the persecuting zeal waxed and waned in the two kingdoms. The Iberian Jewish and *converso* or *marrano* diaspora, perhaps paradoxically, also had the effect of strengthening links between the Iberian lands and the rest of the world.

Rising prosperity, the influence of humanist culture, the bureaucratisation of government, and the institutionalisation of the law in the long sixteenth century also contributed to the greater social prominence of university-educated *letrados*. Yet the men of letters did not form a separate social group. They included the increasingly ubiquitous public notaries and scribes—classed among the lowly “mechanical” occupations by their social superiors—reviled lawyers and respected judges, dramatists and chroniclers, minor officials, churchmen and professional petitioners (*arbitristas*), as well as municipal and royal councillors putting on aristocratic airs. Their influence and status waned somewhat in the new economic, cultural, and political climate of the seventeenth century, as economic pressures restricted opportunities for legal professionals, the vestiges of humanism dissipated, and central government ceded authority to local bodies and institutions. But the *letrado* elite had long since been integrated into the transformed ruling classes.

A new urban patrician elite emerged in the sixteenth century as an amalgamation of the old urban nobility and the upwardly mobile “new men”, mainly bureaucrats and merchants. These employed a range of commercial and political strategies over several generations in the pursuit of economic and political power, heavily reliant on family and kinship networks (Martz 1995). The newcomers had to make themselves socially acceptable through marriage or purchases of land, and the cultivation of the public image of honourable citizens, distinguished from mere shopkeepers and mechanicals. The subsequent conversion of this elite into a “late feudal” urban nobility occurred in partnership with the crown, which exchanged patronage for the support of a local “network of known lineages” (Casey 2007, 80). The new elites for their part consolidated their hold on local power through mechanisms identical to those used by the nobility, such as primogeniture and marriage alliances, as well as new forms of social disciplining not far removed from those observed in Protestant regions of northern Europe (e.g., division between a “godly” laity and sinners). Family was a key institution in this process as the basis of individual social status, and as such it was promoted in public religious rites, often centred around common urban spaces.

The greater social mobility into the upper social ranks in the sixteenth century was not without its tensions. Perhaps above all, the question of blood purity (*limpieza de sangre*) assumed a central importance in the perennial power struggles between urban factions, as wealthy *converso* families vied with Old Christians for local influence. These contests often left deep scars, but a recognition of mutual interests eventually resulted in a new consensus and elite consolidation (Contreras Contreras 2013). The extent to which this urban aristocracy remained open or closed to new members, and how much its cultural and social outlooks owed something to their mercantile or professional backgrounds, varied between Iberian regions. In contrast to the Castilian cities, whose oligarchies largely endorsed the dominant aristocratic notions of status and identity, the formerly bourgeois *ciutadans honrats* of Barcelona redefined elite culture as much as they adapted to it, emphasising the importance of personal virtue and education over birth. Barcelona’s patrician elite also remained relatively open (Amelang 1986). Even in Castile, however, the aristocratising tendencies among the bourgeois, although unmistakable, may have been somewhat misinterpreted by older scholarship.

The seventeenth century was a period of economic decline and

retrenchment, the causes and ramifications of which were many and complex, but a major recent shift has seen historians abandon the longstanding notion of a “betrayal of the bourgeoisie”. Commerce, above all long-distance trade, was not necessarily prejudicial to one’s social status, or no more so than elsewhere in Europe. Many ennobled bourgeois continued to trade, as did many noblemen, and if some of the former settled into a rentier lifestyle, this was partly because investment in land, or in bonds and annuities (*censos* and *juros*), offered a greater yield, and was therefore a sensible response to the difficult economic conditions of the early seventeenth century. Rather than driven by a peculiarly Spanish mentality, the transformation of the Castilian bourgeoisie into a rentier class was the product of a complex economic, political, as well as a social calculus.

Below the patrician elites—often indistinguishable from the nobility—the greater if not quite all the lesser merchants, and the *letrado* officeholders, were the so-called mechanical professions. In many Iberian towns and cities, artisans made up a substantial part of the population, yet to a far larger extent than even those immediately above them in the social hierarchy, they remain a great unknown. To be sure, the dividing line between petty merchants and artisans was often blurred in practice, and certain crafts were more successful than others in casting off the common prejudice against manual labour. A loose occupational hierarchy developed, with some artisans claiming that based on the clientele they served, the precious nature of the worked raw materials, or the high value the finished products, theirs was a noble craft. This was true everywhere of silver and goldsmiths, silk weavers, and a few other luxury trades, although many more aspired to certain privileges and exemptions based on their importance to the local economy. Moreover, although the prejudice against mechanical work was even stronger than that which proscribed many forms of commerce, it was not shared by artisans themselves. Nor was it universal or unchanging. By the seventeenth century the tendency among theorists and the authorities alike was to recognise work as beneficial to the commonwealth, and even as a redemptive activity, the obverse of the associated evils of idleness and poverty (MacKay 2006). This was true even in Castile, whose productive energies were supposedly hamstrung by the uncontested dominance of the aristocratic ethos and a general disdain for work.

Artisans, like all other social groups, nobility and clergy included, sought higher social status, as well as material and spiritual security, in corporate structures, guilds, and confraternities. Incorporation into

craft guilds in the Iberian peninsula, and especially in Castile, did not become a generalised phenomenon until the sixteenth century, and thus later than in Italy and northern Europe. However, in the major cities of Portugal and the Crown of Aragon, the artisan guilds had, in the late Middle Ages, secured a measure of formal political representation that endured into the early modern period. Thus, from 1383 in Portugal the representatives (*mesteres*) of the most powerful craft guilds had a voice in the government of the cities and the kingdom through the institution of the *Casas do Vinte e Quatro*, but their heyday was in the seventeenth century (Beirante 2014). In Catalonia, a more inclusive idea of citizenship extended to plebeians, and master craftsmen in particular, which in turn buttressed a more robust constitutionalism, and the sense of a shared “national” identity (Amelang 1986). Artisans in Castile were excluded from politics, but the guilds nevertheless gradually carved out a measure of independence, especially in the seventeenth century when their bargaining power was enhanced greatly by their role in tax collection and military recruitment. Within guilds however, following the pattern of other corporate bodies, a period of relative openness in the sixteenth century gave way to ossification, and the increasing domination by an elite of wealthier master artisans—a process that once again had social, cultural, and economic roots.

Virtually every adult, male and female, was a member of at least one—and often more than one—lay religious confraternity. Confraternities and brotherhoods fulfilled a number of religious, social, and even political functions in early modern society. Some were exclusive, drawing their membership from the noble estate, and adopted purity-of-blood statutes, but many more were open to all who could afford the membership fees—and exceptions were made even in this regard. For the popular classes, they were particularly important as a form of religious expression, a guarantee of mutual aid, a means of social affirmation, a space of sociability and diversion. They embodied the contradictory principles inherent in the corporatist image of society as a whole, the egalitarian and the hierarchical. Like guilds, confraternities also provided a means for the articulation and defence of common interests, for as incorporated institutions they possessed legal personhood, the statutes and approbations, and the funds to engage in litigation in defence or realisation of rights and privileges. Both guilds and confraternities also afforded the lower orders a unique opportunity to play a significant role in public life through urban ritual.

The organic conception of society, of hierarchically disposed but nevertheless complementary parts, like the language of estates, was meant to convey an image of order and cohesion, and yet it also contained the seeds of disharmony and conflict. In the first place, the bodily metaphor could be turned on its head by those below by invoking the principle of interdependence between parts, so that if artisans were the belly of the republic, and the poor were its feet, they also had their rights as well as obligations. After all, “when the head aches, all the other members ache, too”—and vice versa (Cervantes Saavedra 2005, 470). Second, every community was in its turn made up of various corporations, or “mystical bodies,” each committed to its own version of the common good, the succour, protection, and salvation of its members. Lay confraternities and guilds were formally constituted as such, but urban neighbourhoods could also acquire many of the characteristics of a city within a city (Río Barredo 2002). The quotidian reality in Spanish and Portuguese cities was a more or less constant struggle of various corporate entities—and of the preponderant groups within them—for autonomy, freedom of action, and precedence, even as they served to reinforce the overarching principle of order and hierarchy.

But the associational life of early modern Spaniards and Portuguese was even more dynamic and complex. Individuals identified with not one but multiple communities, formal and informal, based on stronger or weaker social bonds, and which attained greater importance in different contexts. These might be based on kinship and patronage, but also occupation, neighbourhood, and the wider urban or rural community. Moreover, this network of horizontal and vertical social ties extended not only across various internal boundaries, of parish, neighbourhood, guild, confraternity, but also stretched to family and kin, patrons and clients, or trading partners in other villages, towns, regions, and even other countries and continents. The seventeenth-century Portuguese *marrano* merchant and *arbitrista*, Duarte Gomes Solis, even conceived of the world of trade, with its internal rules, norms, and networks or associations based on trust and credit, as a “mystical body” that linked Portugal—then part of the Spanish monarchy—with its colonies but also with parts of the wider world of commerce. Admittedly, Solis was an outlier, but his example shows how far the corporate metaphor could be extended (Wachtel 2011, 178–179). It also reveals the complexity of social networks, and the variety of goals, strategies, and contingencies that must be taken into account. Solis, for instance, was writing as a Portuguese subject of the

Habsburg king, whose court was in Madrid, a city where Solís himself was a *vecino*—having previously made his fortune in Lisbon—but his treatises were ultimately a defence of what he called a “Hebrew nation”, made up of New Christians like himself as well as Jews, many of them Portuguese-speaking, and scattered from Livorno to Amsterdam, via Lisbon and Seville to Brazil and Goa.

As Solís’ struggles to extend the boundaries of his community suggest, all corporate identities implied exclusion at the same time as inclusion. Various groups experienced different forms and degrees of marginalisation, including religious minorities (*conversos* and *moriscos*), the poor and destitute, and the enslaved men and women. As a percentage of the total population, slaves represented around 1% in Spain and less than 7% in Portugal, certainly far below their numbers in Iberian colonial societies in Brazil or the Caribbean. They were unevenly distributed however, less numerous in the north and relatively more abundant in the south and east of the peninsula, making up as much as 10% of the population of port cities such as Seville and Lisbon, or Barcelona and Valencia (Phillips 2014, 10–11). Slave ownership was primarily a sign of status in Iberia, and not an essential element of economic production, and slaves in Spain and Portugal were mainly employed as domestic servants, artisans, or farmers. Some but not all lived with their masters and the latter especially enjoyed a greater freedom of action in their daily lives. On the other hand, historians have shed any illusions regarding the harshness of slavery in the Iberian world in general, or the limited avenues for escape from servitude, and in both these senses Spanish and Portuguese societies are no longer seen as relatively benevolent outliers. What is more, the growing association between slavery and skin colour, in conjunction with existing prejudices, meant that the stigma of slavery impeded the social integration of freed blacks (Martín Casares 2005).

As in the rest of Europe, the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries witnessed changing attitudes to poverty and attempts to rationalise public welfare in the cities of the Iberian peninsula. Although the traditional concept of private charity as a salutary act survived, the tendency was to distinguish between the so-called deserving and undeserving poor, the respectable and the disreputable, the genuine and the false. It was yet another form of social exclusion in a society increasingly preoccupied with distinction and privilege. Portugal in particular was in the vanguard in putting into practice the precepts of Christian humanists, and in the ambition and scope of the

royal government's intervention (Abreu 2016). The cities of the Crown of Aragon also kept pace with the restructuring of public welfare provision, although the initiative there was in the hands of the major cities. In Portugal and in the Crown of Aragon, the consolidation of confraternities, their hospitals and endowments, was under way by the late fifteenth century, more or less at the same time as in the northern Italian cities that were in the forefront of public welfare reform (López Terrada 1999). In Portugal, the turning point was the foundation of the Hospital of All Saints in Lisbon, and the city's *Misericórdia* confraternity (1498), whose replicas proliferated throughout the Portuguese-speaking world (Sá 1997). Although they enjoyed royal support and special privileges, and despite the similarities in their objectives and statutes, the Portuguese *misericórdias* were markedly local and autonomous institutions (Sá 2001). Neither the Portuguese *misericórdias* nor Spanish charitable confraternities, dominated by the nobility or urban elites, had as their goal the eradication of poverty, but—apart from the salvation of their own members—were meant to buttress the existing social order by institutionalising its social and economic inequalities (Callahan 1980).

In Castile, the growing problem of urban poverty and vagrancy was the subject of major debates in the 1540s, and over the course of the sixteenth century various proposals were advanced to deal with the problem, which proved to be either ineffective, impractical, or unsustainable in the long term—if they were implemented at all. Unlike in Portugal, where the state gradually assumed control—direct or indirect—over the provision of public welfare, the Spanish monarchs largely left the issue of poor relief and the control of idlers and vagabonds in the hands of the municipal authorities. In the first part of the sixteenth century, Castilian cities like Zamora were even proactive in their reformism and did not lag behind their counterparts in northern Europe (Flynn 1989). However, the impetus waned with the gradual depletion of municipal treasuries, and the general economic crisis. By the seventeenth century, whenever the issue of vagabondage came to the fore, the authorities routinely reiterated the same precepts and increasingly half-heartedly resorted to inspections and the issuing of licenses, revealing the apathy and disinterest of magistrates in dealing with the problem. The only effective material support for the growing legions of the poor came as a result of independent efforts of religious institutions and private charity—albeit dealing only with the symptoms. Meanwhile the problem only became worse, and the numbers of the poor grew to truly unmanageable

proportions by the end of the Habsburg era (Carmona 2012).

The hospitals, prisons, brothels, and city streets were also the abode of a parallel, fictional “antisociety”, a testament to the fascination and anxiety provoked by the swelling ranks of the marginalised or the deviant, above all in the great cities like Seville and Madrid that seemed to contain the whole world in its infinite and often menacing variety. The literature of what came to be seen as a Golden Age, with its cast of crafty street urchins, criminals, and vagabonds, has been read as a kind of vicarious “thick description” of urban reality, and thus a means to fill in the gaps in the archival record. Yet *picaresque* literature was not a mirror of society, not least because it was the product of an “age of theatre and illusion” and a society that found pleasure in the dissonance between image and reality (Elliott 2009). If we were to take these literary works and treatises at face value, our image of Spanish towns and cities would be brimming with “legions of vegetating bodies, children going hungry as listless parents ignored them, artisans in a drunken stupor unable to pick up their rusting tools, confidence men roaming city streets in search of dupes” (Mackay 2006, 93).

Widespread pauperisation was certainly real, but the image of disorder, subversion, fraud, and general moral breakdown is a rather better reflection of the anxieties of the authors of these tales and, more importantly, of their social milieu. A measure of this anxiety is the apparent shift from the more benign wit and guile of beggars and vagabonds in the sixteenth century to the greater prominence of crime and violence of the seventeenth (Brioso Santos 1998). The *picaresque* novels, as catalogues of idealised social types, and an image of early modern Spanish society as the proverbial society of contrasts, of haves and have nots, and of social chasms bridgeable only by illicit means, through cunning, trickery, and deception by members of a teeming *demimonde*, are yet another tendentious representation of society, a medium through which dominant social discourses were elaborated. Fictional representations of the socially marginalised, the thieves, beggars, were another form of social exclusion, by “reorganising” fragments of reality into shifting, yet generative representations (Chartier 2002–2003).

Among historians today there is a far more profound understanding of the role of agency—of groups and individuals, including the some of the most disadvantaged, marginalised or excluded. Wealth, social capital, and literacy were all unequally distributed and were a real constraint on the vast majority, as was the weight of prevailing social

prejudices and ideals, suffused with an aristocratic ethos and religious orthodoxy. Yet to speak of constraints is not the same as to claim that the actions of historical actors were determined, whether by material and social realities or discourses. Research in local archives, inclusion of a much wider range of sources, as well as new historiographical perspectives and methods, such as microhistory—and, generally speaking, a focus on social practices over prescribed norms—has given us a far more dynamic sense of social life and beliefs in early modern Spain and Portugal. Among other things it has allowed historians to leave behind some hoary essentialist myths.

Honour, for instance, was not a particular obsession, “a trap that forced early modern Spaniards to act in certain tragic and bloodthirsty ways” (Taylor 2008, 7). Rather than a compelling force, it was strategically invoked in all sorts of everyday contexts and disputes by a range of social actors, including the humblest. There was honour even among “mechanical workers”, derived from more plebeian virtues such as creditworthiness, good citizenship, and sober life. Indeed, despite the prejudice against manual labour, and the exclusion of artisans from politics in Castile—if not Portugal or the Crown of Aragon—work itself was seen as a source of honour and the basis of citizenship. Artisans, in other words, did not simply accept the dominant discourse, and they and their advocates, especially in the troubled seventeenth century, found justification in Christian doctrine as well as the new science of political economy (Mackay 2006).

Women, too, used dominant social and religious discourses elaborated by theologians and moralists to defend themselves against accusations of intercourse with men outside marriage—by invoking, for example, fear (of men and relatives, and consequences of loss of reputation), their own supposed natural weakness, the importance of marriage, family and social harmony (Candau Chacón 2012). The same is true of other marginalised or excluded groups, such as the *conversos* and *Moriscos*, who either appropriated dominant discourses in their defence, or developed parallel ones. Blood and lineage for instance was open to all sorts of transmutations or inventions through the manipulation of written documents. Money, as ever, was a key element in this social alchemy, and lineage could be manufactured just as nobility and offices could be bought (Crawford 2014; Pike 2000; Contreras Contreras 2013). The general trend in recent scholarship is to emphasise the agency of an ever-greater variety of social actors, the role of contingency, and the contested nature of social beliefs and discourses.

Never far below the surface were latent tensions that not infrequently erupted in open conflict. It is a truism that violence was part of the fabric of everyday life in early modern Iberian societies (Peña 2012). Urban crime and rural banditry were certainly a major preoccupation of the authorities and of the social elites anxious about the maintenance of order (who were often one and the same), as well as being central to the sensationalist allure of Golden Age literature. But violence and other abuses of power were often perpetrated by the social elites and officials, especially in some of the more remote towns and villages where there was relatively little oversight, and the victims' capacity to protest was more limited (Gamero Rojas 2012; Pascua Sánchez 2012). Overall, though, it seems that early modern Spanish society was not especially violent, but all forms of violence and crime need to be fully historicised, and their spikes and dips related to moments of acute social tension.

Collective forms of social protest were far more common in Portugal and the Crown of Aragon than in Castile, especially from the later sixteenth century onward. The conquest of Portugal by Philip II in 1580 seems to have unleashed simmering social and political tensions and ushered in a long period marked by intermittent popular disturbances (Valladares 2008; Bouza 1991, 210–213; Oliveira 2002). However Spanish Habsburg rule was rarely under serious threat until a disaffected nobility decided to join the fray in 1640. A similar pattern is discernible in Catalonia, although social unrest in the principality took the form of banditry in the decades leading up to the 1640 Catalan revolt, which also began as a popular uprising. Unlike the two peripheral kingdoms, Castile remained mostly quiescent during the same period despite growing social and political tensions. This has been attributed partly to the more mature civic politics in Catalonia, and the greater political participation of artisans which enabled the articulation of a collective identity around local traditions of self-government.

The period of Habsburg rule opened with major urban revolts in Castile and the kingdom of Valencia. Both the *Comunero* and the *Germanías* revolts (1519–1522) had social, political, and messianic elements, and in the end, it was the social radicalism of the popular classes that fatally split the rebel movements. What ensued—and has impressed historians about early modern Castile in particular—was a period of relative stability based on a renewed alliance between the urban elites and the crown. Various additional reasons have been put forward for the absence of revolt in Castile after 1521. The

elimination of religious dissidence spared the Iberian peninsula the internecine violence that afflicted neighbouring France and other parts of Western and Central Europe. Some historians have suggested that decentralisation, achieved through the sale of municipal jurisdiction and creation of autonomous towns, strengthened bonds between the crown and the local communities of Castile (Nader 1993). Others, like Juan Gelabert, have pointed to the effective administration of justice as a key factor in maintaining social peace (Gelabert González 2002, 221–222). Less convincing are the arguments citing an alleged sense of impotence felt by the common people in the face of oligarchisation of local government (Lorenzo Cadarso 1996). What is certain is that the grievances of the lower orders could never be ignored, and the potential for disorder even in Castile was duly demonstrated in 1647–1652.

There has been a tendency to dismiss the Andalusian revolts of 1647–1652 as little more than hunger riots, and to discount their importance because they did not directly challenge royal authority or the hierarchical social order (Domínguez Ortiz 2000; Contreras Gay 2000). It is undoubtedly true that social revolution was not on the agenda of the rebels in Cordoba, Granada, and most notably Seville in the mid-seventeenth century. But the absence of radical social movements should not obscure evidence of political awareness among artisans, who were very much a part of the ideological debates and conflicts during this period (Jago 2001). The Andalusian uprisings of 1647–1652 have been studied recently from the perspective of popular reactions to royal fiscal policies, but they should also be seen in the context of artisan worldviews, notions of justice and the common good—and therefore not as simply reactive and ultimately futile acts of desperation, but part of a longer negotiation between the central and local authorities, and those excluded from formal politics (Gelabert González 2001).

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CHAPTER eight

Women and gender

Structures and roles (1400–1820)



Allyson M. Poska and Kirsten Schultz

Gendered legal and political regimes

Between 1400 and 1820, Iberian legal norms, politics, imperial strategies, religious activity, and cultural life both shaped and were shaped by gender roles and the expectations and actions of women. Although a pervasive cultural rhetoric that emphasised women's inferior and sinful nature led to some restrictions on women's activity, in general Iberian structures and institutions prescribed active roles for women and allowed for extensive female autonomy.

During the early modern period, Iberian culture perpetuated long-held negative stereotypes of women. Drawing on Roman and Patristic sources, male clerics and intellectuals, including Juan Luis Vives in his

De Institutione Feminae Christianae (1523) and Fray Luis de León in *La Perfecta Casada* (1583), advocated for harsh restrictions on women's behaviour, emphasising women's submission to male authority, as well as female obedience, humility, and silence. They argued that female weakness made women susceptible to sinfulness, especially idleness, pride, and lust. Men's honour was predicated on maintaining the virginity of daughters and sisters, who were expected to remain virgins until marriage and chaste thereafter (Morant 2002). The pervasiveness of this cultural trope is most evident in Spanish Golden Age theatre, whose plots often centred on men who, upon hearing rumours of their wives' infidelity, committed uxoricide as a means to preserve their own honour.

In Portugal, Rui Gonçalves' *Dos Privilegios e Praerogativas que ho Genero Feminino tem por Direito comum e Ordenações do Reyno mais que ho Genero Masculino* (1557), dedicated to Queen Regent Catherine of Austria (1507–1578), enumerated women's property and civil rights yet viewed them as circumscribed by chastity, devotion to God, and the broader legal agency of men. *Carta de Guia de Casados* (1651) by the historian and poet Francisco Manuel de Melo similarly affirmed male authority, asserting that, in its best incarnation, marriage sustained women's submission to men, serving as a bulwark against social, economic, and moral disorder (Hespanha 1995; Almeida 1992).

Despite their pervasiveness, these rigid sexual and behavioural expectations had little resonance in the lived experience of most Iberian women. Although some women may have aspired to cultivate chastity as the basis of their personal or family honour, there was little social stigma attached to nonmarital sex. Local norms varied considerably, but in some parts of the peninsula, illegitimacy rates were as high as 15% (the European average was 2–3%) and an additional 10% of brides may have come to the altar pregnant (Dubert 1991; Poska 2005; Carvalho 2011). Even among aristocratic women, sex outside of marriage was not unheard of. Luisa de la Cerda, the daughter of the second Duke of Medinaceli, bore an illegitimate daughter as the result of her relationship with one powerful nobleman, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, and in 1547 married Antonio Arias Pardo, who would become one of the richest men in Castile. In fact, some noble families used mistresses as a strategy to ensure the existence of male heirs (Coolidge 2007).

Cultural assertions of women's natural inferiority were more clearly reflected in legal norms that restricted elite women's opportunities. In Portugal, the "Lei Mental" (1434) affirmed male primogeniture for the

succession of crown goods (*bens da coroa*) which could encompass judicial, fiscal, and military duties that were regarded as beyond women's abilities (Hespanha 1995). In both kingdoms, laws allowed aristocratic families to create entailed estates (*mayorazgos/morgadios*) with royal permission, in which one heir inherited the majority of the estate. Most often these estates were bequeathed to the eldest son, thus diminishing the inheritance of any daughters. Although women were not legally excluded from inheriting entailed estates, they generally did so only in the absence of male heirs. More often, widows managed these estates as guardians for their minor children.

Beyond the aristocracy, Iberian legal codes promoted women's access to economic resources by stipulating partible inheritance, in which all children inherit equally regardless of sex (Lewin 2003). Thus, although inheritance regimes differed somewhat from region to region, nearly all women could expect to come into some property at the death of their parents. In addition, families usually provided daughters with a gift at the time of their marriages, a *dowry*, and husbands provided their brides with a token gift, the *arras* (Nazzari 1991; Poska 2005). Although a husband had the right to administer his wife's property during the marriage, this property remained hers for life. If she believed that he was dissipating her property, she could go to a judge and have his right to manage it taken away. When her husband died, a woman had the right to half of everything accumulated during the marriage. Finally, all single women and widowed women, and even most married women, could purchase property with their own funds (Poska 2005). Widowed women and daughters could also inherit offices, enjoying the wealth and prestige attached to them even if they could not exercise the position (Candido and Rodrigues 2015; Abreu-Ferreira 2005; Sperling 2007).

Iberian law also allowed women to use their property as they wished. During their lifetimes, they could support favoured friends and relatives and provide for their spiritual well-being by funding masses for their souls and for the souls of deceased relatives. Women established orphanages, funded benefices, and supported other pious works. Women's property rights also allowed them to conduct all kinds of business, and thus attain some degree of economic self-sufficiency. Although married women legally gave up their rights to contract business to their husbands, they could, and often did, waive the rights and laws "in their favour" that prohibited them from engaging in contracts and taking on any legal responsibilities. By renouncing those rights, they could buy and sell their property

without legal constraint (Poska 2005). This access to property was particularly important in Iberia's maritime and imperial economies, where the extended absences of men engaged in fishing, trade, and conquest frequently left wives as *de facto* heads of households charged with acquiring and managing assets on the family's behalf (Cook 2012; Abreu-Ferreira 2005, 2012).

In addition to property rights, women in Iberian societies had extensive access to both the secular and the ecclesiastical court systems and families clearly expected women to use those systems to protect both their interests and those of their families. Widows and single women over the age of 25 could use the legal systems without the assistance of a man, although married women and minor daughters generally had to be represented by their husbands or fathers. Neither illiteracy nor poverty were obstacles to pursuing court cases, as the courts provided poor women with legal assistance and public notaries generated legally binding documents. As a result, women of all classes effectively employed the courts to resolve an array of grievances. They took legal action against one another over insults and petty jealousies and used the courts to protect their reputations. If a man reneged on a marriage promise, the woman could sue him, demanding financial compensation for her lost virginity. If the relationship had produced a child, she could request child support. Although divorce was not an option according to Catholic law, women could petition ecclesiastical courts for permanent separations from abusive husbands (Silva 1984, 209–252; Premo 2017).

During the late Middle Ages, until the forcible conversion and expulsion of Jews and Muslims from the Iberian peninsula, women of these faiths lived circumscribed both by Christian law and by the laws of their own communities, which also emphasised female chastity, marriage, and motherhood. Yet, as Jewish communities gradually adopted Christian inheritance practices, Jewish widows came to exert significant authority in their communities, often becoming prosperous businesswomen. Muslim women living under Christian rule also inherited property and received dowries. Recent research indicates that both Jewish and Muslim women had much more extensive interactions with Christian society than we used to believe, including litigating in both Christian and their own communities' courts (Melammed 1998; Shatzmiller 2007).

Women were among those forced into bondage in Iberia and Iberian territories, working in households, including as wet nurses, as

well as in retail and agriculture (Phillips, Jr. 2013). While slavery in Iberia was an ancient, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious practice, following fifteenth-century expeditions along the coast of Africa, the Portuguese developed a trade in sub-Saharan slaves, first to Iberia and then to the Americas, where enslaved Africans supplied the labour for plantations. Although the Iberian Crowns forbade the enslavement of indigenous peoples in America, many were forced into servitude nonetheless, especially in areas far from the scrutiny of royal officials. African and indigenous women were thus part of all colonial labour regimes. Despite their status, enslaved women also regularly used the legal system to their advantage. At times, enslaved women secured manumission for themselves and their children, employing *coartación/coartação*, an appraisal of value and agreement to earn freedom by paying off that price (Higgins 1999; Dantas 2015). They also used the courts to confront abusive masters, although judges rarely enforced prohibitions against rape and such litigation was easier for women living in urban areas than for plantation slaves (Landers 1999; de la Fuente 2004; Premo 2017). Native women in the Americas also learned the benefits of the Spanish legal system. Soon after the conquest, Mexica women used the court system to become guardians of minor children and to protect their access to property (Schroeder et al. 1997; Kellogg 1998). In the eighteenth-century Amazon, when shifting labour and indigenous policies meant that many indigenous peoples, including those living as free people outside official indigenous villages, were forcibly relocated and drafted into harsh rural labour regimes, indigenous women engaged the legal system to defend their autonomy, their domestic arrangements, and their legal status (Sommer 2013). Indeed, across the Iberian world, women's access to property and the legal system defined their place in society more than the negative cultural tropes espoused by intellectuals. These rights situated women as central, independent actors in Iberian society, able to exercise extensive authority on behalf of themselves and their families without the assistance of men.

While for the most part women were excluded from the official spheres of politics and diplomacy in early modern Iberian monarchies, the porous boundaries between these spheres and elite households allowed women to shape both domestic and international politics. As partners in marriages that were intended to fortify alliances or resolve conflicts within and beyond their kingdoms, royal and aristocratic women were expected to do whatever was necessary to preserve family power and privileges (Nader 2004). For example, the Portuguese king

João II's (1481–1495) struggle to consolidate his authority was influenced by the wives of his opponents as they navigated court politics to preserve their families' patrimonies (Humble Ferreira 2005). This political engagement also included female rule; Catherine of Austria (1507–1578), Luisa de Gusmão (1613–1666), and Catherine of Braganza (1638–1705) briefly ruled as regents of Portugal on behalf of sons, grandsons, or brothers. After female succession to the Portuguese throne was affirmed in the seventeenth century, the oldest daughter of King D. José I (1750–1777) succeeded him and ruled as Maria I (1734–1816) until her mental illness forced her son D. João to act as regent beginning in 1799.

Isabel of Castile (1451–1504), the only queen to rule the Spanish kingdoms in her own right during the early modern period, often promoted her marriage to Ferdinand of Aragon (1452–1516) as a joint monarchy; however, their marriage contract explicitly denied him most authority in her kingdoms and he was not her designated heir (Boruchoff 2003; Weissberger 2004). Unfortunately, after Isabel's death, Ferdinand and his son-in-law, Philip of Burgundy conspired against her daughter, Juana, spreading rumours that she was mentally unstable and eventually confining her to a royal residence in Tordesillas (Aram 2005). Although she remained in forced seclusion for the rest of her life, she never abdicated the throne, and officially, her son Charles I (1500–1558) ruled jointly with her until her death in 1555.

In the late Middle Ages, queens and queens consort played active roles in Castilian politics and the kings of Aragon regularly left their kingdoms in the hands of their wives. For instance, following in the footsteps of her predecessors, María of Castile (1401–1458), the wife of Alfonso V, served as his Lieutenant General during his military campaigns in Italy with complete and independent power to govern (Earenfight 2010). Later, both the Habsburg and the Bourbon dynasties relied heavily on royal women's political knowledge and experience. Charles I twice left his wife, Isabel of Portugal, as regent (1529–1532 and 1535–1539), and his daughter, María, served as regent for him between 1548 and 1551. Philip II followed suit, appointing his sisters as regents during the early years of his reign and entrusting the Spanish Netherlands to his daughter, Isabel Clara Eugenia (van Wyhe 2012). During the reign of Philip III, his grandmother Empress María, his wife, Margaret of Austria, and his aunt, Margaret of the Cross, all housed at the convent of the Descalzas Reales in Madrid, politicked energetically on behalf of their Austrian

relatives and often against the powerful Lerma (Sánchez 1998). Later, Mariana of Austria (1634–1696) ruled as regent for her infant son, the soon to be Charles II, sparring with both her husband's illegitimate son, Juan José, and members of the aristocracy in an effort to maintain power for both herself and her son (Oliván Santaliestra 2006; Mitchell 2013). Thus, Iberian queens and queens regent governed within a well-developed tradition of female rule. Moreover, women's political participation was not limited to elites. Spaniards expected a reciprocal relationship with their rulers and royal officials, and ordinary women regularly petitioned the crown for favours. Sometimes, when they felt ignored or rejected by royal authorities, they participated in anti-government riots and other popular protests, hurling stones and hiding conspirators (Corteguera 2002). In 1736 in Brazil, Maria da Cruz, a widowed rancher with extensive properties in the hinterland between the mining region and Bahia, assumed leadership of a rebellion against fiscal reform (Botelho and Anastacia 2012). Although the preference may have been for male rulers, women were expected to engage in politics and govern when necessary.

Gender in the empires

Gendered understandings of politics, society, and economics shaped the creation of the Iberian empires. Following fifteenth-century Portuguese conquests and encroachments in Africa and its Atlantic Islands, the crown sent men to populate new fortified trading outposts such as São Jorge da Mina (now in Ghana). Yet in successive centuries, small numbers of women, primarily of low status, found their way aboard the ships that sailed from Lisbon. The crown also met the need for domestic labour in trading forts by hiring servants known as “castle women” (*mulheres de castelo*), and by providing slaves to those sent to Africa (*escravos/as de ordenança*). Although rape was a serious crime and religious authorities discouraged concubinage, Portuguese men engaged in sexual relations with these women with impunity. Moreover, some Portuguese traders married into matrilineal African families. While Portuguese authorities viewed these men, known as *lançados*, as perilously beyond the scope of European authority, they also conceded that Luso-African trading communities bolstered the viability of the Portuguese African enterprise (Elbl 1996). In the Estado da Índia too, royal officials came

to view the unions of Portuguese men and local women, sanctified in Christian marriage, as an important tool in the consolidation of Portuguese claims in Asia while as new settlements and administrations were established, some high-ranking officials took their wives and children to new postings (Xavier 2008).

Image 8.1Portrait of a young woman from Spanish America. Pedro José Díaz (attributed to), 1795–1810

Source: Davis Museum at Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA

The Portuguese enterprise in South America also depended on establishing enduring contacts with local people. Settlers had both short- and long-term relations with women including the daughters of indigenous leaders, such as the Tupinambá Paraguaçu who married the castaway settler Diogo Álvares and travelled with him to France, where she was baptised and given the name Catarina, and then returned to Brazil. Their offspring, as was case with other Portuguese-indigenous unions, formed the core of early coastal settlements (Metcalf 2005).

To effectively secure and exploit territories at home and across the globe, the Portuguese Crown sought to manage its demographic resources with both restrictions on migration and forcible relocation. Non-elite men and women convicted of both violent and nonviolent crimes could be sentenced to punitive banishment in Africa or Brazil. By the seventeenth century, the Inquisition routinely banished to Brazil women found guilty of bigamy, heresy, blasphemy, and witchcraft, among other challenges to moral order and religious orthodoxy. The crown and charitable institutions, in turn, promoted the relocation of widows, prostitutes, and orphaned girls to imperial outposts, especially those with small European populations (Coates 2001). In some cases, the crown recognised girls, especially those whose fathers had died in royal service as “orphans of the king” and provided dowries in the form of imperial administrative offices. In the Zambezi (Mozambique), the crown awarded grants of land and slaves (*prazos*) to Portuguese orphans and widows that could be bequeathed to eldest daughters. While the crown sought to use these grants to bolster the European population, women of South Asian, African, or mixed ancestry also received or inherited these grants. Indeed, matrilineal inheritance, common in Africa, may have helped bridge Portuguese and African cultures at the local level. The *Donas da Zambézia*, as grantees came to be called, contracted marriages with men who brought additional resources to the family. In the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries, several outlived their husbands and accrued substantial local social authority and economic power in maritime trading networks (Rodrigues 2015). Other women willingly participated in royal colonisation schemes. When the Portuguese transported the city of Mazagão from the west coast of Africa to Brazil in the 1770s, the transatlantic move included more than 300 women and their families, as well as 51 widows (Furtado 2012).

Although by the second half of the sixteenth century, royal officials had grown sceptical of the long-term cultural and economic consequences of mixed unions, marriage, including marriage between local women and Portuguese men, and its presumptive reproductive ramifications, remained crucial to the success of Portuguese settlements. As a result, royal policies exempted married men from military service and sought to prevent women in colonial settlements from entering convents. It was only in 1677 that the crown allowed the foundation of a convent in Brazil's political capital, Salvador, Bahia, setting aside fears that access to the cloister would reduce the growth of European families (Soeiro 1978). Similarly, the convent of Santa Clara in Macao was limited to only 33 nuns, so that it could not drain the limited population of European women from the marriage market (Coates 2001). In the Estado da India, Christianised local elite women viewed marriage to Portuguese men as a way to maintain their status in the face of colonisation. Across the empire, marriage and dowries were also crucial to the consolidation of new social hierarchies and fortunes, especially for families of mixed ancestry.

Women were central to Spanish colonisation from the beginning. Peninsular women accompanied Columbus on his second voyage and, as early as 1502, the crown urged women to move to the Caribbean along with their husbands, as authorities believed that women's presence would provide stability for the new settlements and their reproductive ability was critical to increasing the Spanish population (Altman 2012). Women, particularly from the south of Spain, eagerly answered the call. By the late sixteenth century, peninsular women made up at least one-third of the emigrants to the Americas, usually undertaking the journey accompanied by other family members (Jacobs 1995). Later, Spanish and Portuguese efforts to manage white settler populations converged in schemes to relocate families to peripheral regions of their empires (Poska 2016). Portuguese women moved with their families to the far reaches of the empire, including Angola, Mozambique, and the Amazon, while Spanish families founded Montevideo, and reinforced the Spanish presence in places

like San Antonio and New Orleans.

Despite the presence of peninsular women in many newly conquered American territories, Iberian men did not constrain their sexual activity to white women. During conquest and settlement, European men both imposed European ideals of sexual propriety and female honour on indigenous and African women and acted in ways that disregarded those ideals (Socolow 2000; Powers 2005). The sexual dimensions of conquest led to unions between Iberian men and indigenous and African women (Presta 2005; Furtado 2009). Initially, in Spanish America, some conquistadors attempted to integrate into indigenous social hierarchies by marrying the widows and daughters of elite local families and local rulers. Some even took their mixed-race children away from their indigenous wives and sent them back to Spain to be raised (Mangan 2016). More often, indigenous women were raped by and/or lived with European men in unofficial relationships.

Illicit sexual activity became a regular feature of American societies and resulted in very high illegitimacy rates, especially in urban areas (Mannarelli 1993). At the end of the seventeenth century in Guadalajara (New Spain), 39% of white children were illegitimate, 42.8% of *mestizo* (of mixed parentage, usually Indian and European) children, 60.5% of *mulato* (of African and European parentage) children, and 50% of Indian children (Calvo 1984). In eighteenth-century Santa Fe de Bogotá, half of all *mestizo* and Indian births were illegitimate and in one parish, 35% of all white children were born out of wedlock (Dueñas Vargas 1997). There were few negative consequences for illegitimate sexual activity, and the law encouraged parents to provide for all of their children, regardless of the circumstances of their birth. Insufficient religious instruction, the cost of having a priest administer the sacrament, male migration, and the inability to divorce may have been factors in the decision not to marry.

Although canon law required evidence only of free will and the absence of religious impediments for a couple to marry, in the late eighteenth century, the Royal Pragmatic on Marriage (1776) required parental consent for marriage and moved the jurisdiction over marriage disputes from ecclesiastical to secular courts. In the increasingly mixed-race societies of Spanish America, this legal change allowed families to prevent their children from choosing partners of “unequal” status. Indeed, families used the Royal Pragmatic to prevent marriages to potential spouses based on factors including race,

ethnicity, illegitimate birth, wealth, occupation, and public reputation (Seed 1988; Carballeda 2004; Twinam 1999). In the Portuguese empire, the crown and elites confronted mixed-race relationships in different ways. In the second half of the eighteenth century, legislation challenged the nobility's endogamy by ending the legal distinctions between New and Old Christians. Although new laws stipulated that Asian Christians could enjoy the same privileges as their European counterparts and marriage to an indigenous Brazilian no longer implied the acquisition of "infamy", African ancestry continued to be regarded as a "defect of birth" that could impede social mobility.

Because women of all races had extensive legal and property rights, they quickly became central to the expansion of colonial economies. Although the ideal European division of labour restricted women to the home while men engaged in hard labour and public activity, the exigencies of survival forced women into all types of work (Carbonell I Esteller 2005; Rey Castelao 2005). Domestic service drew women from small villages to larger cities across the Iberian world (Sarasúa 1994). Generally, upper-class white women did not engage in manual labour; however, they often worked as owners and administrators of large landed estates. In the sixteenth century, women could inherit *encomiendas*, grants of Indian labour, from their husbands, and administer them until they remarried. In the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1583, 60 women held more than 230,000 Indians in *encomienda* (Powers 2005). Other women used the wealth that they acquired through inheritance and marriage to invest in businesses. The Spanish made textile production into women's work (Graubart 2007). While indigenous women produced textiles, women often owned textile mills, running them in their homes and overseeing all aspects of production. In colonial Quito, doña Leonor Carxatigua, a wealthy Indian widow, provided both small and large loans to other women and formed a partnership to sell the wheat that she grew on her estate (Gauderman 2003). Women of modest means also provided credit to other women, and pawning provided even poor women with access to financial resources when they were unable to make ends meet on wages alone. In late eighteenth-century Minas Gerais in Brazil, almost 30% of households were headed by women, including free women of African descent, who engaged in farming, ranching, and mining. Across Spanish and Portuguese America, markets were filled with Indian, African, and mixed-race women selling produce, beer, and a wide array of cooked foods (Mangan 2005; Dantas 2015).

While these practices reveal continuities across local Iberian,

American, and transatlantic economies, colonial settlements also disrupted indigenous gendered divisions of labour. In many sedentary indigenous cultures, agriculture was primarily women's work and among nomadic and seminomadic peoples, women were generally responsible for collecting food while men hunted and fished. However, Catholic clergy insisted that men work in the fields and that women remain within the confines of the mission. As one mission manual noted, "the women should be in their homes grinding grain and preparing meals for their husbands and not be going through the fields doing men's work" (Barr 2007, 139). Such ideals created a clash of gender cultures. For instance, among the Pueblo, men spun, wove, hunted, and protected the community while women cared for the home and "undertook all building construction". According to Fray Alonso de Benavides, "If we compel any man to work on a house, the women laugh at him ... and he runs away" (Gutiérrez 1991, 76). In general, attempts to change the gendered division of labour met with resistance, and the reality of subsistence farming meant that both men and women had to engage in fieldwork to ensure their survival.

In sharp contrast, slave owners were highly ambivalent about the role of the traditional gendered division of labour when it came to their workforces. In plantation agriculture, women engaged in hard labour, cultivating and harvesting crops alongside men, while in urban areas a gendered division of labour predominated, as enslaved women were either used as domestic help, or as wage labourers whose income was the property of their masters. For example, a slave owner might send a female slave out to work as a laundress or a seamstress, in addition to or instead of completing her domestic tasks. Skilled slaves could also earn money to put towards their freedom. This work connected enslaved women to both the local and the broader imperial economy (Higgins 1999; Castillo 2005; Amussen and Poska 2012).

Although the creation of the Iberian empires began as mostly male endeavours, women were central to the expansion of imperial societies. As Spanish and Portuguese men engaged in exploration and conquest, they often used sexual relations as a form of domination, but women of all races quickly learned how to take advantage of imperial legal structures. Moreover, throughout the colonial period, women's labour, both free and enslaved, was central to the expansion of the imperial economies.

Religion

Across the Iberian world, the Catholic Church created spaces for all types of women to cultivate piety and exert authority in the public sphere (Pérez González 2005). Midwives administered baptisms for infants in danger of dying when priests were not available. As godmothers, female friends and relatives provided children with spiritual guidance and physical care. They embroidered the cloths for the altars, made communion wafers, and cleaned and maintained religious ornaments. Thus, lay piety was grounded in the participation of women.

In fulfilment of their spiritual obligations, women also played crucial roles in devotional and charitable institutions. Queen Leonor of Portugal (1458–1525) sponsored the foundation of the Misericórdia, The Holy House of Mercy, in Lisbon in 1498 (Sá 2004). Although late in the sixteenth century, Portuguese women were excluded from membership in this prestigious institution, across the Iberian world women of all ranks and races joined other single-sex and mixed-sex confraternities that held festivals for holy days, participated in burial rituals, and provided charity. Confraternities also allowed Indian and African women take on leadership roles and gain access to communal resources. In 1657, the Confraternity of the Humility and Patience of Christ our Redeemer in San Luis Potosí in New Spain (Mexico) was founded by a group of parishioners that included a free mulata, a *mestiza*, four mulatas of unclear status, and a black woman. Even enslaved women found solace and community in confraternities, taking advantage of the association of slavery with holiness in Iberian societies (von Germeten 2006).

However, for many non-European women in the empires, conversion to Christianity was difficult. African and indigenous women were often forcibly baptised and given Christian names. Women in polygynous relationships were wrested from those families and forced into monogamy. Whereas their polytheistic religions often emphasised female fertility and gave women important liturgical roles, early modern Catholicism, with its masculine Trinity and male priesthood, left native women without a female gendered avenue to spiritual leadership. As a result, despite pressure from authorities, many African and indigenous women resisted conversion and worked to maintain their traditional beliefs, even acting as leaders of outlawed “idolatrous” cults (Silverblatt 1987). In response, clergy configured missions to ensure their ability to control Native women’s activity. In Alta California, Indian girls lived in sex-segregated dormitories known as *monjeríos* from adolescence until they were

married and left the mission with their husbands. Among the first buildings constructed at the missions, these enclosures traumatised women by removing them from their families and prevented them from engaging in traditional courtship traditions (Voss 2000). When the Jesuits began their missionary work in Brazil, they sought to convert indigenous women and women of mixed ancestry known as *mamelucas*. Following conversion, these women were also expected to reconcile their relations with Portuguese men with Christian marriage. Those marriages destabilised concubines' place in the community. Some ended up in Jesuit missions where they often served as interpreters.

Female monasticism was a prominent part of the Iberian world's spiritual landscape (Sánchez Lora 1988; Bellini 2005). As convents required entrance dowries, only women of means could profess, and many convents, including Santa María de las Huelgas in Burgos, were founded by or for the female members of royal and noble families. In many of these convents, women lived in luxury, surrounded by servants, not always taking vows and unwilling to follow the expectation of claustration. In fact, convents frequently resisted early modern attempts to enforce religious discipline, often blocking episcopal visits and asserting their right to self-rule (Lehfeldt 2005).

Many women who were unable or unwilling to take monastic vows became *beatas*, pious laywomen who dedicated themselves to prayer and charitable work, sometimes taking vows as lay members of religious orders. They lived alone or in small groups in private homes, known as *beaterios* or *casas de recogimiento* (Muñoz Fernández 1994; van Deusen 2002; Weber 2016). In addition to housing young women involved in marriage disputes and victims of domestic violence, *beaterios* in Spanish America served as temporary boarding schools where *mestizas* could be Christianised, educated, Hispanised, and their virginity protected until marriage. Andean elite women in Cuzco sometimes founded *beaterios* as a means to counter stereotypes of Indian moral weakness and assert their own Christian respectability (Burns 2007).

Around the empires, local elites, eager to set themselves apart from the rest of the population and to practice the female seclusion advocated by male intellectuals and Church officials, enthusiastically embraced female monasticism (Ramos Medina 1995). In many cities, convents came to dominate socially and economically. In the seventeenth century, Lima's 13 convents housed more than 20% of the city's female population, some of whom were nuns, but most of whom

were servants and students. Renowned for their piety and home to the daughters of powerful families, these institutions acquired substantial financial reserves, which they then used to provide loans and credit that were critical for their cities' expanding economies (Algranti 1993; Burns 1999).

As the sole providers of women's education, convents produced some of the Iberian world's most important female intellectuals. Teresa of Avila (1515–1582) founded the Discalced Carmelites as a way to bring the Order back to its roots in poverty and asceticism, promoting prayer and withdrawal as women's contribution to the defence of Catholicism. In Mexico's convent of Santa Paula, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1648–1695) amassed a library of more than 4,000 volumes and wrote dozens of plays, poems, and other works including *La Respuesta a Sor Filotea* (1691), a cogent defence of women's right to learn and write. Unfortunately, religious authorities were often threatened by women's intellectual independence and both women faced intense criticism from ecclesiastical authorities. Teresa's mystical revelations and emphasis on internal prayer attracted the attention of Church officials who worried about the dangers of such unsupervised religious activity by women (Bilinkoff 1989; Weber 1990). Nevertheless, Teresa's reformist vision spread to Portugal, where a Discalced Carmelite convent was founded in the 1580s (Morujão 2003). The widespread dissemination of Teresa's autobiography and her canonisation in 1622 further inspired women of all classes to emulate her pious practices.

Some of the earliest convents in Spanish America were founded by conquistadors to Christianise and Hispanise their mixed-race daughters; however, convents quickly came to reflect the racialised priorities of Spanish elites. As “purity of blood” *limpieza de sangre* was a central requirement of a religious vocation in Spain, no woman of Jewish, Muslim, African, or Indian descent could take final vows. Nuns also had to be of legitimate birth. Thus, black, Indian, *mestiza*, and mulata women who were attracted to the monastic life were only able to participate as convent servants or sometimes lay sisters, *donadas* (Burns 1999). In rare cases, a woman's intense spirituality helped mitigate at least some of the discrimination that women of colour faced. Despite being of African descent, both Juana Esperanza de San Alberto in New Spain and Ursula de Jesús in Peru became renowned for their religious piety and mystical experiences, although Esperanza's biographers described her as exceptional, having overcome the handicap of her race to achieve Christian virtue (Bristol

2007; van Deusen 2004).

Around the Iberian world, some women experienced Tridentine Catholicism through mystical experiences and extraordinary visions and dreams. Most of the Portuguese *beatas* who reported their visions were unmarried and relatively poor. In some cases, their ties to the institutional church took the form of membership in a Third Order and residence in a convent. The few who were literate appear to have been familiar with mystical tracts published in Portugal with the support of Queen Leonor. While visions and mystical experiences were not exclusive to women, the ways in which *beatas* were scrutinised by religious authorities were informed by ideas of female danger articulated in the prescriptive literature of the period. Inquisitors found that *beatas*' claims of spiritual knowledge and their ability to attract both male and female followers contradicted expectations of female humility. Although *beatas*' visions gave them credibility among the masses, as they reconciled Christian doctrine with their own lived experiences of motherhood, sexuality, and family life, they often prompted the distrust of ecclesiastical officials who saw them as blasphemous and heterodox. As they interpreted their prophecies and offered spiritual guidance to both women and men, female mystics were perceived by many as subverting the Church's gender hierarchy (Giles 1999). Such was the case with María de Macedo who, in the 1660s, appeared before the Lisbon Inquisition answering questions about her visionary travels to meet King Sebastião, whose death at the battle of El Ksar-al-Kebir in 1578 set off a succession dispute that led to Spanish Habsburg rule over Portugal from 1580 to 1640 (Givens 2011). Famously, Maria de Santo Domingo and Lucrecia de León became engulfed in court politics when their mystical revelations transgressed the often-blurred lines between politics and religion (Bilinkoff 1992; Kagan 1995).

Established to ensure religious orthodoxy, the Inquisition in both Spain and Portugal took particular interest in the activities of *conversas*, women who had converted from Judaism to Christianity, and *moriscas*, converts from Islam. Christian society was highly suspicious of these women's conversions. Both *conversas* and *moriscas* were frequently denounced to the Inquisition as a result of domestic activities viewed as maintaining Jewish or Muslim traditions, including refusing to cook pork, doing the wash on Fridays, not keeping the Sunday sabbath, or maintaining households according to Koranic law. Although it is impossible to know exactly what they believed, it is clear from the testimonies that many of these women

were maintaining Jewish and Muslims traditions within the home (Melammed 1999; Perry 2007; Barros 2013).

In Spain, some pious laywomen were caught up in the Inquisition's prosecution of the *Alumbrado* heresy of the early sixteenth century. The *Alumbrado* movement, which drew its name from its participants who believed that they were "illuminated" by the Holy Spirit, was led by a beata associated with the Franciscan order, Isabel de la Cruz. The *alumbrados* encouraged the practice of *dejamiento* or abandonment, in which they surrendered themselves to the love of God and denied the need for the ceremonies or sacraments of the Church. Their beliefs not only implied a rejection of key Catholic doctrine, but the group was particularly troublesome as it became associated with the leadership of vibrant, outspoken women (Alcalá 1999).

Women were also implicated in other heretical activities pursued by the Inquisition. Although it was not technically a heresy, the Aragonese and Portuguese tribunals (but not those in Castile and its jurisdictions) investigated cases of sodomy, or non-reproductive sex. While men found guilty of sodomy often received severe punishments, it appears that because same-sex relations among women often confounded inquisitors—they were "dubious matters" in the words of one inquisitor – their punishments were less severe (Marcocci and Paiva 2013, 104; Velasco 2011). Inquisitorial records also shed light on the roles that women played within complex, popular cultures of magic and healing that were subjected to scrutiny and repression throughout the early modern period (Walker 2005; Calainho 2008). The Spanish Inquisition revealed surprising scepticism when it came to witchcraft (although witchcraft prosecutions were more common in other Spanish courts). Prosecutions of crimes involving superstition and witchcraft accounted for only 7.9% of the total number of cases between 1540 and 1700 and the witch hunts that characterised much of early modern Europe were remarkably rare in Spain (Contreras and Henningsen 1986; Tausiet 2014). Rather, early modern anxiety about female power manifested itself most assertively in the prosecution of love magic, in which women tended to be both the purveyors and the consumers of the magic (Sánchez Ortega 1992). Some women wanted fulfilment of unrequited love; others merely wanted to end abuse or adultery by their husbands. Love magic seemed exceptionally dangerous in the empires, as it brought women of all races and classes into contact. Authorities were suspicious of the orthodoxy of women of colour, whom they believed were particularly susceptible to heretical influences. As a result, black, *mestiza*, and Indian women

were more likely than their white counterparts to be denounced to the Inquisition, especially for crimes like witchcraft (Few 2002). As on the peninsula, Inquisitors also focused on accusations of clandestine Jewish practice, investigating *conversas* and their families in Mexico City and Lima (Alberro 1988). In Brazil, an inquisitorial visitation heard similar allegations regarding Ana Rodrigues, the widowed matriarch of a New Christian family who had come to Bahia from Portugal in the 1550s (Assis 2002).

Finally, the Inquisition was interested in reforming the erroneous practices and beliefs of Old Christians. Although men overwhelmingly outnumbered women in the prosecution of all heresies, from time to time, women were charged with blasphemy for asserting heterodox ideas including that the Virgin Mary could not have been a virgin after giving birth to the baby Jesus and for the heresy of simple fornication, asserting that sex between single people is not a sin. In general, women who were brought before the Inquisition for these “minor heresies” received light sentences or were reprimanded and sent home without punishment (Alberro 1988; Sánchez Ortega 1992; Poska 2005).

The Catholic Church provided the opportunity for all races and classes of women to participate in religious and communal life and thus was often a site of racial integration, cultural assimilation, and assertions of female autonomy. However, Church anxiety about women’s ability to influence others and their susceptibility to sin also led to attempts to suppress religious activity that the clergy perceived as transgressive.

Image 8.2*Hércules y Onfalia*, Diego López, el Mudo (17th-century). López’ recreation of the myth of Hercules’ enslavement to Queen Omphale, set within a seventeenth-century Spanish domestic milieu, invoked contemporary male anxiety about female authority. Source: Courtesy of Caylus, Madrid, Spain

Cultural life

Despite the limited access to education and opposition from some male intellectuals, women were enthusiastic participants in the dynamic cultural life of both the peninsula and the empires. Some royal women, like the Infanta Maria de Portugal (1521–1577) and her teacher Joana Vaz, possessed a remarkable knowledge of Latin (Castro 2014). In addition to the most well-known women writers like Teresa of Avila and Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, scholars have rediscovered written works by dozens of other women on both sides of the Atlantic

(Vollendorf 2005; Arenal and Schlaue 2009). As centres of learning, convents were particularly important in the production of devotional literature that circulated both within the cloister and among Iberian elites (Vollendorf 2005; Howe 2008). However, secular women writers also found large audiences. The works of María de Zayas y Sotomayor (b. ca. 1590), including *Desengaños Amorosos* (1647), were best sellers, even as they offered sharp critiques of the male sexual double standard and a strong corrective to the misogynist tropes of the time. Among others, the works of Spanish dramatist Ana Caro (b. ca. 1600), who may have been born enslaved, and Portuguese playwright Angela de Azevedo (b. ca. 1600) challenged traditional gender expectations by focusing on women's sexual desire and the constraints imposed on women (Vollendorf 2005; García-Martín 2012). Oliva Sabuco (1562–ca. 1622) composed important works on medicine and philosophy. But women's contributions to the peninsula's cultural life extended beyond authorship. Between 1540 and 1710, 11% of all commercial theatrical performances were managed and directed by women (Sanz Ayán 2015, 115) and women played a critical role in the expansion of the printing industry in both Spain and Spanish America (Bouza 2005; Garone Gravier 2008; Cabrera 2014).

In the eighteenth century, women's roles in secular literary life expanded together with debates about women's authority and capacities. The publication of Benito Feijóo's *Defensa de las mujeres* (1726) sparked a contentious debate over the role of women in Spanish society (Bolufer 1998). Among others, Josefa Amar y Borbón (1749–1833) argued that women were equal to men, advocated for women's education, and worked for their acceptance into the Madrid Economic Society (Lewis 2004; Smith 2006). In addition, elite Spanish women both on the peninsula and in the Americas held salons, known as *tertulias*, in which they cultivated favourite writers and artists and participated in the critical intellectual debates of the day. These *tertulias* could generate transformative ideas. In Santa Fe de Bogotá, Doña Manuela Sanz de Santamaría hosted a weekly salon that discussed independence from Spain (Socolow 2000). Women also participated in the dynamic scientific community of the eighteenth century. Manuela Tomasa Sánchez de Oreja was one of a number of women who authored astrological almanacs and María Andrea Casamayor y de la Coma (ca. 1700–1780) became a well-known mathematician.

In Portugal, an expanding print culture included an array of pamphlets that re-examined “the woman question”. While some

returned to formulaic enumerations of women's virtues and capacities, women (or anonymous authors assuming a feminine voice) entered the debate. Paula da Graça's *Bondade das Mulheres* (1715) addressed women readers directly and challenged misogynist tropes by citing both female virtues and challenging the significance of gendered difference. In the second half of the eighteenth century, women played important roles in literary-minded social gatherings while female voices and debates about women's virtue, honour, and roles gained even greater prominence in both anonymously-published pamphlets, as well as in literary correspondence and manuscripts that circulated among intellectuals (Marques 2005; Anastácio 2010, 2015). The first Portuguese-language novel written by a woman, Brazilian-born Teresa Margarida da Silva e Orta's *Maximas de Virtude, e Formosura*, was published in 1752 and circulated in subsequent late eighteenth-century editions as *Aventuras de Diófanes*. The reign of Maria I (1777–1816) reinvigorated the public defence of women's education and "reason". Among the queen's courtiers, D. Mariana de Arriaga (1748–1820) distinguished herself for her learning and a literary salon that she hosted. The most celebrated woman writer of the later eighteenth century was D. Leonor de Almeida Portugal, 4th Marquesa de Alorna (1750–1839), imprisoned as a child in a convent as punishment for her grandparents' alleged involvement in a plot against José I (1750–1777). Freed by Queen Maria in 1777, in her lifetime she became well known as a poet and for translations of Horace, Alexander Pope, and Chateaubriand. Her *Recreações Botânicas*, published posthumously in 1844, urged Portuguese women to cultivate scientific knowledge of the natural world. By the turn of the nineteenth century, an increase in elite women's literacy further bolstered auto-didacticism and women's increasing participation in literary circles and salons that included writing and reading prose and poetry and performing plays (Anastácio 2015; Costa 2016).

Most of Iberia's female artists of the early modern period who were famous during their lifetimes later fell into obscurity and their cultural contributions are only now being studied. In fact, the most well-known female artist in early modern Spain was not Spanish: Sofonisba Anguissola (1532–1625), an Italian who became court painter to Philip II. Anguissola's life-like images were praised by Vasari in his *Lives of The Artists*. During her residence in Spain, she painted most of the royal family and instructed the queen, Isabel de Valois, in painting and drawing. In Portugal, Josefa de Óbidos (1630–1684), who was trained to be a painter by her father and lived in an Augustinian and

then a Cistercian convent, achieved professional success in the 1670s with a number of commissions from local churches and convents, including a series of paintings of Saint Teresa for the male discalced Carmelite Convento de Nossa Senhora da Piedade in Cascais (Andrews 2015; Pimentel 2015). Luisa Roldán (1652–1706), known as La Roldana, also achieved great fame and was lauded by her contemporaries. Her small-scale painted terracotta vignettes and life-sized carved wood statues brought her to the attention of the Spanish king Charles II, who named her court sculptor (García Martín 2012). Engravers Anna Heylan, María Eugenia de Beer, and María Luisa Morales also achieved prominence in the seventeenth century (Lizarraga 2010). By the middle of the eighteenth century, and in contrast to its counterparts in France and England, the new Royal Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando also enthusiastically recognised the talents of female artists. The Royal Academy appointed 24 women as “academics of merit” and regularly presented works by female artists in the academy’s public exhibitions (Smith 2006, 53).

Convents and churches remained primary sites for the production and consumption of art by women. Nuns created devotional works for their communities and laywomen embroidered altar cloths and clerical robes, while wealthier women commissioned artworks for private chapels. Artistic talent could be a mechanism for women to enter convents whose families might otherwise not be able to afford it. Convent artists like María de la Santísima Trinidad and Estefanía de la Encarnación produced works as a stipulation of their profession and female musicians were often recruited and given dowry waivers by convents eager for their skills (Taggard 2000; Baade 2005). Although many of their names have been lost to modern scholars, female writers and artists were active participants in the vibrant cultural expansion of the early modern Iberian worlds, frequently using their art to undermine the double standards that attempted to curtail their intellectual development, and deny their creative capacities.

Thus, despite the often negative cultural discourse about women, recent scholarship has vividly demonstrated that Iberian legal, political, imperial, religious, and cultural institutions created spaces for women’s participation and that Iberian societies expected women to be active participants in all aspects of life.

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
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CHAPTER nine

The peninsular economies and the impact of globalisation (ca. 1494–1700)¹



Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla

Introduction: the cross-cultural roots of the fifteenth century-expansion

Perhaps because his celebrated circumnavigation of the globe was financed by Castile, it is often forgotten that Magallanes, the first man capable of organising this extraordinary feat, was a subject of the King of Portugal. This project was an example of the high degree of integration and overlapping between the various societies of the Iberian peninsula, a characteristic found not only in the oceanic expansion but also in the economic growth that has often been underestimated by historians. The following pages are an attempt to bring out these ties as well as the exact nature of the expansion and the subsequent crisis.

The dynamism of the Iberian economies was already obvious in the

fifteenth century. Indeed, it had been manifested in the conquest of the Islamic states of the peninsula: Portugal had taken the Algarve in 1249; the Crown of Aragon had recovered Valencia (1238); in Castile this movement would culminate in 1492 with the conquest of Granada. A process of this sort, in which military collaboration between the armies of these Christian kingdoms was frequent—conflict between them was not entirely absent, it has to be admitted—was both a symptom and cause of the notable economic vitality of the peninsula states. Two factors or tensions were crucial to this phase of military and territorial expansion: first, the rivalry and internal tensions in the heart of the seigneurial aristocracies; second, the needs of the monarchies for economic and military resources. As land and labour (a variable that one can equal to the population) were the most important factors in the productive system, so military expansion was also a form of economic growth. The acquisition of new territories would, through their cultivation and repopulation, favour demographic expansion.

The Iberian peninsula was one of the richest centres of Christendom for the development of knowledge and technology. Here mathematics and a range of other sciences, many originating in Arab and Jewish cultures, had taken root: geometry, astronomy, and cartography; agriculture involving sophisticated irrigation mechanisms; oriental techniques of construction and textile weaving; the most efficient means of navigation (this thanks to advances such as the caravel, a synthesis of the type of ships sailed in the north of Europe and the Mediterranean galley) and the compass, of Muslim origin. All of these arts and sciences were the consequence of the intense trans-cultural relationships between the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim civilisations. Moreover, thanks to its role as intermediary in the commerce between the north and south of Europe, the Iberian peninsula had become a “central corner” in the European-world economy. International commerce also created maritime routes that, having penetrated the hinterland (for the sake of convenience, the term “interior” will be used to denote non-coastal regions), gave impetus to the regional economies by providing a great abundance of productive resources (Constable 1995).

These international connections strengthened the need to explore new worlds, at the same time that they provided the means for doing so. In this way, the search for gold, needed to satisfy the requirement for monetary circulation in an expanding European economy, encouraged the Iberian states to explore and conquer the African coast

as far as Sudan, this being necessary to cut out the nomadic Saharan tribes who previously had acted as intermediaries. The kingdom of Portugal, moreover, also needed fish, wheat, and other products from the coasts of Morocco, North Africa, and the Atlantic, which it started to explore. Growing Genoese colonies, in Portugal as much as in Castile and Aragon, fed the growth of sugar and wine production in the Canary Islands, Madeira, and the Azores. But, crucially, Iberian societies had the means to achieve all of this: as we have seen, it was the melting pot for the technologies and branches of knowledge that made possible this phase of expansion. The school of navigation created in the Cape of San Vicente by Henry the Navigator of Portugal brought together rich seams of knowledge in mathematics, trigonometry, cosmography, cartography, and so on, that had begun in the so-called “School of Translators” of Toledo, the famous “Alfonsine tables” and in Mallorca, itself perhaps the finest example of the positive effects of this cross-fertilisation of ideas and knowledge.

The Iberian economic growth of the sixteenth century

The economic expansion of the sixteenth century was manifested in the growth of population. Between 1500 and 1560 Castile moved from 3.9 to 5.6 million inhabitants. The Crown of Aragon also witnessed a phase of growth: 0.78 to 1 (Nadal 1984, 74). Even in Portugal, the population passed from about 1 to 1.4 million. A process of this type was not unique in Europe, but neither was it a symptom of backwardness. The European population grew from 80.9 to 102.1 million, slower than the Iberian kingdoms (Kriedte 1985,12). It was a form of expansion that sits well within the so-called *ancien régime* demographic model: high-birth rates accompanied by high rates of mortality due to famine and disease, a result of which was low rates of vegetative growth in comparison with those of the nineteenth century. As always with preindustrial economies, demographic growth was accompanied by an agrarian expansion, which was manifested in the tithes figures for many peninsular areas. Different estimates have been made for the evolution of GDP and of GDP per capita, although they all lead to similar conclusions for both Spain and Portugal (Álvarez and Prados de la Escosura 2013; Reis 2016). Whether or not these statistics are correct, they give us reason to believe not only that the population grew, but also that the wealth per inhabitant was

increasing, a picture which does not correspond to the old model of the “*economies immobiles*”, which in any case has been nuanced by recent economic historiography. This phenomenon was corroborated by the fact that the levels of urbanisation increased in both countries. In economies such as these, this pattern reinforces the idea that Iberian agriculture was capable of feeding an increasing volume of persons who were not dedicated exclusively to the cultivation of the soil; that is to say, that agrarian productivity grew *grosso modo* in response to a parallel increase in industry, commerce, and services.

For many years, historiographical thinking has explained this expansion by the availability of lands that permitted an extension of the farmed surface area, a process typical of preindustrial economies. In fact, this growth was evident on the local level, where references abound to the breaking of new soils; it was also manifested in interregional migration, predominantly from north to south. A continuous stream of emigrants made their way from the mountainous zones of the Cantabrian cornice and Galicia, from the north of Portugal, from the Pyrenees, and even from France; they headed south, migrating to the areas around Lisbon, the south Tajo Valley, and even the Algarve; some, alternatively, made for Andalusia, Murcia, and the kingdom of Valencia. The permeability of the frontiers of this time explains the trans-frontier character of these movements, which was manifested in the abundance of Portuguese in Castile, of Frenchmen in Catalonia and even in Valencia or of Castilians in Valencia. But growth would have been impossible without other ingredients and factors: property rights; institutions that regulated the use of natural resources; ecological conditions; forms of combining work, land, and technology.

Portuguese historiography has given importance to *enfiteusis*, a form of long-term land grant that favoured agrarian activity and combined relatively low rents with a degree of security for the tenant farmer (Miranda 2016). True, its inherent capacity to attract immigrants was limited in areas such as Alentejo, whose meagre soils were inappropriate for wheat cultivation; on the other hand, things were much easier in the North of the Tajo valley or even in the Algarve. *Enfiteusis*, moreover, was not exclusive to Portugal. It was also widely present in the Crown of Aragon and, above all, in Catalonia and Valencia, where it was associated with the farming of irrigated lands and intensive fruit-tree cultivation by the *Morisco* population. In Castile a form of seigniorial land grant to peasant collectivities was widespread, involving the communal use of the soils.

Across the peninsula, and above all in Castile, the abundance of terrain belonging to the royal domain (the *realengo*), unfarmed fields (*baldíos*), or soils belonging to rural communities and councils (*concejiles*) also facilitated the movement of population and the extension of cultivated lands.

South of the Tajo, in Portuguese Alentejo, New Castile, and Andalusia, these sorts of lands allowed the development of livestock breeding but also encouraged the migration of farmhands, who provided a workforce on the great estates and allowed them to make use of previously unused soils, whose produce was oriented towards the growing urban markets and, little by little, America. Thus, property rights that originated in patterns of shared or common ownership, and which were largely inconsistent with the logic of modern capitalism, in fact had a very positive effect upon economic growth. Furthermore, the Mesta, the great transhumance association that has traditionally been viewed as a cause of agrarian backwardness, probably had precisely the opposite effect (Klein 1920). Certainly, its existence led to frequent conflicts that suggested a high degree of insecurity in property rights and denoted forms of corporate privilege that limited the capacity of the individual farmer for innovation (North and Thomas 1973). But account should also be made for the fact that the *cañadas* (the herding routes taken by the vast flocks of transhumant sheep) affected only a very small proportion of the available farmland and that the complementarity between mountain and plain resources helped the adaptation of both agricultural and pastoral activities to the many and varied ecological systems of the peninsula. The regulation of property rights by the town councils (*ayuntamientos*) and chambers (*câmaras*)—the municipal corporations of Spain and Portugal respectively—also had a positive overall effect. These bodies created a way of dividing soils into different pockets of exploitation (typically with cereal crops, vineyards, and pastureland) that permitted efficient combinations between livestock breeding and agriculture and also increased security against the indiscriminate entrance of livestock (Yun-Casalilla 2004).

The Iberian peninsula boasts a huge variety of regional ecological systems: these stretched from the mountain ranges with an Atlantic climate of frequent rainfall, great forests, and fertile soils which were difficult to farm, to the plains with a Mediterranean continental climate, dryer and hotter. And, even if patterns of exploitation tended towards a monoculture of either cereals or ovine livestock, the outcome was the diffusion of the white mulberry tree (in the Levant

regions and the south of the peninsula), industrial plants (such as linen and esparto grass), fruit trees, and rice production. The results of all of this were different but highly complementary agrarian calendars and, consequently, a series of peasant seasonal migrations that allowed for the mobilisation of a workforce throughout the year and a more efficient exploitation of the labour force. In the same way as occurred with the circulation of livestock, these arrangements implied a more efficient adaptation of labour to regional ecological conditions.

This complementarity was also found on the local or regional level to the extent that the multiplicity of markets created by the urban network encouraged peasant activities tied to rural domestic industry (the production of woollen fabrics, linen and hemp fabrics; crockery), and carting and peddling in which farmhands, both male and female, were employed in the moments of lesser intensity in cereal production. What Joan Thirsk (1997) called an “alternative agriculture” that would be crucial to English growth from the seventeenth century onwards, was already present in Iberia. The successful combination of labour, the seasons, the work calendar, and land availability would be taken further by important “technological” advances, such as the growing use of animals for pulling carts and load-bearing; above all, the diffusion of the mule as an animal of work and transport was a crucial step. This animal, much quicker than the oxen and cheaper to feed, allowed for the ploughing of more land in less time—facilitating the greater combination between labour, a scarce resource, and land, an abundant one; this step not only advanced interior commerce, but also made it more responsive and flexible. Few other advances have been studied, but it would seem highly possible that when Cervantes had don Quijote charging against “windmills and giants” and spending the night terrified by the sound of the textile machines of the Sierra Morena, he was reflecting wider changes in the economy. The Castilian “*meseta*” and many other areas were also being populated by these machines, whilst similar advances were taking root elsewhere: in Andalusia and the south of Portugal the number of mills producing olive oil was growing, as were the country estates with stables; in Catalonia the house-farms (*masías*) were proliferating, as were the sugarcane mills of Valencia; meanwhile the infrastructure of the wool industry was taking root in Castile, and so on (Vilar 1962, Vol. I; Halperin 1980). Far from being a simple extension of the cultivated terrain, important advances stood behind the agrarian and demographic expansion. These contradict the model of an economy that was backward or lagging behind the others of its

time, although, this having been said, it was, of course, primitive in respect to today's.

Technology, industry, trade, and urban development

Recent findings have made it clear that the Iberian peninsula was a privileged place in the history of the development of mining (Sánchez 1989). The impetus provided by the American sector and the demand for iron and other non-ferrous minerals for the army and naval construction—a strategic sector for the most important maritime empires of the period—meant that it was necessary to import and adapt German and central European techniques, often through encouraging the immigration of artisans from these areas, which were also dominated by the Habsburgs. The intense political, economic and cultural relationships with Italy, the centre of technological and scientific innovation, had similar effects on the development of these sectors and engineering, which was in turn in part a consequence of the circulation of knowledge, books and manuscripts, but also of artisans. A number of individuals involved in these changes have been studied in depth, and these have made it clear that the expulsion of the Jews, and the consequent loss of human capital, did not prevent the development over a reasonable amount of time of sciences such as medicine, thanks in part to the legacy of this “nation” (the term used at the time) and the presence of the *conversos* or Jewish converts, who remained in the peninsula. The role of the Iberian countries in globalisation lay behind the development of the science of botany and the experimentation with medicinal plants which was undertaken by figures such as Monardes (from Seville) or the Portuguese d’Orta. Obviously, not all of these fields of knowledge had a practical effect upon the economy, but their impact was noted in various ways.

The development of nautical sciences, cartography, and the techniques of navigation should come as no surprise to us. Naval construction, which was especially important in Biscay, Barcelona, Seville, Lisbon, and Porto, would develop to the point that the technical advances it generated would be the basis for the progress subsequently made by the Dutch navy in the seventeenth century (De Vries and van der Woude 1997). Recent research into the so-called *arbitristas*, who were similar to the English projectors, have made it clear that there existed a primitive but active system of patents, based

on the concession of monopolies granted to those inventors who presented their ideas to the court (García Tapia 1990; Yun-Casalilla 2016).

The role of the peninsula as a centre for the redistribution of merchandise between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic was strengthened by the oceanic expansion and globalisation. From 1510–1520, Lisbon and Porto became the focal point for the distribution towards the north of Europe of great quantities of Atlantic sugar, slaves, and wines, as well as for peppers brought from Asia, thanks to the *Estado da Índia*, the institution created by Portugal for the organisation of the commercial monopoly with Asia.

In Castile, the export of wool, iron (the basis for the prosperity of Burgos), and salt grew in strength, and these were soon joined by silver, sugar, dyes, and other American products that would be re-exported from Seville. Barcelona reignited its old rivalry with Valencia, with whom it competed for the commerce with Italy, it being a staging point for both armies and shipments of oriental merchandise on the “Spanish road” to Flanders (from 1566 onwards). In 1503 the House of Trade (*Casa de la Contratación*) was founded in Seville, and in 1543 the Consulate of Seville, thus converting the city into a centre for world trade. The Indies silver accumulated there: it would serve to finance the Habsburg campaigns in Europe and to acquire products from Italy, France, and Flanders, which were destined for both the internal Iberian market and America, thus reinforcing the connections of the Atlantic economy with Europe.

It has often been said that this commerce was prejudicial for the peninsula economy. It would, of course, create tensions to the extent that it was based on the exportation of primary materials that were important for the industry, such as wool, and the importation of industrial products. But this commerce also had positive effects upon the Iberian internal market and industry. The intensification of traffic connected to the trade fairs, which had been largely encouraged by the financial transfers effected by the monarchy in the fairs of Castile to pay for its overseas military campaigns, favoured the articulation of the internal market. The cities also helped this trend and encouraged expansion: this was not only for purely economic reasons, but also on account of their role as political and social centres, which infused dynamism into the demand for agrarian products and made internal traffic more responsive.

This commerce was increasingly intensive between the different kingdoms, despite the existence of tolls between them: Portuguese

merchants were increasingly present in the fairs of the Duero valley or in cities such as Seville, Cordoba, or Toledo. The same was true for the Catalans in Medina del Campo. Population growth was also encouraged by trade in products such as Valencian silk, which was now found in Castilian cities dedicated to industry, such as Toledo, or construction, and in flourishing cities such as Zaragoza, Porto, Lisbon, Toledo, or Granada, to name but a few. Here the local nobility, the ecclesiastical institutions and Cathedrals concentrated agrarian incomes and made greater the demand in this sector, which was sometimes tied to Mudejar or Morisco technology, and other branches associated with industrial and artistic development. In this context the expansion of the leather and textile industry in cities such as Cordoba (silk and wool), Toledo (silk), Segovia (wool), Valencia (silk), Granada (silk), and others is especially eye-catching. In Portugal, the exportation of products such as wines from Madeira and the Azores, pepper and other spices, formed part of a much more complex arrangement—in which the imperial system itself must be considered. The Portuguese needed to sell pepper and other spices because this was the principal source of income for the imperial machinery; it was also, of course, a way of paying for the demand for wheat and, perhaps above all else, a method for obtaining liquid money, without which it was impossible to make the cogs of the empire turn. It is now clear that the empire had, during the seventeenth century, a positive impact upon the economy of the country (Costa, Palma, and Reis 2015).

Credit and finances developed at the same time and to the same degree. Here a long tradition of Jewish financiers, who continued to be active in Portugal, and Genoese bankers in Castile, meant that the financial sector saw technical advances that would later be exported to the north of Europe. These businessmen (*hombres de negocios*), alongside German bankers, were especially decisive in financial developments, as they alone—and, again, here the Genoese were pre-eminent—were capable of dealing with the enormous transfers of money that were required to pay for the distant wars of this composite monarchy. The Habsburg dominions stretched across all of Europe. But the role of Castilian and Portuguese bankers also grew throughout the century and was tied to the development of the fairs of Medina del Campo, Seville, and the trade between Lisbon and Flanders (Ruiz 1990).

All of this was helped by the development of state finances. True, here very different characteristics were observable. Castile was

capable of constituting a system that offered certain degree of control to the Cortes, which were required to vote services and to negotiate the *encabezamiento* (the amount paid by each of the cities and towns) in regards to royal incomes such as the *alcabalas*. For this reason and thanks to the flow of American treasures, this system served to overcome one of the great limitations of the composite monarchies of the period: to transfer funds from the kingdom to distant theatres of action in which the interests of the king, and not of the kingdom itself, were being defended, an arrangement which broke the sacred principle that the crown had to live off its own means ([Chapter 2](#)). The result was a fiscal system that, if it clearly had strong counterweights in the Cortes and the kingdom itself, would be relatively efficient in serving the dynastic interests (for a synthesis on this, see Yun-Casalilla 2004). This was not the case in Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, or Valencia, where the control over spending exercised by the kingdom through the *Diputaciones* and surveillance over income by the parliaments was far more efficient, arrangements that were much less conducive to the absolutist interests of the crown. In both cases, these were systems in which the degree of negotiation between king and kingdom was very high and that can hardly be described as having led to a form of untrammelled royal absolutism (see [Chapter 2](#)). Despite the many similarities, the Portuguese model had its peculiarities (Hespanha 1994). Here the king's incomes, thanks to the revenues of the *Estado da India* and the pepper trade, provided more than enough funds to satisfy the needs of the crown. Moreover, the king of Portugal had no need for money to send to wage distant wars in Europe. The result was that public debt developed to a far lesser degree and, second, that the kingdom and the Cortes were much less involved in the fiscal regime. If in Castile a tax state was emerging, in which the kingdom was highly involved in the needs of the monarchy, in Aragon the fiscal incomes were being fossilised, at least in relative terms, thanks largely to the fact that Castilian funds were deployed to attend to the many needs of the Habsburg's dominions. In the final instance, Portugal was establishing a "rent state" in which colonial revenues allowed for a notable but still relative involvement of the kingdom in the fiscal system.

A semi-periphery? The patterns of economic growth

For a great deal of time it was thought that the peninsula economies were semi-peripheral, their function being to be mere bridges for the re-export of products manufactured in Europe to America and for the import of primary materials into the heart of a world economy, whose “centre”, involved in a process of industrialisation, emerged in the north of the old continent (Wallerstein 1974). Today, this model is unacceptable. It is impossible to speak of a global system with a centre in Europe, but rather of a polycentric economy where local forces were crucial and in which, moreover, Asia played a decisive role (Frank 1998). Neither is the role of the peninsula economies taken to be as simple as was once widely believed. It is interesting in this sense to remember the development of the urban networks. They never obtained the physiognomy of the urban systems of the north of Italy or the Low Countries (De Vries 1984; Yun-Casalilla 2002). But it is possible to distinguish, at least until 1580, an urban development that hardly corresponds to the characteristics of a semi-peripheral and dependent economy, where the most dynamic nuclei are the ports, tied to exports and the international services sector. Certainly, the Iberian peninsula saw the growth of number of littoral cities associated with international commerce, such as Lisbon, Porto, Seville, Valencia, and, more and more, Barcelona. But the formation of urban networks in the interior is very instructive, above all in the Duero Valley. The industrial development of a number of these interior cities (where up to 30% of the population might be involved in industry) also underlines how difficult it is to apply a mechanical model of dependence, a schema which is usually behind the traditional interpretation in one way or another. The Iberian economies had a marked export sector, but they were not semi-peripheral.

On the other hand, it is clear that these were not integrated national economies of the sort seen in the nineteenth century. On the contrary, expansion was the consequence of convergent forces of a clearly regional character. Portugal is, without doubt, the territory that most closely resembles a proto-national economy. In fact, the role of this kingdom in the world economy as a means of transferring colonial products on the international scale was increasingly setting the rules for a large part of the country. The Portuguese economy advanced due to the dynamism of coastal cities such as Lisbon and, since 1560s, Porto. Both were closely connected to diverse hinterlands. But the areas of the south—the Algarve, for instance—and the more inland zones of Alentejo, on the frontier of Castile, were governed by very different endogenous forces. Despite being a small

country, and one making rapid steps towards the integration of local economies, their regional character remained obvious.

The case of Portugal helps us better to understand the overall peninsula conjuncture where, despite the increasing level of integration, important regional characteristics remained in place. A series of coastal poles existed that, often tied to different ecological conditions, acted with a certain degree of regional and local autonomy. The Atlantic Spain, from Pontevedra to Navarre, was an agrarian economy with notable forest and mineral resources, abundant rainfalls and connections with the interior that created autonomous pulses or beats. If its connections with the hinterland through Burgos and the mountains of Leon and Zamora were intense, it remains clear that this was very far from creating a market for heavy but essential products (such as wheat) that was totally integrated with the *meseta* or Castilian plain. The fact, for example, that the poor harvests of the interior could not be overcome by importing cereal from the North of Europe through the Cantabrian sea coast is an indicator of the inadequacy of these merchant networks in this regard. In the Mediterranean area two poles of growth, Barcelona and Valencia, set the economic rhythm. Both were creating strong coastal commercial ties through *cabotage* (García Espuche 1998) and strengthened their interior hinterlands. But, once again, short run price oscillations, very much dependent on harvests, demonstrates that the commercial ties with the Castilian *meseta* affected important products such as wheat and were a long way away from creating full economic integration. Of course, the chain of tolls between the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon and of Castile did not disappear, as it belonged to the well-defined political frontier between these kingdoms (Lapeyre 1981).

Facing these great coastal areas, there existed a series of regional economies in the peninsular interior; these occupied the regions between the Crown of Aragon and Castile to Alentejo in Portugal, and from the Cantabrian cornice to the Guadalquivir Valley. This area might also be considered an area with a certain internal unity. It was characterised by notable urban development, with two subsystems: one belonging to the Duero Valley and one shaped around the Andalusian cities; both were united by Toledo, which served as the centre of intermediation and brokerage (Ringrose 1983). Another major characteristic was the impact of the Atlantic expansion through Seville. It was, however, only relative due to the limited development of the overseas markets for the products of the hinterland, and the

growing presence of foreign goods in America. In any case, if we look at their population figures and evolution, these lands of the interior constituted the most important motor of the peninsular economies until 1580.

Lastly, it is important to consider that, within the above progress, the limits of integration of these regional economies derived above all from the fact that agriculture, in spite of its progresses, continued to be one of subsistence. Given the productive limitations found in all agrarian systems of the time, it was unable to avoid the cyclical crises and allow the provisioning of the cities to the extent necessary for an adequate integration of the markets of agrarian products.

Crisis, political economies, recession and recovery (1580–1700): a revisionist view

This overall model of economic development reached its ceiling between ca. 1580 and ca. 1600. By these dates, the population began to stagnate, grew more slowly or even fell, depending on the area in question. The same tendency can be found in agrarian production. Curiously, this deceleration in growth coincided with the Union of the Crowns, that is, the annexation of Portugal by Philip II (of Castile and Aragon) or I (of Portugal) and which gave great impetus to world commerce. But today's perspective on this crisis is less dramatic and, above all, more regionally varied than the traditional view of "Spanish decline".

It was not surprising that the problems should be especially grave in the zones of the interior, where it would result in a crisis that, if sometimes exaggerated, led to a genuine recession in some areas. Figures on cereal production demonstrate that a ceiling was reached in many interior regions between 1560 and 1580. In many areas wheat production fell by more than 30% between 1600 and 1630. The same trend can be found in birth rates in many towns and settlements (see, example, García Sanz 1986; Yun-Casalilla 1987; López-Salazar 1986). Even if with very different rhythms, the growth of many cities reached a peak before 1600 and in quite a few of them the number of inhabitants fell not only until 1640, but also into the second half of the seventeenth century, and perhaps even into the next one (Yun-Casalilla 1999). This process was little more than the manifestation of an industrial crisis generated at precisely the moment that the colonies began to exert more pull on this sector; this pull could not be

fully taken advantage of thanks to the productive rigidities, on one side, and the incursion of other countries, in the ways described above, into colonial commerce. This negative image can be nuanced in light of the growth of Madrid. The city on the Manzanares passed from 10,000 inhabitants in 1560 to around 90,000 in 1590, and it continued to grow, reaching 130,000 in 1630.

Taking these figures into account, it seems possible that a good part of the demographic losses of the interior cities, and their deindustrialisation, were caused by emigration to the capital. This view is suggested by the fact that quite a few of these emigrants appear to have been artisans (Nieto and Zapico 2016). On the other hand, the industrial crisis of the Castilian cities was not a simple free-fall. By the first decades of the century, the arrival of dye products and other primary materials for the textile industry, the demand of the Court and the armada, and the chance to take advantage of a small but stimulating participation in the American market, helped the resistance of some centres. Toledo, whose industry specialised in silks for the high classes, would resist for some time, despite the competition from Milanese and French silks (Montemayor 1996). The same would occur in the high-quality cloth industry of Segovia, which drew strength from demand from the well-heeled classes and even from America (García Sanz 1986). Taking these perspectives as a whole, it is possible to think that the recession was much less traumatic than has often been said. But it is no less certain that it represented a radical change in both the model and the economic structure. From a poly-nuclear model, focusing on growth around several urban centres in a network and with certain bases in industry, it moved to one based upon the Madrid macrocephaly and the development of the court and the services sector, one which in a preindustrial economy had less capacity to generate wealth and basic goods for the overall population.

This economic crisis is usually linked to the Malthusian limitations on growth that were typical of preindustrial economies and with the falling performance of the model of extensive agriculture that was increasingly widespread in the peninsula. This explanation has some basis to it, despite the diversity of agrarian systems, and it was certainly the case that the areas of extensive cereal agriculture were ones where the problems would become very noticeable. But, this having been said, it has to be borne in mind that the Malthusian limits also originated in a property system that put a brake on qualitative changes to the cultivation system. Even if we cannot imagine the

massive development of an irrigated agriculture in Castile, then it is pretty clear that the techniques for the successful exploitation of water resources, well known in the Muslim tradition, were widespread only in certain areas of the southeast of the peninsula. Their impact in the centre of the peninsula seems to have been almost non-existent. The expulsion of the *Moriscos* (1609–1614) made this option even less likely and, in any case, it faced serious ecological impediments in the interior regions characterised by irregular rainfalls and very low levels of summer precipitation. Moreover, the consolidation in many areas of forms of regulation in the use of agricultural and livestock resources by rural communities had solidified a series of interests—in particular those of the rural elites—which made it difficult to change collective practices. Furthermore, major investment from the nobility and ecclesiastical institutions, whose properties had grown throughout the century, was not forthcoming.

It was not the case that improvements were entirely absent, as can be seen in investment by the great landowners in crops such as the olive, which needed a considerable initial cash outlay and subsequent care (it would be some five years before their first fruits were harvested), not to mention the construction of mills to produce olive oil, the wash tubs to clean wool, country houses, granaries, enclosures (above all, in Andalusia). But these investments were insufficient in light of the needs of an abundant population and some of them reinforced even further the extensive model of agriculture in the drylands, which was a practical choice in light of the ecological conditions of large areas but which was coming close to the limit of its efficiency. The arrangements that guaranteed ownership rights over the entitled estate (*mayorazgo*) and ecclesiastic entitled properties (*propiedades amortizadas*) against forfeiture and eviction because of unpaid mortgages—this was, of course, a frequent occurrence—reduced the incentives for major productive investments, which, in addition, were normally risky when made on a massive scale.

That the incomes of the Castilian nobility and clergy were often collected in the form of tithes or exactions on commerce encouraged them to reinforce their control over and monitoring of peasant produce, but not to invest massively in risky innovations. The development of the political system, particularly that of Castile, mitigated against economic efficiency. The opportunities enjoyed by elites to obtain political incomes through their service in the empire, or to claim other related incomes tied to imperial development, reinforced forms of *rent seeking* that led them to invest in political

resources—the purchase of offices and jurisdictions; service in the imperial administration; obtaining privileges and acts of grace—which rendered it less necessary to plough money into productive improvements. Given that lands subject to practices of this sort had increased notably, in part because of donations to the Church, these exploitation criteria affected an increasing quantity of resources.

Malthusian limits have to be set in relation to the entire social system and a political and institutional economy that acted in a very specific ecological context. Moreover, the result in many areas was that the social elites responded to its rising expenditure by increasing land rents paid by peasants or by transforming the *enfiteusis* into a revisable rent, something which weakened the peasantry, whose resistance to illness, disease, and hunger diminished. In technical terms this reduced the chances of work factor efficiency. Many areas, above all in the dynamic Castilian centre, were affected by the auction of unfarmed and council lands (*tierras baldías y concejiles*) by the crown, which was badly in need of money (Vassberg 1983). This move aggravated existing problems and eroded one of the bases of the previous expansion. In many regions where peasant use of collective resources had not been as prevalent—for instance, in Extremadura and Andalusia—municipal oligarchies had formed or, alternatively, patricians had emerged seeking to monopolise advantages in the use of the soils. Not only was this undermining some of the key attributes of the previous expansive model, but also the very institutions that had fed it were now increasingly in the hands of social groups that limited the distribution of incomes and contributed to the weakness of the work factor, undermining the basis of the peasant class that had been in part responsible for the expansion. It is not strange that, in this context, the quantitative indexes of social inequality increased throughout the century, reaching a historical peak around 1600 (Álvarez and Prados de la Escosura 2013).

Historians have also traditionally blamed the growing fiscal pressure for these problems. This assessment is not correct if we consider only taxes in the strict sense of the word—not for Castile, and even less for the other peninsula kingdoms, including Portugal. Despite the recent revision upwards by scholars (and the multiplication of fiscal figures they have produced), the fiscal burden does not appear to have been very high in macroeconomic terms and, even if taxes increased quickly, they were also reduced by inflation. But, on the other hand, the action of the crown took only one direction over the long term, one that was poorly suited towards

maintaining an increasingly voluminous population and an efficient economy. The sale of unfarmed and council lands, mentioned above, was followed by that of seigniorial jurisdictions, which led to the fragmentation of the economic map and its legal regulation framework, trends which increased uncertainty for interior commerce and heightened transaction costs, at the same time as it created insecurity in economic activities in general. In some communities jointly owned or shared forms of resource exploitation disintegrated, ones that previously had been highly beneficial. If this were not enough, the fiscal burden fell upon the trade of consumption goods such as wine, olive oil, meats, fish, and others, thus affecting above all the artisans and limiting the subsistence capacity of the workshops in which apprentices and officials were employed. Accompanied by a noticeable rigidity in the forms of industrial organisation, the result was not only that they were inefficient in adapting to changes in demand—these changes were in part a result of the growing social inequality—but also that they were less competitive against foreign products. For some time, this loss of competitiveness was attributed to the rise of salaries brought about by the arrival of American silver, but it is clear that these did not evolve in a very different way in other countries that faced the crisis of the end of the century with greater success, such as England (Yun-Casalilla 2004). The result was that, together with the severe rural problems, the cities, who faced considerable provisioning difficulties in securing foods from an increasingly inefficient countryside, were plunged into crisis. The subsequent decomposition of the urban network of the peninsula interior would in turn also hit the countryside, to the extent that it reduced the positive stimuli on both peasant production and the auxiliary activities and alternative agriculture that had been the basis of the expansion. Nor did development of the royal court in Madrid help the situation, as it grew explosively to a large degree thanks to the incomes provided by the empire and the composite monarchy and contributed to the decomposition of the urban network of the interior and the market network that this bound together. Monetary manipulations—above all, the minting of *vellón* coinage (copper and silver alloy)—worsened market volatility and the general stability of the urban economies, thus increasing the transaction costs and risks in commercial activities.

In reality, it is impossible to speak of an economy in ruins and entirely inefficient from 1600. Many of the problems mentioned above were also found in other European countries. The very low levels of

investment by the nobility and clergy, their interest in investing in prestige and political incomes that drew capital away from productive investment, and so on, were perhaps more pronounced in Castile, but they were by no means exclusive to this part of the continent. But it is clear that Iberian cities, industry, and agriculture were unable to meet the enormous challenge before them. It is worthwhile considering that these years saw important advances in the countries that competed with Spain and Portugal. In Holland the foundation of the commercial companies, the VOC (*Vereenigde Oostindische*) and WIC (*Geoctroyeerde Westindische Compagnie*), the development of the capital market (the stock exchange and bank) and the impulse towards a more intensive, flexible, and efficient agriculture were creating the basis of a much more competitive economy. Something similar was happening, albeit in a less precocious but more long-lasting form, in England. France, with a political and economic model that was very similar to those of the Iberian peninsula in general and Castile in particular, would reconfigure its economy after the pacification of 1598. These countries would better overcome the problems that were besetting the Iberian peninsula. Their overall population did not collapse; agrarian production would oscillate but would not go through long periods of recession in the vast majority of their regions. Their ecological conditions, derived from climatological systems with greater and more reliable levels of rainfall, would of course help in all of this. And in some countries, above all Holland and England, an industrial development would take place which explains the firm establishment of the urban networks even in times of war and social and revolutionary conflicts.

Perception of the problems, reformism, and institutional rigidity

It was not the case that contemporaries were unaware of what was happening. On the contrary, this process took place in the heart of the peninsula, in what had previously been the engine room of the economic growth and an area that remained central to knowledge production and public opinion; it necessarily produced a profound revisionist and reformist movement. From the end of the sixteenth century the *arbitristas*, an unfortunate name for a generation (or two) of political thinkers and writers on political economy, detected and described many of the ills of both countries. Encouraged by the cities,

the Cortes and factions of courtiers proposed a series of remedies to achieve the “conservation” or the “restoration” of the wealth of “Spain”, a term which for some was starting to denote not only Castile but also the territories of the Crown of Aragon and even Portugal. And the remedies and solutions were clear: reduce the influence and presence of foreigners, including, of course, the Genoese; limit the *mayorazgos* and the religious foundations; stabilise the currency; defend industrial work; establish forms of economic protectionism; encourage agriculture, and so on. This was, then, a proto-nationalist ideology with a mercantilist basis that in some aspects was not exclusive to the Iberian countries, but rather was manifested in the work of such thinkers as J. Child, T. Mun, and others.

Despite the withering criticism that they had to put up with, the storm of self-criticism unleashed by defeats on European fields of battle made even governors, such as the Count-Duke of Olivares, adopt a reforming policy. In a society that understood economy as *oconomia* (the government of the house in all of its aspects), and envisaged society as a body (a sick one, in this case), this logically resulted not only in reform efforts that could be called economic in the strictest sense of the word, but also in attempts to re-engineer social customs and political habits. But, above all, Olivares wanted to reform the way that burdens (taxes and military levies) were distributed among the different kingdoms of the *monarquía*. He was convinced that the problems lay not only in the economy, but also in the minimal response of these “peripheral” states to battlefield exigencies. This was accompanied by new tax increases and innovative fiscal measures: indeed, these grew in proportion to the defeats and reverses of these difficult years. This programme resulted in massive protest not only in the “peripheral” kingdoms, where discontent spread like wildfire, but even in Castile, which he theoretically sought to liberate from debilitating burdens, and where the fiscal pressure now fell on an economy which was weaker by the year and in which corruption and fraud in property administration had grown in proportion to the involvement of the local oligarchies in the collection of royal taxes (Elliott 1986).

The result, in the first instance, was a reduction in the efficiency of both the fiscal mechanisms and the overall system for the mobilisation of resources, as well as an increase in transaction costs and an upsurge in uncertainty amongst economic agents when faced with a government whose behaviour was often arbitrary. The problems were not, on the other hand, exclusive to Castile: they could be found in

Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Navarre, and Portugal and, moreover, a crucial part of the reform programme was that these kingdoms should contribute more to the war efforts of the monarchy. This was a delicate matter, especially in relation to the Crowns of Aragon and Portugal—more sensitive, even, than in Castile—where the governing principle was that the king should live off his own means and could not use the resources of the kingdom for any end other than the interests of its own subjects: that is to say, the basic principle went against the use of the resources of these kingdoms for the dynastic wars of the Habsburgs in Europe or the defence of the other territories of this composite monarchy. Logically, the resultant tension would be one of the reasons for the rebellions of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640. But the situation of Portugal was still more awkward. Until 1570 the fiscal pressure on the kingdom had been light, thanks to the king being able to live off his own resources, that is to say the incomes of the *Estado da India* and taxes levied on commerce. Mention should also be made of the fact that, in absolute contrast to the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs, Portugal had not incurred great military costs. Only after the tragic expedition of King Sebastian in the north of Africa (1578) had debts increased (Disney 2009). But from 1600 onwards, a number of developments were changing the overall situation: the fall in the direct incomes of the crown, thanks to the crisis of the *Estado da India*; the problems experienced in the licensing system and fraud; the growing demands of the Court of Madrid; finally, the crisis of Asian commerce, although this was not as significant as the fall in royal incomes. A tax state was established, increasingly based on taxes paid by the kingdom. This was an unacceptable novelty, even more so when, perhaps erroneously, the Portuguese were increasingly convinced that these efforts were not always employed in the defence of their empire and interests, but rather in those of the Habsburgs and Castile. The fiscal and economic bases of the rebellion of 1640 were thus established (Schaub 2001).

In reality, behind the economic problems lay the fact that these were conditioned by a political and institutional system that remained intact, without great deep and substantial qualitative changes and, therefore, that the elites were able to retain the management criteria that allowed them to take advantage of their privileged position and to search for political incomes without the need for economic improvement. This explanation is quite different to some visions recently set forth of the problems of the Castilian and Portuguese economies, such as the well-known interpretation of Acemoglu,

Johnson, and Robinson (2005). They argue that the great difference between the Iberian empires and those, like the English, that would undergo an early process of industrialisation, lay in the predatory character of Iberian absolutism, which had aborted the flourishing of “positive” institutions capable of reducing risk and transaction costs in commerce. It is certain, however, that, independent of whether or not it had these effects and was—or was not—highly different to the seventeenth-century English system, this political skeleton in reality operated with a marked degree of negotiation, in particular in regards to relations between elites and the crown. It is this negotiated relationship that very possibly explains the capacity for reproduction of political systems in the heart of each of the polities that made up this monarchy; this alternative model of conflict and accord, rather than parasitic absolutism, also helps us to understand why the ruptures in Iberia were caused by programmes of disintegration rather than subversive formations of the constitutional order, as in the end occurred in England and which are considered one of the keys to the development of the island in this period.

The reason why there was not, in Castile, Portugal, or the Crown of Aragon, a break of this type and the conflicts were focused on the periphery of the monarchy is not a matter for this chapter. The fact that it did not happen is, in any case, one of the reasons for the maintenance of the political and institutional system that lay at the root of the economic problems.

From crisis to stagnation in the periphery (1580–1640): towards a new model of economic growth (1640–1700)

The available data shows that from 1580 peripheral regions—Galicia, the Cantabrian cornice, Catalonia, the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia, the Mediterranean areas of Andalusia, and even some areas of the Lower Guadalquivir and, of course, of Portugal—experienced a stagnation of both agrarian production and population. In many senses, this evolution was not very different from that of the areas of the interior (Yun-Casalilla, 1999, 2002). It is very possible that only Seville and Porto provided exceptions to this pattern. The former benefited from its ties to Atlantic commerce and the explosion produced by the second silver cycle, as well as by the initial development of the plantation economy in America. Porto escaped

thanks to the colonial expansion in Brazil.

The reasons for the problems in the periphery are similar to those in the centre of the peninsula: Malthusian readjustments; the increase in land rents; and the revision of *enfiteusis*. Although considerably less important, in some of these areas, a certain increase in fiscal pressure was felt; this was the case in Catalonia. In some areas of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia, banditry, an old problem, generated insecurity for interior commerce and raised the risks and transaction costs. The propensity of elites to live off investments and property incomes can even be found in some industrial areas, such as Catalonia (Amelang 1986). As in the interior zones, these were regions visited by plagues and famine, even if the coastal zones were more easily provisioned with *pan del mar*, bread from the sea, usually cereal brought from the productive areas of northern Europe and the Baltic. In the wake of the War of Granada (1568–1570), the Morisco minority had been redistributed across Castile; even then, its expulsion in 1609–1614 would negatively affect the Valencia regions, Aragon, and Granada. But a few other (positive) factors were also at play which would help in facing the problems. In fact, the crisis did not always lead to recession, understood as prolonged diminution of the population and agrarian production. In only a few of these regions can anything be found that resembles the general fall in baptisms and tithes seen in the peninsular hinterland between 1580–1590 and 1630–1640 (Yun Casalilla 1999).

Figure 9.1 Interior and periphery in Spain: baptisms in rural areas, 1585–1800

Source: Yun-Casalilla, Bartolomé (1999)

In general terms, these regions did not see the massive sale of council lands, in part because these were less extensive. Given that the previous growth had not been based in as widespread use as in Castile, its effects would be, necessarily, much reduced. These were, moreover, zones where the fiscal pressure was far from the suffocating levels of Castile, although, given that this was not the most negative factor, this perhaps strengthens the idea of a more fortunate situation from this point of view. The negative effects of public debt were very far from approaching those of the *juros* in Castile (Vilar 1962). The sale of jurisdictions by the crown had been much less notable. But some specific trends existed in a number of these areas. On the Cantabria coast, Galicia, and the north of Portugal, the expansion of maize farming—and later, of the potato—slowly, but inexorably, helped the diversification of available resources. This was also a

region characterised by very limited urban development and a high degree of peasant auto-consumption, where the model of Castilian fiscal pressure, based above all on the collection of taxes on the selling of consumer goods, would necessarily have much fewer negative effects. The wide spectrum of available resources, with an abundance of woods, prairies, and an Atlantic climate of frequent year-round rainfall, made these populations more resistant to calamities and shortages. In many areas of Portugal, productive improvements were implemented that made their presence felt in the construction of vineyard terraces, spurred on by the growing trade with England. Here there was also a tendency to diversify crops for the market and export. *Enfiteusis* acted positively here, as it remained important in many areas (Neto 2016). Something very similar also happened in the southeast of the peninsula, in particular around Valencia and Catalonia. Even the wounds produced by the expulsion of the Moriscos were to heal in one or two decades in the Valencian lands (Casey 1979). Moreover, in this region the development of agriculture in those irrigated lands near to the capital compensated for the losses in the drylands. The areas surrounding Barcelona witnessed the emergence of a new type of woven wool industry; in time it would become the basis of the region's industrialisation (Vilar 1962). In these areas a growing diversification of peasant production also took place, often orientated not only towards local markets, but also to export. In addition, the farming of products such as barilla (salt tolerant plants, used to produce soda ash), esparto grass, linen, and others, helped to push things forward.

This process was intimately related to broader changes in the global economy, and above all to developments in international commerce. The upward trend found in the Mediterranean coastal regions between Catalonia and Malaga (where *cabotage* navigation took over) was brought about by a number of reasons (Martínez Shaw 1981, 251–257). But one important general factor was the development of Mediterranean commerce, which was caused by a sum of changes: the penetration of Dutch and, above all, English businessmen; the advance of Marseille, which would be vital during the eighteenth century; and the opening up of commercial routes of Levant with the Indian Ocean. Two other developments should be mentioned: the widespread smuggling of American products associated with the plantation economy (cacao, tobacco, dye products, etc.) and the flow of commerce from Seville towards the Mediterranean. The progress of the Portuguese economy can be tied to

its capacity to adopt a new role in Atlantic commerce once its presence in Asia had been marginalised by the Dutch and English. The development of the Brazilian plantation economy, the definitive recuperation of Pernambuco, and, from the end of the century onwards, the exploitation of the gold mines also had positive effects. Compared with Castile and Spain in general, Portugal was also precautious in the foundation and development of overseas companies. After the Count-Duke's failure to impose the Lisbon Company to trade with Asia, the new dynasty was able to create the General Trade Company of Brazil (*Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil*, 1649) even before the war with the Habsburgs finished. Portugal would assume also a more intense relationship with England, in part in response to the political reasons that had led to English assistance being offered during the war with Madrid and the recovery of Pernambuco from the Dutch. In this way the English were able to acquire the Brazilian gold in exchange for their exports to Portugal and its colonies. But the crucial moment arrived when the exports of agrarian goods, above all, wine, of which the production raised in some regions, in return for British industrial products sent to Portugal and its colonies through Lisbon, assumed a greater intensity and had positive effects upon a number of sectors and the development of the cities connected to the Atlantic. The northern regions of the Iberian peninsula would become increasingly active in commerce with the north of Europe. In these circumstances it was logical that criticism should grow of the concentration of Spanish commerce in America in the Seville-Cadiz axis. It was obvious that many regions of the littoral, immersed in smuggling, would have benefited from a legitimisation of their commerce, as perhaps would have been the case for the peninsular economy as a whole—we shall never know.

If the differences between regions were very notable, it can be said that around 1640–1660 the symptoms of recuperation could be found across the greater part of the peninsula. The reasons and rhythms were very different according to regions. It is also unclear to what extent this change of economic trend has to do with reformist economic policies. In Portugal, in example, there were measures for the protection of industries by the Count of Ericeira, superintendent of the kingdom's industries. In Spain there was also a reformist movement materialised in the creation of the *Junta de Comercio y Moneda*, the attempts to attract foreign artisans and the monetary reforms. But what is very clear is that this growth was based on a model very different to that seen before 1580. The records on

baptisms, reflecting the demographic situation, and those on tithes are very expressive in this regard. The regions of the periphery, and in particular Galicia, the Basque country, Catalonia, and even Andalusia, were especially precocious in their recovery, as of course was Portugal (Yun-Casalilla 1999; Costa, Palma and Reis 2015). The areas of the interior, such as Old Castile, New Castile, and Extremadura, began to recover in the second half of the century, although this process was slower. Moreover, these rhythms of expansion would be prolonged for much of the eighteenth century. And the same happened with agrarian production and interior commerce (Yun-Casalilla 1999). The reasons for this are well known. Across the entire peninsula, but above all in the interior regions, an increase in agrarian production and interior commerce was helped by a fall in land rent was accompanied by a fall in land rent that allowed tenants easier access to it. This phenomenon can be tied to the concentration of property of this sort in their hands, the increase in the offer of land to rent, and the reduction of the economic advantages that their involvement in the government of the empire and the composite monarchy offered to elites (Yun-Casalilla 2019). In itself, this was not a qualitative change in the type of property rights, but it produced changes affecting, for example, the way productive factors interrelated. More important, these changes in the productive system help us to understand the economic process in the Iberian peninsula without having to use too general, and rather dramatic, explanations—like the old paradigm of the economic decline.

But the expansion was above all a reflection of the notable capacity for recovery of the regions of the periphery. This new expansive cycle in the peninsula was accompanied by a greater dynamism in the coastal cities, many of them boasting fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and, therefore, outside of the statistical parameters usually cited by scholars. In some cases, the phenomenon is evident in the displacement of economic activity to areas of the littoral, as happened in the movement of American commerce from Seville to Cádiz, in this case to facilitate the use of larger ships that could not sail the Guadalquivir river to the city. This also affected the interior. But the connection difficulties between coastal regions and those of the interior meant that this was limited in impact. The result was a very slow growth in the interior population. The marked concentration of industrial activities (themselves highly regulated) in Madrid, many of them in the hands of corporations of a monopolistic bent, capable of creating entrance barriers for products from other zones or closely tied

to the commercialisation of foreign products, limited the capacity for industrial growth in the peninsula heartlands (Pérez Sarrión 2016). This occurred at the same time as a mercantilist economy was being imposed across Europe, or one with strong protection for colonial markets, that would also be applied in Spain and Portugal, above all in the eighteenth century, but whose efficiency would be reduced by the loss of the economic, military, and naval primacy that had been enjoyed until 1648. The international treaties of the period reflected this situation. But were the Iberian economies an exceptional case of decadence or an anomaly in the overall European picture?

Iberia in the European urban system and the small divergence

What was happening was that a peninsular model of growth based on urban development and the expansion of the interior economy had been substituted for a different one. As, it has been said, the overwhelming role and influence of Madrid, a royal, court, imperial centre, and marketplace for political rents, had replaced a more equilibrated urban network, with a marked industrial character and relatively little differentiation within its hierarchical structure (Ringrose 1996). At the same time, emergent, but still weak, urban networks in the littoral areas were developing in line with the march of global commerce and, within them, the Seville-Cadiz axis played the role of centre of a supposed “monopoly” of commerce with America, which at heart was not really a monopoly at all (Oliva 2004). It has even been said that the *Carrera de Indias* was the “international monopoly of all of Europe”. And rather than feeding Spanish growth, it put a brake on it. This growth model, viewed in a comparative perspective, does not really tie in with an idea of deeper decline of the seventeenth century nor on that of a lack of recovery before 1700; rather it appears more of a small deviation from what was happening in other countries such as England and Holland—which in reality are the positive exceptions in Europe—or France and even Italy, where the so-called crisis of the seventeenth century increasingly appears to have been a soft landing after a long period of growth (Federico and Malanima 2004). But, above all, this panorama resembles processes that were occurring across Europe: a greater dynamism of urban networks tied to international commerce and predominantly situated in the coastal zones, and upon which regional

models of industrialisation tied to domestic and international models from 1750 would be the norm (De Vries 2008). For this reason, Spain, and the Iberian peninsula in general, is a variant on a series of European cases. This variant was largely derived from the fact of empire. But neither Spain nor Portugal were absolutely exceptional and abnormal cases.

Note

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CHAPTER TEN

Cultures and communication across the Iberian world (fifteenth–seventeenth centuries)¹



Fernando Bouza

Introduction

This chapter seeks to establish a link between culture and the different forms of communication—oral, visual, written—used as instruments in the construction of the Iberian empires, as well as to examine the cultural practices that served to distinguish their communities and spaces, without overlooking the scale of individual lives. At the same time, it seems useful to analyse the numerous available examples that enable us to question whether there was a cultural continuum in the Iberian world of that time, despite the fact that there were countless internal jurisdictional and cultural borders between the two

monarchies (different languages, printing laws, etc.). Without denying that the Iberian monarchies were also composite in cultural terms, there are phenomena such as the appearance of new markets and audiences centred around cultural practices and patterns of consumption that make it possible to recognise the existence of an Iberian common culture.

To state that, in the Iberian world, there were some extraordinary instances of cultural splendour throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is a commonplace that has gained almost unanimous acceptance among readers and spectators worldwide. It was, after all, the time of Gil Vicente, Camões, Teresa de Jesús, Cervantes, Góngora, Ruiz de Alarcón, F. M. Melo, Calderón, Juana Inés de la Cruz, Vieira, and Bluteau, not to mention the long list of painters, musicians, and architects that we almost automatically tend to associate with the so-called Golden Age of the Iberian peninsula.

On many occasions, however, the insistence on such literary and artistic splendours (including musical ones) is historiographically bound up with the idea that these cultural glories, especially those from the seventeenth century, were exceptional in nature when compared with the decadent situation that accompanied them in political and economic terms. For example, the Swiss author Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897) confessed his admiration for Murillo, whose self-portrait he saw in Paris in 1843. Part of the praise expressed by this influential historian of the Renaissance was that Murillo's brushwork had lifted him higher and higher "while around him his magnificent fatherland and its noble people sank lower and lower" (Schiff 2004, 111).

Other scholars have claimed that these Iberian cultural achievements were contaminated by Catholic propaganda and confessionalism, that they were the product of an undesirable alliance between the altar and the throne. This is an ancient and longstanding prejudice and not one fabricated only by non-Iberian authors. When the Portuguese Almeida Garrett (1799–1854) found himself standing before the huge bulk of the Jesuit college of Santarém, he claimed that one could see in that building "the Catholic reaction of building temples so that people could believe and pray, but not because people believed and prayed". In his view, until then "the monastery and the cathedral ... [had been] the expression of the people's idea, now they are the formula of government thinking" (Garrett 1846, II, 15).

Yet, to start with, and before we enter into this history of splendour and prejudice, we must first understand what was meant at that time

by culture and communication, as well as what it meant if something or someone was classified as Iberian.

Culture, communication, Iberian

The word “culture” was a term in frequent use, but, generally speaking, not with the conceptual profile that we normally attribute to it nowadays. Its extended meaning referred to the labour of breaking up the ground and cultivating sterile fields that had been left abandoned and had returned to their natural state. In this way, the conversion of the faithful could be imagined as the fruit of a spiritual culture, expressly described as “evangelical” in the book *Imperio de la China* by Álvaro Semedo (1642). So, it could be said that the schoolmasters of seventeenth-century Portugal worked on behalf of the “culture and education of the subjects that attended their schools” (Mimoso 1620, dedication). Finally, in the opinion of the Jesuit Baltasar Gracián (1601–1658), each person should take steps to cultivate themselves because “Man is born a barbarian, and only raises himself above the beast by culture. Culture therefore makes the man” (Gracián 1892 [1647] 31).

In principle, any human exercise that rendered productive something that previously was not so could be described as a form of culture. All that was needed was that it brought with it a transformation of what was natural through the use of human ingenuity and invention – in other words, generally by means of art and, in particular, through the so-called industries. This latter concept—industry—had nothing to do with economic production but was related to the capacity to design strategies beforehand in order to achieve certain objectives. Since, at that time, it was linked to the political virtue of prudence, the notion of industry had an evident utilitarian and intentional quality (Rossi 1639, 238–239).

The industries could be considered as specific knowledge that was connected to a certain field. They were normally presented as forms of advice or warnings transmitted orally from masters to disciples and from parents to children or through handwritten collections of manuscripts, although in some cases they also ended up being printed. This meant that the industries could be learned and that it was necessary to choose between several of them, paying special attention to the needs or conditions of those for whom they were destined and whom one wished to persuade. For example, the novices of the Society

of Jesus copied collections of industries by hand as a part of their apprenticeship on joining the order, so as to get to know them better and to be able to practise them in the future, as demonstrated by the scholars of the missions (Palomo 2013).

Considering the enormous size of their many domains and the plurality of traditions existing at their very heart, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese and the Spanish were faced with very different scenarios. Whenever it proved necessary, or was in their interest and benefit, they gave abundant demonstrations of their ability to adapt to the local cultural conditions. This strategy may be described as one of accommodation or adaptation (Gentilcore 1994). For example, in 1627, the Dominican Melchor del Manzano defended the idea that, in order to facilitate the conversion of the Chinese emigrants in Manila, the newly converted should not be obliged to have a haircut, because “making them cut their hair” represented an affront to their honour, being “a thing regarded as ignominious by their nation, and which is an obstacle to their conversion” (Klöter 2011, 7). Forty years earlier, Felipe II had ordered Domingo de Salazar, Bishop of the Philippines, not to cut their hair on the occasion of their baptism because this made their conversion more difficult and did, in fact, constitute a serious impediment for them, for if they returned to China they would be dishonoured because of their appearance (Crossley 2016, 124). Of course, recognising their capacity to adapt—which, after all, was a form of negotiation—does not, in any way, mean that we can overlook the fact that such empires were built upon imposition, uniformity, fear and violence.

Culture could also take on a negative slant if the exercise to which human talent and its industries were dedicated was considered inappropriate, not to say hateful and, therefore, eradicable. In this way, the word culture could also be linked to the diabolical and the magical, or to idolatry, as when Manuel de Faria e Sousa (1590–1649) claimed that the Portuguese had been the most committed to the “mistaken culture of idols”, of course prior to his conversion to Christianity (Sousa 1680, 148). Less dramatically, culture also had a negative sense if an author endeavoured to use incomprehensible words only for the sake of basking in his own glory. For this reason, Jacinto Freire de Andrada stated that he rejected that “clamour of new voices, which they call Culture” (Andrada 1651, dedication). A quarter of a century earlier, in 1626, Lope de Vega made fun in a letter of those who, boasting of their “culture”, had become speakers of a barbaric language just because they sought to distinguish

themselves from the others (Vega 1943, 88).

It should be stressed that “culture” could therefore be associated with distinction, with the social processes of hierarchical identification and the mutual and collective recognition of social groups. That is to say that, at that time, it was already understood that there was not just one culture, but various cultures, since different individuals and communities could engage in practices and customs that made them recognisable both among themselves and in the eyes of the others.

In 1639, Melo stated that the titled nobles of the Iberian peninsula devoted themselves to what he expressly described as the “culture of the person”. This led them to concern themselves first and foremost (i.e., intentionally) with carriages, servants and livery, but not so much with the world of letters, not even with their own writing, which was fairly crude and careless (Melo 1981, no. 35). For his own part, in the prologue to the Lisbon edition of the *Obras* of Garcilaso, published in 1626, Luis Briceño de Córdoba defended the idea that the “Spanish talents” had dedicated themselves “to culture” in the time of Felipe II with such enthusiasm that they no longer “owe anything to their neighbours” (Laso de la Vega 1626, prologue). Briceño’s idea of the existence of a literary “culture” peculiar to the Spanish talents was echoed in 1688 when Miguel de Guevara spoke of a “culture of the Spanish”, although not in reference to all of the Spanish, but only to the country’s writers who had developed a style that was recognisable because it was pleasant and varied at the same time (Bouza 2005).

Communication was also a word that was in widespread use. Its primary meaning was well explained by Joan Antoni Bacó when he pointed out that “it means the action whereby the thing is made common, by its being communicated to others” (Bacó 1661, 264). The curious thing is that this definition is given by the Majorcan Augustinian when talking about the subject of ecclesiastical excommunication, which was in fact an “excommunication”, or, in other words, a ban on any form of dealings with others that was imposed on the person affected by this sort of sentence.

In principle, communicating and communication referred to relations that did not necessarily have anything to do with the spread of knowledge, but just with situations in which some form of close contact was maintained, some access, some personal relationship and cohabitation—precisely what was prohibited under the terms of religious excommunication. *El Vocabulario manual de las lenguas mexicana y castellana* by Pedro de Arenas was a useful tool for those who did not have an interpreter and who, when travelling or trading,

would have had to formulate the “most common and ordinary questions and answers that are normally proffered in the trade and communication between Spaniards and Indians” (Arenas 1611). In his *Varias noticias*, Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa suggested that ladies better conserved the “purity of talking” by “communicating less than men do with foreigners”, given that ladies did not travel so frequently as men (Suárez de Figueroa 1621, 129r). In turn, political literature was to insist that the prince should be “communicable”. In other words, by the very nature of his office, he was obliged to allow that, within the limits of his majesty, his subjects were able to see him, as well as to receive them in an audience in order to listen to their opinions (Camos 1592, 58).

Ultimately, it was from here that the meaning of communication derived as the act of sharing with others what was hidden or was exclusive to just one person, communicating and sharing secrets, feelings, news, or ideas. Also, the possibility of developing industries to replace the direct experience of contact through means that artificially made it possible to reproduce from a distance, or to represent, the natural sight and voice, such as portraits or papers, especially letters. In this way, communication could indeed have the meaning of disseminating something in a broad and fully conscious way, as when the Portuguese Dominican António Feo, suspecting that his preaching had reached only a few people in the churches, said that it had been decided to publish his sermons converted into chapters of a printed treatise “in order to communicate what I have preached to those who might better make use of my studies” (Feo 1613, dedication).

Contrary to what one might think, it is not easy to document the use of the term “Iberian” at that time. As is known, the territories of the Iberian peninsula were customarily recognised together under the name of Spain, a geographical and historical evocation of the ancient Roman province of Hispania. In 1631, Paul Sherlock (1595–1646) and the French bookseller Gabriel Boissat signed a contract in Madrid for the publication of a new work that the Irish Jesuit, resident in Salamanca, had written about the *Song of Songs*. The book was intended to be published in Lyon (France), but the Society of Jesus reserved for itself the exclusive right to its sale for a whole year in the Indies and Spain, “understanding Spain to mean Aragon, Portugal, Andalusia and both Castiles” (Agulló 1992, II, 74–75). Although the events of 1640 presupposed a point of no return for the break in this geographical or peninsular conception of Hispania/Spain, an

undoubted defender of Portuguese independence such as Manuel Homem nonetheless demanded that Felipe IV should cease to be called the King of Spain, “but just of Castile”, because he was already no longer the king either of Portugal or Roussillon and Catalonia (Homem 1642, 96).

The use of the lexical family related with Iberia and its inhabitants appeared in erudite contexts in which there was a clear demonstration of an undoubted dependence on classical culture. Furthermore, there was some confusion between two territories that could claim that they were the Iberia mentioned by the ancient geographers and the first Christian exegetes. One was the Caucasian Iberia, identified with the present-day republic of Georgia, and the other was the Mediterranean Iberia, which, little by little, ended up becoming equivalent to the peninsula also known as Hesperia or Hispania (Cruz, Le Roux, and Moret 2006).

This confusion not only affected the western, but also the eastern, Iberians, the ones that Luís Marinho de Azevedo had described as “Asian Iberians” (Azevedo 1652, 40). In 1588, one of them, Simon of Kartli (1537–1611), sent an embassy to Rome in order to achieve some form of alliance with Felipe II and Pope Sixtus V against the Ottomans, in whose rear his country was situated. The Georgian prince had thought that they both resided in Rome, where “they governed together ..., the one concerned with the temporal matters and the other with the spiritual matters” of the world (Gil and Tabagua 1993, 213). To some extent, this mistake was excusable because, if Rome was considered the centre and capital of the world, it would not be surprising to believe that Felipe II also lived there, since he was the most powerful among the Christian princes of his time.

The worldwide dimension of Felipe II’s dominions had been constantly stressed ever since he ascended his father’s throne (Parker 2001). The resolution of the Portuguese succession in his favour in 1578–1580 similarly made it easier for him to be attributed with an almost universal power. It can be seen why the French Calvinist Théodore Agrippa d’Aubigne (1552–1630) portrayed him as the victorious “grand Ibérien” as a result of the defeat of Sebastião I at the Battle of Alcácer Quibir in 1578, which had paved the way for him to take possession of Portugal and had restored his power to interfere even more in the politics of foreign kingdoms (D’Aubigné 1867 [1615], 253). The confessional propaganda of the Huguenots who had settled in Geneva, particularly the erudite circle of Theodore Beza, helped to establish the use of the word *Iberian* to refer to the power

(described as “odious”) resulting from the union of the peninsular crowns from 1580 onwards. As part of the celebrations of the defeat of the Armada in 1588, the collection of poems entitled *Iberica* was published in Geneva, in which express mention was made of the Iberian kingdoms—*Iberici Regni*—and of a sovereign who ruled over the Iberian people—*Rector Gentis Ibericae*. In other words, Felipe II.

The use of the term *Iberian* to refer to the union of the two peninsular crowns had its origin in erudite Calvinist circles, above all those from Geneva, who began to use it to discredit Felipe II (Bouza 2017). On the Catholic side, the use of the word was less frequent, although it is, of course, well documented. For example, Claude Clément (1594–1642) drew attention to the proposal that America could have been given the name of “Iberica” in his *Tablas cronológicas* (Clément 1642, Década II), a proposal that in reality never truly took shape.

Image 10.1 Allegorical portrait of Philip II as universal monarch as a result of becoming king of Portugal, Lorenzo de San Pedro, *Diálogo llamado Philipino*, drawing on paper, ca. 1578

Source: Universidad de Salamanca, Spain, Biblioteca, Ms. 2692, folios 522–523

Universal providential government, local horizons of violence and appearances

Among the names that the Jesuit Clément gathered together as possible ways of calling America were also “Orbe Carolino, or Orbe de Carlos”, “Atlantica”, “Colonea”, “Columbina”, or “Isabelica”, in honour of Queen Isabella the Catholic, whose memory was bound up with that of her husband Fernando in a surprising “Fer-Isabelica” (Clément 1642, Década II). The promoter of this last name for the West Indies had been Fernando Pizarro in his *Varones ilustres del Nuevo Mundo* dedicated to Felipe IV, a book in which it is stated that the first sign of greatness of the empire of the Catholic king was that in it the sacrifice of the mass was being celebrated at all times (Pizarro 1639, 1r).

Professing the Roman Catholic religion was undoubtedly a defining feature of the Iberian world at that time, although not all the inhabitants of the territories under the direct rule of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs necessarily had to be Christians. It is sufficient to remember that there was a Jewish quarter in the North African city of Oran under Spanish rule until its residents were expelled in 1669

(Schaub 1999), although such exceptions were not tolerated in the peninsula. On the other hand, the relations with the Papacy were frequently far from fluid. As can be read in some *Apuntamientos* sent to Felipe IV in 1643, “it is clear that Rome is the leech of these kingdoms because it sucks away their life blood” (AHN Consejos 7175, 8).

However, the supposition that there was a special relationship between God and the Iberian monarchies was widespread. The Franciscan Cristóvão de Lisboa stated, in 1641, that Portugal was a “Republic chosen by God” (f. 2v.). Some years later, another ecclesiastical figure, on this occasion a Valencian, went so far as to state that “Our Lord God has become completely Spanish, for he helps us by giving us new victories”, in this case on the anti-French front of Roussillon (AHNo Osuna, 18–103/2, Valencia 23/10/1652).

Trusting in the existence of a divine providence that occupied itself daily with its creatures—people, communities, and initiatives—was in keeping with the Christian religiosity of that time. When the Dutch took possession of Salvador de Bahía, a military response was organised by the whole of the monarchy to expel them from Brazil (Schwartz 1991), but, at the same time, Felipe IV ordered a campaign of general prayer. Fulfilling its mandate, in September 1624, the Council of Aragon busied itself with ordering the priests to make sure that all the vassals “in all the cities and main places” of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia prayed together to guarantee their protection from Heaven in the restoration of Brazil (ACA Consejo de Aragón, 74, 1).

Of course, when Bahía was recovered in 1625, the divine intervention requested by the monarch was generally ensured (Tamayo de Vargas 1628, 50–51). Nonetheless, the kings, no matter how Catholic they claimed to be, did not always enjoy the protection of Heaven and also suffered disappointments and setbacks, so that the providentialist worldview that prevailed in Iberian society could reveal itself to be a critical weapon against the governors. For example, the sudden death in August 1498 of Isabel of Aragon, the Queen of Portugal through her marriage to Manuel I and the daughter of Isabella and Fernando, could be interpreted as proof of the divine disagreement with the policy of the princes in ecclesiastical affairs. Particularly if we consider the fact that the Catholic monarchs had also just lost the heir Prince Don Juan of Aragon—as early as 1497. At least this is what was stated by the Galician clergyman Juan de Eiroa when he evoked the “whips” with which the sovereigns were being punished in a sermon that he preached at the cathedral of Santiago de

Compostela at the beginning of September in that same year, calling upon the chapter and the population to defend the traditional freedoms of the monastic orders. The clergyman was tried and sentenced for having called for such uprisings (AHN, Diversos, Concejos y Ciudades 278, 1).

Divine Providence manifested itself not only in the rewards or punishments that were sent by God, in the form of defeats or victories and private or public calamities or joys, but also through Nature. It was converted, in this way, into a kind of second revelation, together with that of the Holy Scriptures: God spoke to his creatures through the Book of Nature with the help of natural prodigies (Río Parra 2003), ranging, for example, from the comet of 1577, which was considered to be a sign of the misfortune that would lead to the disappearance of King Sebastião in Africa, to the monstrous delivery of a male child born in Lisbon in 1628, supposedly clad in a coat of armour.

This providentialism involved in the consideration of what is natural could, on occasions, be considered an insurmountable barrier for human art and its industries. In 1650, when the Council of Castile took charge of some hydraulic devices proposed by Jean Copin, from Avignon, it was argued that the “fertilities and sterilities of the fields and the years” were the result of Divine Providence, so that “attempting, with human capacity, to introduce new means for that purpose means describing the highest Providence as deficient” (AHN Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Obra Pía, 103–107). However, it was much more frequent to find praise being given to human ingenuity in the transformation of Nature or in imitating it through industries, as in the case of the Galician priest Diego Martínez de Presa, who built various automata that he made known through this book *Fuerza del ingenio humano* (Madrid 1662) and among those that were to be found there were automata of the king himself, Felipe IV, the sacrifice of Abraham and even a Eucharistic representation.

If God had made himself Spanish, then Portugal was a political community chosen by Him, so that it is not surprising that there were many who believed that the Iberian empires were universal through the will of God. In any case, the worldwide dimension achieved by the Iberian monarchies throughout the Modern Age was clearly unquestionable, both because of the enlarged territorial dimensions of their empires and because of the circulation (voluntary or otherwise) of people, objects, ideas, and knowledge, or also because of the possibilities of their connecting between themselves spaces and

societies which, until then, had had no communications between one another. The adoption of a cultural perspective may help us to understand that Iberian world better, which was simultaneously a setting for lives firmly based on a local space and for others that were much more universal.

Undoubtedly, many of the inhabitants of the Iberian world of that time had life experiences which were presided over by local ties that were strongly linked to the particular territory, on occasions above any political and, indeed, confessional purpose. In 1624, as part of criminal proceedings about the distribution of water in the labour camps of Belchite and Letux (Aragon), a witness declared that a relative of his living in the same district had been a captive in Algiers for four years and that there “he had seen and spoken” to one of the Moriscos expelled in 1610 “and that he had been at his house and that he had given him something to eat in it and had offered him friendship because they had met and got to know each other here [in Letux]” (AHN Diversos Recuperación, 303/9 provisional). This does not mean, of course, that the small communities were not without their conflicts, as is proved by this interesting testimony about the continued existence of a local tie that stretched beyond the confessional and political borders, which we find in a lawsuit that had been brought because the inhabitants of Belchite had attempted to “destroy” Letux.

The Iberian cultures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were dominated by conflict—visible not only in the force or prejudice shown towards those who seemed different to them, but also in the continuous internal clashes. Small disagreements between neighbours lay at the base of a pyramid of conflicts ranging from the infamous couplet to the lampoon directed against the governors and rebellions. Even the world of creativity and literature seems to have been dominated by animosities and the ideal of jealousy (Portús 2008). Satires, taunts, invectives, insults, derisive couplets, and an endless string of scornful writing were the relatively poisonous (and witty) products of this widespread spirit of conflict that pervaded the literary rivalries of the Golden Age.

Although it is usually presented as a culture of honour, it was basically one of infamy and dishonour, in which verbal insults and physical injuries were constant (Taylor 2014), with not even the priests themselves escaping them. For example, in 1609, when, the funeral of João Roiz, from Calheta, was being celebrated in Ponta Delgada (São Miguel, Azores), his body was accompanied by

clergymen from the local churches of São Pedro and São Sebastião, which caused a public outrage between one side and the other and ended in nothing less than the cross being broken (ANTT Tribunal do Santo Ofício, Inquisição de Lisboa, Processo 18077). No Iberian territory seems to have been immune to confrontations of this type, in which, on many occasions, the violence was caused by the problems of occupying some hierarchically important spaces that concealed fights between powers, institutions, corporations, religious orders or particular lineages.

Lawsuits were very frequently brought for defamation, so that the already high levels of the litigation that were brought before the courts (Kagan 1981) were reinforced with multiple cases of the so-called “famous libels”, which attacked the reputation of others verbally, in writing or with figures and objects. The moralists, in their turn, insisted on the need to see the good reputation restored of those people subjected to libel, obliging the perpetrators to confess their sins against the eighth of the Catholic ten commandments.

Furthermore, in public, there was a ceremony that consisted of restoring the honour that had been lost as a result of an unfair judgement, and against which, for example, an appeal had been launched with a positive outcome. Very little is known about these types of reparatory practices, but it seems that they consisted of ceremonies that were similar to the public mockery that formed part of the justice meted out at that time. For example, in Ourense (Galicia), in 1611, one of these ceremonies was undertaken to restore the honour of a woman called María Ruiz, who had been unfairly sentenced by the city magistrate and had appealed to the judges of the *Real Audiencia*. Once her innocence had been acknowledged, María “rode on horseback with a garland of flowers and a palm in her hand”, while the town criers proclaimed her innocence throughout the streets of her journey (AHPOu Libro 56, f.12r. Libro de cuentas de Tomás López).

The woman had had a *coroza* (caipirote)¹ placed on her head in view of the public shame that was heaped upon her when the sentence of the city’s magistrate was being executed, and, consequently, when her innocence was recognised, her honour was restored through a visual ceremony in which she was now crowned with a garland of flowers. This case enables us to recall the importance of external appearances in Iberian culture at the height of the modern age, a time when, as we have seen, the sentences of the law courts were accompanied by a visual counterpart that could, of course, be

interpreted quite easily by all concerned.

The cultural mechanism on which, among others, there rested practices such as the wearing of shameful *sanbenitos*² or *corozas* was related, on the one hand, with the importance given to the visual aspect as a form of communication and, on the other hand, with the desire to create an infamous memory that would be perpetuated over time, revealing the condition of a person's lineage and, also, of their profession. In concrete terms, Julio Caro Baroja (1914–1995) turned his attention to the ban that was placed on those condemned by the Inquisition and which forbade them from wearing silk and gold jewellery, informing us of the revealing entreaties for what he described as “sumptuary rehabilitation” (Caro Baroja 2000, I, 349). For example, in 1560, Jerónima de Vargas petitioned the Inquisition, asking to be allowed to wear silk and gold. Although her parents had been victims of the Holy Office of Castile when she was still a child, she had ended up marrying a nobleman, which required her to dress and adorn herself in a sumptuous fashion. Her husband, she claimed, would abandon her if he knew what her origin was, which would become obvious to him and to everyone else if Jerónima were not able to dress in a manner befitting her husband's status.

Lives, objects, and cultural practices in an enlarged world

Regarding the rich, but limited experiences of local lives, it was possible to note the impact of an ever-wider world within the context of the Iberian empires (Gruzinski 2004). Undoubtedly, the impact of this ever-greater dimension must have been very strong. For example, we may compare the scale of life in the small Galician village of Arante with the fresco painted on the wall of its church of Nosa Señora das Virtudes da Ponte, which depicts the devastating effects of a Caribbean storm that, in 1595, caused the shipwreck of the vessel on which Domingos de Aguiar Carranza was travelling to the Indies. The paintings, which were made in 1606, must have been like a window that opened the eyes of the rural population of Arante not only to the devotion of their local compatriot Aguiar, but also to the very existence of a distant world, albeit one that was no longer foreign.

The clear awareness of a world that was increasingly expanding can be found in the letter that Diego de Torquemada, Bishop of Tuy, addressed to the Andalusian antiquarian Juan Fernández Franco in

1573, about the lands of the Northern Hemisphere, from Muscovy to the Labrador peninsula. The bishop marvelled at how much larger the world that the Europe of his time had come to know was when compared with that known to the Greeks and Romans. He also noted that the main impulse for this enlargement had been nothing more than greed. Furthermore, he made a curious declaration to his correspondent when talking about the sensation that he had had on looking at Spain on one of the terrestrial globes that Gerardus Mercator had made in Duisburg. He had been fascinated by seeing on that object “the world so distinct and specified and a Spain in such a small space, so distinct and well-positioned as it is” (ANTT, Casa Fronteira e Alorna, livro 18, 75r.-v. Bujalance, 15/07/1573).

It should be noted that it was the object, in its concrete materiality, that enabled him to recognise that he belonged to a particular community, in this case the Spain of the Iberian peninsula. There has not yet been sufficient study about the importance that cultural objects—such as this globe, but also the *mappa mundi*, printed or handwritten reports, engravings, codices or books about costumes, furniture, alphabets, musical scores, and so on—could have had on both the individual and collective self-perceptions of that time. Undoubtedly, these objects helped to shape people’s ideas about themselves and their community. For example, in 1619, when Manuel de Faria e Sousa entered Castile from his native Portugal, he marvelled at the headdresses of the women of Vitigudino (present-day Salamanca), stating that “I thought I was in China or Persia, or, at the very least, in Constantinople”, territories that he had got to know through “some books about the costumes of the world” (Sousa 1975, 160). That is to say through a treatise such as *Degli habiti antichi et moderni di diverse parti del mondo* by Cesare Vecellio, which was first published in 1590.

The enlargement of the world space could also be seen in the treatment of political conflicts and the increasingly complex and geographically extended wars. In 1583, after the return of Felipe II from Portugal, the royal secretary Juan de Idiáquez (1540–1614) expressed his satisfaction to the councillor Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle because in matters relating to the galleys it was a “question of distinguishing the Mediterranean and Ocean [Atlantic] seas, just as Nature did”, since “covering it all was not possible with the service of our master [Felipe II]” (BMB Ms. Granvelle, 102, 274r.). Yet, later, the collective political imagination also began to acquire a world dimension, with the references and comparisons that could be

introduced into the discourse of decision-making becoming almost universal. For example, in 1678, the Royal Council of Castile showed itself to be opposed to receiving Spartan emigrants to plug the demographic gap left by the expelled Moors, not hesitating to resort to a supposed reason of State of the Chinese, according to which they would never “agree to foreigners in their fifteen provinces” (AHN Consejos 51441, Madrid, 2/01/1678). A quarter of a century earlier, in 1650, Juan de Carvajal had written to the councillor Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado about the problems generated by the monetary policy and the minting of silver from Potosí, stating that, the Emperor of Japan (AHN Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Obra Pía 103/7), would, however, have more problems with his currency, as he had just read in the *Descriptio Regni Japoniae* by the German Bernhard Varen (1622–1650), which had been published a year earlier in Amsterdam by the Elzevier family.

There are numerous examples of how the realities of that ever-larger world were reflected in cultural manifestations. In 1601, Barcelona organised a great celebration of jubilation upon the canonisation of the Catalan Saint Ramon de Penyafort (1180–1270). For several days, the city’s streets and plazas witnessed eye-catching processions, among which could be found distinguished members of the local elites dressed as ambassadors of Persia and Muscovy, but also of the kings of Mexico and Japan, accompanied by their respective retinues (Rebullosa 1601).

Undoubtedly, Barcelona was a good place for Japan, Mexico, Muscovy, and Persia to meet with one another in the early seventeenth century, but perhaps what is more interesting is that the four parts of the world could also conduct relations with one another without the need to pass through Europe. One such example was the contract signed by the crown in 1558 to allow for the plantation in New Spain of different Asian spices, such as cloves, ginger, cinnamon, or sandalwood (Ruiz Medrano 1991, 184), although perhaps the most extraordinary proposal was the one that Giovanni Battista Gesio made from Lisbon to Felipe II in around 1578 to transplant to the Viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain the Asian plants that produced spices and drugs (AGI Patronato 48, 3). The Italian cosmographer proposed to the king that his fame would be immortal if he succeeded in bringing the plants scattered around the different parts of the world all together in America, a land where they would be preserved because the region was less prone to revolutions and enemy invasions. This possibility of intervening on Nature was made reality with the

circulation of animals and plants between different parts of the world that took place at that time.

It is well known that the Spanish took horses to the Indies, but perhaps what is even more surprising is that, when duly acclimatised to the American region, some specimens were brought back to Europe, having been transformed into a zoological rarity. For example, in 1584, the German ambassador in Madrid, Hans Khevenhüller, sent six horses to the Emperor Rudolph II, “five of them Spanish and one from Mexico” (ACA Real Cancillería, Registros 4309, Felipe I el Prudente, Diversorum 14, 166r. El Pardo, 8/12/1584), undoubtedly destined for the new stables at Prague Castle. Years later, in 1632, an order issued by Felipe IV was sent to different American authorities instructing that fierce animals of “each kind” should be sent to the peninsula so that they could be exhibited at court (AHN Consejos 25664–8, Real cédula enviada a Juan Camarena, gobernador de la isla Margarita, Madrid, 2/06/1632). Originating from Peru, three “tigers” embarked by the viceroy, the Count of Chinchón, arrived in Madrid as an adornment for the Buen Retiro Gardens (Soler 1947). In the same way, Juan Eusebio Nieremberg (Marcaida 2014) incorporated examples of American animals into his Natural History lessons for courtiers, which he gave at the Imperial College of Madrid in 1629, causing the *ocotochtli* (ocelot), a wild cat from New Spain, to become the model of generosity for the young people of the court (Nieremberg 1629). Undoubtedly, Portugal and Spain became enormously important intermediary hubs for the spread into Europe of news and examples of exotic animals (Pérez de Tudela and Jordan Gschwend 2007).

The changes in the diet and food consumption at that time are another well-known subject (Pérez Samper 1996; Amelang 2013; Norton 2008). The American impact on everyday life can be seen just by reviewing the list of ingredients with which the merchant Jácome Diamante prepared chocolate in Madrid in around 1640, with vanilla, annatto, Jamaican pepper, cocoa and white sugar (AHN, Inquisición, libro 1400, 75r.), although this latter ingredient had first been taken to the Indies by the Europeans. At a municipal level, it may be recalled that, during the years when Gil Eanes da Costa (1543–1611) presided over the Lisbon Municipal Council, between 1595 and 1602, the possibility was considered of relieving the periodical bread shortages suffered by the Portuguese capital with loaves from the Baltic and the Mediterranean regions, but also with others made from cassava root flour (LC Ms. P-484, Escorial, 20/07/1597), this being the bread that the Brazilians called “pão de São Tomé” (St. Thomas’

bread) as they believed that it had been taken to the Indies by the apostle (Gomes 2014).

In 1636, echoing this globalisation of people's diets, Antonio de León Pinelo bore testimony to the consumption in the Iberian peninsula of American products such as chocolate, potatoes, and *yerba mate*, highlighting the fact that this latter foodstuff, although it was harvested in Paraguay, had also begun to be consumed in Peru (León Pinelo 1636, 64v). One year later, Salvador Correia de Sá noted that he had taken to drinking *mate* during his journey from Río de Janeiro to Tucumán and Potosí, where he had seen that the Paraguayan herb was drunk by both men and women alike, by Indians as well as Spaniards (AHN Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Obra Pía, 43). He himself had brought *yerba* to Madrid and continued to take it at court, just as, Pinelo noted, the Mexicans who resided there did with chocolate, which they prepared in a different way from the other inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula (León Pinelo 1636, 63).

With complete confessional coherence, the Iberian world was also an area where not only martyrs and saints from all the continents were to be found, but also where alms circulated, particularly those that were given to the holy places of Jerusalem, together with a large number of holy images. In the ten volumes of his great *Santuario Mariano* (Marian Shrine) project, Agostinho de Santa Maria (1642–1728) sought to gather together all the images of the Virgin Mary that the Portuguese worshipped in Europe, Africa, Asia, and America. Many of these had been produced at European workshops and studios, particularly those in Lisbon, but it was also possible to find examples of images that had been manufactured, or also discovered, in imperial territories and that had ended up arriving in continental Portugal (Agostinho de Santa Maria 1707–1723).

The same can be said of the Spanish case, where the cult of Nuestra Señora de Copacabana (Our Lady of Copacabana) rapidly spread through engravings or paintings, but also through copies of the wood carvings that the Aymara artist Francisco Tito Yupanqui had made in the 1580s (Stainfield-Mazzi 2013, 72–76). Yet the original images could also be brought to Europe. For example, Luis Fernández de Córdoba received an image of Nuestra Señora del Rescate (Our Lady of the Rescue), destined for a convent in the Andalusian town of Guadalcázar, bequeathed by Mariana Riederer de Paar in her will made in Mexico (Herrera 2011). The image was one of special devotion for this lady, the wife of Diego Fernández de Córdoba, the Viceroy of New Spain from 1612 to 1621, because it had originated

from the port of Acapulco attacked by the pirates of the Dutchman Joris van Spielbergen, who had entered the Pacific after crossing the Strait of Magellan.

By the start of the seventeenth century, the trade in oriental products used for the decoration of the oratories and altars of the Iberian peninsula had undergone an extraordinary development, with it being evident that part of these Indian, Japanese, Chinese, or Philippine manufactures had been made to satisfy European demand (Karl 2016; Krahe 2016), an enormous market that could be reached via both the Portuguese and the American-Philippine trade routes. To give just one example, one of the first things that the new Viceroy of India, Miguel de Noronha, did upon arriving in Goa in 1630 was to satisfy the commission that his aunt, Joana de Noronha, had placed with him for some carpets destined for the steps of the chancel that she had donated to the convent of São Bento de Xabregas, in Lisbon. He sent these carpets to her there after having ordered them in Cambay, in other words, in Gujarat, counting with the exact measurements that his aunt had given him (IEB-USP Arquivo, 13/8, Goa, 31/01/1630).

Many of these objects were intended for collection purposes, being included in cabinets of curiosities, spaces that were related with the creation of the first museums and where a place was found both for natural specimens and for human artefacts originating from all over the world. The great collectors were also capable of distinguishing the provenance of the objects by the way in which they were made, in other words by their material style. For example, the Jesuit Luís Fróis tells us that the young Japanese ambassadors of the 1580s offered Felipe II some Japanese manufactures as a gift and that he “took each thing in his hands ... remarking on how different this work from that of the Chinese” (Fróis 1942, 88).

In turn, the American manufactures spread beyond the realm of ornamental curiosities, with their indigenous featherwork objects creating a most distinctive aura, and fully entered into the world of the devotional cult with the production of New Spanish Christs made with paper and corn stalks (García-Abásolo 2001). These “light images”, which travelled from Mexico to Andalusia, the Canaries, and countless other Spanish churches where they are still worshipped today, were made, in part, according to traditional indigenous procedures, and they may contain inside them the remains of ancient Mayan manuscripts (Amador Marrero 2012).

The fame of the wonders that were operated by the images

scattered around the then four continents of the world did not just simply reach the Iberian peninsula, but it also turned them into major items of news. For example, in 1636, Goa found itself in awe at the supposed miracle of a crucifix in the choir of the Augustinian nuns of Santa Mónica that opened its eyes and moved. The movements of this image were undoubtedly providential because the community was going through a particularly critical moment with the local authorities, which was overcome as a result of this miracle. News of this event soon reached the peninsula and, in 1640, a *Relaçom verdadeira* (True Report) was published in Lisbon, while a *Milagroso portento* (Miraculous Wonder) was published in Madrid.

In this case, what was involved was the production of two printed leaflets, but the circulation of news was very frequently effected in the form of handwritten copies, as is clearly shown by the dissemination of the news of the martyrdom that occurred in Nagasaki in 1637 of the Neapolitan Jesuit Francesco Marcello Mastrilli (Willis 2013). This event could not only be followed in the Iberian world through the reports or lives (Palomo 2015, 26) that were published in Lisbon, Madrid, Zaragoza, or Lima, but also through manuscript copies produced in Castilian and Portuguese (RAH 9/3657(28–31); BNL Arquivo Tarouca L. 106). Of course, together with the news, there also circulated the bodies and other relics of martyrs and saints, whose pilgrimages were reported in detailed form, such as those that arrived in Lisbon and Coimbra in 1588 and 1595 (Carvalho 2001), or those that arrived in Mexico in 1578 (Aracil 2008).

Incidentally, the Augustinian priests caused the relics of three Japanese Christians martyred in 1628 to be brought to their convent in Madrid. The chronicler Luis de Jesús paid homage to them in his *Historia general* of the Order published in 1681 (111–112). Very shortly afterwards, in 1692, a certain Francisco Javier, who presented himself as a native of Japan newly converted to Christianity, and who was, at that time, in Spain on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, had to ask for the protection of King Carlos II since they wished to arrest him as a slave because of the colour of his skin (AHN Consejos 7205). In this case, the enlarged Iberian world seemed to be more inclined to welcome the bodies of saints than the bodies of living beings.

Undoubtedly, the incorporation of Portugal into the Spanish monarchy in 1580 greatly facilitated the continuous movement of people on a world scale. However, soldiers, courtiers, and clergymen had already begun to move with extraordinary facility (taking with them languages, objects, and ways of life) through the different

territories of both monarchies, even before this date. This is clearly shown by the peregrinations of Juan Calvo de Padilla, who journeyed from his native Castile to Santo Domingo and Chiapas, with Bartolomé de las Casas, thereafter travelling to Lisbon, Rome, Cape Verde, and Catalonia, and finally ending up in Madrid, where he awaited the opportunity to travel to Congo (Beltrán 1930; 1943). In turn, the Portuguese Francisco Domingues, from Viana, accompanied Francisco Hernández on his naturalist expedition to New Spain in the 1570s, remaining in Mexico, where, in 1594, he applied for the position of chronicler and cosmographer of the whole of New Spain, the Philippines, Peru, and “Great” China (AGI Patronato, 261, 9).

But the Union of Crowns from 1580 to 1640 was needed in order to promote such projects as the plan devised in 1631 to repopulate Brazil with families from other parts of the monarchy, believing that the increase in the territory’s population with the addition of new European inhabitants (even if these were not Portuguese) was “the most convenient thing for the defence and safety of Brazil” (ACA, Consejo de Aragón, 561, 20, Madrid, 12/12/1631). The lives of the Patagonians Juan, Felipe, and Francisco were also highly interesting: they arrived in Rio de Janeiro in 1582 from Spain, heading for their native land close to the Strait of Magellan and accompanying the new settlers of the fortresses Nombre de Jesús and Rey Don Felipe. Thanks to the Union of Iberian Crowns, the Castilian expeditionaries, led by Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, were able to stop in the Brazilian port for a few months and, in this way, some inhabitants of the southernmost strait of America arrived in Rio de Janeiro (AGI Patronato, 33/3).

At an individual level, this also seems to have been the case with Sebastián Pereira, who declared himself to be a Chinese-born native of Canton, thus coming from close to Macao, who possibly arrived in Spain through Portugal. This Cantonese man ended up in Toledo, where he served as a stable boy and where, in 1593, he made a declaration in an inquisitorial process brought against Aleixo do Couto. In turn, the latter had arrived in Toledo as a slave, but had been born in Goa from Gentile parents and had been baptised by the Jesuits, who had taught him how to read and write, leaving India for Portugal in 1578. Serving different masters, he had moved from Lisbon to Coimbra and from there to Toledo and Rome, from where he had ended up returning to the heart of Castile (AHN Inquisición 200/45; Sierra 2005, 419, which records him as having been born in “Coton”, India).

Music lay at the origin of the prosecution of Aleixo do Couto [Alessio de Coto]. One night, he had been heard singing the *baile* or dance-song of *Antón pintado*, which was considered dishonest, but the problems grew worse when he said that he preferred to sing that song rather than an *Ave Maria*. *Antón pintado* was related with the *zarabanda*, a dance that seems to have come from Mexico to Spain (Esses 1992, 736–738). In this way, we find an Indian from Goa singing an American dance-song in the Toledo of 1593, after returning from Rome to where he had gone in the company of the cardinal Juan Hurtado de Mendoza. But let us now make some remarks about music.

Image 10.2 *Vanitas* [Allegory of the senses] by the circle of Tomás Hiepes (1610–1670) or Maestro de la Colección Ruiz Giménez

Source: Museo Nacional de Artes Decorativas, Madrid. Photograph: Óscar Fernández. Alcalá Subastas, Madrid

Undoubtedly, music was considered to be one of the cultural experiences that revealed the (sometimes involuntary) links between the different parts of the Iberian world. The members of a group of instrumentalists—“very great players of the flageolet”—were “Indians from Portuguese India, born in the city of Goa”, who also found themselves obliged to demonstrate that they were not slaves in Madrid, in 1623 (AHN Consejos 4422-211, 1623). To their case, we can also add that of María Angola, undoubtedly an African lady, who danced or sang in the company of a Portuguese musician for the Counts of Añover in 1627 (AHN Diversos, Recuperación, 75-14 provisional); and that of the *mulatto* Leonor de Guzmán, the “musician”, who had come from Seville to Madrid, where, in 1610, she sought to make her own living by strumming and singing, both at her own house and at the residences of some nobles (AHN Consejos 51171). And, finally, to all of these can be added the songs and dances of *guineos*, in other words African music that ended up being turned into an evocation for scholarly authors such as Sister Juana Inés de la Cruz (Tenorio 1999; Swiadon 2004–05) or into an exercise for cultured composers such as, among many others, the carol *Antonya, Flaciquia, Gasipà* composed by the Portuguese Filipe da Madre de Deus (Stevenson 1976).

Together with this globalising dimension of an enlarged world, there was also local diversity to be found at the heart of the Iberian empires. For example, the medical knowledge of the Portuguese in Goa was built on the recognition of a previous wisdom and understanding in the use of plants and treatments that led to their description and prescription by the doctor Garcia de Orta in his

Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India [Coloquios dos simples] in 1563. Years later, when the Frenchman François Pyrard de Laval visited the Hospital del Rey in Goa in 1608, “he observed with some surprise the number of indigenous staff engaging in healing work” (Walker 2015, 222). It should be added that the only people allowed to enter the hospital as patients were soldiers and European Christian males (Bastos 2010).

On occasions, as is shown by some American cases, express mention was made of the existence of memories prior to the presence of the conquerors themselves. These could, for example, be referred to in order to justify the deep-rooted nature of certain types of practices, such as when the Capuchin friar Basilio de Zamora wished to explain the abundance of penitent flagellants in Peru and appealed to “the old custom that they previously had of bleeding in order to offer their blood to the idols”, stating that “changing their motive and purpose, they continued to enjoy doing so with their new custom” (*Cosmographía o descripción del mundo*, 1677, BCLM, Ms. 244, 511). But it is also possible that what is being highlighted here is the resistance to the disappearance of old local memories.

As is known, the arrival of the Spanish in the Indies involved the use of a new toponymy in the Castilian language, which forcibly imposed itself on the previous place names, which were partly replaced. However, the Spanish themselves realised that the local names continued to be used and that it would not take long for them to reappear. This was made very clear by Hernando de Oxea in 1606, when he wrote that:

although we gave many of them [the provinces of the Indies] new names in Spanish, these were forgotten and dropped or very little used, and the old ones used by the Indians prevailed and still do today, even after they were all killed in many parts.

The Dominican friar expressed himself in this way in a letter praising the work done by Baltasar de Echave about the Basque language, which was published in Mexico in 1607 (Echave 1607, unnumbered). For his own part, although he had lived in New Spain for many years, Oxea himself was writing a history of Galicia, since, as is borne out by his own case and that of Echave, the Indies had rapidly been converted into a scenario from where one could easily think of Europe. Just as one could equally well think of China (Villamar 2015).

Voices, images, and writings: empires of ink and republics of inventiveness

One of the main features of peninsular culture as a whole was the existence of several languages that were spoken at the same time (Gil 2013; Feros 2017), accompanied, of course, by the maintenance of Latin as the *lingua franca*. In Spain, Castilian and Catalan had a rich literature in both manuscript and printed form; however, the Basque and Galician languages, even though they were widely spoken in their respective territories, were commonly used in the writing of manuscripts, but they were much less frequently transferred into printed material. Bernard Dechapare's poems from *Linguae vascorum primitiae*, printed in Bordeaux in 1545, and some poems he wrote on the death of Margarita of Austria in 1612 were among the first, and very rare, examples of texts printed in Basque and Galician at that time. It is worth highlighting that the Basque emigrants took their language to the Indies (Otazu and Díaz de Durana 2008) and that Baltasar de Echave published the previously mentioned *Discursos de la antigüedad de la lengua cántabra* in Mexico in 1607.

In turn, there were frequent references to the use of Arabic as a spoken and written language until the expulsion of the Moors in 1609, particularly in those areas where the Moorish communities were demographically in a relative majority. There are documentary records showing that, in some manorial lordships, both government and accounting activities continued to be conducted in that language. There are, however, very few mentions of the *hispanorromaní* spoken in Spain, although "A Gypsy-Spanish word-list" has been preserved. This was published by John M. Hill in 1921 and it could well date from the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century (Adiego 2002, 13).

A most valuable testimony about this multilingual Iberia was left to us by Manuel de Ataíde, who travelled across the peninsula between 1602 and 1603, from Lisbon to Montserrat, recording his impressions about Catalan, Castilian, and Aragonese. While the Castilian spoken in Castile was energetic and lively, the variety spoken in Aragon had "a softness that is very similar to Portuguese". In his opinion, the Catalan language was very distinct and seemed like French with "some Castilian, Portuguese and Italian words, from which a good mixture is made and the pronunciation is very charming, particularly when spoken by women" (BA Ms. 52-VIII-44, 23v [Aragonese], 39v-40r [Catalan]).

The Castilian and Portuguese languages witnessed the publication of their first grammars, respectively the one compiled by Antonio de Nebrija (1492) and those compiled by Fernão de Oliveira (1536) and João de Barros (1540). In them, the language is presented as the companion of the empire, based on a proposition made by the Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla (Asensio 1960), but this does not mean that the Iberian empires established as their sole languages either Portuguese or Castilian. Mention was made earlier of the Iberian linguistic plurality, including during the period of the Union of Crowns that lasted from 1580 to 1640.

With undeniable displays of a fully conscious pride (Curto 2007), Portuguese established itself as a differential language spoken in Lusitanian, or Portuguese, territory, although it is certain that Castilian also enjoyed a powerful presence there in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Teyssier 1980, 91–92), as was abundantly reflected in the production of the printing presses, with many native authors resorting to Castilian in order to enjoy a wider dissemination of their work. In this way, above all, Lisbon was converted into an important centre for the production of books in Spanish.

The reasons for this phenomenon were not only a supposed subordination to Spanish manners and customs during the period 1580–1640, however important this might have been. It should be stressed that it was also due, in part, to reasons that were peculiar to the nature of the typographical production itself, such as, for example, the faultless quality offered by one of the most legendary families of Iberian printers/publishers of that time: the Craesbeeck family (Dias 1996). Being of Flemish origin, they maintained fluid relations with scholars and poets, importing a very small letter type—*diamantina*—for their edition of *Os Lusíadas* in 1626, which made it possible to read the poetic text with great clarity, including those volumes that were printed in a smaller format. Therefore, both before and after 1640, Lisbon became a sort of beacon that attracted many of those who wanted to publish collections of poets in the Castilian language, ranging from Garcilaso de la Vega (1626, 1632) to Góngora (1646–1647, 1667), Paravicino (1645), and Figueroa (1625, 1626).

On the Spanish side, it is not possible to find anything similar, although the Portuguese authors were very highly regarded, especially as poets and preachers who were translated or commented on, as, for example, in the magnificent Madrid edition of *Os Lusíadas*, published in 1639. There are, however, some examples of books in Portuguese that were printed in other areas of the Iberian peninsula, beginning

with *Varias obras em lingoa portuguesa e castelhana* by Duarte Dias, published in Madrid in 1592. A few pages earlier, mention was made of an opinion expressed by António Feo, taken from one of his books that appeared in 1613 in the city of Lleida, published at the expense of the Catalan bookseller Miquel Manescal, who also took charge of the publication of a second volume in Barcelona in 1614. A year later, two books of sermons by Francisco Fernandes Galvão were published in Seville, also in Portuguese, one of them at the initiative of the Flemish bookseller Peeter van Keerberghen (Pedro Kerbergio). The same year of 1615 also saw the appearance in Madrid of the *Quarta decada da Asia*, which the chronicler João de Barros had left incomplete and which João Bautista Lavanha completed and, in part, rewrote at the express orders of the king, as the marvellous book in which the same Lavanha describes the *Viagem* that Felipe III made to Portugal in 1619, and which came to light in Madrid three years later. We could also add to this group of books the Barcelona edition of *Relação defensiva dos filhos da Índia Oriental*, by Miguel da Purificação, published in 1640, but with licences from 1639 (Xavier 2014); a *Regimento do bagaço da azeitona*, some *Resois* by Ambrosio Cardoso de Abreu about taxes, and other legal pleadings, published by Madrid printing presses between 1620 and 1630; and the *Loa sacramental* by Ana Caro de Mallén, published in Seville in 1639, and which was translated into the Portuguese language in order to serve as a common vehicle for a Moor, a *guineo*, a Frenchman and a Portuguese, but in a festive context that was very similar to that of minor theatre publications (López Estrada 1976).

These books were printed in Portuguese, but not in Portugal. Instead, they were printed in other territories of the Iberian peninsula that were, at that time, under the rule of the same monarchy (1580–1640). However, this phenomenon did, in fact, date from an earlier period, since, already in 1539, the third printing of Manuel I's legislative *Ordenações* had taken place in Seville, but it clearly increased during this period and certainly continued after 1640, as is shown by the publication in Madrid, in 1678, of the *Tratado* on the sacramental sacrilege of Odivelas by Manuel Alvares Pegas. Leaving to one side the book by Ana Caro, which was itself similar to other examples of Christmas carols in Portuguese printed in Castile, the printing of the books by Lavanha and Barros in Portuguese, as well as that of the *Regimento* published in 1630, was linked to the respect for the privilege that Portugal enjoyed as a united kingdom and not one that was under the dominion of Spain, a status that was expressed in

the maintenance of its own language.

Yet, it is hard to explain why, in Andalusia and in Catalonia, the aforementioned collections of sermons were printed in Portuguese, since, due to the fact that Feo and Galvão were successful authors, these same works were being published by other printers in Spanish translations. Perhaps it was thought that they might be read outside Portugal in the said language, or perhaps they were intended to be sold in Portuguese-speaking territories in Europe or in its empire. Whatever the case, the important thing is that, behind such a phenomenon as this one, there seems to have been a growing market of readers whose demands were satisfied by a very active group of printers and booksellers.

Gutenberg's ingenious invention arrived in Iberia relatively early on. Only 15 years after the appearance in Mainz of the 42-line *Bible*, what is considered to have been the first peninsular incunabulum was printed in Segovia in 1472 by Johann Parix, a travelling printer from Heidelberg. This marked the beginning of the extensive series of German, French, Flemish, Portuguese or Italian-speaking printers who arrived in Spain and Portugal from the late fifteenth century onwards and who caused a whole host of foreign languages to be spoken at Iberian print shops (Griffin 2005). Beginning with the Portuguese language, since, from Portugal, there came such printers as Manuel Botelho de Paiva, who was active at small Andalusian print shops during the 1620s and 1630s, and Francisco de Lira Barreto, the leading printer in Seville in the first half of the seventeenth century. Finally, it should be mentioned that, during this period, the sovereignty of the Hispanic monarchy also extended to the Southern Netherlands, where the cities of Antwerp and Brussels were located, two of the main centres of production of printed material at that time, which naturally strove to ensure that their publications reached all of the other dominions of the House of Austria in the Iberian world.

In general terms, the manual printing press was a technical innovation that enabled an increase in book production, and meant that the price of the copies of texts fell in relative terms, while also guaranteeing that the resulting copies had a more uniform text. The stamping of inked metal moulds on conveniently prepared sheets of paper meant that the copies obtained were equal, or almost equal, to one another. Thanks to these conditions, printed copies became an everyday reality, despite the high rates of illiteracy that were typical of that time. Besides the abundance of printed materials—the average print run in the Spanish Golden Age was 1,500 copies—the proximity

of illiterate persons to printed texts was due to the practice of reading aloud, so that it can be said that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, people either read or listened to other people reading. A magnificent example of this practice is provided by the case of the Peruvian *mestizo* Francisco Escobar who “would mount the oxcart and read to the slaves the books of Amadis and from the books of chivalry” at his Arequipa sugar plantation in the second half of the sixteenth century (Schwartz 2008, 155). Nonetheless, it should be remembered that reading aloud was also a customary practice in the literate world, just as was the recourse to the use of visual images.

The production of printed works called for the establishment of a system of printing licences, which, through the prior censorship of the reproduced texts, guaranteed their usefulness, as well as, of course, their confessional and political orthodoxy. The censorship that we are accustomed to identifying with the repressive system of purging contents, drawing up lists and edicts of banned books, or the denouncements made to the Inquisition corresponds to a form of censorship conducted *a posteriori*, in other words a censorship that concerned itself with the orthodoxy of the books that had already entered into circulation. The granting of printing licences was a privilege of the monarchy, but this does not mean that it did not include the consideration of confessional criteria or the participation in the concession of such licences of religious bodies, such as the episcopal authorities—licences from the Diocesan Vicar—or, in Portugal, the Holy Office of the Inquisition. Given the compound nature of the Hispanic monarchy, special licences had to be obtained for each crown or each area of authority and government; thus, during the period of the kings Felipe, separate licences had to be obtained for Castile, Aragon, or Portugal, whereas the processing of applications for licences for books published in New Spain or Peru was the responsibility of the viceroys.

The licence permitted the printing of a work on just one occasion, but, generally speaking, this privilege was also requested for a certain number of years, normally ten, during which time the royal judiciary kept a close watch over things to ensure that nobody other than the holder of the licence and the right to print should in fact exercise this entitlement. These printing privileges were the closest thing to copyright that existed at that time and their usefulness in protecting the rights of authors was only relative and was limited to a brief period of time. There was not, therefore, an effective defence system equivalent to what would later come to be known as intellectual

property. This was always threatened by the customary practices of plagiarism by other authors, by the counterfeit printings made with false imprints, or, frequently, by the need that the authors and holders of licences or privileges had to sell their rights to third parties in order to be able to cover the expenses of publishing their works. Generally speaking, it was booksellers or printers who signed contracts for the purchase of licences and privileges in order to become the owners of the work, financing the printing and, furthermore, acting as editors by introducing changes to the original text, which could often be quite major in nature. For example, in 1604, Miguel de Cervantes asked for and obtained a printing licence and privilege for a book that was entitled *El ingenioso hidalgo de la Mancha*. In order to be able to print his novel, the author sold the licence and privilege to the bookseller Francisco de Robles, who financed its publication at his own expense, publishing it already under the title of *Don Quijote de la Mancha*, a name that did not, however, figure as the title in the original application process for the granting of the licence (Bouza 2012).

The importance of these publishers or defrayers of printing costs is enormous because it demonstrates the mercantile nature of the business that surrounded the production of books during this period. These publishers acted out of evident economic interest, which led them to prefer to publish authors, titles, and genres that already enjoyed a prior demand. In other words, on many occasions, they preferred to reprint already consolidated works rather than to invest in new authors or genres. Obtaining a printing licence seems to have been relatively simple for the time, always, of course, being granted for works that did not offend the prevailing values, as was the case with the vast majority of those embarking on the initial official process of prior censorship. What was much more complicated and problematic was being able to complete the printing of the work, and it may be estimated that perhaps a third of the works that were granted printing licences never got to be printed because their authors, or the owners of their licence could not find the funding that was necessary for their publication.

Some of these great publishers, acting as the funders of the publication and, therefore, as fundamental elements in the production of printed texts, played a crucial role in the dissemination of authors and specific subject-matters. For example, the printer-publisher Valentim Fernandes de Moravia, active in Lisbon between 1485 and 1518, played a very important role in the placing into circulation in Europe of news and images about the Portuguese empire, especially in

Germany, sharing mercantile interests with the Welser banking family (Leitch 2010, 73–74). Other important printers and booksellers who promoted the publishing activity were the Craesbeecks or Miguel Manescal in Lisbon, the Crombergers of Seville, Cormellas in Barcelona, the Robles, Alonso Pérez and Pedro Coello in Madrid, Angelo Tavanno in Zaragoza, João Antunes in Coimbra, Francisco del Canto in Lima, Enrico Martínez in México, and Antonio [Ricciardi] Ricardo in Mexico and Lima.

Although the advances made in the western movable-type printing presses after 1455 were truly amazing, this does not mean that either oral or visual means of communication disappeared as fully realised ways of creating knowledge and memory, nor that people stopped making use of manuscripts. It would be better to say that people resorted to each of these means of expression and dissemination in accordance with their circumstantial needs, which had to be satisfied. Therefore, in view of the nature of the recipients (or even the nature of the message that was being transmitted), people chose either this or that industry and could frequently resort to a combination of the oral and the visual form, as well as the written form.

While it is certain that printed material was often preferred as the most convenient form for mass propaganda, it should also be remembered that a status of greater truthfulness was afforded to the voice and the portrait. The same could be said about the manuscript form of communication, which was usually considered to be more trustworthy than the printed copies, with which, as in the case of *Don Quijote*, it was frequent for people to pretend that the origin of the account was nothing more than a manuscript that had been discovered by pure chance (Bouza 2004). It should not, however, be imagined that the manuscript was reduced to a form of personal expression. Instead, there existed a whole system of professional copiers who wrote on demand and, moreover, could count on jobs open to the public where they were paid to write a new text or make a copy of others that already existed. These public writers, such as those stationed next to the *Pelourinho Velho* (Old Pillory) in Lisbon, should not be confused with notaries' scribes, for their writings had no value in terms of public trust. Their public was a very broad one, since well-educated people came to them when they required copies to be made of their rough drafts, as did illiterate women and men who wanted them to write letters for their correspondence or statements that they required for the establishment of relations with the authorities.

On the other hand, the western devotion to typography must not

lead us to overlook the fact that the great powers of that time, such as the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, did not need printing presses to display their power, which, if their empires were built on ink, then it was that of the manuscript and not that which was used by the printing press. Furthermore, it was fully clear that there were other non-European printing presses, such as the Chinese one. This latter press could be glorified because it made it possible for each person to print “what gives them pleasure, without needing approvals, censorship or licences” (Semedo 1642, 54).

The spoken language was undoubtedly the principal means of communication among the illiterate. Clear evidence of this is provided by the fact that the missionaries strove to replace the contents of the oral traditions with new confessional messages, but without abandoning the spoken word as the means of their transmission. This is what was done, for example, by the Aragonese Pedro Selleras (1555–1622), endowed with great musical skills, who replaced the words, although not the melody or the rhythm, of the songs that already existed with others more in keeping with the religious orthodoxy. When he encountered a woman who was singing “profanely” while sifting wheat in Lécera (Zaragoza), he took the sieve in his hands and taught her this other song: “Alma pecadora / dime ¿dónde vas? / A ti digo, hola, / que te perderás” (“Oh, sinning soul / ask me: where are you going? / And I’ll say to you, hello, / that you will be lost”—Francés 1664, 121). Moreover, as is known, neither the monarchies nor the Church insisted at that time on teaching the masses to read and write in Castilian or Portuguese, since, in fact, the huge advances of these two languages into the old imperial territories only took place in the nineteenth century (Del Valle 2015). During the late Middle Ages, in general terms, either the clergy learned the languages of the communities under their charge, who remained illiterate and continued to speak their own languages, or they resorted to a system of interpreters and translators, who served as intermediaries between the powers in charge and the vassals.

Spoken communication was not, in any way, solely the preserve of illiterate people, since its presence and prestige in the literate world was enormous, with the voice being converted into the privileged instrument of the preacher in his pulpit, but also of the courtier in conversation, the lawyer in the law court, the diplomat at the embassy, and also the general who might have to quell a mutiny of his troops through the power of his words. In turn, the recourse to visual images was essential for the scholarly education of that time, being

built on the art of memory, a complex intellectual process that taught people how to create images by linking concepts to spaces, and which lay at the origin of emblematics. Furthermore, the development of the engraving served to produce as many copies as were needed of the same original drawing, with a process being produced in the visual world that was similar to the one set in motion by the arrival of typography as far as obtaining copies of texts was concerned.

Not only did the printed texts reach the furthest extremities of the world with relative swiftness, but, thanks to the active commercial trade, they also reached the luggage of travellers, where there were usually books, or even whole libraries, to be found. On occasions, the Iberian print shops would turn out texts which, besides those in Portuguese and Spanish, also included texts translated into American or Asian languages, such as, for example, the Tamil/Portuguese *Cartilha*, which appeared in Lisbon in 1554 or the Guaraní *Catecismo* published in Madrid in 1640. In the same way, printed material also began to be produced outside Europe.

When the sixteenth century came to an end, the printing press had already become widely implanted all over the Iberian world, from Mexico in 1539 and Goa in 1556 to the Philippines in the 1590s, passing through Lima (1584) and Macao (1585). The next century witnessed a more gradual expansion into other places in the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, reaching the Jesuit settlements of the River Plate in 1700 (Wilde 2014), without, however, the possible intentions of establishing a first printing press in Dutch Recife succeeding in ever becoming a reality. The shortage of permanent print shops in Brazil until sometime after the arrival of the royal court in 1808 has been a matter for debate that does not seem easy to solve, but which might be explained by the parallel absence of universities and of a viceregal court during the previous period.

The strategic position of Goa on the Asian trade routes was partly responsible for the typographical wealth of the capital of Portuguese India. On the one hand, the first printings were made with a movable type printing press initially destined for Ethiopia (Wicki 1956). On the other hand, in 1587, a printing press arrived in Goa, accompanying the Japanese ambassadors who had visited Felipe II and Pope Gregory XIII and who stopped off in India on their return to Japan, taking with them the printing press that they had purchased in Lisbon (Pinto 2016). It was used in 1588 to publish a Latin *Oratio* given at the Jesuit college by the daimyo Martinus Hara thanks to the skills of the equally Japanese Constantinus Douratus, who had learned the art of

printing in Lisbon in order to be able to then practise it in Goa, Macao, and Japan (Dias 2014). Finally, Goa was also a good example of how books printed outside the Iberian peninsula were not condemned to always have a merely local circulation, although there is no doubt that their dissemination was restricted. In 1563, the *Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India* by the Portuguese Garcia de Orta (1501–1568) were printed there, a book that was acquired a year later in Lisbon by the Flemish Carolus Clusius, who noted with care the date when he made that purchase (Boxer 1963, plate II).

Although the Indians were accustomed to reading Spanish literature, very few fictional stories included in their plots both American and peninsular territories at the same time. Among those that did so, however, was the picaresque novel *El donado hablador* (1624–1626) by Jerónimo de Alcalá. Of course, the Iberian expansion became a subject that occupied the attention of the pens of Portuguese and Spanish authors throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, not everyone had travelled to the lands that they wrote about and only some of them had been born outside the Iberian peninsula, such as Garcilaso de la Vega el Inca from Cuzco (1539–1616) and Juan Ruiz de Alarcón (1581–1639) from Taxco. Luís de Camões (1524–1580) published his *Lusíadas* in Lisbon in 1572, shortly after having returned from a long stay in India and after spending some months in Mozambique. Alonso de Ercilla (1533–1594) also gained a direct knowledge of the American lands in which his epic *Araucana* (1569) was set. While the chronicler Diogo do Couto (1542–1616) moved to live in the Indian region that he described, and ending up dying in Goa, the Spanish Antonio de Herrera (1549–1626) never left Europe, although he wrote numerous stories and a description of the Indies from Castile.

For his own part, Francisco Manuel de Melo (1608–1666) lived in exile in Brazil between 1655 and 1658, where he wrote his famous sonnet “Vária ideia, estando na América e perturbado no estudo por bailes de bárbaros”. Juan de Palafox (1600–1659) lived in New Spain throughout the 1640s, founded the extraordinary library known as the Biblioteca Palafoxiana in Puebla, and, among other books, wrote *De la naturaleza del indio*. Needless to say that the work of the Jesuit António Vieira (1608–1697) is incomprehensible without knowledge of his experience in Brazil, where he lived for long periods, which were complemented by stays in Portugal, Italy, France, and Holland. However, Cervantes, although he wished to go to the Indies to occupy some government post, never succeeded in doing so. Mateo Alemán

(1647–1614) was more fortunate: he moved to Mexico, where he published his *Ortografía castellana* in 1609, a book that opens with an epistle written in dedication to the city inhabited by “such subtle and happy geniuses”.

Undoubtedly, a republic of letters was created about the Iberian world. In principle, this was a Hispanic one, but it was gradually advancing towards the construction of two separate Parnassuses (Carvalho 2007). Eugenio Asensio drew attention to the conversion of the Portuguese Camões into the “Príncipe de los Poetas de España”, as he was described on the title page of the 1639 Madrid edition of *Os Lusíadas* (Asensio 1980). Here, Spain is the Peninsular Hispania, just as it is in the catalogue of the “natives of Spain ... who have given their works to be published”, compiled between 1590 and 1615 by Gabriel Lobo Lasso de la Vega, the author of the *Mexicana* (Artigas 1917).

As if he imagined a Hispanic literary nation, in which there was no distinction between ancient and modern, and to which his “Spanish” authors belonged through their mere dedication to literature, Lobo gathered together in this catalogue more than 450 Castilian, Portuguese, Biscayan, Aragonese, Galician, and Catalan authors, but also “the Master Juan Latino [who] was black and swarthy” and Pablo de Cartagena, “Spanish and Jewish” and a convert to Christianity. Without forgetting either Averroes or Avicena (who it was supposed, at that time, was from Cordoba), about whom he wrote:

I have placed these two Moors here so that people may know the geniuses in all the sciences and faculties that have come out of Spain and how naturally the country has produced them and also so that some people who doubted some of these things should not ignore them.

(RBME Ms. L-III-27, *voces signantes*)

Gabriel Lobo also easily incorporated into his collection of authors the Inca Garcilaso de la Vega because American geniuses could also quite easily enter this ideal republic of letters. In this way, in his *Templo de la Fama*, Andrés Ferrer (1620–1680) drew up a hierarchy of the world’s four best universities, inclining towards those of Paris and Salamanca, as was to be expected, but also towards those of Lima and Mexico (Ferrer 1680, 143-bis).

Ferrer had spent part of his life in New Spain and had always displayed his desire to incorporate the American realities into the

common treasure of all men of letters. He therefore questioned whether the series of the wonders of the world should not also include the Inca Temple of the Sun or Moctezuma's Gardens, besides the Great Wall of China (Ferrer 1680, 121). His own career as an author had begun in the printing presses of Puebla de los Ángeles, but undoubtedly, he only became a relatively famous author thanks to the printing of his works in Spain.

With a certain sense of disappointment, Juan Díaz de Arce lamented that the histories had forgotten Bernardino Álvarez and his foundation of the Hospital de San Hipólito de la Orden de la Caridad, a pioneering institution dedicated to the care of the mentally ill (Rumbaut 1971). The Mexican Díaz wondered if this forgetfulness was due to the fact that this charitable order "was born in the Indies" and explained that he had decided to publish the life of Álvarez so that he could be deservedly better known (Díaz de Arce 1651, Prologue). However, a quarter of a century later, in 1677 and, apropos of Antonio de Céspedes, Esteban de Aguilar stated that in the kingdoms of Spain there was a continuing interest about everything that was done in America, "with it being certain that, for many years", there arrived from the New World not only "gold and physical, and natural, silver, but also gold and symbolic silver". He therefore approved the printing in Madrid of the sermons that Céspedes had preached in Peru (Céspedes 1677, unnumbered).

With the antecedents of highly successful preachers already at the beginning of the seventeenth century, such as Juan Sebastián de la Parra (1545–1622), or the continued presence of Pedro de Alva (1601–1667), it is certainly surprising to note the number of "Peruvian sermons" that were published at different Spanish print shops in the second half of the seventeenth century, including those of several Jesuit priests (Barrasa, Céspedes, Jáuregui, Salduendo), the Dominican friar Fernando de Herrera (1675), the priest Diego Carrasco de Saavedra (1680, 1696), or the canon Juan Caballero de Cabrera (1663). It should be stressed that some of these sermons had already been printed separately in Lima, being gathered together as a collection at the Spanish print shops, where they were destined for the peninsular market, but also, of course, due to be returned to the Indies, perhaps with the Spanish editions of the sermons of António Vieira, which were also published in great profusion at the Spanish print shops of that time.

The same thing happened with the famous *Carta atenagórica* by Juana Inés de la Cruz, printed in Puebla de los Ángeles in 1690, but

later reprinted in Seville in 1692, where it formed part of a volume of the nun's works. Besides its literary value, the *Carta* is interesting because the nun from New Spain criticises the work of the "Luso-Brazilian" Vieira, showing how the intellectual debate took place in a transverse manner. The same could be said of the *Apologético* of Juan de Espinosa from Cuzco, who defended the Castilian Luis de Góngora against the Portuguese Manuel de Faria in a text printed in Lima in 1662 (Guibovich 2005).

Some American authors, such as Juan Sarmiento de Gamboa, paid their own expenses for the printing of their works at European print shops. In other cases, works that had already been published in the Indies were reprinted on peninsular printing presses. For example, *El espejo de la perfecta casada* by Fray Alonso de Herrera appeared in Lima in 1623, but only 15 years later, in 1637, was it reprinted in Granada, with the references to Lima and its women, including the Indian women, being translated to the context of the Iberian peninsula. The same happened with the *Suma de sacramentos* by the Dominican Friar Bartolomé de Ledesma (ca. 1524–1604), printed in Mexico in 1566, but which, with numerous later additions, was reprinted in Salamanca in 1585. The interesting thing about this work is that the volume was intended to be used for training clergymen to develop the sacramental practices, first in the Indies, and then in Spain, but based on the American experience, as is highlighted by the fact that it deals in detail with the question of whether the catechesis should take place before or after baptism, a circumstance that certainly corresponded to the American context, but less so to the peninsular context (Beuchot 1991).

The printing press also provided its services to the exercise of power, making it possible to disseminate regulations or laws, but also being used for propaganda purposes, both for strengthening power over the vassals and for legitimising actions against third parties. For example, amid the preparations being made for the new armada that Felipe II was to send against England in 1597, a manifesto was printed at a Lisbon print shop, written in English in order to convince the inhabitants of Great Britain of the king's just reasons for invading their country, and which the Spanish troops were supposed to distribute after landing there (Thomas 1946).

Printed material was also used to obtain information on which the government could justify its decisions from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards (Brendecke 2016). A questionnaire was printed for the purposes of conducting a great survey known as the

Relaciones topográficas, ordered by Felipe II in the 1570s and designed in such a way that all the citizens affected would answer the same questions. Furthermore, the mechanical printing of these forms obliged everyone to answer the questions in the same order, which facilitated the final processing of the data obtained in this way. The same procedure was followed, in 1577, in the *Relaciones Geográficas de Indias*, for which an *Instrucción y memoria* was printed with a questionnaire of 50 questions; and for the great campaigns for the observation of lunar eclipses between 1577 and 1588, when an extraordinary network of observers was organised that extended from Toledo and Seville to Puerto Rico and the Solomon Islands (Portuondo 2009). However, the results of the expedition undertaken by the doctor Francisco Hernández to New Spain from 1571 to 1576, a major work of natural history in the sixteenth century, did not end up being published (and then only partially) until 1651, and, furthermore, in Rome (Varey 2000).

The printing press not only served the kings, but it was also used by bishops and by the nobility in their communications with their congregations and vassals. Of course, private individuals also used it to publicise their stances or opinions about certain conjunctures, both personal and collective ones (Bouza 2016). For example, the German Ferdinand Cron and the Flemish Jacques and Joseph de Coutre, all of whom had mercantile interests in Goa, were accused of maintaining secret dealings with the Dutch in India, and were consequently prosecuted and exiled to Lisbon. When they were declared innocent, they decided to resort to the printing press in order to restore their good name, the former in around 1629 and the others in 1632, since this enabled them to afford a greater dissemination to the recognition of their innocence. In a completely opposite way, printed publications could also be used to retract some opinion that had previously been expressed, as was the case with Luis Crespí de Borja in his *Retractación*, printed in 1649, through which he acknowledged his mistake in having put his name to a text written in favour of comedies (Callado 2011). His retraction began with the startling words: “I am not writing this paper in order to excuse myself, but rather to accuse myself”.

Despite the importance of the printed publication in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the manuscript continued to be a capital means for the dissemination of orders and news in the far-flung Portuguese and Spanish empires. In two monarchies with absent kings, the political communication between the different territories

and between their government bodies was made by sending envoys who acted as ambassadors or attorneys representing the interests of the remote populations, but, above all, by an impressive system of handwritten correspondence, through which there came into circulation letters, reports, and other memoranda. Although personal audiences remained in force throughout this period and there continued to be visual expedients, such as the sending of royal portraits (Rodríguez Moya 2001), the advances in writing were undeniable during this period.

The presence of the sovereign at those councils over which he had previously presided in person was gradually replaced by an increase in the intermediary role played by the secretaries and in the use of written records as a way of substituting the eyes and ears of the king himself. On the other hand, a royal directive about how private citizens should write to the kings and to the government tribunals was made available through a *Pragmática* published in 1586 and a *Provisam de como se ha de falar e escreuer* printed in 1597. Finally, the impulse given to the great royal archives, such as Simancas or the Torre do Tombo in Lisbon, made it possible to complete a panorama in which ink made government possible by allowing the circulation of orders and petitions, at the same time as it generated written documentation that could be stored and therefore recovered for use when necessary.

Consequently, without forgetting the almost unmanageable world of rumours—whispers or murmurs in the lexicon of the time—the Iberian world turned into a world of notifications of news and postal exchanges. The ones that benefited from this transformation were the established powers, but, at the same time, writing (whether in printed or in manuscript form) could also be used to create new for public discussion. The advantages and the dangers were clearly revealed by Juan Vitrián, in 1643, when he guaranteed that the weekly post was good because it guaranteed a continuous flow of information, but “it is bad for gossip and the tittle-tattle written by the backbiters, disturbing people’s minds and poking the king’s authority into every little trifle” (Commynes and Vitrian 1643, 413).

First, as handwritten notices and numerous separately printed reports, but later as periodical printed publications, albeit with a very short life, the news about contemporary events began to circulate increasingly (Ettinghausen 2015). For example, the Catalan *Gazetas* of 1641–1642 and the Portuguese *Gazetas* of 1641 to 1647 or the monthly series of the *Mercurio portuguez*, which appeared in Lisbon

between 1663 and 1667, made it possible to accompany the crucial years of the crisis of the mid-seventeenth century. In turn, the *Gazeta nueva*, which appeared in Madrid between 1661 and 1662, fulfilled a similar function. Also extremely important were the different reports of the European events that came out of the printing presses of Lima, with such titles as *Quarto pliego del estado en que están las cosas de Portugal*, dating from 1641, the *Diario* of the events of Spain, Portugal, and Catalonia in 1646, published by Julián Santos de Saldaña in 1647, and various issues of the *Noticias de Castilla* or the *Noticias del Sur* (Winship 1908).

One of the most active printers of these reports of events and *gazetas* was Juan Gómez de Blas from Seville (Cameron 1988). It was he who, in 1642, requested royal permission to publish in Seville a book of devout Marian prayers that had already been printed in Mexico and whose fame and respective copies had arrived in Spain (AHN Consejos 46599). The printing press had managed to create a market that not only resulted in continuous consignments of books being shipped from Europe to the Indies (Rueda 2012), but also caused American books and authors to be brought to the Iberian peninsula to be printed here for the first time or to be reprinted afresh. The circulation of objects, people, foodstuffs, devotions, images, relics, rhythms, animals, plants, or news had helped to make it possible for culture and communication to circulate across an Iberian world.

¹Translator's Note: A tall, pointed dunce's cap worn in public as a sign of humiliation and a garment of shame during the Spanish Inquisition. ²Translator's Note: An ornamented garment of sackcloth worn by a heretic condemned by the Inquisition.

Note

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Abbreviations

ACA	Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Barcelona
AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Seville
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid

AHNo	Arquivo Histórico de la Nobleza, Toledo
AHPOu	Arquivo Histórico Provincial, Ourense
ANTT	Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisbon
BA	Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon
BCLM	Biblioteca de Castilla-La Mancha, Toledo
BMB	Bibliothèque Municipale, Besançon
BNL	Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, Lisbon
IEB-USP	Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo
LC	Library of Congress, Washington
RAH	Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid
RBME	Real Biblioteca del Monasterio del Escorial, San Lorenzo del Escorial

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

Religious conversion and identities in the Iberian peninsula



James S. Amelang and Mercedes García-Arenal

Introduction

“There are only two families in the world, my old grandmother used to say, the haves and the have-nots (*el tener y el no tener*)” (*Don Quijote* II, ch. xx). The early modern Spanish sage who made this observation, Sancho Panza, was no Marxist before Marx. Rather, he voiced the common sense that everyone around him learned early in life: that a great gap separated men and women whose lot in life was to enjoy wealth and power from those who lacked them. Nowadays, when people speak of assuming, dropping, and changing their identities with stunning ease, it is worth recalling that in earlier periods the

widespread poverty that the vast majority of men and women suffered severely limited their ability to control, much less better, their own fates—a matter of no little importance for one's identity. That said, Sancho's aphorism actually echoed a similar remark made earlier by his master Don Quijote: that the world was divided into two lineages, those falling over time from high social position, and those rising from the ranks of commoners to become great lords (*Don Quijote* I, ch. xxi). Which suggests that while fate played a strong hand in assigning and otherwise shaping status and identity in early modern Spain, some individuals were able to end their lives in a different place or position from whence they had started out. Early modern society afforded a certain margin for change in the activities and appearances by which people wound up making their way in the world, and this was as true of the dynamic patchwork of localities that made up the Iberian world as anywhere else in Europe.

Despite its importance both then and now, relatively little has been written on the question of identities in Spain and Portugal from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries (although see Thompson 1995; Rodríguez-Salgado 1998; Burdiel and Casey 1999; Ballester Rodríguez 2010; and above all Feros 2017). When surveying what is largely uncharted terrain, it is prudent to begin with certain basic clarifications. The most crucial of these—albeit a point often obscured by widespread belief that Iberian history took a radically eccentric path in comparison with that of the rest of Europe—is that the contours of what is now referred to as individual identity in Iberia from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries diverged little from those found in the rest of the continent. There as elsewhere determining and describing who one was started at birth, as each newly born child acquired his or her immaterial inheritance of name, family and kin group, and local place, along with even more communal features such as religious faith or ethnic category. Historians and social scientists distinguish these initial overlapping markers of identity in diverse ways, by referring to scale (individual versus collective, macro versus micro), location (inhabiting centres versus peripheries), status, and the like. To be sure, ascribed identities of this sort could eventually be resisted and rejected as well as assumed and asserted. Neither fully facts nor fictions, they constituted a collective framework within which all persons received and refined a sense of place within various close—but only rarely closed—communities.

Not surprisingly, the options of voice, exit, and loyalty that

developed elsewhere as means of finding one's way amid possibilities and constraints thrived in Iberia as well. The same could be said for another pattern of behaviour associated with the early modern era, self-fashioning. Indeed, one of Spain's most influential gifts to the rest of early modern Europe was the picaresque novel, whose plots focused precisely on the means by which resourceful individuals from unpromising social backgrounds could scheme their way up the social ladder through clever use of deception and disguise.

The historian has little choice but to take as a starting point the resolutely individual nature of early modern identities. Each man and woman had a life to live, and a soul to save. Yet even the most determined loners—such as the mystics and hermits who sought eternal life through cloister and rigorous isolation—joined the rest of society in defining themselves and others as members of the groups to which they belonged. Early modern Iberians developed firmly relational notions of selfhood. They thought of individuals collectively, as members of aggregates—chosen or inherited—bound together publicly by shared ties, contacts, and vested commitments. At the same time, they derived much sense of position and belonging from their awareness of the existence near and far of other persons and groups from whom they differed. What brought together some Spaniards and Portuguese—faith, language, work, residence in city versus the countryside, race or colour, among many other qualities—separated them from others, both within and beyond the peninsula.

To repeat: these social signals of collective identification and separation closely resembled those found in the rest of Europe. Place in local society within and beyond the peninsula was structured and allocated in much the same ways. Dominating as the broadest contours were gender; class, which was directly linked to occupation or trade; ethnic and often linguistic background; and religious allegiance and activity. Mediating between these macro-categories and micro-positions within local hierarchies stood the bedrock foundation of identity: the family, a construct that ranged from the individual household to the broader kin group (Davis 1986). Two other large-scale sources of differentiation that shaped collective and individual identities were vassalage—while serfdom had virtually disappeared from Spain by the end of the Middle Ages, the seigniorial regime was still alive and well—as well as *vecindad*, or local citizenship based on permanent residence (Herzog 2003). Both of these conditions bore directly on what was perhaps the most direct indicator of local status, the personal and familial ownership of property.

Yet despite these basic similarities with virtually all other European societies, both the realities and the constructions of collective identities in Iberia departed from those found in the rest of Europe in three major ways. These special characteristics were:

- a significant, albeit not exclusive, set of internal political, cultural, and linguistic loyalties, which reflected the underlying pluralism of what many outsiders (and later historians) saw as a strongly unified state;
- a metropolitan sense of identity that was one of the many consequences of the construction and maintenance of vast overseas empires; and
- the persistence of religious heterodoxy within states regarded throughout Europe as a model of spiritual uniformity.

Collective markers

The construction in the late fifteenth century of a strong and more unified—while still notably composite—monarchy under Ferdinand and Isabella impressed observers throughout the rest of Europe. One of the earliest and more closely watched exercises in early modern state-building, it won the respect of hardened analysts such as Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Outside perception of Spain's growing external power as well as internal strength merely increased when its Habsburg ruler became the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1519. In one fell swoop a hitherto peripheral country was suddenly thrust into the centre of continental politics. Yet outsiders often failed to see something well known to the Spaniards themselves: that while they were subjects of the same crown, they were not fellow citizens in the sense of residing in the same country. Instead, as the preceding chapters have analysed in detail, the Iberian peninsula—especially prior to the succession crisis of 1700–1714—was divided into a number of discrete polities, each of which attributed to the common sovereign different powers and prerogatives.

In practice this meant that while from the early sixteenth century on all Spaniards professed allegiance to the same (and invariably distant) monarch, the vast majority regarded themselves as more closely bound to other, more immediate loyalties. It is in fact quite difficult to ascertain how many early modern Spaniards thought of themselves as such. Beginning in the later Middle Ages allusions to Spain and a Spanish identity increased in various forms of public

discourse, especially among the educated elites. This frame of reference not only continued to expand during the sixteenth century, but it also broadened its social base, as shared experience as soldiers or settlers outside the peninsula provided a strong stimulus to thinking in what would now be called national terms. Yet in many respects Spain continued to function more as an assemblage of diverse peoples, each with its own traditions, institutions, and cultures, than as a unitary whole. This powerful sense of local community was anchored in equally local patron saints and other objects of devotion. The early modern period saw widespread promotion by bishops, antiquarians, and civic authorities of relics, tombs, and venerable objects of local saints and martyrs, many of whom not only antedated the Muslim period but also even the Visigoths. This “local religion” upheld and drew upon an equally strong sense of local identity, deeply rooted in sacred geography. Which version of Virgin Mary one worshipped, or which saint to whom one prayed for protection served as the basic foundations of community throughout the peninsula (Christian 1981; Rowe 2011; Olds 2015).

Plural collective identities—and the pronounced localism on which they rested—were the norm throughout all of Europe at this time. However, the Spanish case constituted a mix of its own. In the case of Catalonia, for instance, the most visible among many markers of divergence was linguistic. Most early modern Catalans spoke only Catalan, and while the proportion among them who also spoke (and wrote) Spanish increased during the early modern era, until the eighteenth century their ranks were by and large limited to those who lived in cities and larger towns or near major highways. Having a language of their own did much to foster a separate sense of ethnicity—that is, the form of collective identity that conceives of difference from others largely in terms of culture, history, and behaviour. Early modern Catalans moreover linked these sources of distinction to their other major singularity, a constitutional political system that was characterised above all by its success in placing substantial limitations on monarchical authority.

A similar mixture of linguistic and cultural autonomy and defence of traditional forms of local government against outside (including royal) interference also characterised the other major node of ethnic differentiation, the Basque Country. A borderland like Catalonia, the area comprising the triangle of Biscay, Guipúzcoa and Alava was endowed both with a language unrelated to the Romance tongues spoken in the rest of the peninsula, as well as an impressive degree of

local self-government. (Basque was spoken in much of neighbouring Navarre as well, which also enjoyed considerable autonomy in its relations with Madrid.) Finally, the inhabitants of Galicia, in the northwestern corner of the peninsula, spoke a language of their own, known as *gallego*. However, royal oversight of this kingdom was much the same as that found almost everywhere else in the peninsula.

By contemporary and even later standards early modern Iberia sheltered an impressive range of local identities. The peninsula's topography and its division into a wide range of eco-systems played a major role in fomenting this diversity, which in turn helped generate a high degree of institutional pluralism at both local and intermediate levels. That said, it is important not to overstate this, nor to confuse early modern ethnic and geopolitical identities with the exclusivist claims of modern nationalisms. Clearly there were separate species within the Iberian aviary. Yet many Catalans had no trouble referring to themselves as being both Catalan and Spanish. Thus, the humanist writer Cristòfol Despuig in a series of dialogues extolling his home town of Tortosa (published in 1557) referred to Catalonia as the best part of "our Spain", which he described as a peninsula whose inhabitants were divided into three nations, Portugal, Castile, and the Crown of Aragon. That said, it was a rare Catalan indeed who confused him or herself with a Castilian; Despuig certainly did not, and strongly resented what he saw as arrogant claims to superiority on the behalf of Castile's language, military prowess, and political might (Despuig 1981, 35–38). Thus, as in most of the rest of Europe, the early modern era in Spain witnessed growing reference to pan-Spanish frameworks, in which all the Iberian peoples participated—except the Portuguese, who for the most part harboured no doubts about their not being Spaniards, not least because of the literary and other strengths of their own language. (At the same time, they knew how to distinguish among their own, between, for example, the *minhotos* of the north and the *alentejanos* from the centre-south, readily identifiable from their speech, if nothing else.) In both kingdoms local distinctiveness did not diminish thanks to the rise, great or small, in national sentiment. In this Spain's experience closely resembled that of France. In both countries an expanding sense of a shared national identity, especially but not exclusively at the level of political and social elites, did relatively little to alter the deep localism in which most men and women lived their daily lives.

Crucial to this slowly growing sense within both Spain and Portugal itself of a shared identity as Spaniards and Portuguese in addition to

being Castilians, Catalans, Galicians and the like, was the experience of empire. All three major Iberian kingdoms expanded in various directions beginning in the late Middle Ages. The Crown of Aragon moved eastward into the Mediterranean; Castile pushed southward during the last stretch of the so-called Reconquest, the final phase of which focused on the absorption of the kingdom of Granada; and Portugal headed toward the west and above all south into north Africa and the Atlantic Ocean. The long-term result was the creation of the two most extended state structures in the early modern world. While the Portuguese empire saw a greater proportion of its population leaving the metropolis for colonies overseas, the Spanish empire—the eventual amalgam of the widely dispersed territories under Aragonese and Castilian rule combined with the western Habsburg holdings in continental Europe—tempted a greater number of its subjects to try their luck abroad, as soldiers, merchants, artisans, clergy, and the like. The deep impact on the homeland of such massive out-migration, both temporary and permanent, is dealt with extensively in the rest of this book. The emphasis of this chapter is on the ways in which this sort of common experience contributed to the development of a broader, pan-Spanish identity. For if there were any condition or experience that in addition to being ruled by the same king led all sorts of residents of the Iberian peninsula to think of themselves as Spaniards or Portuguese in addition to their other, more local identities, it was empire.

It was moreover no accident that outward expansion proved to be the crucible in which many of the more extreme visions of a specifically pan-Spanish identity took shape. The final phase of the conquest of Granada, which culminated in 1492, consolidated a triumphal notion of the war as a “Reconquest” that not only strengthened Ferdinand and Isabel as monarchs, it also brought to the forefront an intensified version of the crusader ideology that eventually prevailed over the less fraught habits of coexistence that had moulded relations between Christians, Muslims and Jews during much of the Middle Ages. Other currents joined in—among them millenarianism and messianism—to foster an ever more providential view of Spain not just as a political and military power, but also of Spaniards as a people chosen to become the most strenuous defenders of the Catholic faith in Europe, as well as its most determined propagators abroad. This dual sense of mission will be discussed at greater length below. What is worth remarking here is the special way in which this shared national vision was refracted outside Spain.

While a growing number of early modern Spaniards were thinking of themselves as such, they gradually constructed a collective vision that emphasised deep loyalty to Catholicism on the one hand, and more political markers such as military prowess and natural lordship on the other. Bookshelves rapidly filled with expressions of an ever firmer collective self-confidence, ranging from a veritable explosion in local histories and hagiographies to an equally impressive outpouring of biographies (and autobiographies) of exemplary movers of collective destinies. Such literature showed Spaniards depicting themselves as agile in body and mind, brave and effective warriors, and austere and easily scandalised by French and Italian weakness for luxury. Renowned for their sobriety and self-control in words as well as deeds, they valued decorum and above all honour in their personal behaviour and in their modes of literary and artistic self-representation.

Yet beneath the level of formal discourse and imagery lurked another plane on which pan-Spanish identity took shape. This was the realm of demotic, daily-life encounters between Spaniards and others with whom they entered into contact. Here a much less flattering stereotype of Iberians developed. Many if not most early modern Europeans knew exactly what a Spaniard was. He—they rarely thought, or at least, wrote about Spanish women—was proud, boastful, and vain, an exemplar of arrogance and blind self-conceit. Yet at the same time he was a hypocrite: all show and pretence in his extravagant external display of Catholic piety, but underneath a cynic or even worse, an atheist or secret Jew or Muslim. Much of the rest of Europe—and above all Italy and the Netherlands—forged a collective image, a “mirror of Spain” that characterised it as “oriental” thanks to its Muslim and Jewish substratum (Hillgarth 2000). Outsiders saw the mixed ancestry of Spaniards reflected in an ambiguous religious identity that prized pretence and dissimulation. In their view, suspect origins gave rise to spiritual weakness, not pre-eminence, and rendered Spaniards and Portuguese unfit for hegemony over other nations. Foreign slurs that they were secret Jews or Muslims contributed to an obsession with origins and “blood purity” that shaped not only the identification of Iberians by outsiders, but also the self-understanding of the insiders as well.

Very few peoples in early modern Europe inspired such a strongly negative reputation as did the Spaniards. Then again, few others had so many enemies. The latter included the French, their strongest and oldest rivals; Italians, many of whom lived (and chafed) under their

imperial rule; and above all the English and the Dutch, not just religious foes but also those who most feared (not unreasonably) being conquered by Spain. All these constituencies, and particularly the northern Europeans, made signal contributions to the collective vengeance known as the “Black Legend” (Maltby 1971; García Cárcel 1992). This began as a propaganda campaign of pamphlets and broadsides combating the reality or threat of Spanish rule, and eventually spawned into a multi-front attack on Spaniards themselves as cruel, haughty, vengeful, envious, treacherous, and hypocritical fanatics (the inconsistencies in this characterisation did not matter much to its creators). In time backwardness, ignorance, and near-comic ineptitude joined this congeries of faults. It took a long time for Spain to shed this negative reputation; indeed, much of it lingered well into the twentieth century, and on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. And while its impact on the self-image of Spaniards themselves was not that pronounced, it was one of several factors that contributed to isolating Spain from the rest of Europe during the long march to modernity.

There is a certain irony in early modern Spaniards being singled out in the rest of Europe as fanatic Catholics and the torchbearers of intolerance. After all, Iberia’s recent past had exemplified the very opposite. During a large part of the Middle Ages most of Spain’s population had been Muslim. At the same time nowhere else in the continent did Jews meet with as much acceptance and prosperity as in Spain and Portugal. The early modern period replaced this deeply rooted, if often conflictive, coexistence with a radically exclusive approach to the role of religion in public and private life. The new spirit of spiritual and intellectual closure had far-reaching consequences for both individual and collective identities. Above all, religion became the fundamental sign and substance of difference and thus of identity. And while the same was true for the rest of Europe, Spanish society regarded the continental-wide conflict between Catholics and Protestants that occupied the centre stage there from a certain remove. Instead, it wrestled with its own inner demons, those of its own singular past, and which lay dormant in the present.

Dealing with forced conversion

The end of the legal coexistence and social acceptance of Iberia’s religious minorities began in the later Middle Ages (Amelang 2013).

Crucial to this outcome was the deep trauma of the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century and the ensuing power vacuum and dynastic conflict in the peninsula. These overlay deeper religious currents which included the Church's adoption of harsher policies toward the Jews at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, as well as the ever more determined preaching of the mendicant orders whose apocalyptic and millenarian hopes comprised the "dream of conversion" (Burns 1971). An even more dramatic turn took place in 1391. The incendiary sermons of the Archpriest of Écija Ferrant Martínez incited his fellow Christians not to suffer the Jews among them. These provoked a series of episodes of violence that culminated in a wave of pogroms that not only wreaked death and destruction in numerous Jewish communities, but also the forced conversion of thousands of individual Jews. Pressure on the survivors continued through public debates such as the Disputation of Tortosa (1413) and the preaching campaigns of St. Vincent Ferrer later in the same decade. The result was a new wave of demoralised converts, many of whom were convinced that Jews would never regain the rights they had enjoyed in the past. The first half of the fifteenth century thus witnessed the consolidation of a fundamentally new social identity, that of the "New Christian", also referred to as a *converso* or *confeso*.

Among the more visible converts were the so-called court Jews who played a prominent role in the administration of Castile and Aragon. Many of them went on marry into the lower and middling ranks of the nobility. Other conversos bought seigneuries or held permanent positions as aldermen in municipal governments—both key paths to social promotion and acceptance within the privileged classes (Márquez Villanueva 2006). The middle and lower classes felt threatened by their success and allied with the traditional nobility wishing to preserve its social pre-eminence and perquisites to oppose the converts' rise to power and prestige. The most important of these revolts—and one with especially ominous implications for the future—was that led by Pero Sarmiento in Toledo in 1449. The rebels' promulgation of the so-called Statute-Sentence that decreed that converts from Judaism could not hold public office in the city or the surrounding area under its jurisdiction is generally considered to be the first piece of "blood purity" legislation passed in the peninsula (Sicroff 1985; Domínguez Ortiz 1978).

Other forms of reaction to the unexpected social rise of formerly Jewish families that managed to intermarry into the traditional Christian elites included a new interest in genealogy and a growing,

even obsessive identification with the ancient Goths, that is, the inhabitants of the peninsula prior to the Muslim invasion of the early eighth century. Here traditional religious antisemitism overlapped with anti-Muslim sentiment, as “Old Christian” families sought to distinguish themselves by tracing their ancestry back to the period prior to the rise of the Muslims in alliance with the Jews, seen as their allies against the Christians. The official historiography of the period similarly presented medieval Spanish history as a “Reconquest” and recovery of the “true” Spain following its loss to the Moors. Thus, there emerged a proto-national discourse tightly organised around a single and exclusive religious identity. It partook along with much of the rest of Europe of the same effort to stress the antiquity of individual nations that claimed to have emerged during the prolonged disintegration of the Roman Empire. What was more unique about the Spanish case was its highly racialised cast, which included the equation of rival religions with racial as well as spiritual inferiority. In this view, “Goth” and “Old Christian” were one and the same. Further extensions of this identification include the positive overtones associated with *vizcaños*, or Basques, who took pride in being one of the few areas of the peninsula that had never been under the dominion of either Romans or Muslims. On the other side of the religious-racial spectrum stood the *portugueses*. These were individuals and families of Jewish origin who took refuge in Portugal following the expulsion of 1492, only to be forcibly converted by royal order in 1497. Following the union of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns in 1580 many of their descendants returned to Spain, where they prospered as traders and economic middlemen. There they met with considerable social success as well, especially during the reign of Philip IV, whose court welcomed them as merchants and especially financiers. In fact, throughout the seventeenth century the term “Portuguese” stood for “Jew” in popular discourse.

The opposition between “pure” Gothic blood and “impure” Jewish or Muslim blood intensified during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Nirenberg 2002). Mass conversion and genealogical obsession connected in many ways, for example in discreet changes of surnames, along with other hints of the social weight attached to names and lineages. The so-called “*converso* problem” was an idiosyncratic but fundamental feature of early modern Spanish and Portuguese identities, even if it had deep roots in the Middle Ages. And the contrast between “true” Spaniards and Portuguese and their opposites could be easily transferred to other oppositions, overseas as

well as at home. The range of such distinctions was aptly summarised by the humanist Francisco de Támara in 1556 when he thanked God “for making us Christians and not pagans, civilised and not barbarians, Spaniards and not Turks nor Moors ...” (Elliott 1989, 57).

One could even characterise the consequences of the forced conversions of Jews (and later Muslims) as a massive identity disorder, or even crisis. It moreover rested on an explicit ideology of assimilation and homogenisation through obligatory absorption into the Catholic fold that was full of cultural implications. Conversion in such a context and on such a large scale necessarily transformed a wide range of customs, rites, food habits, festivities, and even speech (both written and spoken Arabic was prohibited, while the use of Hebrew was often identified with Judaism). All this was aimed at making difference disappear. Yet that very goal raised problems of its own. The eradication of reliably readable boundary markers that rendered Jews and Muslims easy to identify led “Old Christians” to devote special effort to remembering the origins of themselves and others. At the same time, they made efforts to find both formal and informal means of discriminating and stigmatising New Christians, thus hindering their social assimilation into the majority.

Two instruments were tapped for the complex task of blocking this infiltration. The first was the Inquisition. While the so-called Holy Office was founded in 1478 in order combat heresy in general, it focused on one type of apostasy or denial of faith in particular: “judaising”, that is, the clandestine adherence to Judaism of recent converts and their descendants. The other was the spread of “statutes of blood purity”, that is, regulations that required written and sworn proofs of Old Christian status in order to obtain most types of public office, privileges, or benefices, as well as entering the royal administration, military orders, the more prestigious university corporations, and certain professional guilds. The statutes evolved mostly at a local level and did not lead to the creation of a uniform body of legislation in either Spain or Portugal. In fact, there was little effort at codification until the period of Philip II, who showed surprisingly little enthusiasm for them. These laws were the most direct expression of a systematic effort to limit the political and economic power and social prestige of the New Christians in the name of protecting religious orthodoxy.

Not surprisingly, the Inquisition played a major role in promoting the principle and practice of *limpieza de sangre*. In 1501 Ferdinand and Isabel issued two decrees that stipulated that no offspring of anyone

penanced by the Holy Office could hold public office, or even exercise medicine, without royal permission. Strictly speaking, this prohibition did not affect all conversos, only those who had been found guilty of judaising. But it did not take long to conflate the two categories, and to turn a *converso* background into a form of infamy. The Inquisition itself did its best to link Jewish descent and heresy. Thus, it closely interrogated suspects about their precise family histories. And crimes against the faith such as blasphemy, denying the afterlife, or showing disrespect toward sacred images were punished more harshly if the suspect was a New Christian.

Creating and defining blood purity was one of the more singular features of early modern Iberian society. Its importance should not be underestimated. As this peculiar identification between genealogy and orthodoxy took hold, there emerged a fundamental social requirement: that the honour of an individual, and of his or her family, required the obligatory display of pure blood.

Identity and blood

Hierarchies of blood based on notions of purity and impurity were of course neither new nor exclusively Spanish. Medieval European society in general took for granted that blood lines, beginning with that of the king, constituted the basis of the feudal order. But Spain gave rise to an unusually harsh application of this symbolism as it associated impure blood not so much with vassalage as with Jews. (Ironically, aristocrats suffered more risk of social jeopardy in this regard, due to the greater frequency—or visibility?—of *conversos* marrying with nobles than with commoners.) The ideal of pure blood not only became a powerful instrument for the creation of new social hierarchies. It also fostered the emergence of novel forms of social identification.

The Inquisition created lists of the individuals it punished known as *mantas*, which they then made public by being displayed in cathedrals and other churches. The same was done with *sambenitos*, the penitential robes that heretics were forced to wear during the ceremonies of sentencing and punishment known as *autos de fe*. Public infamy thus became an additional sanction for a crime of spiritual deviance that was at the same time one of *lese majesté*. Other means by which bloodlines could be registered and exposed included the creation of books containing lists of surnames and other genealogical

information regarding families known to contain “stained blood”, largely through intermarriage with Jews. The most infamous of these was known as the *Libro verde de Aragón* (literally the “green book of Aragon”). It and others like it circulated widely and were often used to weed out candidates for office, to smear a rival or enemy, and above all to avoid compromising marriages. The ease with which they could smear a family’s reputation finally led the crown to order all known copies to be burned in 1606 (this order was repeated in 1615 and 1622). The situation got so out of hand that even certain publicly printed works of professional genealogists wound up being banned (Domínguez Ortiz 1973, 22). For what was at issue here was not just the honour of individual families. The existence of such texts also threatened the power of both the king and the Inquisition to determine the outer limits of social acceptance.

Another curious figure related to the question of blood purity was the so-called *linajudo*. This was a specialist hired by families in need of a *probanza de sangre* or affidavit of blood purity. Once contracted this individual would search for documents, witnesses, and other forms of proof needed to provide official certification. Recent studies have revealed much about this fairly sordid profession, whose mainstay could pass with ease from bribery to extortion (Pike 2000; Soria Mesa 2015). Ironically, the corruption of the *linajudos* and their massive manipulation of documents could also serve on occasion to certify the blood purity of manifestly “impure” lineages, thus facilitating the social ascent of the very sort of families that blood purity statutes tried to exclude. It was by no means all that difficult to obtain (or to forge) the papers needed to cover up unpleasant facts about one’s family, especially since the crown itself—perennially short of cash—sold privileges, seignuries, tax exemptions, and public offices on a massive scale. In the end, the swarms of rules and exclusions whose aim was to prevent social mobility often wound up providing a means of achieving it, and the restrictions of *limpieza* were no exception.

The efforts of the Inquisition and of Spanish and Portuguese society at large to put an end to religious dissidence in the form of the practice of a minority religion such as Judaism (not to mention the efforts by a handful of Spaniards to promote Protestantism) were uncontestedly successful. In this sense, both Jews and Protestants appeared in the imaginary of early modern Spain in particular as negative identities expressing the very essence of what Spain and its people most dreaded and opposed. Such imaginary opposition lingered well into the nineteenth century, when the first large-scale

efforts to rethink the role of Jews in the Iberian began to take effect. The same cannot be said, however, of the other “stain” or identitarian problem for the vast majority of early modern Spaniards. For the case of the moriscos—one of several labels applied to the descendants of Iberia’s formerly Muslim population—was different from that of the converted Jews. It diverged from the latter in numerous respects, but one proved to be especially crucial: whether their collective identity as former Muslims would ever permit their successful integration into a militantly Christian society.

The other “new Christians”

It is often forgotten that the moriscos were, along with the descendants of the Jews, the target of blood purity laws, and that they also were officially blocked from various forms of upward social and economic mobility. Muslims had long lived as legal subjects of all the Iberian kingdoms during the Middle Ages. During centuries the possibility of fleeing across borders to Islamic territories mitigated the increasingly harsh treatment the *mudéjares*, or Muslims living under Christian rule, received in the later Middle Ages. If anything, the Muslims had an outward focus or refuge that the Jews lacked, and were able to use that to their advantage despite the slow erosion of the Islamic presence in the peninsula.

The conquest of Granada by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492 was followed by no overt change in the traditional royal policy of official toleration of Islam. However, the monarchs soon launched a campaign to convert their Muslim subjects through preaching and other forms of missionary activity, which included discouraging the use of Arabic, along with traditional food, dress, and other signs of identity. The growing pressure eventually provoked a response in 1502, when the population of the largest Muslim neighbourhood in the city of Granada, known as the Albaicín, revolted against the increasingly harsh restrictions. This provided the Christian authorities, and the royal agent Archbishop Cisneros in particular, the pretext they needed to order the conversion to Christianity of all Muslims in the Crown of Castile. Those who refused to do so were forced into exile in North Africa. In the mid-1520s similar measures were decreed for the Muslims of the Crown of Aragon, most of whom lived in Valencia and Aragon proper in large rural communities under the jurisdiction of feudal lords who had little interest in disturbing the status quo. Forced

baptism was promoted there by local “Old Christians” who resented the Muslims as direct economic competitors willing to work for lower wages in exchange for the protection offered by the aristocratic landowners. The so-called *Germanies* (literally “brotherhoods”) revolt of 1519–1522 followed a familiar path of expressing opposition to feudal oppression by striking at their Muslim vassals. Imbued with much the same millenarian fervour found in the rest of Europe at this moment, the *agermanats*’ attacks on Muslim neighbourhoods and the murder of scores of local inhabitants led to widespread conversion by the survivors. After the revolt subsided and the former Muslims sought to return to their previous status, they met with strong opposition from the Inquisition and theologians who argued that the baptism, while occurring under duress, was nevertheless valid, thanks to the sacramental nature of the act. In 1526 king Charles V finally ratified this policy and extended it to all the remaining Muslims in the Crown of Aragon. This controversial decision brought the official existence of Islam in Spain to an end and inaugurated the so-called “morisco problem”.

Image 11.1 *The expulsion of the Moriscos. Vicente Carducho, ca. 1627*

Source: Museo del Prado, Madrid, Spain. Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain

The problem was in large measure the product of a war followed by colonisation. Most moriscos wished little more than to live in peace as far from the embrace of “Old Christians” as possible. Little tempted by assimilation, they preferred instead to be left alone. And in Granada and Valencia their opting for seclusion met with considerable success. Their relative isolation and the active connivance of their lords allowed them to continue to practice Islam (and to speak Arabic) fairly undisturbed. However, the situation was different in the rest of the peninsula. In Castile in particular the morisco population was considerably smaller, more dispersed, and above all more urban. As a result, far fewer moriscos there knew Arabic, and were more assimilated into the customs of Old Christian society.

Following several decades of uneasy truce, the Inquisition began in the 1540s to crack down on moriscos in both Castile and Aragon. The Holy Office pursued not only those who practiced or professed Islam, but also those who ate suspicious foods such as couscous, who fasted for the wrong reasons, who sat on the ground instead of in chairs, or who played traditional musical instruments and participated in ancestral dances. Even more compromising were those who celebrated the victories of Islam over Christianity in the hot and cold wars that

plagued the Mediterranean world throughout the sixteenth century. In short, any action or speech that the Inquisition interpreted as expressing or exalting a sense of communitarian identity that distinguished moriscos from the Christian majority was read as a sign of faith in Islam, and thus liable to vigilance and persecution. Particularly harsh punishments were meted out to moriscos who possessed books or manuscripts written in Arabic, or in *aljamía* (Spanish transliterated in Arabic script). Whether or not such texts promoted Islam, they were seen as promoting an identity that failed to adhere to that of a true, sincere Christian. What we would now refer to as “cultural difference” was then almost invariably condemned as a sign of heterodoxy.

Many moriscos did not meekly accept the forced conversions or the outlawing of their ancestral customs and language. The 1502 rebellion in Granada was followed by a similar revolt in the Espadán mountains in Valencia in the mid-1520s. But the greatest uprising took place in the mountains south of Granada in 1568–1570. The so-called Alpujarras War witnessed ferocious violence and numerous atrocities committed by both sides, including the widespread torture and martyrdom of Catholic clergy and the massacre of all the inhabitants of morisco villages. The collapse of order was such that Philip II was forced to bring veteran Spanish troops from Italy under the command of his half-brother Don Juan de Austria to quell the revolt. The aftermath was just as brutal: the king ordered the deportation of virtually the entire population of Granada’s moriscos—both those who rebelled and those who had remained loyal to the crown—to the rest of Castile. The exiles were scattered in small groups in towns and cities in northern Andalusia, La Mancha, and beyond. Above all, the violence left behind a deep fear of the moriscos as an internal enemy as determined and resourceful as were the Muslim pirates that attacked Spanish ships throughout the Mediterranean.

The possibility of ridding Spain of moriscos was first brought up in the Council of State in the early 1580s. Philip II—doubtless chastened by his earlier missteps in Granada—showed little sympathy for so extreme a measure, but his successor Philip III finally acquiesced to strong pressure from the clergy and others to order the expulsion of first the Valencian moriscos in 1609, and shortly thereafter those from the rest of Spain as well (García-Arenal and Wiegers 2014). While many factors intervened in this outcome, the most important was the invincible perception of so-called Old Christians that the formerly Muslim New Christians and their descendants could not be trusted to

be either loyal Spaniards or true Christians. Their final removal from Iberia signalled the creation —at last—of an exclusively Catholic polity, in practice as well as in theory. It also meant the constriction of “Spanish” identity to a single set of spiritual as well as political parameters.

The impact of the expulsion was as uneven as the sequence of events that had led to it. Not surprisingly, there were moriscos who were thoroughly assimilated and devout Christians, and some of them managed either to escape eviction or eventually to return to the peninsula following a prudent period abroad (Dadson 2014). Recent studies have also highlighted the existence of *morisco* elites at a local level. Their members played crucial roles in mobilising networks of support for the threatened moriscos, in addition to paying bribes in order to obtain special delays and concessions for themselves and others, and to expatriate morisco capital. Some even managed to turn the genealogical obsessions of Old Christian society in their favour. One especially telling example is that of the Granada-Venegas lineage. Like other members of the Nazirid aristocracy that ruled Granada prior to 1492, they had seized the opportunity to undergo baptism as Christians prior to the general orders to convert. From there they successfully married their way into the southern nobility, and even claimed for themselves the status of “Old Christians”. The Granada-Venegas commissioned an elaborate history of their lineage whose author dutifully held that they were not descended from moors but from “Moorish kings”, and that their lineage dated back to the pre-conquest Goths. Even more extraordinary, and most likely linked somehow with the same noble families from Muslim Granada, was the notorious forgery known as the “Lead Books” whose discovery in the 1590s led to the creation of the Sacromonte shrine in Granada (Harris 2007; García-Arenal and Rodríguez Mediano 2013). These referred to patently faked lead tablets written in a bizarre imitation of ancient Arabic script that purported to hail from a circle of Arabic-speaking early Christians who, after receiving a direct revelation (in Arabic!) from the Virgin Mary had accompanied the Apostle James in his mission to Spain, and who then were martyred by the Romans. The aim of this audacious fraud was to uncouple the Arabic language from Islam, to offer an alternative martyrdom to that of Christians killed by Muslims during the recent Alpujarras war, and to claim for early Hispanic Christianity an Arabic variant that would confer greater legitimacy on (and protection for) their morisco descendants. This was one of several attempts to depict Muslims not as external invaders, but

as ancient, “natural inhabitants” of Spain. This broadly based if doomed effort wound up producing one of the most interesting statements about identity written in early modern Iberia (Núñez Muley 2007). In an attempt to convince royal officials not to unleash the Inquisition on the moriscos, the Granadan noble Fernando Núñez Muley wrote a lengthy plea in 1567 that argued that “Moorish” language, dress, music, dances, and other customs were precisely that: customs that reflected popular traditions, not Islamic precepts. While the petition failed to prevent the crackdown that provoked the disastrous revolt of the following year, it did offer a remarkable exercise in early anthropology, based on a strikingly precocious recognition of the difference between social practices and religious rules, and their implications for the definition and representation of identities under conditions of extreme duress.

As in the case of the “New Jews” of Amsterdam—that is, the (largely Portuguese) conversos who in the seventeenth century returned to Jewish orthodoxy in the Dutch Republic, while retaining strong traces of their Iberian origins—the expelled moriscos emitted clear signals from their exile regarding the complexity of their identity and self-representation (Kaplan 2000; Bodian 1997). For example, those who wound up in Tunisia continued to speak Spanish for almost two centuries. The literature they wrote in that language provides an intriguing parallel to that of the Jews in Holland, in terms not only of language—many were fluent in Spanish as well as Portuguese—but also in lingering themes, stylistic devices, and background references. Both moreover expressed a fondness not only for poetry but also the contests known as “jousts”, and cited Lope de Vega as a favoured authority. Carrying such a background into exile was the rarest of compliments, and an eloquent testimony to how shared cultural references can equip a surprisingly broad range of individuals and groups with the fundamental instruments and modes of expression of their identities.

Afterword


Much more remains to be said about identity in early modern Iberia. This chapter has tried to convey some of the immense complexity of this issue. At the same time, it has underlined the singularity of the play of collective identities in the peninsula, and above all how its multi-religious medieval past and the means by which it was exorcised

in the early modern period created a situation at first sight far removed from that prevailing in the rest of Europe. Not that religious dissimulation and the imposition of orthodoxy by fire and blood were unknown elsewhere in the continent. The sufferings of the final adherents of minority faiths in Iberia pales in comparison with the far greater numbers of those persecuted by the rival Christian confessions in the rest of Europe, not to mention the tens of thousands of women executed north of the Pyrenees as witches. But few other countries had managed to entangle the different identities they housed so deeply, and then to unravel them into separate, even opposed strands. It took centuries to work out the implications, and even today, the peoples of Iberia continue to wrestle with the consequences.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

Black Africans in the Iberian peninsula (1400–1820)¹



Arlindo Caldeira and Antonio Feros

Introduction

The title of this chapter is “Black Africans in the Iberian peninsula”, rather than black slaves or slavery in Iberia. In contrast to other minorities in the peninsula—individuals with Jewish or Muslim ancestry—black Africans were seen as unequivocal outsiders, all of them without exception descended from sub-Saharan peoples forced into slavery in the peninsula since at least the late medieval period. For this reason, slavery in all its facets (numbers, legal status, views of slavery and of the enslaved, and the existence of a system of slavery that was according to many distinct from those of other regions) are important, and even central themes of this chapter. However, that is not to say that black Africans were present in the Iberian peninsula only as slaves. Scholars have increasingly drawn attention to the existence, at least since the sixteenth century, of a significant population of African freedmen. As a result, we will consider this group in relation to the dominant political, social, and cultural processes from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century. The goal is not only to understand the treatment of slaves, but also of freedmen, and the extent to which they were able to become part of the Spanish and Portuguese communities that were themselves in the process of being constructed during this period.

For too long, the subject of black Africans in the peninsula, and of slavery in general, was largely ignored by Luso-Spanish scholars. The reason for this was seemingly not the negligible numbers of slaves, and Africans more generally, in the Iberian peninsula from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. It was rather due to a kind of historical forgetting, which had assumed the status of a national myth: the belief that the enslavement and exploitation of thousands of black Africans had been an exclusively colonial problem, and never one of the metropolis. Also, and perhaps even more important, the Spaniards, but also the Portuguese, from the early nineteenth century onward fostered the myth that their populations were ethnically homogeneous, with no appreciable admixture of non-Iberian blood. As in many other respects, the Spanish and the Portuguese tended to fashion legends about their historical past, in this case eliding the history of slavery in the peninsula, as well as the discrimination against, and profoundly negative perceptions of black Africans and their descendants, or the contribution made by Africans to the formation of national communities.

The last two decades have seen a radical shift in this respect. In

recent years, numerous works on this subject have appeared, including attempts to comprehend the numbers of African slaves imported into the peninsula, their origins, their geographic concentration, rates of manumission, and the lives of those who attained their liberty. This new scholarship has also had to contend with the notion of alleged Iberian exceptionalism: the idea that the Hispanic system of slavery exhibited a tendency toward abolitionism long before those of other nations, and that this more liberal system gave slaves opportunities to obtain their freedom, and thus become integrated into Spanish society on their own terms. Some recent studies continue to insist on the relative “benevolence” of the Iberian system of slavery, but many others have demonstrated its no less insidious nature in terms of blocking avenues to freedom and impeding the integration of freedmen and their descendants.

Another recent development, in addition to general studies of the topic, has been the appearance of major studies of individual cities and regions of the peninsula. These works have made it possible to map urban slavery in the Iberian peninsula with some precision—the approximate total number of slaves in these regions, the number of slaves living in the largest cities, as well as the decline of slaveholding everywhere in the eighteenth century. There is a growing body of knowledge on the “confraternities of the blacks”, and other corporate institutions that served to defend their interests and sometimes enabled a measure of social integration. We are also increasingly familiar with early modern Spanish and Portuguese theologians and writers’ views on slavery, and slaves and non-Europeans in general. However, knowledge of rural slavery is still relatively scarce, or, to put it another way, “how slave experiences changed over time or varied between regions of the Iberian Peninsula”. Even more important, it is still unclear how “the many socioeconomic and political changes occurring in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries affected the institution of slavery and the status and treatment of slaves” (Blumenthal 2003, 1001). The same lack of knowledge applies to the process of transition between what has been referred to as the medieval Mediterranean model of slavery and the slave trade, and the early modern Atlantic system of slavery in which Portugal took the lead in the commerce in slaves originating mainly from sub-Saharan Africa. Not a great deal more is known about the wealth derived from the slave trade and the sale of slaves in local markets in the peninsula (Armenteros Martínez 2012, 101–102). Perhaps most importantly, we are largely ignorant of the ways in

which slaves and freedmen understood their condition and their role in the Iberian communities where they lived, worked, married, and died.

The studies produced in the last two decades have shown beyond any doubt that Spain and Portugal were not only actively involved in the introduction and exploitation of millions of African slaves in the Americas, but also in the European possessions of these monarchies. Moreover, having been the first to create slave systems on a massive scale, they were the last to support and implement the abolition of slavery, which would not take place in the Iberian colonies until the second half of the nineteenth century. As a Spanish scholar once remarked, “it is incumbent [on the Spaniards]”—and we may also add the Portuguese—“to study the origins of black slavery, which appeared in Spain before any other European country” (Cortés López 1986, 9).

The origins and development of slavery in the peninsula

There had been slaves in all the political communities into which the Iberian peninsula has been divided, in all periods of their history. Certainly, from the period of Roman domination, through the plethora of Christian and Muslim kingdoms that characterised the medieval political world, but also extending into the monarchies of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Slaves were present in greater or smaller numbers in all these territories, and at certain points in the course of this long stretch of time they were quite numerous, although in the peninsula—in contrast to the American territories under European domination—there were no slave societies.

The Iberian case is indeed exceptional when compared to other western European regions. In all of the latter slaves were present in large numbers, but until the late fifteenth century the majority were from eastern Europe and the Mediterranean hinterlands. Slavery in the Iberian peninsula itself changed over time and may be understood in terms of distinct phases. There is a clear break between slavery as it existed in the ancient and early modern periods, the first being a vestige of Roman tradition, the latter linked to overseas expansion. From the High Middle Ages onward the enslavement of Christians was no longer permissible (or only in exceptional cases, as punishment for particularly serious crimes) but the enslavement of and trade in

enslaved non-Christians continued to be legal. The Muslim conquest of Iberia initiated in 711, marked the beginning of a long period of eight centuries of intermittent warfare, during which the opposing side(s) served as the main source of slaves. Some of these slaves were prisoners of war, but the majority were captured in raids carried out by land or sea into enemy territory (Sweet 1997, 145–150). In 1217, when the Portuguese king Afonso II conquered the city of Alcácer do Sal from the Muslims, 3,000 of its inhabitants who had survived the siege were sold into slavery in Lisbon (Boissellier 1999, 364).

Until virtually the end of the medieval period, although following somewhat distinct chronologies in Portugal and the Spanish kingdoms, the vast majority of slaves were Muslims. In Portugal, where the conquest of the national territory was essentially complete by the middle of the thirteenth century, from that point onward and into the fourteenth century there was a decline in the number of slaves, although slavery did not disappear. The Portuguese would take advantage of every occasion when they lent military assistance to the kings of Castile, and that pitted them directly against Muslim armies, to replenish their supply of Saracen slaves. That is what happened in 1340, in the wake of the decisive battle of Río Salado against the Marinids. On the other hand, piracy and the activities of corsairs were on the rise in the Mediterranean, and one of the most sought-after prizes were precisely Moors of both sexes. However, violence was not the only means of obtaining slaves, as slaves were bought and sold in Lisbon as well as other Portuguese cities. Portuguese merchants in turn procured slaves in foreign markets—there is evidence of such commercial links with Barcelona and Valencia, two great Mediterranean entrepôts. It is highly likely that it is through these channels that the first black African slaves arrived in Portugal and other Christian Iberian kingdoms.

The slave system imposed in the Iberian peninsula and in Spanish America after 1500 was based on laws and frameworks dating back to medieval Spain. The laws on slavery included in the thirteenth-century *Siete Partidas* were supplemented by slave laws and regulations generated by local authorities in the peninsula, almost all of which aimed at imposing limits to slaves and freedmen. Slavery in the Spanish context was not considered a natural condition—there were no individuals who were destined to be slaves by nature—but rather slavery was seen as the consequence of particular life circumstances. Thus, the *Siete Partidas* held that “servitude is an agreement and regulation which people established in ancient times,

by means of which men who were originally free became slaves and were subjected to the authority of others, contrary to natural reason” (Fourth *Partida*, title XXI, law 1). As a result, there were laws to regulate the conditions under which an individual could be enslaved, legal precepts that would serve as the basis of critiques of certain aspects of the slave trade in the early modern period. According to the *Siete Partidas*, slaves could be prisoners taken in just wars, children of enslaved women, those condemned for certain crimes, or those who had been sold into slavery by their parents due to extreme poverty. Beginning in the fifteenth century, generally speaking, only the first two reasons were seen as a legal basis for enslavement. Equally important, the slaves were deprived not only of their independence, control over their own actions, but also power over “their own person” and even “all the earnings obtained by a slave, no matter how he obtains them, will belong to his master” (Fourth *Partida*, title XXI, law 7).

But these laws also stipulated that masters were obliged to attend to the needs of their slaves, not mistreat them, and were certainly forbidden from killing them without cause or the consent of a judge, unless “he [the slave] is found with his [the owner’s] wife, or his daughter, or had committed an equally grave error, in which case he may freely kill him”. Mistreatment without just cause was grounds for slaves to take their complaints to judicial authorities, who could rule that the slave should be sold to another master. In later times, the slaves also had the right to marry—a right protected by the church—although there is evidence that masters did their best to impede such unions. Legally, masters could not break up a slave family unit or sell one of the spouses, or the children of married slaves. As in other slave systems, the children acquired the legal status of the mother. They were considered slaves if the mother was enslaved, free if she was not. Slaves had to be baptised, and to receive some form of religious instruction, although as everyone hastened to point out, baptism was meant to free souls, not bodies. The Spanish system also provided for a number of ways to secure liberty. A slave could demonstrate that he or she had been unjustly enslaved, marry a free man or woman, become ordained as a priest or friar (although these provisions were abolished in the early modern period), secure his or her freedom in the master’s will, or purchase his or her liberty.

The history of slavery in the early modern Iberian world is undeniably complex. Slaves in the peninsula between 1400 and 1600 included Mudéjares (unconverted Muslims) living in Christian

territories, inhabitants of the Muslim kingdom of Granada, Albanians, Greeks, Slavs, and other individuals of European extraction generally found on the Mediterranean slave market. To these were added Moriscos (converted Muslims), Jews from Northern Africa, Amerindians, and Asians. They exhibited a great diversity of skin colours, from pallid white to black and all shades in between (Martín Casares 2014). However, although Moorish, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and Javanese, and slaves of many other origins could be seen on the streets of Portuguese and Spanish cities from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, over the course of these three centuries by far the largest number of slaves in the peninsula had their origin in sub-Saharan Africa, and especially its west coast.

Although there had been black slaves in the peninsula during the medieval period—many of them brought by Muslim merchants and officials—beginning in the fifteenth century the Portuguese and the Spanish became directly involved in the capture and sale of slaves from sub-Saharan Africa. Alongside their incursions and territorial conquests in Morocco, the Portuguese in their caravels were inching their way southwards along the African littoral. The first tangible result of these voyages was the arrival, in 1444, in the port of Lagos, at the southern extremity of Portugal, of the first large contingent of slaves—around 250 men, women, and children captured on the coast of Arguim (modern day Mauritania). In this case, these were still enslaved “moors” (bereberes/ azenegues), some of them white-skinned, but that same year, 1444, Portuguese ships reached as far as the Senegal river, and thenceforth, as they proceeded further down Africa’s western shore, the number of black Africans brought over as slaves increased exponentially, initially captured along the coast, and from the middle of the fifteenth century purchased through agreements with local authorities. The Spanish case was similar. There are numerous reports of the presence of “black” slaves, sometimes in very large numbers, in the Canary Islands, Seville, Valencia, and other cities from the mid-fifteenth century.

During the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, slaves obtained on the African coast by Portuguese merchants were mainly destined for Europe and the Atlantic islands where sugar production had been introduced (Madeira, the Canaries, São Tomé). Large numbers of slaves were also re-exported from Portugal to Spain, the Italian states, and northern Europe. Starting in the early years of the sixteenth century, some of the slaves who arrived in Spain were subsequently re-embarked at Seville and Cadiz bound for Spanish America. Direct

export of African slaves to the Spanish American colonies was authorised around 1520, with Cape Verde and São Tomé archipelagos becoming the main outposts where Portuguese (and some Spanish) ships took on their human cargoes. Thenceforth Portugal was, at best, a secondary port of arrival for the slave trade, so that in the second half of the sixteenth century slaves arrived only sporadically as part of mixed ship cargoes: slaves, hides, and cotton from Cape Verde; slaves, sugar, and timber from the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, direct trade between Portugal and the African continent had virtually ceased (except for smaller vessels arriving from Cape Verde or Cacheu, in Guinea), and the slaves disembarking in Portugal during this period arrived mainly as “secondary goods”, in the ships of the *Carreira da Índia* or the inbound fleets from Brazil. Some of these slaves were still making their way to Spanish markets, ending up in different Spanish cities, or the trade fairs of some of the frontier settlements, such as Zafra (Periáñez 2008, 165–175). Nevertheless, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the vast majority of black slaves had been born in the peninsula.

Black slaves’ numbers and lives

From the early sixteenth century, African slaves could be found in greater or smaller numbers scattered throughout the Iberian peninsula. Given the lack of evidence, it is hard to be very precise about the total number of African slaves who landed in Portugal and Spain during more than three centuries, but it is estimated that between 2,000 and 3,000 slaves arrived annually in the period between 1450 and 1550, and a total of around 400,000 for the whole period from 1450 to 1750, including both legal and contraband shipments (Caldeira 2017, 135–136). Alessandro Stella has calculated that around 700,000 to 800,000 African slaves passed through the Iberian peninsula during this time, around half of whom (350,000 to 400,000) remained in Portugal, and a similar number in the Spanish kingdoms, but in that case the number of arrivals in Portuguese ports must have been higher than stated above, given that a significant percentage of all slaves arriving in the peninsula came through Portugal (Stella 2000a, 64–79). There seems to be general agreement that, at least with regard to the Spanish kingdoms, it is possible to discern three distinct stages: the sixteenth century, during which the

importation of sub-Saharan slaves was steadily growing in importance; the seventeenth century, or at least its first six decades, when the vast majority of all slaves in the Iberian peninsula were of sub-Saharan origin; and from the closing decades of that century until the end of the eighteenth, when the number of slaves arriving in the peninsula was greatly reduced, and virtually negligible. In Portugal, the preponderance of slaves of sub-Saharan origin was evident much earlier and can be traced back to the first decades of the sixteenth century.

In both Portugal and Spain, slavery was essentially an urban phenomenon. In the rural regions of the peninsula, it seems that the presence of slaves was rarely noted, although our knowledge of rural slavery is still relatively scant (Andújar Castillo 1999, 8). There were major concentrations of black slaves in the large Mediterranean and Atlantic port cities, in Alentejo, Algarve, and Andalusia, and the frontier regions of between Portugal and Castile (for instance, in Extremadura). The presence of slaves was especially notable in some of the most important urban centres in both monarchies: the capitals, Lisbon and Madrid, the city of Évora, where the Portuguese kings and their court often took up residence in the sixteenth century; Lagos and Portimão, in the Algarve; Seville, the great commercial hub, with links to other parts of Europe, north Africa, and the Americas; as well as Cadiz, Valencia, Granada, Barcelona, and other large cities. The case of Barcelona is notable because in the transition from the Mediterranean model of slavery—when the majority of slaves were from the Mediterranean region—to the Atlantic model, marked by the preponderance of enslaved Africans, Barcelona's role as a major Iberian slave market declined, and its place was taken by Valencia.

Image 12.1 View of a square with the King's Fountain in Lisbon, ca. 1570–1588.
Chafariz d'el Rey in the Alfama District

Source: Courtesy Associação de Coleções—The Berardo Collection

The presence of black slaves in many of these cities was mentioned by contemporary observers, some of whom were astonished by the sight. In 1533, the Flemish humanist Nicolaus Clenardus, recently arrived from northern Europe, was immediately taken aback: “I had scarcely set foot in Évora, when I felt myself transported to an infernal city: there were blacks everywhere.” A few months later, he was in Lisbon: “The place is swarming with blacks. All services are performed by captive blacks and moors. ... It seems to me that in Lisbon there are more male and female slaves than Portuguese of free status” (cit.

Cerejeira 1926, Vol. I: 253, 258). Almost 50 years later, an anonymous Italian traveller assured his readers that “the slaves are so numerous, mainly Ethiopes [sub-Saharan Africans], that the cities resemble chessboards, for there are as many whites as blacks” (Marques 1987, 127–245).

These reports are, however, somewhat exaggerated. Based on the first population count in Lisbon, carried out in 1551 on the orders of the city’s archbishop, its total population of just around 100,000 inhabitants included 9,950 slaves—around 10% (Oliveira 1987, 101). Meanwhile, based on studies of the sixteenth-century baptismal records of some parishes of the Portuguese capital, the number of baptised slaves as a proportion of the total was generally below 10%, the only exception being the parish of Santa Cruz do Castelo, where there was a high concentration of aristocratic households. In other words, for sixteenth-century Lisbon at least, this percentage seems like a reasonably accurate estimate. In the rest of the country, these percentages were attained or even surpassed in some towns in the Alentejo or the Algarve (the southern half of Portugal), but even in these regions the overall average was lower: 8.4% in the Algarve, and 6.4% in the Lower Alentejo (Fonseca 2010, 90–100). In the centre and north of Portugal the numbers, as far as they are known, were significantly lower. Most of the sources for these regions point to a steady decline in the number of slaves over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, due to lower numbers of arrivals, combined with high mortality and low fertility among the slave population. It therefore seems reasonable to estimate that slaves made up between 3% and 5% of the population of Portugal in the sixteenth century, and between 3% and 4% in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, albeit by then including slaves and freedmen.

The situation in the peninsular kingdoms of the Spanish monarchy resembled that of Portugal in many respects. However, unlike in Portugal, the majority of slaves were found not in the capital, Madrid, but in some of the other large cities. In Seville, for instance, the 1565 census recorded the presence of just over 6,000 slaves, or 13.5% of the city’s population (Lobo Cabrera 2001, 543). In the case of Seville, slaves of sub-Saharan origin were already the most numerous in the early sixteenth century (61.4% in 1500–1525) and became even more preponderant in subsequent decades (Pérez García and Fernández Chaves 2015, 720–722). In the sixteenth century, there were also significant numbers of slaves (around 5–10% of the total population) in other Spanish cities, such as Valencia—the most important slave-

market, surpassed only by Lisbon in the peninsula—Mallorca, the Canary Islands, Malaga, Cadiz, Caceres, and many others. In Cadiz, for which detailed studies exist, the number of baptised slaves as a proportion of the total of those who received the sacrament ranged from more than 15% in the first half of the seventeenth century, 12% in the second half, and less than 4% in the eighteenth century (Morgado García 2013, 127–147). Scholars have made the general distinction between Andalusia, which had the greatest concentration of slaves, other regions where slaves were less numerous but still present in significant numbers—Valencia and Madrid, once the latter became the seat of the royal court, as well as Toledo, Valladolid, Murcia, and Extremadura—and the rest of Spain where few if any slaves were to be found (Periáñez Gómez 2008, 37–38).

With regard to slave owners and the average number of slaves per household, there were broad similarities between Portugal and the Spanish peninsular kingdoms. In the large cities, where the majority of slaves were concentrated, most of the slave owners were members of the nobility (beginning with the royal family), sections of the clergy, religious institutions, royal officials, and merchants. Outside the main urban centres, landowners stood out as the major slave owners. However, slave ownership was not restricted to certain social groups, for there were slave owners among the humbler classes, and even some former slaves. On the other hand, it was relatively uncommon for an individual to own large numbers of slaves, and those who did were almost invariably nobles. In 1563, the Duke of Braganza, Dom Teodósio, left 48 slaves in his testament; in 1728, there were 15 slaves in the household of the *fidalgo* Aires de Saldanha de Albuquerque; and, in 1754 the Count of Ribera Grande, Dom José da Câmara, had 23 slaves in his service. These numbers in turn seem relatively modest in comparison with some of the Castilian nobility: in 1507, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, Don Juan de Guzmán, had 248 slaves, and a few decades later, Doña Catalina de Ribera, Duchess de Medinaceli, had 93 (Fonseca 2010, 226). In a 1720–1721 sample of 24 rural and urban southern Portuguese parishes, out of a total of 4,850 hearths, and 18,950 inhabitants, only 183 households (3.8%) possessed slaves. Of these, 65% owned no more than one or two slaves, and only 15 individuals (8%) owned six slaves or more (Caldeira 2017, 126). In the Canaries, 85% of slave owners had between one and five slaves, and only 1.3% owned between 15 and 23 slaves (Lobo Cabrera and Díaz Hernández 1984, 234). In the case of Extremadura, almost 55% of the owners had only one slave, and less than 5% owned between 5

and 9 (Periáñez Gómez 2008, 230).

Although slaves were to be found in nearly all occupations, the majority of enslaved women as well as some men, in both rural and urban settings, worked as domestic servants. This predominantly domestic nature of slave labour may explain why in the Iberian peninsula, unlike in the colonial context, enslaved women were more numerous than men. However, it should be kept in mind that during the *Ancien Régime*, unlike today, domestic service comprised a much wider range of duties and tasks, including some that were productive in character. In the urban centres, many slaves, known as the “*escravos de soldo*” or “*esclavos de ganancia*” (“wage-earning slaves”), did not work directly for their masters. They placed themselves in the service of third parties, in principle earning a salary comparable to that of free workers. The difference was that these wages belonged to the slave’s owner, who in turn spent only a small fraction of the money for the sustenance of the one who had earned it with her or his labour. There was thus a symbiosis between slavery and wage labour, but with servile status being more significant.

It was under these conditions that many enslaved women were employed as water carriers and water sellers, and in the removal of all kinds of waste. In the case of the Spanish peninsular kingdoms, enslaved women also worked in the manufacturing sector (especially textiles and leather), in taverns and inns, and as agricultural workers (García Barranco 2011, 8). Many slaves also worked as *stevedores* in the ports, warehouses, and marketplaces, or for instance in Lisbon’s royal industrial facilities, such as the *tercenas* shipyard (which housed a foundry for cannons, anchors, and other paraphernalia of naval warfare), the Ribeira das Naus shipyard, the rope yard (where the rigging for the ships was made), the grain mills and ovens of the Vale de Zebro (where the ship’s biscuit was prepared and baked). The slaves who belonged to landowners were used in agricultural work but always alongside free labourers (servants). There are no known cases of farm enterprises that relied exclusively on slave labour, and those where slaves outnumbered servants were rare.

Although all slaves suffered the brutalities and indignities of slavery, the ordeals of enslaved women were greater inasmuch as many of them were also victims of sexual violence. Raped repeatedly, sometimes by other slaves or free servants, but in most cases by their masters, or not infrequently used as concubines by owners belonging to all social strata, enslaved women were captives in a double sense: as forced labourers and sexual slaves. The church synod of Badajoz,

convened in 1671, acknowledged as much, electing to impose harsh sanctions on those who “cohabited with their slaves”, because the situation was becoming intolerable: “some are bought for the purpose of being misused, while others consent to being concubines in the interests of the children which they bear to [their owners] ... and there are those who keep them like cattle on a farm and use them as such” (cit. Perriáñez Gómez 2008, 96; García Barranco 2011). As in other territories of the Iberian monarchies, a study of marriage records reveals that the majority of slaves and freedmen and women married persons of the same colour and status. Further proof of this is the number of births out of wedlock, with a high proportion of illegitimate children born to enslaved women, all, or nearly all of them of mixed blood. Many of these offspring were the result of the sexual exploitation of enslaved women, including those owned by the clergy. The situation was no different in Portugal, where studies have shown a similarly high rate of illegitimacy.

The growing presence of slaves from sub-Saharan Africa led to changes in the language used to describe slaves, a process sometimes referred to as the Africanisation of slavery, or the convergence of “African” and “slave”. The gradual disappearance of slaves from other regions left the African continent as the only source of slaves. Consequently, the terms black and slave became confounded, almost synonymous, in the Iberian world. The very title of a play, associated with the playwright Antonio Mira de Amescua and probably written in the 1620s, clearly shows this link: *The Best Master's Black* (*El negro del mejor amo*), a work that could have been titled *The Best Master's Slave*.

Moreover, alongside this process of the Africanisation, or blackening of the slave, there were changes in the very meaning of slavery itself, or the rationale for its existence, as well as intense reflection on the character of black slaves, and, more importantly, the possibility of the future integration of their descendants into the Luso-Hispanic communities. On this point, various Iberian theologians and writers saw the alleged backwardness of the blacks as the direct consequence of slavery, rather than the result of inherent nature and characteristics of these people. On both sides of the Atlantic there were those who argued that the only obstacle to the advancement and social integration of the Africans was their slave status. If they were only offered a means to attaining their freedom, and receive an education, the Africans would show the same intellectual capacity for progress, and the same aptitude for becoming fully fledged citizens of Iberian communities as other groups.

Belief in the Africans' greater capacity for conversion to Christianity led some writers to contrast them positively with indigenous Americans, Jews, Muslims, and even European protestants, because, unlike all of the latter, the Africans were seen as a blank slate, with no beliefs prior to their acceptance of Christianity, and thus more immune to backsliding. This enthusiasm was expressed in the words of Pellicer de Tovar, for whom the Africans were "docile sheep and hearts of wax upon which the mark of truth is easily impressed and remains indelible thereafter". Pellicer and many others also speculated on the Africans' potential to become civilised, their ability to learn the Spanish language, so that their children may be educated with those of Indians and Spaniards. The Africans were still "uncultured and crude", but this was due to being uneducated, and not because they lacked the natural capacity for improvement (Pellicer de Tovar 1649, fols. 14v–15r, 24r). The Jesuit José de Acosta was even more emphatic, arguing that education rather than natural characteristics determined the progress of peoples and nations, and pointed to the Africans as evidence:

There seems to be nothing baser than the descendants of the Ethiopes; yet even they, if educated in a palace, become so alert, quick-witted, and capable of performing any task, so that if it were not for their colour, they would be taken for one of us.

(Acosta 1984, Vol. 1, 151)

There were, especially in the theatre, slaves who demonstrated the potential for improvement once they found themselves living among Christians in Spain or Portugal. However, these enlightened individuals were the exception, and far from being representative of most of the African population—or those of African descent—in the peninsula. The majority, both real and fictional individuals, were subjected to deeply paternalistic attitudes, and overwhelmingly negative public perceptions. In theatrical works, poetry, novels, and many other literary genres, the impression given to audience and readers was one of slaves whose speech was unintelligible, and who could not be assimilated, individuals who were not only fully conscious of their status as slaves, but above all of their "natural inferiority" manifest in their skin colour, their slave condition, but also their repeated failure to overcome their primitive nature. One of the most consistent features of the portrayals of African slaves in Iberian literary works was their infantilisation: the blacks were like

overgrown children, unable to think for themselves, to think about the future, or exercise self-control.

For the most part authors gave a voice to the African slave not to affirm their humanity and their potential for progress, but in order to ridicule them, and render them spokespeople for their own inferiority. Hence the proliferation in many literary and theological works of a type of black character who has not only internalised their inferiority, but who also makes it public—not least through the external markers of this inferiority: skin colour, physical ugliness compared with the inhabitants of the peninsula, their inability to express themselves in Castilian or Portuguese, and their incapacity for articulating complex ideas—not as the product of their civil status as slaves but rather of their natural state in some sense, and thus unchangeable (Morgado García 2013, 25–50; Fra Molinero 1995, 2014; and Tinhorão 1988, 233–269). There are few more striking examples of this negative image, and its persistence over centuries, than the poem by Francisco de Quevedo, “Boda de negros” (1610s), and the “Nueva relación y curioso romance, que se refiere la celebridad, galanteo y acaso de una boda de negros que se executó en la ciudad del Puerto de Santa María” (written in the late 1700s and published in the first decades of the nineteenth century), both of which rank among the most profoundly derogatory texts written about black Africans.

Despite this overview of the situation in the Iberian peninsula, it should not be concluded that slaves had no agency, that they were incapable of defending themselves and their rights. In contrast to the colonies, where their numbers were far greater, slaves in the Iberian peninsula were far more likely to defend their rights in the courts. The *Siete Partidas*, but also church doctrine, stipulated that slaves had the right to raise complaints against masters who abused them or exploited them beyond legally sanctioned limits. Slaves were also permitted to marry, a right that could not be legally denied by either masters or the authorities, ecclesiastical or secular. We know that there was a great deal of opposition to these marital unions, as well as slave family formation, but historians have also shown that slaves fiercely defended these legal rights (McKinley 2016). One of the most revealing texts in this regard is *Entremés de los negros* (1602), by Simón Aguado, whose slave protagonists Dominga and Gaspar are able to marry and establish a family despite vehement resistance from their respective owners, and they did so with the help of the slave community (Martín Casares 2010). As Stella has shown by publishing a diverse collection of judicial and legal documents, slaves—and

especially enslaved women—were quite adept at defending their rights in the Spanish courts (Stella 2000b). Escape was one of the more desperate acts of resistance against the arbitrary power of masters. Although fraught with risk (the punishment was severe) and not very likely to succeed—in the peninsula at any rate—thousands of slaves nevertheless attempted to attain freedom this way over the centuries.

In contrast to the colonial territories, where slaves and freedmen played an important role in regional and local defence, very little is known about the formation of slave and freedmen militias in the Iberian context. Although scattered, oblique references to such units in Cadiz and elsewhere have surfaced, but historians have yet to uncover documents pertaining directly to these militias, and there has been no concerted attempt to verify their existence (Morgado García 2013, 314). On the other hand, the existence of black or *mestizo* lay religious confraternities is well-attested in many cities with a significant slave population, especially in the south of Portugal and Spain. Some of these were the result of initiatives emanating from the secular or ecclesiastical authorities, but many others were the product of efforts by “black men” themselves. The oldest, the Irmandade de Nossa Senhora do Rosário dos Homens Pretos (Brotherhood of Our Lady of the Rosary of Black Men), was founded in Lisbon in 1460. Like other such associations of laymen, their purpose was incorporate its members into the civic religious rituals that were such a prominent feature of the early modern period. But they also served as mutual aid societies among their members, assuming as one of its main tasks the defence of the interests of “enslaved brothers”, such as securing their liberty, especially for those who were being mistreated (Mira Caballos 2014; Lahon, 2003; Fonseca, 2016). For the majority of Africans, and especially the slaves, religion was a palliative amid the daily struggle against a strange and almost invariably hostile world. While forms of magical ritualism and religious syncretism flourished—and were viewed with great suspicion by the Inquisition—more orthodox forms of Catholicism also undeniably took root. The fact that songs and dances of African origin were incorporated into some of the religious festivities, with the consent of some sectors of the Catholic Church, at least partly explains this adherence to the official faith. These songs and dances were a central feature of African sociability, and in towns with significant populations of African descent, it was not uncommon for public squares and open spaces to become gathering places, transformed, on Sundays and holy days, with the colours and sounds

Manumission and integration

According to Debra Blumenthal, slavery in the Iberian peninsula in the Middle Ages was “an institution regulated by a well-defined set of legal procedures”, and the same may be said about slavery in the early modern period (Blumenthal 2000, 24). One of these procedures, more or less regulated, was the manumission of the slave. Only the slave’s owner had the power to release him or her from servitude through manumission (*alforría*), either in testamentary dispositions or the granting of a “carta (letter) de alforria”. There were many possible motives for granting manumission—a voluntary decision by the master to free his slaves, the purchase of his or her own liberty by the slave, the demand by a slave for the fulfilment of a promise of liberty, or because of abuse suffered, or if the slave could prove that he or she had been unjustly enslaved. In Valencia, from the early fifteenth century to the early sixteenth, Blumenthal has located 82 documents in which slaves were petitioning for their freedom. Half of these were from slaves who denied the legitimacy of their enslavement; the rest were slaves attempting to prove that their masters had promised to grant their freedom and had failed to do so (Blumenthal 2009, ch. 6).

The path to obtaining manumission was fraught with obstacles, as numerous studies have shown. Even in cases where masters had elected to free their slaves, this decision would frequently be disputed by the relatives, and the slaves in question were forced to take the matter to court. In many other cases it was the slaves themselves who took the initiative, but this usually involved having to purchase one’s freedom—and it took some time to raise the required sums. On the other hand, manumission was often a poisoned chalice, for instance when the master chose to free his slave once the latter was too frail or too old as a means of getting rid of one who could no longer work. The slaves belonging to the king or the royal family were most likely to be manumitted. On her death in 1578, Catherine of Austria, widow of the Portuguese king João III, left all her slaves “free and manumitted”, while in his testament, king Pedro II (1683–1706) likewise ordered all his slaves to be freed.

It is not easy to ascertain the number of slaves freed in Portugal in the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. A census of all the *moradores* (householders) of Lisbon was commissioned in 1565 for

the purposes of levying an extraordinary tax (from which the nobility and the clergy were exempt, and therefore not included in the count). Among a total of 15,056 potential taxpayers, there were 262 black and *mulatto* heads of household (1.7%), not all of them necessarily former slaves, concentrated in some of the city's poorest parishes (Coelho 1999, 157). It is safe to assume that this percentage only increased over the next two centuries, certainly in the great urban centres, which freedmen were overwhelmingly drawn to, and Lisbon in particular.

On the other hand, Stella and other scholars have demonstrated that only a tiny minority of slaves ever won their freedom. All the studies thus far have shown that slaves invariably outnumbered freedmen, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, the total number of slaves was in decline, as well as the number of those who owned at least one slave, but the number of freedmen was always relatively low. In Cadiz, for instance, in the first half of the eighteenth century, no more than 5% of all testators who owned slaves granted them manumission (Morgado García 2013, 223). If other types of sources are taken into account, and not only slave-owners' testaments, it may be that the number of freedmen was higher than 5%, especially in the eighteenth century. In the case of one region of Extremadura, fewer than 200 slaves were freed even though several thousand are known to have lived there during the early modern period (Mira Caballos 2016, 301). However, in Cadiz, for which a number of studies exist, at least 642 letters of manumission were issued in the period from 1600 to 1750—441 in the seventeenth century, and 201 in the first half of the eighteenth, which translates into 13% of all purchases of slaves for the seventeenth century, and as high as 80% for the eighteenth century, when the total number of slaves had been reduced to virtually nothing (Morgado García 2013, 287; Periañez Gómez 2008, 457, 469, 488, 492–496). Elsewhere, the situation was somewhat different, such as for instance in the Canaries, where as many as 29% of slaves were granted their freedom, the majority of them women, although it's unclear how many of them were of sub-Saharan African origin. At the time, freedmen of all ethnic origins made up around 3% of the total population (Lobo Cabrera 1983, 43).

Integration, in terms of being considered as one among the many peoples that made up the population of the Iberian peninsula, possessing the same rights as other members of the communities where they happened to live, was a remote and unlikely prospect. The

reasons for this were many. First, despite the letter of manumission, and not unlike a freedman in ancient Rome, the “manumitted slave” was not exactly a free man or woman; rather, according to the royal Ordinances, he or she continued to owe respect and gratitude to the old master, who in turn had the power, in theory at least, to return the freed slave to his former status (*Ordenações Filipinas* IV, 68; Periañez Gómez 2014). Indeed, local ordinances often regulated not only the public life of slaves, but also of the recently freed, limiting their freedom of movement.

More important was the fact that they never stopped being slaves or considered as such. In the eyes of contemporaries, a former slave never ceased to be one, because servitude was impressed on the spirit, and on the body through skin colour. In many regions, the majority of freed slaves were *mulatto* women, while black women or men were least numerous (Periañez Gómez 2014, 136). According to Aurelia Martín Casares, “emancipated slaves were fatally stigmatised by their past”. In virtually all the documents where they are mentioned, a freedman is referred to as one “who is free and was a slave, or recently freed from slavery” and this circumstance is noted in many other cases, even with regard to individuals who were born free to parents who had once been enslaved (Martín Casares 2005, 252; Periañez Gómez 2008, 492).

It is precisely because of this marginalisation, the exclusion of freedmen from most occupations and public offices, which makes it so difficult to reconstruct the lives of these individuals. Only when they ran afoul of the law, or when freedmen (or their descendants) filed complaints or petitions of their own, they left traces that historians are able to follow up (Periañez Gómez 2008, 492). More than anything, it was their past as slaves, or the descendants of slaves, that conditioned the generally wretched lives of freedmen, especially men. To be sure, some managed to integrate, and even to become persons of note in their towns and cities, while others married or mixed with slaves and freedmen from other regions—North Africa, former Moriscos—and thus rendered themselves biologically “invisible” (Lobo Cabrera 1983, 17–18). Meanwhile, blacks in Cadiz filed petitions demanding access to various occupations, arguing that as a result of being marginalised they were driven to rely on public charity, or else turn to crime. King Charles III himself sent a letter to the city’s governor ordering him to

protect and support the blacks by enabling them to gain admission to all the occupations [that exist] in the republic

[city], so that through their labour they may earn their daily sustenance and thus abstain from idleness, beggary, and other attendant vices.

(Morgado García 2013, 314)

Although freedmen faced many obstacles in trying to integrate into society, there were exceptions: the New Christian merchant António Gomes de Elvas purchased and subsequently freed the slave Manuel, who was said to have been his half-brother, for he was the product of a relationship between António's father and another master's slave. Manuel was allowed to use the family name, and in due course became a prosperous international merchant and banker in his own right, receiving in 1606 the title of a *fidalgo* of the Royal Household from King Philip III (Abecasis 2017, 57–61). Likewise, at the court of the sixteenth-century Portuguese King João III, the black former slave João de Sá, celebrated for his witticisms, was granted the title of *cavaleiro* (knight) that enabled him to ride on horseback through the streets of Lisbon, wearing the habit of the Military Order of Santiago. There were many other examples of illustrious black men and women—individuals like Juan Latino (freedman and poet), Juan de Pareja (freedman and painter), Antonio Machuca (freedman and celebrated entrepreneur), Elena/o de Céspedes (famous in her own time not only as a free woman, but also for having been accused of witchcraft and pretending to be a hermaphrodite), or Teresa Juliana de Santo Domingo (freedwoman and nun). Finally, the children of slave owners and their female slaves, some of whom were mentioned above, found it much easier to integrate.

Image 12.2A seventeenth-century engraving representing a Black man called Juan de Alba, represented as a knight of a military order. He is the main character of the following piece: *Romance de los valerosos hechos de el Valiente Negro en Flandes, llamado Juan de Alva* (Seville, Herederos de Tomás López de Haro, en calle de Génova [ca. 1690])

Source: Private collection, Madrid, Spain

In any case, these were exceptional cases. Many of the “ordinary” freedmen chose to stay in the service of their former masters or their descendants, performing the same functions as before, but for a salary. A popular theatrical work published in 1787, titled “O contentamento dos pretos” (“The Contentment of the Blacks”), showed a slave couple at the point of receiving their freedom, joyful because they would be allowed to continue serving their masters, thenceforth as servants (*Novo e divertido entremez* 1787). When this was not an option,

integration was easiest for those who married free individuals, or who were skilled in some craft. The rest found it extremely difficult to find paid work, and many flocked to the great urban centres, where they survived by doing odd jobs, through begging, or petty crime.

Poor, uprooted, and vulnerable, freedmen and women were seen by the dominant society as drunks, thieves, or prostitutes, as evinced by the documents and the literature of the period. In a dramatic work by Gil Vicente, *Clérigo da Beira* (1526), the freed black character is said to be an irremediable thief. There are cases of owners who apologise for not freeing their slaves because that would mean condemning them to prison or to the gallows, and several Portuguese municipal governments restricted the settlement of freedmen without a fixed occupation in their territory (Caldeira 2017, 406–407).

The formation of stable families was no easier for freedmen than it had been when they were slaves. In Cadiz, for instance, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some 1,800 marriages were recorded in which at least one of the partners was a slave, while 1,126 children of slaves were baptised, which means an average of only 0.6 children per married couple. Many of the children born to slave fathers or mothers, and to freedmen or freedwomen, were born out of wedlock (Morgado García 2013, 231–240). It has also been established that fertility rates among enslaved women were low, even in relation to the average, probably no more than one or two children at most. One of the explanations that has been put forward for this phenomenon is that the vast majority of freed slaves were either very young, or very old, and in both cases the available evidence indicates that their fertility was lower in comparison with other demographic groups (Martín Casares 1999, ch. 9).

The number of slaves sharply declined from the middle of the eighteenth century. This was clearly the case in Portugal, where the laws of 1761 and 1773 introduced by the Marquis of Pombal, King José I's minister, resulted in the rapid fall in the number of slaves and a corresponding, albeit temporary, rise in the number of freed blacks and *mestiços*. At a time when the importation of new slaves into Portugal was already significantly reduced, the law of 19 September 1761 strictly forbade new arrivals. Thus, all the "blacks and black women" brought thenceforth from America, Africa, and Asia would be considered free immediately upon their arrival in any of the kingdom's ports, without the need for a letter of manumission or any other formality. On the other hand, the law of 16 January 1773 was a kind of "law of the free womb", although it went even further,

granting liberty not only to those born to slave mothers, but also those whose slave status derived from at least their great-grandparents. The only ones who remained slaves were those unable to prove this ancestry, but their condition was not passed onto their progeny. According to this legislation, former slaves were to be considered “suitable for all offices, honours, dignities, without the distinguishing mark of *Freedmen*, which the superstition of the Romans introduced into their customs, and which Christian union and civil society today renders intolerable” (Silva 1829, 640). The law was no doubt well-intended, but its impact was limited. The number of slaves in Spain also fell as a result of the changes in Portugal, but the number of freedmen was also falling at this time, in many cases reduced to nothing.

Conclusion

In Portugal, the law of 1773 did not signal the end of slavery. Aside from those who were not freed as a consequence of this law (whom their owners were allowed to keep as slaves while they lived), other slaves arrived as contraband or following special dispensations, as happened in 1822 with the return of many Portuguese following the Brazilian declaration of independence. Officially, slavery was prohibited in Portugal in 1869, at the same time as in the overseas territories, although by then there were scarcely any slaves left in the metropolis. The situation in Spain was very similar. Although a minority of the Spanish elite seem to have taken an interest in the ongoing debates around abolition of slavery in England, and at various points in the nineteenth century there was some discussion in the Spanish parliament on the issue of abolition—initially of the slave trade, and then slavery itself—slavery in peninsular Spain was not officially abolished until 1837, although by that point, as in Portugal, there were few slaves left (Morgado García 2013, 50–66; Galván Rodríguez 2014).

The nineteenth century also witnessed the progressive disappearance of the population of freed black Africans in Portugal. The *mestiços*, most of them the product of relations between black women and white men, when they were recognised by their fathers were absorbed by the dominant society through a process of real or symbolic “whitening”. Other factors may help explain the disappearance of the rest of the African community, or those of

African ancestry. A perhaps unlikely source provides a snapshot of this community: the burial register of one of the largest cemeteries in Lisbon, the eastern cemetery (Alto de São João), in the period from 1840 to 1900 (Neto 1994, 1–14). During this period, 738 black and (only) 57 *mestiços* were buried there. The most common type of burial confirms the image of poverty that characterised this community: only two individuals were laid to rest in vaults, and 93 in individual graves. The remaining 700, that is to say, more than 88%, were buried in common graves. When the occupations of the deceased are mentioned, we find that they are not very different from those performed by slaves. In the case of men, 78 (29.5%) were servants and cooks, 63 (23.9%) were manual workers and wage labourers, 18 (6.8%) beggars and vagrants. With regard to women, 190, or 72.5%, were most likely servants, followed by beggars and vagrants, 45 (17.2%).

There is yet another revealing number: of all the black women and *mestiças* buried in this cemetery, 74.4% (three in four) died single. Since many of them were domestic servants, this would seem to be the result of pressure from employers, and although being single was not an impediment to having children (even by one's employer), the fertility rate among these women was low. Combined with a very high mortality rate (greater than among the white population), it is hardly surprising that the population of African descent, not being replenished by new arrivals from abroad, suffered a precipitous decline. Until the middle of the nineteenth century a brotherhood of black men still existed in Lisbon, and festivities invoking the kings of the Congo were still being organised. However, by the turn of the twentieth century, despite the colonial empire, black Africans had almost disappeared from the streets of the Portuguese capital, and there remained only vestiges of small African communities in two or three rural towns in southern Portugal.

No such accurate information about the descendants of freedmen exists for nineteenth- and twentieth-century Spain. However, there is every indication that most of them died without leaving descendants, whether black nor *mestizo*. Others, as in the case of Portugal, ended up being absorbed into the white population, thus bringing to an end the memory of the presence of black Africans in Spain (Herzog 2012). This was already the assumption at the beginning of the nineteenth century, during the debates in the Cortes of Cádiz (1810–1812). In that assembly, the peninsular representatives claimed that all the “nations” living in the homeland had mixed until each one had been

integrated into the one Spanish nation.

However, even if “memory” of the Africans in Spain had disappeared, the socio-demographic reality was a little different, at least at the local level. Communities of black Africans were still to be found in some areas of Andalusia, for instance. These were undoubtedly smaller than in previous periods, but still enduring. In Seville, for example, a “Cofradía de los Negritos” (Confraternity of the blacks), albeit reduced in size, continued to exist throughout the nineteenth century. This was even more evident in the peninsula of Huelva, especially the area of Gibraleón, where communities of blacks survived until at least the 1960s, and where the process of miscegenation could be observed (Larrea 1952; Márquez Reviriego 1966). Yet despite the history of the presence of black Africans, until the present day at least there has been no attempt to study the African contribution to the creation of the Hispanic identity.

Note

¹Translated by Igor Knezevic.

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Part 2

Expansion and empires (fifteenth–seventeenth century)





CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Iberian EXPLORATIONS

The construction of global empires (1450–1650)



Giuseppe Marcocci

Introduction

This chapter deals with the construction of the Portuguese and

Spanish empires, approaching it as an entwined historical process across three continents, Africa, America, and Asia. Can we speak of an Iberian imperial pattern? To answer this question, I will examine the fifteenth-century backgrounds and the specific circumstances of the birth of the empires of Portugal and Spain in the early sixteenth century, their shared institutional, legal and social features, and the peculiarities of their respective transoceanic configurations up to the mid-seventeenth century, as well as the main characteristics of Portuguese and Spanish imperial thought.

While discussing the recent historiography on the polycentric structure of the Portuguese and Spanish monarchies, special attention will be paid to its intersection with the vast literature on empires in global history. I will argue that in the construction of their empires, Portugal and Spain did not apply models that diverged since the beginning. Rather, such construction was the product of casual factors and improvisation, circulation of institutions, norms and people, and negotiation with formal and informal powers, but also borrowings from non-European empires. Consequently, their emergence was a slow process that developed over time in profoundly different contexts and was influenced by the thinking of the Portuguese and Spaniards on each other's transoceanic experiences, as well as by their need to respond to internal criticism and from other European countries. Thus, the term "Iberian explorations" here refers to the multiple forms of power configuration and legitimation in which the Portuguese and Spaniards were obliged to engage in order to consolidate their overseas power.

Recently, the notion that the early modern empires of Portugal and Spain developed in an entwined manner has gained significant scholarly ground (Subrahmanyam 2007a; Elliott 2015; Flores 2015; Ponsen and Feros 2017). This idea breaks with the longstanding view of the two Iberian imperial experiences as distinct, if not opposing, trajectories, and emerges from a consideration of transfers and reciprocal influences, circulation of people and institutional patterns, as well as shared social values and political ideals. Rivalry and conflict notwithstanding, these two empires supplied the political framework for the emergence of the Iberian world (Gruzinski 2004)—a world on the move, according to a famous sixteenth-century Jesuit:

we see many men who have sailed from Lisbon to Goa, from Seville to Mexico and Panama, and on that other South Sea as far as China and the Strait of Magellan: and they do this with as

much ease as the farmer goes from his village to the town.

(Acosta 2002, 55)

Image 13.1 The Earth protected by king John III of Portugal and his consort, queen Catherine, in the guise of Jupiter and Juno. Brussels Tapestry, ca. 1530–35. Design attributed to Bernaert van Orley. Patrimonio Nacional, Madrid

The above-cited passage is taken from a chronicle published in 1590, when the Spanish King Philip II of Habsburg (r. 1556–1598) occupied the Portuguese Crown following the end of the Avis dynasty in 1580. In the six decades that preceded the return of a Portuguese ruler to the throne, namely, John IV of Braganza (r. 1640–1656), the consolidation of the two empires reached its apogee. The merging, however, was never complete since Portugal was both “unified to and separated from” Spain (Cardim 2014). Notably, this composite empire fuelled, but did not ignite, the perception of the Iberian world as a single whole. The dream of political unification was already present in late medieval Castile and Portugal. Moreover, a general sense of continuity was nurtured by a porous border, bilingualism, and intermarriage among the elites (including the reigning dynasties), as well as the Reconquista—a common past of confrontation with Muslims, which the Portuguese first exported to Morocco by taking Ceuta (1415), well before the Spanish conquest of Granada (1492), put an end to the last Islamic power in Western Europe.

The projection of universal lordship is common to empire (Bang and Kołodziejczyk 2012). The Portuguese and Spanish were no exception, including before 1580 and after 1640, when their transoceanic possessions were not “under one individual’s empire”, in the words of the Spanish jurist Juan de Solórzano y Pereira (1629–1639, Vol. 1, 76). As such, the expression “global empire” here refers to powers that stretched over an extended multiplicity of peoples and lands, adjusting their forms of government and legislation to local differences. The coexistence of various global empires, in which the desire to dominate on the part of one empire was only limited by a similar ambition on the part of other empires, held the early modern world in balance. As in the case of Spain and Portugal, such competition entailed mutual observation, communication, and imitation, producing a sense of political connection across the globe.

Atlantic experiments

It all began with explorations along the Atlantic coast of West Africa

in the early fifteenth century—a widely shared experience that involved the informal presence of seafarers and merchants from throughout Western Europe and state-sponsored expeditions. These endeavours offered the opportunity to test medieval nautical techniques, geographic knowledge, and human taxonomies, as well as different forms of joint venture with capital from a variety of financial centres and groups. When control of sea routes or settlements were at stake, however, the matter had to be settled among Iberians.

The question concerned what belonged to whom. The setting was rather different from that of the Mediterranean Sea, which Europeans periodically crossed with aggressive intent, establishing settlements in North Africa and the Levant. Thus, when Portuguese incursions challenged Castilian claims over the Canary Islands in the early 1430s, the pope had the last word, being ascribed spiritual authority over “pagans” living in a non-Christian world, as Canarians were deemed. Such a designation allowed the pope to entrust their conversion to a Christian ruler, entitled to conquer lands and subjugate—but not enslave—their inhabitants if his envoys encountered violent resistance. This legal fiction provided a framework for regulating official controversies on the edge of the still little-known Atlantic world (Muldoon 1979, 119–131). Papal arbitration, however, was questioned and transgressed, as happened after Castile was granted rights over the Canary Islands (1437).

A few years later, the Portuguese turned again to Rome. The new point of contention was access to a special good to trade: slaves. The first captures of Azenegue Berbers and Wolofs had been made about 1445, along sandbanks north of the Senegal River. The Portuguese, however, were already purchasing slaves from local dealers, when a couple of papal diplomas, between 1452 and 1455, granted them exclusive jurisdiction as “true lords” over the lands and seawaters south of the northern coastal limit of the Sahara Desert. Commerce and navigation in such a boundless space were restricted to authorised ships, irrespective of funding or crew origination. Finally, a deliberately confused depiction of the native people as both “Moor” and “pagan” made it possible to force the papal authority to justify the perpetual slavery of sub-Saharanans in the hope of their conversion, that is, to apply to them the rules applied to captives in the context of wars of crusades.

The warlike tone adopted by these papal decisions was geared to legitimise Portuguese control over the incipient slave trade in the eyes of Castilians and other European powers with growing Atlantic

interests (Saunders 1982). Moreover, it gave a religious justification to an extraordinary and absolute power over non-Christians, laying the legal foundations for the future Iberian empires. Facts on the ground, however, were rather different. Violations of papal dispositions were an everyday affair, leading to episodes of open hostility. The Portuguese established trading-posts along the African coast, periodically visiting them in search of slaves and other goods (including gold and melegueta pepper). The annual volume of the slave trade increased from under 900 units per year in 1450–1465 to 2,200 in 1480–1499 (Elbl 1997). For the most part, the slaves were sold in Iberian markets, but they were also sent to work in the sugarcane plantations Portuguese settlers introduced in the uninhabited archipelagos of Madeira, the Azores, and Cape Verde (later a junction of the slave trade to America), as did Castilians in the Canary Islands. Thus, the plantation economy that supported the colonisation of the Caribbean and Brazil in the following century took its first steps.

Iberians and their European competitors (mainly English and French) were soon to learn that their success relied on adapting to different contexts. They acquired knowledge of local conditions, including the identification of partners who could actively inform them about commercial opportunities and how to approach local rulers and chiefs. After the death of Prince Henry (1460), who had managed Portuguese explorations until then (Russell 2000), the crown took full control of the Atlantic enterprise. However, both Afonso V (r. 1438–1481) and John II (r. 1481–1495) pursued a patchy overseas strategy. While efficiently colonising the desolate Atlantic islands, Portuguese explorers wandered about West Africa, where established powers and stratified societies already existed (Thornton 2007), in search of landing places and trade hubs. This policy was especially intense on the mouth of big rivers where informal settlements of fugitives (*lançados* or *tangomãos*), acting as mercantile mediators and often going native, were soon to show up (Lingna Nafafé 2007). Meanwhile, the annexation of a few cities from 1471 on, marked the return to an expansionist policy in Morocco, after the conquest of Ksar es-Seghir (1458) had revived a crusading spirit which had the conquest of Fez as its ultimate goal. These varied outcomes mirrored different pressures and interests both at court and among overseas lobbies. The crown was still tempted to disengage from direct involvement in exploration, as we see in the case of Fernão Gomes. A leading figure in the early slave trade, in 1469 Gomes received as a

private subject a five-year royal delegation to manage traffic with the Gulf of Guinea in exchange for an annual rent and advance along the African coast.

In 1484, Diogo Cão returned from an official expedition to the mouth of the River Zaire, erecting stone pillars with the Portuguese royal insignia along his route instead of wooden crosses, a tradition that Gomes had continued to observe. Commerce was slowly moving, first to political ambition and then to lordship. Thus, when the Portuguese completed the fort of São Jorge da Mina (1485), in present-day Ghana, which became their main trading-post in the area, King John II took the grandiloquent title of “Lord of Guinea”. Meanwhile, institutions connected to the exploitation of African goods were strengthened in Lisbon, where the *Casa da Mina e Tratos da Guiné* had a specific department for slaves.

By the late 1480s, the Portuguese seized control of a vast trade region in Atlantic Africa. The scenario changed abruptly following a few celebrated voyages. The dream of alliance with Prester John, a legendary Christian ruler believed to reign somewhere between East Africa and Central Asia, encircled by Muslim enemies, contributed to turning Portuguese expeditions eastward, both overland and by sea. The rounding of the Cape of Good Hope (1488) proved that it was possible to sail to the Indies and their sought-after markets, spices aplenty and other luxury merchandise, thus bypassing the traditional land routes, which had been disrupted by the recent Ottoman extension up to the Mediterranean Sea. Four years later, after the Treaty of Alcáçovas (1479) had settled internal instability in the Catholic kings’ Spain, a dramatic set of events occurred. Christopher Columbus, a Genoese, who had navigated to the Gulf of Guinea in Portuguese service set sail from Andalusia, travelling westward with patents of the Catholic kings to the Great Khan of Cathay. After his spectacular finding of islands in the open Atlantic Ocean, initially mistaken for the eastern fringes of the Eurasian continent, Castile seemed to be ahead in the race for the Indies. Even this achievement, however, was made possible by a substantial, if not free, circulation of nautical techniques and cartographic knowledge among seafarers, pilots, and map-makers, who often passed from the service of Portuguese ships to Castilian ones and vice versa. Their ability to master new routes across the Atlantic emerged from personal experience of currents and winds, rocky floors, and coasts, which had a high cost in terms of shipwrecks and human lives. Under their tutelage, smaller ships like galleys and caravels were improved, and

large vessels of Mediterranean origin, such as carracks, were adapted to the violence of the oceans.

The Portuguese reaction to Columbus' shocking news provoked a crisis, especially after the papacy granted Castile similar powers over the newly founded islands as those given to Portugal in the mid-fifteenth century—a striking recovery of a Portuguese paradigm in the context of the discovery of America (Russell 1992). After the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) had fixed the Atlantic line of demarcation between the respective legal spaces of Castile and Portugal, Vasco da Gama reached Calicut in West India (1498) with the assistance of a Gujarati pilot, erecting stone pillars on the shorelines along the route. Finally, the Portuguese had entered the Indian Ocean, not without hostile intentions. Two years later, on the outward journey of the second expedition to South Asia, the fleet commanded by Pedro Álvares Cabral came upon Brazil.

By 1500, the main directions of the Iberian explorations had emerged. The Atlantic experiments had demonstrated that the construction of transoceanic powers was largely a matter of communication and collaboration with locals. However, Castile and Portugal did not rule empires yet. While as early as 1450 the humanist Poggio Bracciolini had exalted Prince Henry as greater than Julius Caesar, the Portuguese court still distrusted the high seas and heeded warnings about demographic weakness (Dinis 1960–1974, Vol. 9, doc. 186, and Vol. 13, doc. 183). The following decades would showcase how the ability to readapt medieval institutions and legal solutions would craft the process of empire-building. Foremost among these notions was the idea that while each crown could possess its own sphere of “conquest”, jurisdiction was subordinate to effective possession. All things considered, more than a half-century of Atlantic exploration had proved the exclusionary overseas project of Portugal to be untenable.

inventing empire

Iberian explorations assumed explicit imperial connotations in the early sixteenth century. After Gama's return to Lisbon, in a context of millenarian enthusiasm (Thomaz 1990), King Emmanuel I of Portugal (r. 1495–1521) entitled himself “Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India” and created the *Casa da Índia*. Meant to regulate the trade with the Antilles in a rather

different way, the year after its Spanish counterpart—the *Casa de Contratación*—opened in Seville, where meanwhile a Castilian edition of Marco Polo’s *Travels* (1503) responded to a recent Portuguese translation (1502), with a prologue celebrating Emmanuel I as next to be “entitled as emperor of any monarchy (*com título imperial de toda a monarchia*)” (Pereira 1922, 5).

The birth-pangs of the Portuguese establishment in India (Subrahmanyam 2007b) clashed with its metropolitan representation. A handful of men had to get by in local conflicts along the Malabar coast to bring pepper and other spices back to Portugal. Empire for them was a matter of improvisation, juggling diplomatic malleability, threats, and armed resistance in order to open commercial agencies (*feitorias*). However, as soon as the Portuguese presence was formally organised by appointing a viceroy (1505)—a century-old office created for Aragon’s rule of Sardinia and recently renewed by Columbus (Cardim and Palos 2012)—Emmanuel I was urged from India to call himself “emperor of this world here, which is much larger than that there” (Rego 1960–1977, Vol. 11, 40).

The Portuguese aimed at seizing trade networks and sea routes in the Indian Ocean, where commerce and navigation were traditionally free and no European law was in force. This did not prevent them from signing treaties and agreements, not infrequently extorted from local rulers with demands for tribute or vassalage. Moreover, if from the beginning their empire was “written on water” (Subrahmanyam 2001), its construction drew some inspiration from the model of ancient Rome, especially under the governorship of Afonso de Albuquerque (r. 1509–1515). Albuquerque fought to establish Portuguese authority on solid military and social grounds, taking control of key port-cities like Malacca (1511) and Hormuz (1515) and conquering Goa (1510), the future capital of the *Estado da Índia*, as the Portuguese called their official power along the coastline stretching from South Africa to the Malay peninsula. The promotion of mixed marriages also reflected the ambition to build a permanent empire in Asia. In the early 1530s, echoing a passage from Niccolò Machiavelli’s *Discourses on Livy* (bk. 2, ch. 19), the humanist João de Barros was still exhorting King John III (r. 1521–1557) to “order vassals and natives to go and live in the lands acquired (which the Romans called colonies)” (Barros 1937, 114).

How were these imperial claims reconciled with the fact that European political tradition acknowledged one emperor at a time? In fact, Iberian explorations were just a further breach of the universal

authority still attributed to the Holy Roman Empire, but somewhat eroded when Charles of Habsburg, already king of Spain (r. 1516–1556), ascended its throne (1519). Significantly, the following year, soon after his unauthorised invasion of Mexico, Hernán Cortés wrote to Charles V that he could now entitle himself “emperor of this kingdom with no less glory than that of Germany which, by the grace of God, Your Majesty already possesses” (Pagden 1995, 32). Imperial dignity was established by overseas conquests and, as in the Portuguese case, this new possession soon became a viceroyalty (1535), taking the name of New Spain.

Nurtured by similar proclamations, the ideological construction of the empires of Portugal and Spain ran in parallel to each other. Moreover, initially these paths were fairly confluent. The conventional distinction made between the two empires—Portugal as maritime and merchant and Spain as land-based and military—developed with the passing of time and stemmed from many factors: different opportunities on the ground, conflicts among imperial elites and indigenous resistance, acceptance of local autonomies and privileges, rendering their structures more polycentric (Cardim et al. 2012), as well as a constant circulation of persons and ideas (Ruiz Ibáñez 2014). Spain, for its part, was much more powerful than Portugal and quickly invested institutional and legislative effort in the American enterprise, developing the *encomienda* system to such an extent that as early as 1514 Bartolomé de las Casas criticised it as a mere front for the enslavement of natives. Yet, on Albuquerque’s death (1515), a European observer would have found it difficult to say which power was more promising, with the still-limited Spanish possessions in the Caribbean and the Portuguese settlements dotting the African and South Asian coasts—Brazil still being just a few lines sketched on a map. Ironically, one of the few extant eyewitness accounts of the Iberian feats was published in 1512 by a Castilian soldier, Martín Fernández de Figueroa, about his service in Portuguese Asia (McKenna 1967). Despite an increasing interest in the discovery of America, spices long emblematised the wealth made accessible by Iberian exploration.

Things began to change after the expeditions of Cortés in Mexico (1519–1522) and of the Pizarro brothers in Peru (1531–1535). The Spaniards profited from local rivalries and civil conflicts to overthrow the Aztec and Inca political order, establishing the conditions for a wide-ranging, land-based empire in Central and South America. Viceroyalties—that of Peru being established in 1542—served as direct

rulers embodying the “king’s living image” (Cañeque 2004), while high courts of justice (*audiencias*) were established in the main cities. What survived the violence of conquest became the material structure of the new colonial power. It benefited from pre-existing networks of urban centres and roads, whose magnificence induced chroniclers to draw parallels between ancient Romans and Aztecs (Motolinía 1985, 318) and Incas (Cieza de León 1864, 144). And if some pre-Hispanic customs and traditions were maintained in the institutional life of villages and small towns, after Charles V’s *New Laws* (1542) condemned the *encomenderos*’ misconduct and forbade enslaving natives—their emancipation being anything but automatic (Van Deusen 2015)—pre-Hispanic regimes of tributary service (*cuatequil*, *mita*) provided a basis for a gradual, if irregular reorganising native labour (*repartimiento*), often after long-distance displacement, while the massive importation of African slaves guaranteed the settlers a new workforce.

As the Spaniards were building their empire in America, the Portuguese were abandoning any illusion about substantial advance in Asia. In parallel to Cortés’ conquest, an expedition headed by Tomé Pires (1517–1524) was still following the vain hope of subjugating China, encouraging local representations of the “Franks” (a term denoting all Europeans) as cannibals (Gruzinski 2014). Meanwhile, the Portuguese Ferdinand Magellan’s circumnavigation of the globe on behalf of Spain (1519–1522) showed to what extent Iberian antagonism had become truly planetary. Controversy arose over the demarcation of their respective conquests, until the Portuguese paid a large sum to obtain full rights over the Moluccas (1529), the “Spice Islands” where cloves came from. Thus, while protests in Europe grew against its monopoly over the spice trade, the Portuguese Empire gradually went onto the defensive. After all, some internal voices were already pressing for a lighter structure, more oriented towards commercial objectives, and it was from Southeast Asia that low-cost solutions emerged, possibly inspired by the pluralism that had allowed the fourteenth-century Majapahit Empire to dominate the region from Java. In this area foreign communities kept their legal autonomy under the Portuguese, while personnel from all over Asia, including Japan, were appointed to official positions (Villiers 1986). Meanwhile, contrasting visions of empire placed into question the Portuguese network of strongholds in Morocco. It was a corollary of the distance between overseas possessions and from the kingdom that gave the empire its characteristic configuration as a “nebula of power”

(Bethencourt 2007). Formally limited only by royal instructions, viceregal authority in Goa was spatially fragmented and locally challenged by captains, while fugitives and renegades created merchant communities that enlarged the “informal empire”, especially in the Bay of Bengal (Newitt 2001). All this encouraged free trade and smuggling in the region. Short duration of high offices—usually three years—so exacerbated factional rivalry that a clash for the governorship nearly caused a civil war in the *Estado da Índia* (1526–1527). Not long after, the Ottoman expansion across the Indian Ocean posed a serious threat to the Portuguese, who claimed to keep 300 vessels and 20,000 soldiers in readiness to protect the liquid connections upon which their empire relied (Góis 1539, E4v).

Spanish America, too, experienced internal tensions—especially Peru, where the eruption of a separatist rebellion headed by Gonzalo Pizarro (1544–1548) exposed local discontent for the *New Laws*. Lack of military pressure by other European powers and exclusive concentration on America made the *indios*—a collective name for the indigenous peoples—a key matter for the Spanish Empire (Pagden 1982). The celebrated Dominican theologian Francisco de Vitoria lectured on this topic in Salamanca (1539), acknowledging the *indios*’ full rights to their freedom and lands, and maintaining that, as for any other people, only the infringement of natural law (like anthropophagy, human sacrifices, and prohibition of free circulation) authorised their conquest. In so doing, Vitoria somehow was supporting Charles V’s aim to deal with his empire in the New World as a personal affair, rejecting any papal interference by virtue of the diplomas issued since 1493. It was part of a general assertion of the crown’s authority in America, which had already led Charles V to settle his controversy with Columbus’ heirs over the Antilles (1536) and to put an end to the Welsers’ private colony in Venezuela (1528–1546), after having granted this German family of bankers exclusive rights to explore it and use it to repay his debts.

Law and theology supported the construction of the Iberian empires, and both Portuguese and Spaniards used iconography to celebrate their global powers and read them in light of millenarian expectations. The latter stimulated missionary efforts carried out under royal patronage, through which the papacy entrusted the Crowns of Spain (1508) and Portugal (1514) with organising spiritual life overseas (Boxer 1978). Religion was an essential feature in Iberian imperial thought. The centrality of the *indios*, their conversion and rights, made the Spanish debates both extensive and daring.

Temporary or permanent boards, starting from the *Consejo de Indias* (created as an autonomous institution in 1524), discussed imperial matters, carving out a lively intellectual space together with judicial courts, universities, colleges, and monasteries on both sides of the Atlantic. Things were slightly different in the Portuguese case. As shown in many literary works, including the chronicles of explorations, the two imperial cultures evolved in a process of mutual exchange. Yet, some peculiarities of Portuguese imperial thought were not simple to incorporate into that of Spain. First of all, its relative military weakness compared to other European competitors—France was then the most serious rival, though it allowed a bilateral court in Bayonne (1537) to settle litigation about privateering—prevented Portugal from rejecting papal diplomas. Moreover, the Portuguese Empire’s spatial extension embraced peoples and cultures that could not be brought under a common definition. The notion of *indio* was not widespread, partly due to the slow colonisation of Brazil, where the most familiar category was the theological one of “heathen” (*gentio*). The term “heathen” meant different things in different places, a fact that hindered the development of consistent legislation and a general theory of empire.

With all their centrifugal forces, the Portuguese did not lack institutions that defined their official line. A royal board of theologians and canon lawyers, the *Mesa da Consciência*, was founded in 1532, after discarding the idea of replicating a *Consejo de Indias* also at the Portuguese court. It was meant to interpret papal diplomas, limiting Roman interference on delicate matters like war, trade, slavery, and conversion. This choice led to silence Vitoria’s name in Portugal, despite influential pupils of his, including Martín de Ledesma and Martín de Azpilcueta, holding important chairs at Coimbra University. Similarly, there was nothing comparable to the celebrated controversy at Valladolid between Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda about the nature and rights of *indios* (1550–1551). However, this controversy seems to have influenced a Portuguese treatise that condemned the Atlantic trade of African slaves with the same arguments as Las Casas—paradoxically, if we think that he suggested replacing *indios* with them—adding that the Portuguese, “being little in number, conquered many lands and kingdoms of barbarian nations in India, Guinea and Brazil, thanks to cunning and astuteness” (Oliveira 1555, 70v).

In the mid-sixteenth century, when the Iberian empires had reached a relatively stable balance and appearance, the casuistic approach

typical of the Spanish representatives of the Second Scholastic, including the missionaries overseas (who not infrequently supported local settlers), also characterised Portuguese imperial thought. While the anonymous, unpublished *Treatise on the Just War* harshly criticised imperial violence and the enslavement of “heathens” and raised doubts about a “conquest as that of India” (Rego 1960–1977, Vol. 2, 684), Azpilcueta taught that, on certain conditions, not only trading, but even forming a military alliance with Muslims was licit. In the following years, further developments were to challenge the Iberian imperial theories in many unexpected ways.

Mutual attractions

The traditional distinction between Spaniards committed to the construction of a vast land-based power in America, and Portuguese defending on the seas their scattered settlements and possessions from North Africa to Southeast Asia—“crumbs remaining on the table after dinner” (Sasseti 1970, 418), to recall the witticism of a Florentine merchant—appears to have become an established fact by the late sixteenth century. Yet, the reality might be less cut-and-dry, not only because the Spanish Empire relied heavily on the military control of the Atlantic routes, or because its possessions in the New World were far from covering uniformly a clearly defined territory (Herzog 2015). Well before the dynastic union, a dual movement of convergence had emerged, also showing traces of increasing influence of cultural circulation across the Iberian world (Curto 1998). This movement gradually reoriented the Portuguese Empire toward both land and the South Atlantic, especially after the launch of a real colonial project in Brazil, which established a central government in Bahia (1549) and put an end to a French settlement (1555–1567) in the area of present-day Rio de Janeiro. We should place in this context also the unsuccessful attempt to penetrate Southeast Africa (1569) and Angola (1571), which, at least in the second case, allowed the Portuguese to strengthen their presence on the coast, gaining access to new slave markets. At the same time, after the conquest of the Philippines (1565) and the inauguration of a trans-pacific route, annually navigated by galleons connecting Manila to Acapulco and exchanging Chinese merchandise for the American silver from the mines of Potosí (exploited since 1545), the maritime nature of the Spanish Empire became undeniable.

It was only then that the Portuguese formulated a real theory of seaborne power, in response to the Spanish jurist Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca. Paving the way for the return of Spanish ambitions for Asian products, he refused any lordship over the oceans, by applying Vitoria's doctrine on free circulation, "no matter what the Portuguese shout out, as I often heard them do" (Vázquez de Menchaca 1564, 114r). In the following decade, while the Portuguese in India suffered the increasing pressure of the Mughal Empire (Flores 2018) and other local powers, like the Bijapur Sultanate that put Goa under siege (1571), professors at Coimbra and Évora universities took a stand against Vázquez de Menchaca. If Vitoria's titles "authorised the Spaniards to rule the West Indians", "the same must be understood for the Portuguese with the East ones" (Simões 1575, 304r), they taught, while maintaining that "it only takes to occupy some lands and to have power to conquer other ones, to forbid another king to interfere" (Barbosa 1982, 371). A few decades later, both Iberian powers had to face the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1609), who used Vitoria's and Vázquez de Menchaca's argument against seeking to prohibit anyone from sailing the seas to trade worldwide. The first to react was a Flemish Jesuit living at the court of Madrid, Nicolas Bonaert, who as early as 1610 defended the legitimacy of lordship over the oceans, since, like the ancient Greek thalassocracy, it ensured safety of navigation and trade, delivering the high seas from a state of anarchy (Mariño 1992).

In the same years, the integration of the Iberian empires, which, however, remained formally separate, was praised by stressing that the many "kingdoms, dominions, provinces and diverse states" already under the Hispanic monarchy were now reinforced by a "great power over the sea" thanks to the Portuguese, whose galleons were equated to "rocky castles" (Salazar 1619, 2 and 16)—a maritime image consistent somehow with the representation of Portuguese as "frogmen" then circulating in East Asia (Flores 2014, 37). Meanwhile, the Habsburg Crown attempted to remodel Portuguese imperial institutions on those of Spain, such as with the replacement of the *Mesa da Consciência's* overseas activities with a *Conselho da Índia* in Lisbon (1604–1614), the ambitious theorising of Jesuit theologians like Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez, and the introduction of a centralised judicial system in Brazil, paralleling that which already existed in the rest of the New World (Schwartz 1973). This occurred in 1609, in association with renewed efforts to restrict the enslavement of *índios*, which, unlike Spanish America, the Portuguese

never prohibited entirely, though they promulgated a set of laws and decrees against it (Perrone-Moisés 1998). After all, the attraction of a plantation economy based on forced labour led the settlers to seek repeatedly an extension of the *encomienda* system to Brazil. Due partly to native resistance—which, however, never took forms like the Vilcabamba kingdom in Peru, ruled by the last Inca, Tupac Amaru, executed in Cuzco (1572)—colonisation was long limited to the coast. Thus, the relationship with the *indios* living in the *sertão*, outside Portuguese jurisdiction, developed into a daily frontier war. This struggle was not so unlike those fought by the Spaniards in North Mexico or Chile, where the pacification of Mapuche was significantly termed “Indian Flanders” (Lázaro Ávila 1997). It was a clear reference to the military confrontation with the Dutch, which was to turn into a global conflict (Israel 1982) following the first signs of a new challenge from Northern Europe, in the form of Francis Drake’s raids against Iberian possessions during his circumnavigation of the globe (1577–1580). In the meantime, a black legend had emerged, not only of the Spanish Empire, as introduced by Las Casas (1552) or Girolamo Benzoni (1565), and then revamped by many translations published in Northern Europe, but of the Portuguese Empire too, as is shown by the coeval defamatory poems describing the colonisers of Brazil as “sodomites”, published by the Scot George Buchanan (Williamson 1998). Demonised in similar terms, these very characterisations of Portuguese and the Spanish, too, pushed for the emergence of an “Iberian Atlantic” (Schwartz 2011; Braun and Vollendorf 2013).

A sense of shared global responsibility could not fully dispel a reciprocal, residual mistrust between the Portuguese and the Spanish, which not only emerged in Brazil (Schwartz 1968), but also in Southeast Asia (Valladares 2001). As early as 1570, the Portuguese Crown had given up controlling directly the annual voyage between Lisbon and Goa, selling the business to private traders from all over Europe. Faced with multiple challenges and despite the late colonisation of Sri Lanka in 1597 (Biedermann 2009), the *Estado da Índia* suffered from diverging drives on the part of the imperial elites, precipitating a crisis that led to complaints about endemic corruption and decline (Winius 1985), besides diverse losses caused by the Dutch (Ambon 1605, Ternate 1607, Solor 1636, Malacca 1641, Sri Lanka 1658, Cranganore, Cannanore and Cochin 1662–1663) and the English (Surat 1615, Hormuz 1622), whose strategies were part of a more general tendency to learn from the Iberian enemy (Elliott 2009; Pagden and Subrahmanyam 2011). The Portuguese also ended up

being expelled from Japan in 1639, after even enjoying exclusive rights in trading with China through the route between Macao (whose harbour had been granted them in 1557) and Nagasaki, the main centre of the local Jesuit mission.

In this turbulent scenario, the Spaniards exploited the threat of North European ships and settlements in Southeast and East Asia to expand their official presence in the area. This continued a policy dating back to the conquest of the Philippines, where they established an *audiencia* (1584), headed by a governor and other American institutions (despite some voices pressing for a much lighter structure), countering the Portuguese-protected Jesuits by supporting missions to East Asia of rival orders like Augustinians and Franciscans. The Spaniards sought to control the global trade of Chinese merchandise, a goal that met with some trouble, like the bloody repression of the *sangleys*, as the Chinese community was known in the Philippines, who revolted against Spanish restrictions and malpractice (1603) (Borao 1998). Meanwhile, the Spaniards established themselves as defenders of Iberian rights in the area, on the basis of Tomar's capitulations (1581) on the relations between Portugal, Spain, and their respective empires under Habsburg rule. Armies from Manila repeatedly intervened in places within Portuguese legal space, including Cambodia, where a Spanish expedition under a Portuguese commander (1593–1599), supported by a junk with a *mestizo* crew, headed by a corsair from Nagasaki, Francisco de Gouveia (probably of mixed Portuguese-Japanese origin) (Morga 1970: 186–188), failed to exploit the military disorder to put the region under indirect rule. Later, the Spanish attempt to contain the rise of the Dutch from their fortress in Tidore (1606) gave rise to works like the *Conquista de las islas Molucas* (1609) by Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, which did not spare criticism of the Portuguese, who in turn protested the emergence of a Spanish Empire in Asia. This general readjustment also provided opportunities for playing personal games. In 1603, a Portuguese navigator at the service of Spain, Pedro Fernandes de Queirós, set sail from Peru with the royal permission to explore the South Pacific in search of his obsession, the mythic Austral continent, though he returned to Acapulco (1606) after having discovered only islands and archipelagos. A few years later, on the way back to New Spain after his temporary governorship of the Philippines (1608–1609), Rodrigo de Vivero was shipwrecked in Japan, where he negotiated the dispatch of miners from Mexico in exchange for better conditions for

Iberian merchants and a possible cessation of Dutch penetration. At the same time, Vivero had a significant discussion with the minister of court ceremonies: if he had to present himself before the ruler Tokugawa Ieyasu (r. 1600–1616) not as a “private gentleman” but as a “servant and minister” of Philip III (r. 1598–1621), the protocol needed revising, as the latter “was known as the greatest and most powerful king in all the world, since his kingdom and empires extended throughout the East Indies and the greater part of the New World” (Vivero 2015, 88–89).

The Dutch and English threat, whose development had been nurtured by trading concessions made in the 1580s by António, Prior of Crato, the pretender to the Portuguese throne who had challenged Philip II, reinforced the sense of a deeply connected Iberian world. After all, external observers had already developed its unitary image, reflecting on the incipient crisis of both the Portuguese and Spanish empires, ascribed to the “dearth” of men: they had not imitated the example of the Romans, whose “number”, by incorporating foreigners, “became so great that it stood against the whole of the rest of the world, not only with its valour, but with its size” (Botero 1591, 15). Conversely, in the 1620s, the English adventurer Anthony Sherley, while endorsing the Count-Duke of Olivares’ plan to strengthen the political and military integration of the different components of the Hispanic monarchy, maintained that the Portuguese scattered across the globe were unable to establish an “empire” because of their “greed” (Sherley 2010, 90). A further position was that of the *converso* merchant Duarte Gomes Solis. He argued that the dynastic union was the cause of the decline of the Portuguese Empire, which had inherited all the enemies of Spain (Elliott 1986, 143–146), asserting that a solution on the model of the Dutch or the English East India companies would restore its trading hegemony in Asia (Disney 1978).

Conclusion

The contraction of Portuguese Asia, whose Christian inhabitants, mainly converted natives, nevertheless numbered around half a million in the mid-seventeenth century (Bethencourt 2005, 118), must also be related to the marked relaunch of the colonisation of Brazil following the expulsion of the Dutch colony in Pernambuco (1630–1654). From the Western Indies of Castile to the new “states” of Brazil and Maranhão, as they were renamed in 1621, America was now the

heart of both Iberian empires, with a population of roughly ten million and colonial societies that were more and more mixed, partly thanks to thousands of African slaves. However, a substantial difference between the empires remained, since the Spanish possessions not only extended further and had a more complex institutional organisation but saw also increasing activism from Creoles (sons of Iberians born overseas) and descendants of indigenous peoples. The former redefined the role and attitude of local elites, with visible effects on urban architecture and rural landscapes. On the other hand, *indios* and *mestizos* addressed judicial courts to negotiate their rights about lands, labour, and tributes. In Mexico they interpreted Spanish legislation as a practical and moral resource that might allow them to retake some control over their lives (Owensby 2008), occasionally submitting pictorial codices as legal proofs. In the Viceroyalty of Peru, oral traditions about ancestral entitlements were slowly replaced by verdicts that certified land properties at the time of the Spanish arrival, which were not infrequently solicited before a trial (Herzog 2013). Significantly, this attempt to appropriate justice followed the publication of chronicles concerning delicate matters like the pre-Columbian ages and the conquest, written by indigenous authors such as Chimalpahin, Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxochitl, or Guaman Poma de Ayala. A controversial project to create the “laws of the Indies” (*derecho indiano*) as a uniform body of norms to impose upon all *indios* indiscriminately emerged in this context, with the publication of Solórzano y Pereira’s *De Indiarum iure* (1629–1639). Nothing comparable existed for the Portuguese Empire. Paradoxically, while not applying to Brazil, the “laws of the Indies” prompted the release of at least those Asian slaves of Filipino origin who had been transported to America (Seijas 2014), since they were considered equal to Spanish *indios*, unlike “Javanese, Malays, Bengalese, Malabars, Gujaratis”, and others from regions under Portuguese jurisdiction (Solórzano y Pereira 1629–1639, Vol. 1, 743).

None of this means that Portuguese colonial societies were less hybrid and hierarchical than their Spanish counterparts: indeed, they featured an intense blend of coexistence and segregation. But in the first half of the seventeenth century, there were at most Portuguese chroniclers writing the history of their empire from Goa, while the only native authors there were those converted Brahmins who claimed to have a distinctive social position in Portuguese India (Xavier 2012). Evidently, despite further losses in the North (Tangier, transferred to England in 1661, and Ceuta to Spain in 1668, as a peculiar

consequence of its withholding support from the new Braganza dynasty in 1640) and West Africa (the Gold Coast, seized by the Dutch in 1642), the original geography of empire had not been fully abandoned in favour of Brazil and the South Atlantic. Like the Spanish Empire, the Portuguese transoceanic power still had a global projection. It even tried to reassert the importance of the *Estado da Índia*, from South Asia (Ames 2000) to China (Souza 1986), now operating under the oversight of the *Conselho Ultramarino*, established in the aftermath of the independence from Spain in imitation of the *Consejo de Indias*. More than two centuries into the Iberian explorations, it would have been difficult to say if the enduring asymmetries between the Portuguese and Spanish empires outnumbered the similarities originating from their entwined history.

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
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
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
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


Spanish Administration in *las Indias*



Portuguese Administration in the *Estado do Brasil*





CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Administration and government of the Iberian empires

Pilar Ponce Leiva and Alexander Ponsen

Introduction

Among the most intriguing themes in the history of early modern Iberian expansion is how the Portuguese and Spanish Crowns attempted to impose formalised control over diverse panoplies of territories and subject populations spread across such vast, discontinuous spaces. Within roughly a century Portugal and Spain had transformed from small, isolated polities at the edge of Europe into globe-girdling monarchies with overseas possessions in Africa, Asia, and America. Already by the mid-sixteenth century Portuguese rulers had adopted the imperious title, “Kings of Portugal and the Algarves, and of the Sea near and far, Lord of Guinea and of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia [referring to the whole of Africa], Arabia, Persia and India” (Barros 1778, 12). At the same time, they claimed dominion throughout the sprawling territories of Brazil. The enthusiastic fervour for Spanish imperium gained force over the sixteenth century as well, reaching crescendo in

the 1580s when Philip II of Spain ascended the Portuguese throne, bringing the two hemispheres of Iberian expansion together under his singular sovereignty. The famous medallion emblazoned with the phrase, “The World is not Enough”, was one of many reflections of Spain’s confidence in its expansionary prowess (Parker 2001). And the following decade the influential Spanish chronicler and jurist, Gregorio López Madera, lauded collective Iberian conquests throughout the Old World and the New, where, he wrote, “Roman power never reached, and which not even Alexander attempted to subject” (López de Madera 1597, 63v).

Of course, a gaping divide existed between the Iberian Crowns’ grandiose claims to dominion and their ability to impose full control over those dominions they claimed. Distinct from the worn portrayal of the Spanish monarchy as a domineering, centralised political unit exercising supreme rule over vast swathes of uninterrupted territory and millions of overseas subjects, Spanish rule in America was, in reality, highly fragmented and often indirect, especially beyond fortified towns. Likewise, even in Brazil, which lacked hostile native polities that were large or centralised, Portuguese Crown power remained largely restricted to a series of coastal enclaves throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet despite the challenge of ruling their numerous distant territories, the Iberian Crowns proved adept at mobilising often limited resources, and the institutional frameworks they created were successful in balancing local settlers’ and officials’ tendencies toward autonomy with more centripetal forces of inclusion and subjugation.

In this chapter we explore the relationship between political theory, legal frameworks, and practice of government in defining the nature of Spanish and Portuguese Crown rule and administration beyond Europe. We assess the aims, strategies, and effectiveness of the Iberian Crowns in extending control over the land, inhabitants, and economic production of their overseas possessions. With an emphasis on the American dominions—which emerged as the major centre of gravity within Spain’s overseas imperium by the mid-sixteenth century, and in Portugal’s a century later—we examine the evolution and internal hierarchies of the main political, military, judicial, fiscal, and ecclesiastical institutions of overseas administration, and their competing or overlapping jurisdictions. We show not only the similarities and differences between the Spanish and Portuguese institutional frameworks, but also their mutual influence over time. Finally, we analyse the instruments the crowns developed to manage

their officials from afar and to ensure their obedience and accountability in distant colonial contexts.

We adopt a broad view in reconstructing the institutional frameworks of Iberian overseas administration. In addition to the institutions under direct crown control, including viceroyalties, governorships, high courts, royal treasuries, and the various metropolitan bodies created to regulate expansion, we also discuss a range of distinct powers like the secular church and missionary orders, the Inquisition, and European and indigenous municipal councils and confraternities throughout the overseas colonial world. These latter institutions, while under the king's overarching authority and dependent on his recognition for legitimacy, in some cases maintained distinct orders of hierarchy, owed obedience to other high authorities (in Rome, for instance), or were local in origin and elected their own members free from royal appointments and supervision. Together the local, regional, and central powers formed a complex constellation of institutions that, while allowing a high degree of decentralisation and local autonomy, united the many peoples and territories under Iberian Crown rule within singular systems of social and administrative organisation.

Scholarship of the past two to three decades has added significant depth to our knowledge of the nature of the early modern "state". If the sovereign power of the state then as now was absolute in theory, it has rarely been absolute in practice. Including during the supposed height of European absolutism in the seventeenth century—and including in the Spanish monarchy, traditionally held as a classical paragon of effective centralisation—crown power was circumscribed, dependent on constant negotiations with elites and local interests over financial and military support to the crown, jurisdictional autonomy, and royal recognition of local custom and privilege (Fernández Albaladejo 1992; Amelang 2006; Cardim 2012; Chittolini 1995; Clavero 1996b; Hespanha 1989). This revisionist concept of the state has provided a vision of the exercise and organisation of power as flexible, diffuse, and fluid in early modern monarchies, including both Portugal and Spain. In addition, it has contributed to a gradual cross-fertilisation between specialists of Iberian America and those of the peninsular kingdoms. And it has produced an enriched, integrated historiography on the multi-continental polities of Portugal and Spain, showing that certain phenomena supposed to have existed only in America, like the selling of offices and honours in Spanish territories, for instance, could be found in the peninsula as well.

Image 14.1 Laws by and for the monarchy: an interpolation of the iconography from the frontispieces of *Ordenações e leis do reino de Portugal, recopiladas per mandado do mito alto catholico & poderoso rei Dom Philippe o Principe* (Lisbon: Pedro Craskeek, 1603) and Juan de Solórzano Pereira, *Política indiana* (Madrid: Diego Díaz de la Carrera, 1648)

Overseas administration guiding principles

The extension of Iberian Crown rule over the Americas was defined by the three guiding principles of accession, replication, and territorialisation (Garriga 2006). Accession refers to the manner by which new possessions were incorporated into the crowns' extended dominions. Replication denotes the imposition of Portuguese and Castilian law throughout those new possessions. And territorialisation implies the creation of newly incorporated geographical spaces as legal jurisdictions.

According to the European tradition of territorial accession and aggregation, territories became incorporated within existing monarchies through a variety of means including dynastic marriage, voluntary cessions of sovereignty, and conquest (Elliott 1992; Gil 2012). Although the overseas territories under Iberian jurisdiction were eminently diverse in their size, location, ethnic composition, and strategic or economic function, and despite the manner in which each territory had been acquired in practice, from a legal perspective the crowns considered those possessions as extensions of and fully integrated within the kingdoms of Portugal and Castile. The ethical and religious justifications for overseas expansion explain why in the 1570s the Spanish Crown ordered its subjects to eschew the word "conquest" as a source of law, replacing it instead with those of "settlement and pacification" (Tau 2000, 85). Although they did not possess any distinct political status, however, the position of "the Indies" within the kingdom of Castile was not equal to that of the other kingdoms ruled by the Castilian Crown. This was as true in practical political and economic matters as in the basic perceptions of contemporaries on the issue. In the Spanish Indies, which eventually included the Philippines, there was no parliament (*Cortes*) and Spanish settlers had no representation in the *Cortes* of Castile. Nor was there a titled nobility comparable to that in the peninsula. In America, Spaniards forced indigenous peoples to labour for the benefit of individuals and the crown. Spaniards also developed norms in economic matters that did not exist in the peninsula, including, for example, the prohibition of commerce between viceroalties or the

obligation to trade exclusively through the port of Seville. The overseas provinces and kingdoms, therefore, were exclusively at the service of the interests and tendencies of European politics (García Gallo 1972, 489–514; Tau 2000).

The extension of Iberian rule over the Americas was a process of replication in the sense that, as incorporated territories, Spain and Portugal assumed the right to impose their own peninsular legal systems from the outset. In Portugal, the *Ordenações Afonsinas*, of the mid-fifteenth century, the *Ordenações Manuelinas*, of 1521, and the *Ordenações Filipinas*, issued in 1603 during the period of Iberian union, were all examples of comprehensive, codified revisions of Portuguese royal law completed during, and in part shaped by, the long process of overseas expansion. Although the crown continually supplemented these laws with decrees and instructions to overseas officials on specific issues, these compilations provided the general legal framework governing all Portuguese subjects throughout the Old World and the New, including in Brazil and peninsular Portugal. In Spanish America, the process of replication saw the extension of Castilian law overseas. This central legal system was grounded on a body of laws specifically created for the Indies, collected in the *Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de Indias* (Compilation of Laws of the Indies), published in 1680. There was thus a set of legislation for the Indies not applied in Castile, as well as one of Castilian legislation not applied in the Indies. As early as 1614 the crown declared that new laws promulgated in Castile would only be applied in the Indies when expressly ordered.

Finally, the processes of accession and replication were materialised through that of territorialisation, which implied the conversion of geographic spaces into political entities with jurisdiction (Garriga 2006). While the Portuguese Crown initially divided the Brazilian territories into donatory-captaincies reminiscent of the autonomous lordships granted to elites during peninsular Reconquest from the Moors, it eventually introduced a viceregal administration with sub-jurisdictions, mirroring Portuguese India and similar to that of Spanish America, but on a smaller scale. In Brazil as in Spanish America, despite efforts toward centralisation, the various institutions of Iberian administration, from viceroalties to governorships, high courts to royal treasuries, bishoprics to municipal councils, were created in different moments for distinct purposes. The American dominions of both Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are best understood as collections of territories

with multiple centres, ruled by individuals or institutions each of which could communicate with the metropolis, and which possessed competing, often overlapping jurisdictions. In the Spanish case, however, all these diverse powers converged in the Council of Indies, reflecting the polysynodial conception of Spanish administration (Cañeque 2004).

Despite the numerous differences that characterised Spanish and Portuguese frameworks of government and administration in the overseas territories, the institutionalisation of those frameworks was guided by certain common principles as well. First, royal power throughout the multi-continental monarchies of Portugal and Spain possessed both temporal and spiritual dimensions. Second, both monarchies divided the civil administrations governing their overseas territories into four separated political, military, judicial, and fiscal branches. Each branch possessed its own offices and institutions with specific competencies and jurisdictions, some of which overlapped. Finally, in both Spanish and Portuguese America different offices and competencies could be united in a single individual, as was the case with the viceroy or governor-general, for instance, who possessed certain overarching powers across the various branches of administration (Céspedes del Castillo 1983 and 2000; García Gallo 1987; Garriga 2006; Pérez Herrero 2002; Tau 1992).

Highlighting the duality of Portuguese royal power, Diogo do Couto, the eminent chronicler of Portuguese imperium in Asia, remarked in the early seventeenth century that “the Kings of Portugal always aimed in their conquest of the East at so uniting the two powers, spiritual and temporal, so that one should never be exercised without the other” (Couto 1781, 322). In Portugal as in Spain and other Christian monarchies of their time, the king was regarded as God’s representative within his realm and was charged above all with ensuring justice and preserving the *ecclesia*, or community of believers (Cardim 2008; Clavero 1996a; MacLachlan 1988). Although lacking the power to determine matters of theology, which remained the authority of the pope in Rome, the king was nonetheless responsible for facilitating the expansion of the faith worldwide and for defending Christendom against threats from infidels and heretics. This sacred duty encouraged a mutually supportive relationship between king and pope, and ultimately enhanced the former’s aura of power by imbuing it with divine legitimacy. In recognition of Portuguese and Spanish exploits in propagating the faith beyond Europe, the papacy institutionalised the Iberian kings’ ecclesiastical power through a

series of concordats in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, establishing the Royal Patronage, which granted the Iberian Crowns powers to appoint bishops and establish new bishoprics and dioceses throughout their dominions. In addition, the crowns gained the monopoly over evangelisation in their territories. Missionary orders like the Dominicans and Jesuits, for instance, depended on the king's mandate and good will.

Central administration

In the civil sphere the Iberian Crowns developed institutions to consolidate their pre-eminence over the kingdoms' political, military, judicial, and fiscal organisation as well. These institutions took shape over several centuries, expanding as Iberian Christians reconquered territories from Muslim rule, and continued to evolve throughout the long process of expansion overseas. The opening of long-distance sea routes, the conquests of new territories and peoples, and the profits generated by overseas commerce compelled the Iberian Crowns to expand their administration both overseas and, in the peninsula, to more tightly control the political and economic development of their increasingly lucrative and extensive colonial worlds. Lisbon's House of Guinea (ca. 1460) and House of India (ca. 1500) regulated the crown's monopoly contracts, collected the royal share of imported merchandise from each region, and served as maritime courts and warehouses for trade goods, including slaves. If throughout the sixteenth century the majority of Spanish Crown revenue derived from taxes levied on Castile, already by the 1510s 39% of the Portuguese Crown's total income derived from the Asian spice trade alone, making the House of India the kingdom's most important economic institution (Godinho 1975, 33; Lang 1979, 30). In the early seventeenth century, while under Spanish Habsburg rule, the Portuguese Crown established the short-lived Council of India (1604–1614), modelled on its Castilian counterpart, the Council of Indies, which in theory held supreme jurisdiction over all political, military, judicial and commercial affairs throughout the colonial world (Luz 1952). Finally, the Overseas Council (1642), established after Portugal's separation from Spain, possessed the same mandate as the Council of India, but was more powerful than its predecessor and survived into the nineteenth century given its legitimacy as a purely Portuguese creation.

The House of Trade, founded in Seville in 1503, was Spain's first institution of overseas administration. Modelled on Lisbon's House of India, its competencies were nearly identical. Soon, however, it came under the authority of the newly created Council of Indies. In the monarchy's political hierarchy, directly below the king was a polysynodial system of councils, including one for each constituent kingdom. The Council of Indies, which emerged initially as a sub-committee within the Council of Castile, became an independent body in 1524. It advised the monarch on everything related to the administration of his overseas possessions and became the highest authority on all legislative, executive, and judicial matters concerning those territories, subject only to the order of the king.

Spanish overseas administration

The theme of the government and administration of Spain's overseas territories provides a unique perspective from which to analyse the incorporation of those territories within the Spanish monarchy, and the extent to which their integration proved exceptional. The degree of exceptionality derived from the diversity of the integrated territories, from constantly evolving circumstances, and from the ever-present physical distance between America and the peninsula as well as between the different overseas territories themselves. All this gave rise to a peculiar casuistry in legislation and political management.

The key idea sustained in numerous reports and memoranda that arrived to the metropole, especially during the first half of the sixteenth century, was that realities in the Americas were hardly compatible with the rigid Spanish legal norms seen as essential to the exercise of good government above all the contingencies of people, time, and place, which determined particular circumstances (Tau 1992, 33). Another principle guiding political action from the mid-sixteenth century was captured in the oft-repeated phrase, *conocer para legislar* ("know in order to legislate"), which translated into an interest in rationalising systems of information. With a continuity that was not necessarily regular, from 1570 the Council of Indies began obtaining standardised information on the Americas through general or partial questionnaires. More than 30 such questionnaires were sent to America from 1577 to 1812, giving rise to the well-known *Relaciones Geográficas* (Ponce Leiva 1992).

Alongside these examples of exception, however, several other

factors provide evidence of the Indies' full and normal integration within the monarchy. Such factors include the sharing of one king, one language, and one official religion (which in practice coexisted alongside many indigenous ones), the implantation of a collection of institutions that channelled the incorporation of the Indies within the monarchy's political and administrative apparatus, and the insertion of the overseas territories in an economic system regulated by the metropole.

In the period from 1492 to 1535, management of the overseas territories was based on a system of "trial and error". Despite the instability and general lack of control that characterised these years—without doubt the hardest for the indigenous population—it is nonetheless clear that in the Spanish sphere the crown's presence in the management of its overseas territories was constant, and thus distinct from other processes of European colonisation, including that of the Portuguese in Brazil. Until 1535 or 1540 government was exercised through the viceroy (Columbus, father and son), whose powers were steadily curtailed; through governors, in so-called "capitulations"; and through high courts granted governing powers either by royal delegation or by the absence of other high officials in their jurisdiction. From that date the system of government was structured around viceroys, high courts-governorships, local magistrates and *corregidores*. Beginning in 1564 this system was transferred to the Philippines, which fell within the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of New Spain. From there developed the particular trajectories for each of the different jurisdictions, all of which were managed from the Council of Indies.

The crown created six superior governorships in the sixteenth century with both political and judicial attributes based in Mexico City, Lima, Santo Domingo, Guatemala, Santa Fé de Bogotá, and Manila. Each was subordinated directly to the king and his Council of Indies and headed by a governor who was also captain-general of the military, president of the high court where he resided, and chief treasury official. In Mexico City and Lima, the governor was also viceroy and hence vicepatron of the church. Below this superior level there were minor provinces and governorships of varying size and population whose governors, although subordinated to a corresponding viceroy or high court president, nonetheless acted as chief justice and general commander of defence within their territorial jurisdiction. They also possessed important fiscal powers (Céspedes del Castillo 2000, 32).

For the government of cities and their districts, the crown appointed *corregidores* to oversee local municipal councils. *Corregidores* had functions of government, acted as royal judges, military commanders, and as representatives of the royal treasury not only where they resided, but also often in neighbouring municipalities. Chronologically, the municipal councils were in general the first institutions created in America. As Spaniards spread across America, they founded new towns and cities with such councils, which provided them limited self-government at the local level. Municipal councils held jurisdiction over the municipality and its surrounding countryside, served as bastions for the protection of local customary law, as courts of first instance, set prices on foodstuffs and other products, allotted and sold municipal lands, regulated agriculture and access to the market of indigenous labour, and organised militias for defence.

Communities of indigenous peoples were governed in two ways. Several, especially in remote regions, maintained their traditional leaders (*caciques* or *curacas*) and forms of social and political organisation, while others created municipal councils on the Spanish model, overseen by indigenous *corregidores*. In the first case, the great variety of indigenous American societies produced diverse manners of governing themselves under Spanish dominion. In the second, through the *cabildos*, *caciques* or *curacas* frequently occupied posts of governor, magistrate, and alderman, and for that they learned and adapted to Spanish law and custom for their benefit (Stern 1982; Rojas 2010).

In the judicial sphere there existed 12 high court districts. As courts of third instance after hearings by locally elected judges and *corregidores*, high courts' sentences were final, except in the rare cases appealed to Spain's Council of Indies. There were three classes of high courts, determined by the powers of the official who presided over them. Viceroys presided over viceregal high courts (in Lima and Mexico City), and provincial governors over provincial high courts (in Panama, Santo Domingo, Guatemala, Manila, and Santa Fé). Subordinate high courts (in Guadalajara, Quito, Charcas, Chile, and Buenos Aires, from 1661 to 1673), for lack of another, more proximate high official, depended on the viceroy in matters of government.

The crown also created royal treasury boards in Lima, Mexico City, and Santa Fé de Bogotá to oversee fiscal affairs. These bodies supervised the legion of fiscal officials, including treasurers and

accountants, of royal treasuries in the principal cities, ports and mining centres across Spanish America. There were also fiscal offices that administered specific royal incomes, like the *alcabala* tax, indigenous tribute, and royal monopolies. Holders of these offices did not need any specific training beyond basic accounting experience (Bertrand 2011, 78, 173).

Defence was one of the most important preoccupations of Iberian overseas administration. Nevertheless, throughout most of both Spanish and Portuguese America there did not exist a true military organisation. The viceroys' armed guards were often the only military units with social prestige and formal training. The crowns established a certain number of modest professional military garrisons in ports and coastal areas of high strategic value, as well as in Spanish *presidio* military posts in frontier zones. In practice, however, most defence forces consisted of troops raised in moments of danger and directed by leading members of local society who were granted honorary military titles, like "captain" or "field-master" (Marchena 1992, 47). This circumstance explains the near ubiquitous practice of appointing professional soldiers as governors, captains, and *corregidores* throughout the Iberian world.

The organisation of spiritual government was structured around 27 bishoprics and five archbishoprics (in Mexico, Santo Domingo, Santa Fe, Lima, and La Plata). From both an administrative and pastoral point of view, however, the most important units were the Spanish and *mestizo* parishes, directed by the secular clergy, and the Amerindian *doctrinas*, administered by the regular clergy. The history of relations between the Catholic Church and Spanish monarchy abounds in confrontations between bishops and royal authorities over the treatment of native peoples, ecclesiastical autonomy and immunity, the competencies of tribunals, and, especially, the right to present candidates for ecclesiastical posts, including everything from *doctrina* priests to bishops (García Añoveros 1990, 83–99).

Portuguese overseas administration

Although the institutional framework governing Portugal's possessions in Brazil eventually came to resemble that in Spanish America and Portuguese Asia, it followed a distinct trajectory. Despite basic formal similarities, Portuguese royal administration in Brazil never achieved the reach and complexity of its Spanish American counterpart.

Whereas Brazil languished initially as a backwater, providing only modest commercial promise for much of the early sixteenth century, Portugal's burgeoning commercial empire in the east yielded windfall profits almost immediately. As a result, soon after da Gama's voyage to India in 1498, the crown placed a viceroy there with broad jurisdiction over the political, military, judicial, and fiscal administration of the still modest collection of Portuguese footholds across the circum-Indian Ocean. As expansion continued, the crown established governorships in East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia, headed by autonomous governors and captains responsible for political and military administration. The crown also created provincial judgeships and a high court in Goa in 1544 to hear appeals from across Portuguese Asia, as well as a similarly structured fiscal administration that reached from the viceregal capital down to the myriad customs houses and trade posts (Miranda 2009). Treasury officials managed crown revenues and spending, monopoly contracts, and customs duties and taxation for the entire viceroyalty. In addition, they supervised the *cartaz* system through which Portugal sought to enforce its monopoly on navigation and trade by regulating the inter-Asian commerce of Hindu, Muslim, and Malay merchants across the Indian Ocean. Beyond these civil institutions the crown also created a system of bishoprics to care for the spiritual welfare of its overseas subjects, a Goan office of the Inquisition (1560) to ensure purity of faith, and a branch of the Lisbon-based Board of Conscience (1570), also in Goa, to provide moral theological guidance to the viceregal administration (Marcocci 2012, 2014).

Figure 14.2 Portuguese Administration in the Estado do Brasil

Figure 14.3 Portuguese Administration in the Estado da Índia

Despite Cabral reaching Brazil just two years after da Gama's landing in Calicut, the Portuguese Crown waited half a century before establishing direct rule in the New World. Bereft of the spices of the great Asian emporia and the silver of Mexico and Peru, the crown nonetheless recognised Brazil's strategic importance with the rise of French incursions. In 1534, it delegated Brazil's early occupation to 15 "donatory-captains" who, in return for financing and executing the conquest, settlement, and defence of their assigned territories, enjoyed wide political, military, and judicial authority there and a major portion of the profits from all economic production and trade. After 15 years, however, only two of the original captaincies had become profitable. Several remained as undeveloped as when Europeans first

set eyes on them. One contemporary observer warned in a letter to the king: “If Your Majesty does not succour these captaincies soon, not only will we lose our lives and goods but Your Majesty will lose the land” (Goés 1924 [1548], 259). To reinforce Portugal’s sovereign claim to the territory the king sent the first governor-general to Bahia in 1549 to found a capital and implement royal authority throughout Brazil (Cardim and Miranda 2012; Bicalho 2012). Given their relative success, Pernambuco and São Vicente were the only captaincies to remain hereditary and governed by their original donatories. The rest were converted to royal captaincies, subject in theory to viceregal rule from Bahia. Although the Portuguese king did not appoint *corregidores* to oversee Brazil’s municipal councils, as Spain had in its dominions, he did send a single superior magistrate to oversee the locally elected judges (Schwartz 1973). He also sent a royal treasurer with broad authorities in fiscal administration.

Local institutions including the *Misericórdia* confraternities, municipal councils, craft guilds, and even families, the base unit of colonial society, all had their own rules, customs, and leaders. This integrated network of smaller powers was fundamental in determining the legal and normative frameworks governing everyday life in colonial society. The *Misericórdias*, for instance, confraternities devoted to charitable works, although protected by the king, were local in origin. In addition to facilitating social cohesion among Brazil’s settler elite, they also served an important administrative function in processing and executing wills (Bethencourt 2007, 200). The other key pillar of local society, the municipal council, enjoyed similar powers to its Spanish counterpart (Bethencourt 2007, 200; Boxer 1965; Bicalho 2001). The lack of *corregidores* to supervise their activities, however, gave Brazilian municipal councils even more independence with respect to royal authority than those in Spanish America and peninsular Portugal. And their right to correspond directly with Lisbon gave them a degree of autonomy from the crown’s central colonial institutions. Unlike in Spanish America there existed no Portuguese equivalent to the Republic of Indians in Brazil and therefore no separate indigenous municipal councils. The Portuguese Crown did promote the conversion, and at least in theory the protection, of indigenous communities through the creation of Jesuit-run settlements. But since the indigenous populations surrounding Portuguese settlements in Brazil were smaller, less centralised and sedentary, and relatively less integral to Brazil’s export economy (soon dominated by African slave labour), the Portuguese

never created a separate juridical-political body for the native population as Spaniards had.

Only in the early seventeenth century, under Spanish Habsburg rule, did Brazil see a further expansion of the colonial bureaucracy (Cardim 2004). This process extended crown rule throughout the territory while simultaneously diffusing the governor-general's power by creating new levels of judicial and fiscal administration that reported directly to Lisbon (and Madrid from 1581 to 1640) rather than to Bahia. Above all, it was an attempt to transform the colony's government and administration from an operation led by individuals into a more robust and effective hierarchical bureaucracy. To alleviate the judicial demands on Brazil's sole superior magistrate, the crown created its first and only Brazilian high court, in Bahia in 1609, roughly a century after Madrid had established its first of many in Spanish America (Bethencourt 2007, 239). Bahia's high court was subject only to the oversight of the king and his supreme court in Lisbon, rather than to the governor-general. At roughly the same time the crown established a network of provincial judges as an intermediary level between the locally elected judges of municipal councils and the high court. The crown also finally opened a central Bahia office of the royal treasury in 1614. Its officials supported the royal treasurer and oversaw an expanded bureaucracy of intermediate and lower level treasury officers of the captaincies and municipalities (Mukerjee 2009).

If Brazil's political, judicial, and fiscal institutions were limited in their development and reach, royal military and ecclesiastical powers were even more so. As in Spanish America, Brazil had no regular, centralised military organisation. Although a royal defence fleet plied the long Brazilian coast intermittently and modest retinues of trained soldiers guarded the governor-general and certain coastal fortifications, the ground forces protecting the colony were, for the most part, irregular, untrained militias of private settlers raised by municipal councils or provincial governors. Finally, in the late seventeenth century, the crown created permanent garrisons in Bahia, Pernambuco, and eventually throughout the other captaincies to repel encroachments of imperial competitors on Brazilian territory.

Although Bahia was named a bishopric in 1551, it was the only one in Brazil for over a century. It was not until the 1670s that Bahia was raised to an archbishopric, that new bishoprics were created in Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Maranhão, and that the first convent opened in Brazil. Unlike Spanish America and Portuguese Asia, Brazil

never had its own Holy Office of the Inquisition. Another distinction was that in Brazil the Jesuits, rather than the secular church, dominated religious life in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Institutional frameworks and their internal dynamics

The institutional and administrative frameworks governing Spain, Portugal, and their overseas possessions were not strongly centralised. They were defined by a plurality of powers and jurisdictions (high courts, municipal councils, bishoprics, regular religious orders, etc.) united symbolically by the king, yet each of which acted with a large measure of autonomy (Hespanha and Santos 1993). Logically, there existed points of articulation and conflict between those powers. The function of the king and the central organs of government was not to eliminate the capacity for autonomous action of the various components of the body politic, but rather to represent its unity and maintain harmony between its constituent parts (Tau 2000, 113; Cañeque 2013, 283).

The exercise of power was based on complex systems of pacts, reciprocities and negotiations, which functioned in multiple directions and intensities, and which encompassed the diverse interests of the crown and the various nuclei of power overseas, including the church, royal officials, and, above all, powerful local elites. The systems in both the Spanish and Portuguese realms were based on the understanding that, while the exercise of power could be debated and critiqued, the fundamental authority of the monarch was beyond question. Yet the monarchs' power to determine basic decision-making was not absolute, nor was it expected to be. In Spanish realms in particular, high crown officials, including viceroys and high court justices, had wide power to interpret royal decrees as they saw fit and were not always required to execute them to the letter. The famous legal device captured in the phrase *obedezco pero no cumplo* ("I obey but do not comply") permitted officials to refuse to implement certain decrees while still affirming their obedience to the monarch's supreme authority (MacLachlan 1988). According to the Compilation of Laws of the Indies, "Ministers and judges should obey, but not comply with our decrees and orders" if given local circumstances they seemed imprudent (Book 2, Title 2, Law 22). Loyalty to the king and the maintenance of social peace took precedence over strict compliance

with royal order (Pérez Herrero 2002, 95, 133, 134; Berthe and Calvo 2011, 39).

Despite the autonomy afforded to their various overseas institutions, the Iberian Crowns did nonetheless develop similar means, based on peninsular precedent, to ensure a degree of obedience, accountability, and good governance among their officials. These means included *residencia* evaluations, a broad typology of investigations called *visitas*, *pesquisas*, and *devassas*, the sending of magistrates with supervisory powers, the obligation in Spanish realms to complete inventories of an office's patrimony before entering into one's duties, the social isolation of crown agents, the ban of debtors of fines from receiving new royal appointments, and the right of any subject to denounce a crime or abuse of office. Every single individual in the political, military, judicial, and fiscal administration, including the viceroy or governor-general, was submitted to a mandatory *residencia* evaluation, for instance. These evaluations were conducted at the end of an official's term and typically entailed an investigation conducted by the successor to that post. The evaluator interviewed individuals familiar with the outgoing official's performance in office and inspected all relevant documents before submitting a report that often had the power to make or break careers. Even if such supervisory mechanisms were ineffective in detecting most abuses and fraud, they did nonetheless provide a legal means for individuals to denounce bad government and eventually, in some cases, to punish the guilty through loss of office, fines, and, in rare circumstances, prison. While relatively systematic in Spanish America, such evaluations were applied infrequently in Brazil, however, especially beyond Bahia (Schwartz 1973, 154–170).

The Iberian monarchs sought to consolidate crown rule through jurisdictional layering as well. Within the political, judicial, and fiscal institutions there existed more or less clear orders of hierarchy, and all were subject to the ultimate authority of the king. But between them, relations of hierarchy were not always clear. Jurisdictional disputes erupted frequently between the viceroy/governor-general and high court, for instance, since both reported directly to Lisbon or Madrid. Even municipal councils could appeal directly to the king through his advisory boards if they felt the governor-general, viceroy, or another authority had violated their local rights or privileges. Rather than provoking anarchy, however, this organisational structure produced a degree of cohesion while at same time affording local institutions substantial autonomy. Factors like jurisdictional layering, physical

distance and communication lags, and respect for local custom and privilege all converged to diffuse the monarch's effective power and ability to influence everyday decision-making. But the checking of certain institutions by the power of others also aimed to ensure that ultimate authority always remained in the hands of the king.

Beyond the fact that the political, judicial, and fiscal authorities of colonial administration all eventually reported directly to Madrid or Lisbon rather than to each other, there also existed several key linkages between them which institutionalised their mutual regulation and overlapping competencies. For instance, by the mid-seventeenth century Brazil's fiscal and judicial authority had been enmeshed to a degree, at least at the highest level. The royal factor, although not a judge, adjudicated minor financial disputes, and the high court's chief justice presided over more serious cases involving fiscal issues throughout Brazil (Lang 1979, 42). In addition, a royal treasury council, consisting of four high court judges, was created in 1652 to help oversee the colony's fiscal administration. Judges of the high court and provinces also provided regular counsel to the governor-general and provincial governors and reviewed their legal action. In turn, the governor-general evaluated judges' performance and could suspend them if he deemed their conduct unsatisfactory.

Through a process of continuous negotiation, the king, his overseas officials, and local elites all assented at certain moments to sacrifice some of their own pretensions in order to preserve the essential equilibrium of forces that maintained the social and political order. Royal appointments and, in Spanish realms, the selling of offices were the main currencies of exchange. Through them, American elites expanded their power, although not without considerable effort (Berthe and Calvo 2011, 109). American-born Spaniards, for instance, known as *criollos*, developed a rich tradition of treatise writing, which peaked between 1620 and 1670, devoted expressly to their exclusion from the royal bureaucracy (Ponce Leiva 1997; Garriga 2003). Paradoxically, although there were several universities in sixteenth-century Spanish America, Spanish American graduates found it far more difficult to gain positions in the upper levels of Spain's colonial bureaucracy than Brazilians did in Portuguese administration (Camarinhas 2009). Since Brazil had no university until the nineteenth century, Brazilians of means completed their studies in Portugal and found administrative positions throughout the Lusophone world, especially in judicial posts. This fact, along with the almost constant migration between Portugal and its overseas

territories (Camarinhas and Ponce Leiva 2019), helps explain why there was less conflict in Brazil than in Spanish America between local born settlers (*criollos*) and those arriving from the peninsula (*peninsulares*).

American-born Spaniards, on the other hand, only entered the civil administration in significant numbers when offices came up for sale. Positions as scribes and secretaries were sold from the mid-sixteenth century, municipal council posts from 1591, royal treasury posts from the 1630s, and judicial and political positions, including *corregidores*, governors, and judges, from 1674. Competing with peninsular born candidates who also resorted to purchase when it became the predominant means of access, Spanish Americans only became the majority among municipal councils and subordinate positions in the judiciary. Importantly, Spanish American *criollos* did not acquire power by entering into the administration. Rather, they entered the administration by leveraging the social and economic resources they already possessed.

Conclusion

Spain and Portugal were pioneers in the process of overseas colonisation. From the late fifteenth century, the two monarchies expanded roughly in parallel, extending their rule over complex mosaics of heterogeneous peoples and territories. The major challenge each monarchy faced was that of organising and regulating social and geographic realities totally foreign to those they had previously known and doing so according to their own cultural parameters. A common set of core principles guided the extension of Iberian Crown rule overseas. These principles defined the political and juridical status of newly incorporated territories and determined the contours of the institutional frameworks developed to manage them. In implanting royal administration overseas, the Iberian Crowns copied some pre-existing institutions from the peninsula, occasionally imitated each other's structures of colonial government, and sometimes improvised, creating altogether new institutions. All this led to the consolidation of institutional frameworks that were highly adaptable to the distinct realities of the American territories. The frameworks matured and persisted precisely through their capacity to redefine and adjust themselves to the specific conditions and contingencies of those territories.

Despite the separation of Spanish possessions from Portuguese ones, with very little communication between them, influences in administration were mutual. The influence of Portugal's House of India on Spain's House of Trade, and Spain's Council of Indies on Portugal's Council of India were key examples of this. This was especially evident during the period of the union of the Iberian Crowns from 1581 to 1640, when the reform of Portuguese overseas administration was strongly influenced by the Spanish model.

If the political-administrative models were similar, Spain developed a much more complex system of administrative institutions in America than did Portugal, and it did so much earlier. Spain created its first American high court in 1511, in Santo Domingo, while Portugal only created its first in 1609, in Bahia. Although in both monarchies spiritual government was exercised through the Royal Patronage, it was more fully developed in Spanish realms. In the late sixteenth century Brazil had only one bishopric while in Spanish America and the Philippines there were a total of 27, along with five archbishoprics. This distinction was linked to the demographic situation in the peninsula. But it was also due to the fact that Brazil did not become the economic centre of Portugal's multi-continental monarchy until the second half of the seventeenth century. Mexico and Peru, on the other hand, had already emerged as the economic centres of the Spain's overseas territories with the discovery of silver mines there in the mid-sixteenth century.

Both monarchies integrated their overseas possessions as annexed territories, not as colonies, even if Spain developed a separate compilation of law for the Indies. In both Spanish America and Brazil, permanent armed forces were small and scattered, and militias had little formal training. Although the fiscal system in colonial Brazil was more or less centralised through Bahia, merchants in each captaincy could travel to and trade directly with Lisbon, whereas in Spanish America such trade and communication was centralised through a handful of ports.

A notable difference between the two Iberian spaces was the importance of *criollismo* as a cultural and political phenomenon in Spanish America versus Brazil. The inexistence of universities in Brazil, in contrast to the multitude of them in Spanish America, meant that Luso-Brazilians went to Coimbra for training and came to form part of the monarchy's administration both in Portugal and overseas. Moreover, throughout the Portuguese world Luso-Brazilians gained office through royal appointment, whereas Spanish Americans did so

increasingly through the purchase of offices. The constant migration of Portuguese to Brazil made the proportion there of Luso-Brazilians to peninsular Portuguese more balanced than that in Spanish America where *criollos* came to steadily outnumber Spanish-born *peninsulares*.

The autonomous powers enjoyed by overseas officials, central institutions, and municipal and other local bodies should not be viewed simply as indicative of the monarchies' impotence and inefficiency, a view predominant in scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, to a certain degree such diffusion of power was integral to very nature of Iberian monarchical rule, both in Europe and overseas. Even if the presence of central power was more intense and evident in Spanish America than Brazil, the exercise of government in both realms was based fundamentally on negotiation, administrative decentralisation, and on the equilibrium and autonomy of several different institutions and jurisdictions. It was precisely this complex, fluid balance of central, regional, and local powers that enabled the Iberian Crowns to adapt to constantly evolving circumstances, to integrate diverse territories and peoples within their extended imperium, and to maintain ultimate sovereignty from afar despite the vast distances separating their numerous dominions across Africa, Asia, and America.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Patterns of conquest and settlement of the Iberian Americas



Stuart B. Schwartz

Introduction

Although Castile was three times larger in area than its neighbour to the west, and had a population of about 8.5 million, or over five times the size of Portugal's 1.5 million, during the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both of these kingdoms, moved by similar economic and social forces, and by religious motives and missionary zeal, established settlements in the Americas, and integrated them into imperial systems. Drawing on their own populations, but also on human and capital resources from elsewhere in Europe, Portugal, and Spain (integrating Castile as part of a composite monarchy) used medieval precedents, institutions, and models, but modified them according to geographical and ecological realities and local conditions, especially those created by the nature, size, and density of the indigenous populations that they encountered. The history of Iberian conquest and colonisation in the Americas thus was marked both by strong parallels between the actions and imperial objectives of Spain and Portugal, but also by a significant degree of variation, not only between the two monarchies, but also within the areas under control of each. Those local and regional differences generated primarily by geophysical characteristics, economic potential, and the size and social complexity of the indigenous populations determined to a large extent the pace and spaces of settlement, the stages of colonisation, and the character of society within, and political control over, the vast territories claimed by the two monarchies.

Iberian and Atlantic origins

The Iberian conquest and settlement of the Americas was prefaced by their experience at home and in the Atlantic. Portugal, having captured the last Muslim territories and established a monarchy independent of Castilian sovereignty by the late fourteenth century, began a process of centralisation at that time, although its rulers maintained many aspects of feudal and patrimonial administration. In Castile, the process of unification under Christian rule took a century longer, finally succeeding when Muslim Granada fell in 1492. Both Castile and Portugal had been strongly affected by their long, and often contentious medieval history of multi-religious contact with Muslims and Jews, and by a sense of religious fervour born from the reconquest campaigns which included the conversion (voluntary or forced) of the conquered populations. By 1500, Christian religious unification of Iberia had been achieved with the conversion or expulsion of Castilian Jews (1492), the forced conversion of Jews in Portugal (1497), and a program of conversion of those Muslims left in Iberia.

Over the long course of reconquest, a series of customs and practices developed that the Spaniards extended to the Indies. These included royal authorisation of military campaigns conveyed through a legal contract (*capitulación*) to a commander (*adelantado*) who often financed the expedition himself. Enlistment depended on voluntary military service, but there were strict rules in the distribution of booty, and also an expectation of reward, usually in the form of land in the conquered territory. The process of reconquest also included the foundation of towns in a captured territory, the close cooperation of civil and ecclesiastical authority, the mobilisation of orders of knighthood as a royal military cadre, and the sponsorship of privately organised raids or campaigns, all of which provided models and expectations for the later Iberian experience, first in the Canary Islands and then in the Americas.

In the fifteenth century, Portuguese interests in cereals and gold led first to outpost settlements in Morocco, and then down the African coast, and into the Atlantic itself. The Portuguese created “factories” (*feitorias*) or commercial outposts on the coast of West Africa from which gold, ivory, and, after 1441, slaves were shipped to Europe. Powerful African kingdoms and Portugal’s own limited resources discouraged settlement on the west African coast itself, but the Portuguese did colonise unoccupied island groups like Madeira (1418), the Azores (1427) the Cape Verde islands (1462) and Sao Tomé and Príncipe (1471). This push into the South Atlantic

eventually became directed towards opening a sea route into the Indian Ocean, a dream realised in 1498 with Vasco da Gama's voyage. A landfall on the Brazilian coast in 1500 by a subsequent Portuguese fleet to India did little to distract Portugal from its goal to create a maritime empire in Asia. Even so, it is important to emphasise that the Portuguese could draw on a century of overseas settlement, commerce, and contact with other populations prior to the development of Brazil.

The Portuguese had not been alone in the Atlantic. Genoese, Mallorcans, Catalans, and Andalucians had also been active. Castile had contested claims to the Canary Islands with the Portuguese, and after prolonged conflict, it had wrested control of most of the islands from the indigenous Guanche population. By treaty with Portugal (Treaty of Alcaçovas, 1479) Castile won recognition of its sovereignty in return for acknowledging Portugal's control of the Azores and Madeira and the west coast of Africa. The papacy granted Castile responsibility for the evangelisation of the Canary Islands, and then after Columbus' voyage in 1492, it had, over Portuguese objections, expanded papal recognition of Castilian claims to new lands further westward. The competing claims of Castile and Portugal were finally resolved by the bilateral Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) which solidified a Portuguese sphere of influence in the eastern Atlantic and southward down the African coast and recognised a Castilian sphere to the west. Both the Portuguese in the uninhabited Madeira islands and São Tomé and the Castilians in the Canaries began to settle these islands, and drawing on Genoese and Northern European capital, and then on the importation of slaves from the African coast, began to develop sugar plantations that by the 1480s were exporting large amounts of good quality sugar to Europe. The patterns of settlement, the technology, and the organisation of these Atlantic island settlements provided examples and models for the later colonisation in the Americas, although for much of the sixteenth century these islands were also the principal rivals of the first American settlements.

Stages and types of colonial settlements

The conquest and settlement of Iberian Americas can be conceptualised in a number of stages over the period from 1492 to ca. 1700 (Lockhart and Schwartz 1984; also Céspedes del Castillo 1983; Pietschmann 1989; Garavaglia y Marchena 2005). In both empires

there was an initial period of first contact of two or three decades in which state presence remained limited and exploration, settlement, and economic development was largely in the hands of individuals under royal concession, contract, or license. In this period, contact with indigenous peoples was mostly unregulated and highly dependent on the economic needs of the Europeans. After an initial peaceful encounter, these early contacts were often accompanied by violence, and by rapid indigenous demographic losses due to warfare, social dislocation, and disease. For Spain, this stage of first contact took place mostly on the large islands of the Caribbean, and its general outline subsequently served as a model for the practices, vocabulary, social arrangements, and institutions that later would be transferred and readapted in other areas of the Americas.

The continuity of the Mediterranean and Atlantic worlds was embodied in the career and actions of Columbus, a Genoese mariner sailing for Castile in 1492 who had considerable experience with the use of “*feitorias*”, which in Europe had been strictly commercial bases, but that the Portuguese in Africa had established with military and political functions. These experiences influenced his own conception of his rights, and goals. The presence of foreigners like him, and of foreign capital, had been a common aspect of the early Iberian experience in the Atlantic that would also characterise the first decades of settlement in the Americas. Columbus conceived of his settlement on Española as a proprietary enterprise and trading monopoly, and he treated the original contingent of 1,200 men (no women) that he brought in 1494 on his second voyage as strictly controlled, salaried employees in his service. Frustrated by these conditions and by their limited access to gold or Indian workers, the latter in part because of the efforts of missionaries sent to convert the native inhabitants, the disgruntled employees, hoping for the practices of reconquest Spain where lands and privileges had been distributed in recompense for military service, broke with Columbus and his faction. He was forced to place groups of indigenous labourers in the hands of individual Spaniards, a system of reward and labour organisation that was regularised when Fray Nicolás de Ovando succeeded the Columbus family in 1501 as the principal governmental authority. This system, eventually known as the *encomienda*, was widely used throughout Spanish America to mobilise indigenous labour, and to satisfy the ambitions and reward the service of the conquerors and colonists. The struggle and disruption over this transition from the commercial trade factory to a settlement model of

colonisation led to the gradual loss of Columbus' proprietary rights and privilege.

The arrival of Ovando, establishment of a court of appeals (*audiencia*) in 1511, and the creation of three bishoprics in that same year, all underlined an increasing level of royal and ecclesiastical administration which by 1520 was well established in the city of Santo Domingo. By that date, exploration, conquest, and settlement had begun on Puerto Rico (1508), Jamaica (1509), Cuba (1512), and other islands as well as on the mainland coasts of Panama (1509) and Colombia (1514), where the search for gold or Indian slaves continued, or on the coast of Venezuela (Nueva Cádiz ca. 1515) where the oyster beds could be exploited for pearls, once again utilising forced labour. Missionaries had initiated a campaign to stop the slave raids and abuse of the indigenous populations, which on many of the islands had suffered a precipitous decline. On Española alone, the native population had dropped from 60,000 in 1508 to about 26,000 by 1514, and after a smallpox epidemic in late 1519, to under 3,000. By the 1530s, the stream of immigrants to the Caribbean islands had become a trickle as the gold mining on Española and Puerto Rico had diminished and the new conquests in Mexico and Peru now attracted potential settlers. The islands began a transition to sugar production, livestock raising, ginger, and other kinds of agriculture, or in the case of Cuba, to maritime provisioning, especially from its northern coastal city of Havana.

Further south, Portuguese early contact on the Brazilian coast began about a decade after the Colombian voyage, but seeming to lack gold, Brazil drew little royal interest or a flow of colonists. The Portuguese Crown remained more interested in Asia and thus in Brazil it employed a model of commercial colonisation for a longer period. It supported small, scattered enclaves where merchants, mariners, castaways, and a few settlers cohabited and bartered with native inhabitants to cut dyewood and to serve as allies against European (principally French) competitors. Unlike Castile in the Caribbean, there was almost no missionary activity to convert or protect the indigenous peoples. Only foreign competition brought a change. In 1530, the king, Dom João III, dispatched a royal expedition to clear the coast of rivals and begin settlement. It created the town of São Vicente (1532). Simultaneously, drawing on precedents used in the colonisation of the Atlantic islands, Portugal initiated a program to divide the Brazilian coast into 15 proprietary grants or captaincies to be held by nobles who would use their own resources to promote

colonisation and settlement.

Despite differences in chronology and in their first decades of contact in the Americas, there were also marked similarities in the Spanish and Portuguese experiences of occupation. In both cases early contact was carried out with limited state involvement, using arrangements modelled on previous Atlantic experience, and drawing on common traditions of commercial contacts. Both Spaniards and Portuguese first encountered indigenous peoples who practiced semi-sedentary agriculture, and thus had some resources that could be expropriated. The Castilians, needing workers in the gold washings and to supply food, mobilised and exploited the Taino peoples of the islands of the Greater Antilles to such an extent that by the 1520s, the Spaniards were extensively raiding other islands to make up for the diminishing population. This raiding did expand Spanish knowledge of the region's geography, but it also provoked a century of firm resistance of peoples from the Lesser Antilles that the Spaniards referred to as "Caribs" (savages). The Portuguese, needing indigenous workers to find dyewood and to supply food stuffs, at first depended on barter and marriage alliances rather than on conquest or force, although they too were confronted by indigenous enemies: Tapuyas (non-Tupi speakers) who like the Caribs were considered savages; or by those Tupi-speakers who were allied with Portugal's French rivals. It was only with the attempts at settlement under the donatary captaincy system and the development of a sugar industry that Portuguese relations with the native peoples changed from barter to slavery.

The contact phase in the Caribbean and on the coast of Brazil provided previews of patterns of settlement that would be followed elsewhere by the Iberians, but this early phase differed in the Caribbean in the sense that the indigenous population was so rapidly destroyed, and never recovered. Instead, the Caribbean provided an early example of the replacement of the decimated original population by the importation of African slaves, beginning slowly by 1508 with the arrival of black slaves from Spain, and by the 1530s in increasing numbers from Africa, as their principal role changed from domestic servants to agricultural workers, especially on the growing number of sugar mills. Curiously, this process drew the parallel stories of the Spanish and Portuguese into direct contact because many early Portuguese emigrants who left for Brazil ended up in the Caribbean, attracted by gold and opportunities there, and eventually Portuguese contractors and suppliers from Portugal's West African outposts

dominated the slave trade to the Caribbean (Ventura 1999).

Conquest and settlement

The foundational contact stage in the New World was followed by an era of conquest and settlement from roughly 1520 to 1570 but varying in duration and character by region. After the first decades in the Caribbean, the Spanish conquest and occupation of the vast American continents took place rapidly, but selectively over the course of the next 50 years (New Spain, 1519–1535; Peru 1533–1545; New Granada, 1537–1549). The societies that formed were shaped to a large extent by Hispanic ideals and social practices as well as by the previous decades of experience, but there were also regional differences due in large part to the character and influence of the dominant pre-conquest indigenous cultures and polities.

As in the Caribbean, the conquests were usually carried out by semi-independent military operations, with royal concessions or rewards to ambitious leaders (often including the position of governor), opportunities for rapid social mobility by some participants, and by the reduction of indigenous populations to European civil and ecclesiastical authority, although this control was often mediated by integrating native leaders or elites into the structure of government. Taking possession of new territories continued in a leap-frog pattern with the conquest of each area spinning off subsequent expeditions composed of unsatisfied participants in the previous effort, ambitious late-comers, and by large numbers of indigenous servants and auxiliaries from the last area conquered. In Spanish America, the major military operations of a conquest were usually followed by a period of political instability caused by tensions between the successful leader and the crown, or between his faction and his rivals over the spoils. In general, each conquest was followed by the abuse and decline of indigenous populations made worse by the spread of epidemic diseases, the emergence of a semi-independent conqueror-*encomendero* elite, and in some areas, by the discovery of mineral wealth, all of which eventually moved the crown to intervene by reducing the authority of the original conqueror and his faction and to impose bureaucratic controls and the formal institutions of law and government.

The island of Española served as the initial launching pad for the subsequent conquests. To the north, slave raiding decimated the

population of the Bahamas after which the Spanish showed little interest in these “useless islands”. Other expeditions like that of Ponce de León (1508) and Vázquez de Ayllón (1525) reached Florida but produced few results. Eventually, Spain created a fortress town at St Augustine (1565) to protect the sea route to Spain, but Spanish settlements and missionary activity in the region were minimal. This was a pattern much repeated. Areas like the eastern slopes of the Andes or the desert regions of northwestern Mexico that lacked large native populations that could produce an agricultural surplus and provide labourers, or that lacked deposits of mineral wealth, were often underfunded or ignored, and after exploration were left relatively unsettled. These were areas that later would be turned over to mendicant missionary orders whose task was to convert the local inhabitants and turn them from barbarians into Christians, or more exactly from Indians into peasants.

Starting from Española, the Spanish thrusts to the mainland followed two principal trajectories. The first began in Castilla de Oro (Panama) where for a while a considerable amount of gold was extracted. A second expedition followed, sailing directly from Seville in 1514, and subsequently some of its participants organised the successful strike southward to the Inca empire in Peru (1532–1534). The trajectory from Española took Cuba and then moved on to Yucatan and next to Central Mexico, where the Aztec confederation was conquered (1519–1521). The pace and intensity of the two trajectories depended to some extent on the nature and attractions of each region. The conquest of Mexico under Hernán Cortés was launched by the governor of Cuba, and while the number of Spaniards involved was relatively small, the conquistadors received considerable help from large numbers of indigenous allies and “ethnic soldiers” (Whitehead 1990). The territory of the Aztec empire fell rather quickly, and from the former Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan which Cortés now made his capital as well, the Spaniards expanded their control over Michoacán and Oaxaca by 1530. Fighting, however, in Yucatan, where there was no central imperial authority for the Spaniards to seize, dragged on for years, as it did in the areas of nomadic peoples north of the dense populations of central Mexico.

Starting from Panama, Francisco Pizarro and his band of 168 companions carried out a relatively rapid campaign against the Inca empire in Peru (aided here as well by indigenous allies). After the fall of the Inca capital of Cuzco (1533), the pre-existing Inca imperial structure and lines of communication, aided Spanish occupation,

despite a rebellion and then the survival of a centre of neo-Inca resistance at Vilcabamba (1537–1572). Northern South America was conquered in the 1530s by expeditions moving southward from the Caribbean coast and another striking northward from Quito after the conquest of Peru. Attracted by the dense indigenous populations of the Chibcha peoples in the Andean highlands and a considerable amount of gold in the area, the cities of Cartagena (1533), Bogotá (1537), and Tunja (1538) established Spanish occupation of this region of New Granada as an extension of the Peruvian orbit.

After the fall of the great Inca and Mexica indigenous imperial states, a second wave of expeditions, attracted by rumours of wealth or great empires still to be conquered, ventured into other areas. These efforts were often notable for their courage and violence, but also for their failure to produce lasting settlement or occupation. In the 1540s, Hernando de Soto's expedition from Cuba to the southeastern part of North America (1539–1542), Coronado's venture from Central Mexico into the southwest of the present United States (1540–1542) and Gonzalo Pizarro's penetration from Quito into the Amazonian rainforest (1541–1542), all failed to find exploitable resources or to serve as the basis of permanent Spanish occupation. The chronicler Francisco López de Gómara put his finger on a key to their failure when he said critically of de Soto's expedition, "He did not populate the land." Pedro de Valdivia's 1541 expedition from Cuzco southward to Chile did establish the city of Santiago, but it was hard pressed to survive the resistance of the local Araucanians, and that region long remained a military frontier. Further to the east, a large expedition of 1535 that had sailed directly from Seville to the Rio de la Plata region founded the city of Buenos Aires, but a native siege forced the Spaniards to abandon the small outpost, although some of the expedition's members moved up river to settle among the agricultural Guaraní peoples on the Paraguay river and founded the city of Asunción. It was only in 1580 that the Spanish returned to settle Buenos Aires at the mouth of the La Plata.

Overall, the speed of the conquest of two continents and an inland sea was impressive. By 1550, the occupation had taken place in the areas of sedentary indigenous societies, the core areas of New Spain and Peru, and the neighbouring regions of sedentary or semi-sedentary agricultural peoples such as Central America, New Granada, northern Chile, Paraguay, and New Mexico. On the edges of these regions there remained frontier zones of nomadic hunters much less accessible to Spanish occupation and much less attractive, at least so

long as silver or gold were not discovered. But while the speed of Spanish conquest was impressive, great areas of the interior of North America and South America remained outside of Spanish control and virtually off limits to Spanish settlement.

In Brazil, the captaincy system introduced in 1534 did produce some small settlements, but the Portuguese for most of the sixteenth century remained, “like crabs on shoreline” as Frei Vicente do Salvador, a Franciscan friar and Brazil’s first historian, stated (Salvador 2008, Vol. I, bk 1, ch. 3). Their settlements formed a coastal archipelago of port towns and surrounding agricultural areas that extended from Pernambuco southward to Guanabara Bay, where after the expulsion of a French colony, the Portuguese established the city of Rio de Janeiro in 1565. Some 230 miles further south, only the small town of São Paulo, created at a former Jesuit mission, broke the pattern of coastal settlement. Its location at the confluence of two rivers on plateau some 30 miles from the coast gave it access to the interior. For the most part, the Portuguese from the other settlements only penetrated the interior or *sertão* on occasional, and mostly unsuccessful, searches for mineral wealth, in raids for Indian captives, or eventually as they pushed livestock herding into lands unsuited for sugar or tobacco. North of Pernambuco, the occupation of the enormous areas of Maranhão and the lands at the mouth of the Amazon came mostly to keep out foreign rivals and was delayed until the early seventeenth century.

The population of European origin in Brazil remained tiny; less than 20,000 as late as 1570, and over half of it concentrated in the two captaincies of Bahia and Pernambuco. By 1600, the colony as a whole may have had 100,000 people but only about 35,000 of European or mixed origin and the majority composed of indigenous people under Portuguese control and a growing number of Africans. With its small population and spotty settlement pattern, the occupation of Brazil seemed to differ considerably from the Spanish conquest and occupation of the great populous centres of Mexico or the Andean region, but if the comparison is limited to the Spanish settlement of more marginal regions like Paraguay or Venezuela then the similarities become more apparent. Moreover, it should be emphasised that like the Portuguese in Brazil, the Spanish occupation of the continents had also left large areas virtually uncontrolled because the costs of settlement did not seem to be worth the benefits. In some ways, Brazil’s First Contact stage that paralleled the Spanish Caribbean experience started a decade later and simply lasted longer.

Despite utopian rumours of gold fields and emerald mountains, there were no great empires to attract them to abandon their Atlantic ports and the small surrounding agricultural zones.

In Brazil, the “conquest era” was simply an extension of Portuguese control of the coast, driven for the most part by the partial failure of the donatarial settlements and by the developing of the sugar industry’s need for constant agricultural workers. While the Portuguese Crown was unwilling to assume all the costs of settlement and government of Brazil and still recognised the donatarial captaincies or even created new ones, it now moved to take control of the colony. In 1549 a large expedition under a royal governor created a capital city at Salvador in the captaincy of Bahia and established the presence of royal judicial and treasury officers in the colony. Two years later a bishopric was established there as well. Six Jesuit missionaries had also arrived with the governor, and that religious order soon became the most important spiritual force in Brazil, especially in terms of the conversion and protection of the indigenous peoples who at this moment were particularly vulnerable.

By the 1540s, a Portuguese shift from barter to enslavement of the indigenous populations in combination with agricultural disruption, and epidemic diseases, caused widespread depopulation. Many native peoples fled to the interior of the continent or sought protection in Jesuit mission villages, but the latter made them more vulnerable to epidemics like that of 1562–1563 that swept through the indigenous populations. Under influence from the Jesuits, the Portuguese Crown issued its first attempt to limit indigenous slavery in 1570 (others followed in 1585 and 1609) but it was not effective, and by that time the coastal indigenous population had so dwindled that a transition to enslaved African labour was already under way. A Jesuit missionary, Father José de Anchieta, wrote from Bahia in the late 1560s with incredulity about the destruction of the native peoples, or as he said, “no one could believe that, so many people would ever be used up, let alone in such a short time” (Schwartz 1985, 28). Following the pattern of the Atlantic littoral, the wars of conquest in Brazil accompanied by occupation of new territories and the destruction or removal of native peoples continued in the same pattern into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Conquest societies

Despite the dangers, the high costs of maritime transportation and supply, and various government restrictions, about 200,000 Spaniards emigrated to America during the sixteenth century (Boyd-Bowman 1973; Sánchez Albornoz 1974). Over a third (37%) came from Andalusia and other 15% from the western region of Extremadura, and most of the remainder from Castile and León, although there was usually a good representation of Basques as well. The Indies were legally incorporated into the Crown of Castile, and so there were restrictions prohibiting subjects from the Crown of Aragon from holding office in them, but nevertheless, some did participate in the early expeditions and settlements as did an important smattering of foreigners (Portuguese, Italians, Greeks, and some northern Europeans). Non-Catholics, converts from Judaism (conversos) or Islam (moriscos) and their descendants, criminals, and women of ill-repute were all at one time or another prohibited from residence in America, but there were constant violations and evasion of these restrictions. Before 1540, women composed only 6% of the Spanish immigrants, but between 1560 and 1580 that figure rose to almost 30% of the arrivals. Half of that number was from Seville and surrounding towns. By 1570 there were perhaps 220,000 “Spaniards” (and other Europeans) resident in the Spanish Indies, although the definition of “Spaniard” was based on culture and status, and not exclusively on place of birth. The immigrants brought with them their norms and social and cultural understandings, but local practices, the experience of those who immigrated before them, and opportunity resulted in a stripped-down version of Hispanic culture heavily influenced by Andalusian and maritime traditions and vocabulary. This new and innovative “conquest culture”, formed in the Caribbean, was then further modified and transformed by subsequent experiences and contact with indigenous peoples as Spanish control spread over the rest of the Americas (Foster 1960, 10–20).

Regional associations and kinship ties were often important in creating migration chains, and continual immigration from particular towns in Spain to particular regions in America was common. These ties and affiliations often played a crucial role in the organisation of expeditions, and in the distribution of rewards to the dismay of those who were left out. Added to these personal ties were the traditional social divisions of Hispanic society with distinctions maintained between gentlemen (*hidalgos*) and commoners, and an ordering of society based on social class or juridical estate. But the conquest also created new distinctions and a new form of hierarchy based on the

antiquity of service. Those who had participated in the original expeditions of conquest were considered conquerors and were favoured in the award of *encomiendas* or other benefits. Those who had arrived at later stages of a conquest could claim the status of *poblador antiguo* or settler and also enjoy privileged treatment, but social rank also played a role in what an individual could expect. Mariners hardly ever received a grant of Indians, hidalgos of good lineage almost always received one. Nevertheless, the conquest and the use of arms in general provided new possibilities for upward mobility as commoners assumed the attitudes and perquisites of gentlemen. As a Viceroy of Peru remarked in 1582, “in the Indies everyone is a gentleman, and this is the thing that most populates them” (Lohmann Villena 1947, xxii).

We can identify three essential characteristics that defined the nature of conquest society created by the first two generations. The first was the essentially urban character of Spanish settlement; an extension of Mediterranean patterns building on Roman and Islamic urbanism and on a strong Iberian tradition of municipal government. During the reconquest, cities had been the spear point of the acquisition and Christianisation of new territories, and municipalities were granted broad autonomous control over justice, the Church, and local matters. This use of the city to establish “civilised” life in newly settled lands among hostile or non-Christian populations was now transported to the Indies. The Castilian ideal of stable urban settlements with resident householders (*vecinos*), and a town council (*cabildo*) with jurisdiction over the surrounding countryside and authority over urban life and law became the norm. Cities like San Juan, Santiago de Cuba, and Havana and smaller towns (*villas*) flourished in the Caribbean and then spread across the Spanish Indies (Kagan 2000). The crown encouraged the foundation and even prescribed the grid-plan the layout of these urban areas, and in 1573 issued a law codifying these instructions. By 1600, the Spanish rulers had granted municipal charters to over 250 cities and towns.

The Spaniards conceptualised the urban centres as the appropriate places for “civilised” residence in contrast to the *despoblado*, the countryside inhabited by indigenous villages. In parts of New Spain and in highland Peru, the Europeans encountered an indigenous urbanism that seemed parallel to their own traditions, and they usurped it, turning Native American urban centres like Cuzco, Quito, and Tenochtitlan into Spanish cities, sometimes intentionally appropriating the previous ceremonial or symbolic importance of sites

to solidify their control. They also adopted indigenous urban hierarchies of regional centres and dependent towns for their own administrative purposes introducing Hispanic forms of urban government, and where control of the scattered indigenous population was difficult, the Spaniards congregated them in new towns. Where needed, the Spaniards created new administrative cities like Lima (1535) or ports like Vera Cruz (1519) or mining centres like Potosí (1545) in Upper Peru or Zacatecas (1546) in Mexico. Along the major lines of communication from ports to major cities or between and the mining towns, important secondary towns developed. Even those Spaniards who eventually owned large rural properties or spent considerable amounts of time in indigenous villages were required by law to maintain a residence in an urban centre. By the 1550s, this pattern was already well established, and thus for much of the colonial era Spanish America was an “empire of towns”, characterised by Hispanic cities where capital, government authority, and the white population, especially Spanish women, tended to concentrate, in contrast to a predominantly indigenous countryside inhabited by the vast majority of the population.

Creation of a town was invariably accompanied by the distribution of a house plot and a supporting grant of property outside of town to those who would become the citizens of the town. All Spaniards were expected to maintain an urban residence. High officials of the state and Church resided in the major cities as did members of the elite and the artisans and craftsmen needed to serve their needs. Poorer Spaniards resided there too, but many were pushed outward toward secondary towns. Spanish cities and towns always included indigenous neighbourhoods or outskirts that provided the labourers and artisans who, along with the large numbers of African slaves and freed persons, also populated all the major cities. Rural landscapes were also urbanised. The *pueblo de indios* was the natural companion to the Spanish city. In New Spain from 1550–1564 as Indian populations declined Spanish friars relocated the remaining population into new settlements, often aided by caciques who took new Hispanic municipal offices to reinforce their authority. In the following decade, the Peruvian Viceroy Francisco de Toledo attempted a general resettlement of over a million people. This great social experiment was disruptive, but it indicated the extent to which the ideas of urbanism, state control of its resources, and the desire to make populations “legible” to state and Church authorities influenced colonial policy (Mumford 2012).

The city thus became the focus of social and political life. Prominent *vecinos* (householders), actively sought out offices within the town councils, sometimes buying them in perpetuity, and the council members became a kind self-aggrandising urban patriciate. In the period before 1580, these council posts were often held by the *encomenderos*, those men who had received grants of Indian communities. Perhaps the defining characteristic of the Conquest stage in the territory claimed by Castile was the importance of the *encomienda* and the power and predominance of the *encomenderos* as an elite class. Cortés had reluctantly introduced the Caribbean precedent of *encomiendas* during the conquest of Mexico. Thereafter it was adopted and in all subsequent conquered areas as an effective and relatively inexpensive way both to satisfy the ambitions of the members of the expeditions, and to establish control over the indigenous populations by extracting tribute or labour service from them. Although originally a form of land grant in reconquest Castile, implying reciprocal military service, in the Americas, no land title was involved, and the obligations of the grantees became less military and more administrative, including the responsibility to provide for the Catholic religious life of the communities in the grant. Essentially, this made the *encomenderos* an elite supported by a form of vassalage that implied for them a steady income and a dependent population. In the areas like central Mexico or highland Peru, where a structure of provinces and city states existed before the conquest, *encomienda* grants were often large and substantial and could involve a whole pre-Columbian state (*altepetal*). In frontier areas like New Mexico or Chile they tended to be smaller and less stable but throughout the Indies, obtaining an *encomienda* became a primary objective of the conquest generation of Spaniards since other promised rewards like noble titles or membership in orders of knighthood, or titles of nobility were rare in the sixteenth century. Still, not every ambition was satisfied. Only 91 men out of about 2,000 (4.5%) in the conquest of Panama received an *encomienda*; in Mexico, only about 400 of Cortés' companions at the fall of Tenochtitlan received one; and in Peru by 1555 only 6% of the 8,000 Spaniards there held an *encomienda* (Góngora 1975; Lockhart 1994; Himmerich y Valencia 1991).

The *encomenderos* dominated the municipal councils in the Hispanic cities, controlling large number of indigenous workers, and seeking to assume the role of a New World nobility. Missionaries who complained of the disastrous demographic and social effects of the *encomiendas* on the newly converted Indians opposed such noble

pretensions and sought to limit them. By the 1540s, as the crown sought to impose more control over the Indies, powerful clerical criticisms of the abuses of the institution and its impact on native populations were supported by a Spanish Crown reluctant to see the emergence of a new, semi-independent American nobility with perpetual control over large numbers of indigenous vassals. The New Laws of 1542 which sought to eliminate the granting of new *encomiendas* and to limit their inheritability was met by hostility in the Indies by the leading elites. In Mexico, the viceroy suspended the law to avoid disaster, but in Peru, resistance resulted in a civil war, the murder of the viceroy, and a smouldering rebellion (1544–1548) that only ended when the provisions of the law were softened.

To some extent, however, demography and economics rather than politics resolved the problem. Despite the uproar, the crown's desire to eliminate the *encomienda* was obvious. In 1536 about a quarter of the Spaniards in Peru held a grant of Indians, but by 1555 that ratio was only one out of every 16. The precipitous decline of the indigenous population so reduced the benefits of holding an *encomienda* that the descendants of the conquerors and *pobladores* now preferred land which now seemed a more secure basis of wealth. In frontier regions like Chile and New Mexico, the *encomienda* remained important into the eighteenth century, but in the core regions of New Spain and Peru, it was replaced by state organised systems of required, but remunerated labour imposed on indigenous communities. This shift was a major change in the patterns of occupation and settlement that differentiated the Conquest and Settlement era from what followed.

In Brazil, the process of populating the colony and the development of a social hierarchy was somewhat different. Overseas emigration from Portugal between 1500 and 1640 has been estimated at about 4,000 annually, a not insignificant number for a population never more than three million people in those years, but much of it went to the Atlantic islands, the Portuguese outposts in Asia and Africa, or to Spanish America rather than to Brazil. Needing *moradores* (settlers) to occupy the enormous area of Brazil, Portugal tried various measures: sending orphan girls to marry in the colony, denying for a century requests to establish convents, and most of all, dispatching convicts to Brazil like the contingent of 400 who accompanied the first royal governor in 1549. Later, the Portuguese Crown at various times sent couples from the Azores to populate the southern captaincies and the coast of Maranhão, and at times suggestions to send Italians or

Galicians were floated as well. In addition, perhaps 20% of the early immigrants were “New Christians” (converts from Judaism) attracted by the opportunities and by the distance from scrutiny. The Lisbon region contributed many immigrants, but above all the early settlers were poor folk from Minho and the overcrowded north of Portugal where land was in short supply.

Apparently without mineral deposits to be exploited or large indigenous peasantries to provide tribute, the immigrants who did go were not so much interested in Indian tributaries as they were in acquiring land which with a few Indian slaves would provide an adequate livelihood. As in the Atlantic islands, the donatary captains and later governors distributed large land grants (*sesmarias*) and eventually a system of smaller properties and a land market developed around them. As a destination for orphans, penal exiles, and converts, and a land of sexual laxity, Brazil gained an early reputation for the low status of its immigrants, but also as a place of rapid social mobility where land could be acquired easily, and where the arrivals could shed the humble manners that “poverty had imposed on them in Portugal, and their *mestiço* sons shed their red skins like snakes and used the most honorific titles in everything” (Gandavo 1922 [1574], 34).

In a few Brazilian port cities, the Iberian urban traditions of organisation and government also flourished, but a supporting network of smaller villages and towns remained weak, and by the 1560s their functions had been usurped to some extent by the sugar mills that with their chapels, slaves, collections of artisans and workers, and concentrations of population took the place of secondary towns. As one observer put it, each mill was like “a commonwealth unto itself” (Pudsey 2000 [1670], 3: 25). As the sugar industry boomed and the demand for labourers grew, the planters turned first to the enslavement of native peoples despite the opposition of the Jesuits or tried to employ work gangs contracted from the Jesuit villages. After 1580 and the union of Spain and Portugal, there were occasionally pleas by the settlers in Brazil to have the *encomienda* introduced there as well, but the Habsburg monarchs so anxious to end the institution in the Spanish Indies had no interest to see it reborn in their Portuguese dominions. By the 1620s, the indigenous slaves that had predominated in the Brazilian sugar mills had been mostly replaced by enslaved Africans. The sugar planters, some of whom had been government officials or merchants, controlled the municipal councils and thus the local economic conditions (Fragoso

2006). They were a colonial elite with pretensions to the status of nobility, but unlike Spanish America, their social prominence and status was not based so much on the control of the indigenous labour as it was on the growing slave population of African origin. So long as the imperial government was content to tax commerce and assure the planters of a continual supply of Africans through a relatively secure slave trade, and so long as the crown meddled little in the treatment of the slaves or in private economic decisions, the planter elites in the most prosperous captaincies were relatively satisfied.

In poorer or more marginal regions where African slaves were harder to acquire that was not the case. The little town of São Paulo which in 1600 still had under 2,000 residents was a good example. There, despite laws against enslavement of Indians, houses and farms depended on large numbers of “administered” Indians in various forms of tutelage. The principal families counted upon hundreds of Indian workers and dependents. Families that were “rich in archers”, that is, in Indian auxiliaries, became the elites of the region. In areas like this and in the Amazonian regions of Pará and Maranhão, indigenous labourers remained the key to wealth and the cause of conflict between the crown, the missionaries, and the colonists, creating a situation similar to the Spanish American battles over the *encomienda* in the previous century.

The mature colonies ca. 1550–1700

In the Spanish Indies processes and patterns developed in the 70 or so years after Columbus’ landfall evolved over time into the stable practices of a mature colonial society. By this time, Spain had created the Council of the Indies, a House of Trade, and a merchant guild to handle the business and administration of empire. In the Indies, by around 1570, the consolidation of a more formal and stable regimen had been more or less achieved at least in the major colonial cities.¹ The timing of this transition in terms of the active role of the state and the subordination of private powers appears to be directly linked to the tremendous production of silver in the Spanish American mines. By the close of the sixteenth century, a certain social and demographic balance had been achieved. The Church hierarchy and diocesan organisation had been firmly established (31 bishoprics had been created in the sixteenth century), and the full range of Spanish social, religious, and legal structures had been reproduced, but with

complexities and variations created by social mobility, cultural interchange, and by the sexual and cultural interactions of Spaniards and the indigenous populations and with Africans and their descendants. In terms of population, the indigenous demographic crises of the periods of first contact and conquest persisted. The great typhus outbreaks of 1576 in New Spain and 1588 in Peru were devastating, but by ca. 1630 these terrible losses were now replaced to some extent by an equilibrium and a slow recovery of the indigenous population and of the population of in general, but once again with considerable regional variations in its chronology and intensity. The importation of Africans expanded during the period of the Iberian union (1580–1640) when the Portuguese were the principal suppliers, but it continued thereafter as well. The precise dimensions of the trade are still in debate, but they nevertheless underline the central importance of slavery, the slave trade, and Africans in the formation and occupation of the two Iberian empires in the Americas (Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat 2015).

Immigration from Europe continued, at a level of perhaps 4,000 newcomers a year in the first half of the seventeenth century. By 1630, the population of Spaniards in the Indies had reached 75,000 *vecinos*, or about 450,000 individuals, but they were increasingly native born, and although whites were never a majority of the colonial population, they were now numerous enough to create a market to support significant trade with Europe as well as to create a demand for local goods and services.

The direct and active role of the king and the empire in the governance of the Indies was a principal marker of the conclusion of Conquest society. In each conquered region, after about a decade, the crown had moved to replace the conquistador captains with royal officials. A viceroy was sent to Mexico in 1535 and to Peru in 1541, and since the administration of justice was theoretically one of the monarch's principal functions, ten royal courts of appeal (*audiencias*) staffed by university-trained lawyers who were essentially royal bureaucrats had been placed in the principal regional cities. Along with the highly trained judges came a myriad of lower officials, treasury officers, administrators, notaries, and lawyers, all of whom were part of an expansion of government under imperial control, as too were the large retinues of relatives, servants, supporters, and advisors that made up the viceregal courts (Cañeque 2004; Valenzuela 2001). Confronted by this bureaucratisation, the disgruntled conquistadors and their descendants objected to their loss of power.

The iconic battlefield in this conflict of empire against local interests had been the struggle over control of the Indians and the perpetuity of the *encomienda* fought out in the 1550s and 1560s. Once the issue was settled, the viceroys instituted a state operated labour system or *repartimiento* which forced native communities to provide workers, but with exception of the mining *labour mita* that supplied the Peruvian mines, by the mid-seventeenth century a wage labour market predominated in most of Spanish America, employing indigenous workers who had left their communities and growing numbers of former slaves, humble Europeans, and *mestizos* who now were becoming the colonial population.

Economic and demographic transformations supported the social system created in the previous century. The colonial elites remained powerful, but their economic base now changed. The remaining *encomenderos* and now landed elites and mine owners competed for and shared power with large-scale merchants who controlled the export of silver and the import of European luxury items. Family alliances were formed through marriage and no matter what the origins of wealth or prominence, acquisition of landed property became a general elite goal. The contraction and relocation of native populations created an opportunity for *encomenderos* and other Spaniards to purchase, occupy, or take lands. This was the great formative period of the haciendas, large landed estates supplying markets in the cities and mining towns with grains and meat. These estates, while often in conflict with indigenous communal lands, became increasingly dependent on indigenous workers participating in the wage labour market. In the cities, the demands for inexpensive textiles and other goods lead to the development of small sweatshop factories employing thousands of indigenous workers (mostly women) in cities such as Puebla, Mexico City, Lima, and Quito. From the point of view of Spain, however, the key to the economic fortunes of the Indies and what made up over 85% of the value of what was shipped to Spain were the precious metals from the silver mines such as Potosi in Peru or Zacatecas in Mexico, and to a lesser extent the gold from Quito, Popayan, and western Amazonia. The mining centres like Potosi with a population over 120,000 around 1630 became great urban concentrations and rivalled or surpassed the viceregal capitals like Lima (22,000 in 1615) or Mexico City (ca. 50,000 in 1630). All these cities attracted capital and workers and created markets for locally produced goods. It is difficult, however, to separate the local from the international economy. Silver exports to Spain crested in the

early seventeenth century and then seemed to fall off considerably by 1640, causing an imperial political crisis by the end of the century, but these signs of imperial downturn may have been evidence of the growing importance of American markets and American production (Romano 1993). In any case, the wealth of the Indies had the effect of attracting foreign rivals anxious to establish their own claims in the Americas, and who were no longer satisfied with contraband trade or piracy. The French, English, and Dutch fought out their imperial rivalries with Spain in the Americas, but with few exceptions Spain's permanent territorial losses in the Indies were suffered in unoccupied and sparsely settled areas and not in the heartlands of the viceroyalties.

Finally, this period also witnessed the consolidation and elaboration of the regime of ethnic and racial categories derived from the contact of Europeans, Native Americans, and Africans. Immigration from Spain continued, but the majority of those accepted as Spaniards were now locally born just as the majority of indigenous people by now had been born under Spain's rule, often in reorganised or relocated towns and villages. The concept of two distinct communities, the "republic of the Indians" and the "republic of the Spaniards" (which included everyone who was not an Indian) continued to influence social policy and law, but a key feature of the mature colonial society was cultural hybridity and the proliferation of people of mixed origins, *mestizos*, mulattos etc., the so-called castes. Estimates vary but at by 1650 they made up about 6% of the population of the Spanish Indies, a figure slightly less than the percentage of whites, but a number that was increasing rapidly in part from demographic growth and in part because claims to *mestizo* status freed indigenous people from their tribute obligations. *Mestizos* did not have an identity as such since their origin was, in fact, the very negation of the idea of distinct racial categories, but in the central areas at least there was a relative decline in their status from the conquest period when their numbers were relatively small, their skills as cultural brokers were valued, and many of the first generation were the children of Spaniards and high-born indigenous women and thus accepted in the community as Spaniards. By the seventeenth century as their numbers had grown and further miscegenation had taken place, their status fell in the colonial core areas, but in peripheral regions, *mestizos*, especially women, still enjoyed relatively high status and acceptance as Spaniards, and in some regions like the Caribbean, and in areas of New Granada, the term *mestizo* virtually fell into disuse

(Schwartz 1997; Rappaport 2014). By 1700 *mestizos* made up about 25% of the colonial population. Overall, the *castas* filled myriad intermediate occupations and statuses within the “republic of the Spaniards” and along with a stream of Spanish-speaking, acculturated Indians and the continuing arrival of new immigrants from Spain, they continued to expand and elaborate the Hispanic sector.

The consolidation of the colonial society in Brazil had a different look and feel to it due to the economic basis of the colony and because of its relationship to Portugal, its metropole. After 1570 the sugar economy of the northeastern captaincies of Pernambuco and Bahia provided the basis for the increase of the slave trade, growth of population, and the expansion of government. Other missionary orders (Franciscans, Benedictines, Carmelites) joined the Jesuits in the 1580s, new monasteries and impressive churches were constructed, a court of appeals was installed by 1609, and the institutions of Portuguese society and government were being installed or reproduced. By 1585 Brazil had 120 sugar mills and a total colonial population of about 30,000, but 85% of the mills and of the population were in the two major captaincies and their dependent areas. The 60 years (1580–1640) that Portugal was ruled by the Habsburg monarchs, was the height of Brazil’s dominance of the Atlantic sugar markets. By 1637, Brazil’s 350 sugar mills were producing 14,000 tons of sugar annually, and as its sugar industry developed, the colony drew a stream of Portuguese immigrants and a growing concentration of African slaves, their numbers increasing from 4,000–8,000 arrivals a year during the seventeenth century. Salvador, the capital had a population of ca. 25,000 and Olinda and its port area of Recife probably about 15,000, but as urban centres, their size was small when compared to the main cities of the Spanish Indies. As to be expected the sugar planter families and merchants became the elites, controlling the municipal councils and other local institutions and using marriage arrangements and other social contacts to achieve their social and political goals. By about 1640, Brazil had overtaken India as the economically most important colony in the Portuguese empire.

As in Spanish America, Brazil’s wealth also made it a target for the Spanish monarchy’s international rivals. From 1630 the Dutch occupied Pernambuco and much of the coast from the Sao Francisco river to the Amazon and with the cooperation of Portuguese planters who remained, they competed as a sugar producer until their expulsion in 1654, after which time the new Caribbean sugar colonies of the Dutch, English, and French began to compete directly with the

Brazilian plantations. As a result of that competition, the second half of the century was a time of troubles in Brazil, caused in large part by the falling price of sugar, the rising price of slaves, and by a series of political crises and natural disasters.

There are three aspects of the mature Brazilian colony in the seventeenth century that deserve comment. First, in many ways until the eighteenth century, Portuguese America was really three distinct colonies, and at various times the Portuguese Crown had, in fact, tried to separate them administratively. The northeastern captaincies producing sugar and later tobacco were the most populous and wealthiest, they were the colonial core where the hand of imperial government was the strongest. São Paulo and the temperate lands to the south remained sparsely settled, and while this region would eventually turn to livestock raising, in the seventeenth century its settlers were still practicing subsistence farming, searching for elusive mines, raiding the interior or Spanish Jesuit missions for Indian slaves, and contraband trading across the frontiers with Paraguay and eventually Potosí. North of Pernambuco, the vast state of Maranhão, administered as a separate colony after 1621, was not occupied until the seventeenth century, and its principal towns São Luís (1614) and Belém (1615) remained tiny, precarious settlements in a vast territory that lived by extracting forest products, depending on Indian labourers, and hoping eventually to start up sugar plantations. As late as 1684 the whole Amazonian region had fewer than a thousand Portuguese householders. These northern and southern peripheries long remained marginal areas characterised by a heavy presence of missionaries, large numbers of indigenous people and the continued use of the Tupi- based lingua general as a means of communication, little international commerce, and a minimal presence of imperial government. In terms of political structure and wealth, they lagged at least half a century behind the wealthier sugar plantation zones, and their relationship to them was much like the relationship of Paraguay, or Central America to the viceregal centres in Spanish America.

A second distinctive feature in this period was the integration of Brazil into a south Atlantic imperial system especially in terms of its trade with Angola. The Portuguese had long experience in Guinea, the Congo and São Tomé, but after the opening of Angola in 1575, it became the major supplier of slaves to Brazil and its importance was summed up by the common phrase: "Whoever says sugar, says Brazil and whoever says Brazil, says Angola." The Dutch realised this fundamental connection when in 1641 they seized Portugal's West

African slaving stations including Angola's main ports of Benguela and Luanda, and when the Portuguese took back Luanda in 1648, they used troops raised in Brazil. For much of the second half of the seventeenth century, governors from northeastern Brazil often served in Angola as well, and the two colonies became intimately linked by colonial policy, but above all by the booming bilateral trade of Bahian tobacco and Rio de Janeiro rum for the sons and daughters of Angola. Rio de Janeiro, in its origins a minor port with close ties to São Paulo and the southern margins, emerged as new plantation zone in the late seventeenth century, in large part because of its proximity to, and trade with Angola. While Spanish America also depended on the slave trade, it did not develop the imperial administrative and economic ties that linked Brazil and Africa, especially to the regions of Angola, and to a lesser extent the Bight of Benin (Alencastro 2000).

By the end of the seventeenth century Brazil had a population of roughly 300,000. In areas of the northeast and the state of Maranhão new territories had been opened up by cattlemen to supply the coastal cities and sugar mills with beef and oxen, and new, sometimes enormous, land grants had been awarded to them. The crown, anxious to populate its Brazilian colonies, hoped to mobilise their private initiative and capital to help in that process. Along with the growing number of slaves, cities and countryside now had a large population of mixed origins including ex-slaves, their descendants, *mestizos*, and whites that constituted the "people".

Finally, it is important to note that while the wealth generated by sugar and a few other products funded the maturation and consolidation of the Brazilian colony, in comparison to a similar process in Spanish America, that maturity was attenuated in a variety of ways by policies that limited the reproduction of elements of Portuguese culture. Portuguese imperial policy emphasised the integration of Brazil with the metropolis not as separate kingdoms, but as part of a composite monarchy as in Spanish America. No separate institutions were created in Portugal to administer Brazil even though it had become the keystone of the colonial empire. In Brazil, provincial governors were encouraged to correspond directly with Lisbon, viceroys for Brazil were not appointed regularly until the eighteenth century, there was no archbishop in the colony until 1676, and no permanent Inquisition tribunal operated in Brazil. In an even greater contrast with Spanish America, there was no printing press or a university in Brazil, an absence which thus required the Brazilian elites to constantly return to Portugal for their education. Portugal did

employ its Brazilian-born white subjects in the metropolis or elsewhere in the empire, but the policies that limited the development of a distinct colonial culture or self-consciousness among white elites were intentional. A nativist or creole consciousness was slow to form, but not absent.

The last decade of the seventeenth and first decade of the eighteenth century marked a considerable change in the character in the American colonies of both empires. A dynastic crisis in Spain and the resulting War of the Spanish Succession (1700–1713) placed the Bourbons on the throne of Spain and initiated a series of reforms and a change in the balance of commercial and political power that would eventually have profound effects on the Spanish Indies. In Brazil, the discovery of gold ca. 1695 in the interior opened whole new areas to settlement, stimulated a tremendous increase in immigration from Portugal, and a sharp rise of the slave trade. As in Spanish America, during the following century both the residents in Brazil and the makers of policy in Europe changed their attitude about these colonies and about their relationship to each other.



Note

¹I have chosen ca. 1579 even though the viceroyalties had been established earlier. I would note the Laws of Settlement of 1573, the establishment of episcopal authority by the Ordenanza de patronazgo (1574), the establishment of the Inquisition of Lima (1570, and Mexico (1571), and the active administration of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (1569–1581), including the creation of the mita, the introduction of the amalgamation process in the mining of silver (1571), and the subsequent royal control of the mercury necessary, all point to the consolidation of imperial rule. The fall of the neo-Inca state at Vicabamba in 1572 provides a fitting symbolic end to the Conquest era, although the last Maya stronghold Tayasal at Lake Peten in Guatemala, did not fall until 1697.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Asians in the Iberian world



Tatiana Seijas and Ángela Barreto Xavier

Introduction

This chapter on “Asians in the Iberian world” might better be titled “Iberians in Asia”.¹ The first implies that the Iberian empires were the dominant political structures in this part of the world, while the latter recognises that Iberians were a minority population that wielded economic, political, and religious power only in small enclaves, mainly fortified port cities, where their main purpose was trade. Iberian colonists in these commercial entrepôts categorised and interacted with indigenous people according to their own determinants. People in Asia who were Christians were allies, and it was they who maintained relations with Iberians for their own political ends.

This chapter illustrates the diversity of experiences lived by Asians under Iberian rule through a legal lens. Legality, in other words, provides an analytical framework for examining the extraordinary diversity of peoples and geographic regions encompassed by the term Asia. This endeavour requires parsing out the legal status of the native populations in each region and articulating the different legal structures that shaped people’s lives on the ground. For instance, in certain colonial cities like Goa and Manila many natives converted to Christianity and accepted Iberian sovereignty, thus becoming indigenous vassals of the Spanish and Portuguese Crown with legal rights and tributary obligations. In these contexts, there was also some degree of intermarriage, which resulted in the creation of new groups of people who were both Asian and Iberian. In other coastal outposts in India, by contrast, native peoples remained under the political jurisdiction of local rulers and were thus less susceptible to Iberian influence.

The chapter also considers those Asians who travelled to Spain, Portugal, and their American colonies, where their status often changed, as did their experiences. In Mexico, for example, enslaved people from all over Asia who arrived on the Manila Galleon were all

called “chinos” and their legal status was as chattel property, until the end of the seventeenth century when the crown abolished chino slavery. In Portugal, Asian slaves lived in Lisbon and elsewhere, while free natives from Asia were found studying at the University of Coimbra.

These topics are addressed in two sections, one on the Portuguese State of India (*Estado da Índia*) and the other on Spanish Asia. The Portuguese sphere is divided into two sub-sections: one on the legal framework that covered Asians living under Portuguese rule; and another that is a case study regarding Asian attitudes towards the Portuguese. The Spanish section primarily focuses on the three main groups of Asians who lived under Spanish rule. Both the Portuguese and Spanish sections end with references to Asian diasporas in the Iberian world.

Portuguese Asia

The Portuguese State of India wielded political dominion over territories and sea routes in Asia. It was created to sustain the *Carreira da Índia*, which was a rentable trade route that connected Lisbon to the Indian Ocean from 1498 onwards. These were vast dominions, spanning from Macao to the eastern coast of Africa, and including commercial spots like the factories of Cananor, Calicut, and others, as well as territorial dominions like Goa (capital of the State of India from the 1530s onwards), Bassein, and, for a short period, parts of Sri Lanka. The king’s official title—the “Lord of the conquest, navigation and commerce” of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, India, and so forth—was meant to evoke the diversity of his dominion, which allowed for direct and indirect rule, and for different jurisdictional and institutional solutions (Thomaz 1994; Hespanha 1995; Saldanha 1997; Biedermann 2009; Marcocci 2012; Myrup 2015).

The State of India’s multi-dimensional structure is evident in the Portuguese Crown’s relationship with regional rulers and local sites of government. There were municipalities, fortresses, factories, “feudal” grants (*prazos*), as well as contractual grants that accorded the crown royal prerogatives over navigation and trade. Some Asian princes were vassals of the king of Portugal, while others were formal allies (Thomaz 1994; Hespanha 1995; Alves 1999, 2007; Flores 2018). Portuguese interactions with local populations depended on the type of rule they exercised in any one particular area.

By virtue of a number of papal bulls, the papacy granted the Portuguese king royal patronage and political dominion over Africa and Asia, as well as jurisdiction over the souls of Asian peoples. In return for such power, the king had the duty to convert Asian people and provide the necessary administrative structures to promote and conserve Asian Christianity, namely dioceses, parishes missions, and schools. In the sixteenth century, the Archdiocese of Goa was the largest in the world; it included China, Japan, and Persia, which were territories under the political rule of non-Christian princes, but whose Christians were under its own jurisdiction. Religious missions and convents (as well as schooling) provided another form of sovereignty—the spiritual and cultural one (Jacques 1999; Alberts 2013). However, in the majority of cases, pre-existing laws and customs regulated the daily life of Asian populations in Portuguese spheres of influence, where the crown was heavily dependent on the support of indigenous elites (Scammell 1989; Thomaz 1994; Pearson 2006; Subrahmanyam 2012; Xavier 2012, 2015).

Asians' political and legal status under Portuguese rule

During the first decades after contact, Portugal's general policy was to harmonise different interests, even while employing extreme violence in the processes of conquest. One tactic was Viceroy Afonso de Albuquerque's policy of encouraging intermarriages, which resulted in a difficult-to-classify social group that consisted of the descendants of unions between Portuguese men and Asian women. These people carried both metropolitan blood, which was a sign of distinction, and Asian blood, which placed them in a liminal condition. Portuguese born in the kingdom of Portugal (*reinóis*) derided them for having engaged in a process of indigenisation. In response, people with mixed-blood engaged in multiple strategies of differentiation, with the explicit goal of whitening their own condition and separating themselves from other locals (Boxer 1965; Tavim 2003; Pearson 2006; Subrahmanyam 2012; Xavier 2012).

This approach (miscegenation or *métissage*) for inscribing Portuguese power in their Asian territories shifted dramatically from the 1540s to the end of the seventeenth century, when *métissage* became undesirable, and conversion to Christianity became mandatory. Additionally, the pluralist template developed into a kind of assimilationist model based on the legal principle that birth

(*generatio*) and baptism (*regeneratio*) were equivalent (Souza 1979; Hespanha 1995; Pearson 2006; Xavier 2015). Disregarding the sociocultural multiplicity of Asians living under Portuguese rule, this change in policy “created” two main categories of Asians: those who converted to Christianity, known as newly converted (*novamente convertidos*), and those who did not, frequently called gentiles (*gentios*) when professing an Asian religion, or moors (*mouros*), if Muslims.

In those regions where the Portuguese wielded direct rule, Asians who accepted baptism became vassals of the king of Portugal. They enjoyed similar rights to Portuguese people living in the State of India. Theoretically, the newly converted (*novamente convertidos*) were to be submitted to a process of cultural conversion, which included learning the Portuguese language and enrolling in Portuguese schools. Few of the newly converted, however, went on to higher education, though some travelled to Portugal for this purpose. In contrast, those who did not convert usually suffered negative consequences. Conversion rates were asymmetric: the territories and municipality of Goa were almost fully Christianised, while Hormuz, Bassein, Kochi, Columbo, Melaka, and Macao had large segments of their populations who remained “gentiles” (Boxer 1965; Flores 1998; Alves 1999; Pearson 2006; Strathern 2007; Biedermann 2009).

Considering that political conditions were much more complex, conversion was relatively more successful in territories with Portuguese fortresses and factories (approximately 50 spots in the early 1600s), but without municipalities. In these places, almost all native peoples remained non-Christian and kept many dimensions of their cultures intact. The few who converted became a Christian minority that reproduced itself, sometimes to this day. Such was the case in the majority of Portuguese settlements along the western and eastern coasts of India and the Bay of Bengal, as well as in Southeast Asia (such as East-Timor and Solor) (Hespanha 1995; Strathern 2007; Xavier 2015).

Conversion was somewhat more successful outside the borders of the State of India, such as in Japan, China, and Persia—territories that were under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Goa, and where Jesuit, Franciscan, Dominicans, and Augustinian missionaries carried out evangelisation projects. These missionaries engaged in different types of dialogue and negotiation with the local population, often depending on pre-existing social groups (Županov 1999; Hsia 2006; Brockey 2007). While missionaries claimed to protect and educate Christian natives, they were also known to exploit them (or

their non-Christian counterparts) as labourers or slaves (Bayly 1989).

Non-Christian Asians were also known to support Portuguese imperial rule (in political or financial terms). These non-Christians tended to enjoy a privileged legal status, sometimes better than those who had converted. Diplomats and merchants who lived transitorily in the State of India also had privileged rights (Scammel 1989; Pearson 2006; Flores 2018). Overall, the situation of Asians under Portuguese rule started to change in the eighteenth century, when the political dimension of conversion became less important to the Portuguese Crown, and the dimensions of the State of India were highly reduced, even if the territories of Goa more than doubled.

Converted and non-converted Asians of the territories of Goa

Given the multiplicity of societies that interacted with the Portuguese in the State of India (Persians, Indians of different sorts, Chinese, Japanese, Malays, Javanese, Tamul, Chingalas, among others), it is difficult to address the richness of Asian attitudes towards Portuguese domination. As such, this section only examines Asian attitudes in Goa—the central territory of State of India—through the lens of conversion. As already noted, the majority of Asians under Portuguese rule did not convert, even where systematic conversion was attempted. This was the case in the much larger territory of Sri Lanka, where churches and schools abounded, and with some 250,000 Catholics at the time of Dutch arrival. The evangelisation of Sri Lanka under Dutch rule integrated new agents, namely Asian missionaries who had a different impact; their cultural conversion was minimal, and many of them continued to live as previously. Yet in 1723, and at least nominally, there were between 50,000 and 55,000 Catholics in the kingdom of Kandy. Christianity in Japan, by contrast, faced dire threats. From the seventeenth century onwards, the Hideyoshi and Tokugawa shogunates persecuted Christians, killing many of them during the martyrdoms of 1613, 1630, and 1632, and afterwards.

Image 16.1 View of Kandy, in Ceylon. Joris van Spilbergen (Amsterdam, 1617), “*De Stadt Kandi gelegen int eiland van Celon*”

Source: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, The Netherlands/Public Domain

Comparatively, the Christians of Goa had a quieter life, the majority having converted pragmatically. Many collaborated and zealously operated within the imperial power system, while keeping features of their previous identity. Brahmans and Kshatriyas

(*Charodos*) refashioned themselves as Christians, wearing Portuguese outfits, speaking and writing in Portuguese, and living in Portuguese-style houses (Thomaz 1994; Xavier 2015). These groups were tangentially supportive of Portuguese rule, but their aspirations to legal equality remained unsatisfied, and they existed in a liminal condition similar to *conversos* in Portugal.

Goans' efforts to overcome their subaltern position are documented by several petitions from the sixteenth century onwards, manuscript and published treatises, as well as other testimonies. In response, the Portuguese government issued new decrees, established institutional procedures (like the statutes on purity of blood), and promoted implicit social norms in order to reduce the scope of legal equality. For example, an official called Father of Christians was charged with supervising the careers of Asian Christians who sought to participate in Portuguese government, but these tended to be minor offices. Mateus de Castro and other seventeenth-century Brahmans illustrate Asian aspirations and their strategies to overcome the obstacles they faced in the State of India. Through the protection of Propaganda Fide and the Pope, Castro and others became bishops, a dignity that they would not have accessed otherwise (Sorge 1986; Xavier and Županov 2015). In spite of their status, the Portuguese accused Castro and other Brahmans of conspiring with the Dutch against them.

The liminal status of Asian converts persisted into the eighteenth century, fuelling different forms of resistance. The royal norm of 1761, similarly to that of 1542, decreed that all Christians born in Portuguese dominions, independently of their nation, were to be granted the same honours, distinctions, rights, and privileges as those born in Portugal. This mandate, however, had little impact, as demonstrated by the 1787 "Pinto's Conspiracy", when several Brahman priests and their relatives prepared a revolt against Portuguese power in order to resolve existing inequalities (Rivara 1990; Lopes 1995).

Lower social groups similarly collaborated and/or resisted Portuguese rule. Many of them, for example, openly returned to their previous religious affiliations, prompting prosecution by the Portuguese Inquisition. Christian apostates also engaged in internal and external rebellions against the crown, inciting fierce persecution (Kamat 1999; Xavier 2015). Non-Christian Asians living in Goa (around 10% in the early 1700s) exerted passive or open resistance, while others were indifferent. As in other parts of the State of India, they were local informants, translators, moneylenders, and members

of strong mercantile networks. Many of them were functionally important to the conservation of Portuguese rule, namely those involved in financial activities. Few of them, however, kept their privileged positions for long (Subrahmanyam 2012; Carreira 2014).

The competition among non-Christian rich elites for collaborationism could be high, as illustrated in a collection of documents produced by eighteenth-century Vaishnava and Smarta Brahmins of Goa, translated into Portuguese, and stored in the office of the secretary of the viceroyalty. Smarta Brahmins, for example, accused Rama Sinai, one of the heads of the opposite party of being the “author and the motor of all disturbances”, an “astute and intelligent” man, who always tried to “please the government, and succeed in this way”. Based on these allegations, these Brahmins asked the king to expulse Sinai from Goa. Clearly, Smartas were the one who sought to “please the government” and succeed in “that way” (Historical Archives of Goa, Livro das Monções, nº 101, fls. 730–860; Rivara 1992; Xavier 2012; Xavier and Županov 2015). The Portuguese Crown’s awareness of the conflicts between these two groups (collaborators vs. collaborators), and the ways it coped with them, increased its local power, as well as the influence of elite groups.

Asians in Portugal, Europe, and Brazil

“No one can think better than us, because we know both Goa and Europe”, wrote José António to his brother living in Goa, João Baptista Pinto (one of the members of the “Pinto conspiracy”). In this letter, José António commented on the community of upper caste Goans living in Lisbon, their beliefs, their aspirations, as well as their intellectual practices (“Letter of José António to his brother, 1787” in Lopes 1995). Among them were father Caetano Vitorino Faria, and his son, José Custódio de Faria; they arrived in Lisbon in 1771 and soon became leaders of that party (Lopes 1995, 254). These elites sought to promote the condition of their relatives back in Goa. Some of them studied at the University of Coimbra, while others tried to pursue ecclesiastic or military careers. Members of the Portuguese nobility with connections in Goa usually supported their efforts. A few like Caetano Vitorino were welcomed in the homes of high clergy like the Nunzio of Rome and Cardinal da Cunha, some of the most powerful men in Portugal. They even gained access to the houses of high nobility and the royal court (Rivara 1990).

Apart from strengthening their Portuguese connections, these

Goans sought additional ties elsewhere in Europe, just like their seventeenth-century ancestors. Caetano Vitorino and his son travelled to Rome to pursue studies in theology, where Caetano wrote a doctoral thesis that he dedicated to Queen Mary I of Portugal, and a theological treatise about the Holy Spirit dedicated to the Pope. The Pope was impressed and invited Caetano to preach at the Sistine Chapel. His son studied in the college of Propaganda Fide, and pursued doctoral studies, returning to Lisbon, where he preached in the Royal Chapel (Rivara 1990).

These two Goans enjoyed high social standing when their participation in the “Pinto conspiracy” was uncovered. José Custódio fled to Paris with other Goans, but Caetano Vitorino was incarcerated. José’s fascinating life in revolutionary France inspired Alexander Dumas to create the picturesque character *Abbé Faria* in *The Count of Mont Christ*. Their lives in Europe were extraordinary. Asians forced to travel to Portugal were more numerous.

There were different sorts of Asian slaves in Lisbon and elsewhere in Portugal (Indian, Chinese, Malayan, Japanese) though fewer in number than those of African origin (Saunders 1982; Fonseca 2002; Nelson 2004). Many of them were the result of military conquests (war captives), individuals enslaved as punishment for rebellion, while others were simply purchased in Asian slave markets (Seijas 2008). The majority engaged in domestic works, and those who lived in the countryside also did heavier agricultural labour.

Manuel was one among these slaves. Born in Sri Lanka, he arrived in Portugal with a Portuguese bomber. Manuel’s relatives were already dead, and he had neither siblings, nor wife and children. In February of 1610, when he was 30 years old, the Portuguese Inquisition accused him of sexual crimes. Some Portuguese men had seen him having sex with a young boy in Rossio, near the Royal Hospital. The boy said that Manuel had forced him. After six months of interviews, the inquisitors acknowledged that Manuel was almost deaf, and by the end, surprisingly, they considered that he was a good Christian who had mistaken the boy for a woman, releasing him by the end of the year (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo (Lisbon) [hereafter ANTT], Conselho Geral do Santo Ofício, Processo de Manuel, proc. 315, fl. 34). The story had a happy end for Manuel, but not all slaves survived the Inquisition.

Inquisitorial records reveal the forced journeys of other Asians, non-slaves, to Portugal and Brazil. Antonio Lourenço, for example, was accused of Islamism and condemned to exile in Portugal in 1623;

and Deugo, a Brahman, was condemned to exile in Brazil for ten years in 1697 (ANTT, Maço 34, Caixa 113, Junta do Comércio).² Unfortunately, we do not know anything else about their experiences. Their stories only became visible because of the judicial system intervened in their lives. Otherwise, they would have remained anonymous, as were many other Asians who lived in the kingdom of Portugal or its imperial territories.

Asians travelled to Portugal and elsewhere (like Bahia, in Brazil) for transitory periods, such as commercial agents and diplomats. Besides the Japanese princes who travelled to Portugal, Madrid, and Rome in the late 1500s, the best known were Indian merchants who went to Bahia. Around 130 Indian merchants arrived in Bahia between the end of the seventeenth and eighteenth century—many of them involved in the tobacco trade (Antony 2004). Like other Asians who were useful to the Portuguese imperial power, their movement of action and the commercial opportunities they exploited testify to Asian agency (Faria 2015). The lives of the majority of Asians in the Portuguese sphere still await historical recovery.

Spanish Asia

Spain's colonial presence in Asia was limited to a number of islands in the Western Pacific Ocean—the Spanish East Indies in historical parlance. The Spanish Crown claimed political sovereignty over the Philippines Archipelago, the Caroline, and Mariana Islands, as well as the Moluccas for a short time, but its military presence was nearly insignificant in most of these territories (Bohigian 1994; Villiers 1986). The so-called Spanish Philippines (Luzon and the Visayas) were strategically and economically the most important. The ceremonial naming of the whole Archipelago after a Habsburg king did grant Spain universal dominion over the varied ethnic groups living in this vastly complex topographical space. First, the southern islands of Mindanao, Jolo, and other Muslim regions remained largely independent into the eighteenth century. Second, Spain's sovereignty over “colonised” areas was entirely contingent on indigenous elites (*principales*).

Spain relied on the support of native lords to exert political and economic power—a model that began from the first decades of Spanish settlement and persisted for most of the colonial period (dated, somewhat imaginatively, from 1521 and truly ending in

1898). In the mid-sixteenth century, indigenous elites in Luzon Island, for example, consented to Spanish settlements and some local governance in return for wider trading networks and imperial privileges (Gerona 2001). During this time, Spanish colonists also partook in local power struggles, lending assistance to friendly rulers, who verified their alliance to Spain by accepting Catholicism. Soldiers and churchmen committed untold crimes in settling parts of the Philippines, but the emphasis on Spanish violence and native exploitation distorts the complicated history of this European-Asian encounter. Local actors had agency depending on their status in indigenous societies. This lived reality begs for a reconsideration of Spain's triumphant imperial narrative about the "conquest" of the Philippines, which continues to dominate the historiography in spite of research that underlines Spain's relatively weak political grip on its main colony in Asia.

Image 16.2Eighteenth-century Map of Asia (Madrid, ca. 1795). "Mapa de Asia dividido según la extensión de sus estados" by Tomás López de Vargas Machuca

Source: Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library, Brown University, Providence, USA

Four main groups of "Asians" lived in the Spanish sphere of the early modern world; three of them came together in the Philippines Islands, while the fourth was a diaspora. These groupings, of course, reflect Spain's perspective, and do not represent the ways people in Asia self-identified (based on ethno-linguistic differences and the like). These groupings, instead, replicate the categories Spaniards employed to identify people born in Asia who were, in some sense, the concern of the crown.

The first group of Asians was indigenous people of islands claimed by Spain, who accepted sovereignty to some degree, and whom Spain legally classified as Indians (*indios*). The legal category Indian was the same whether people were from the East Indies (Asia) or the West Indies (America). This grouping might also be conceived as native Filipinos who converted to Christianity. The second group was people from islands that Spain sought to possess, but who effectively blocked Spanish incursions. These people were primarily from Muslim kingdoms in Mindanao, Palawan, Jolo, and other islands in the Philippines Archipelago that remained firmly part of the Islamic world; Spain categorised them as moors (*moros*) (Majul 1973; Donoso 2011). The third group of Asians was people from China (mainly from south Fujian or Hokkiens), called Sangleys (*sangleyes*), who lived next to Spanish settlements, where they formed part of the trading and

artisanal class (Gil 2011b; Laufer 1967). The fourth and final group was people from Asia who lived in the diaspora, having mostly arrived in the Americas and Spain as slaves. Spaniards categorised these individuals as *chinos* (*chinos*), because China stood in for Asia in the western imaginary. The following section examines the experiences of Sangleys, Filipino Indians, and *chinos* (in that order), with special reference to their status in Spain's legal realm. Those people categorised as moors are not included precisely because they remained independent, Spanish law only impinged on those who were captured and enslaved (Seijas 2019).

The Sangley community in light of Spain's commercial interests

Manila, officially founded as a Spanish city in 1571, was the colony's reason for being (Reed 1978). The capital served as the seat of the Governor of the Philippines and High Court (*Audiencia de Manila*), but its primary purpose was to sustain Spain's "Asia Trade" by means of the Manila Galleon (Schurz 1959; Fish 2011). Each year, Manila residents awaited the fleet that arrived laden with silver from Mexico, which then returned with Chinese goods, Indian textiles, spices, and slaves. Spanish residents (*vecinos*), Portuguese traders, Chinese wholesalers, elite Filipino investors, and Mexican merchants all profited from this trade. Manila was a transit market, with little local industry beyond ship building in nearby Cavite, and entirely reliant on imports. For the majority of Spaniards in the Philippines, who mainly resided in Manila, commerce was everything, and most of what occurred beyond this entrepôt held little interest. The few exceptions were some of the missionaries who lived in rural areas to fulfil their evangelising mission.

The Sangley community (one of the "Asian" groups) was the lynchpin in the Asia trade (Chin 2010; Gebhardt 2015; Tremml-Werner 2015). Their economic importance, however, was not reflected in their social standing. Spanish society insisted on their outsider status and relegated Sangleys to live in a designated neighbourhood called the Parian (*parián*) outside the walls of Manila, which functioned as a kind of ghetto. The colonial government gave a religiously inflected justification for this residential segregation, which was that Sangleys as non-Christians would negatively influence native Filipinos if allowed to gather among them. Beyond religion, Spaniards insisted on the Parian's existence because they remained mistrustful of

Sangleys' loyalty (Crewe 2015). The government, in fact, recurrently imposed harsh taxation to limit the growth of the Sangley population and declined to grant them resident (*vecino*) rights, such as representation in the municipal council (*cabildo*) (Alva Rodríguez 1997).

Events in 1639 and 1640 further illustrate the way Spaniards mismanaged relations with the Sangley community. That fall, the government forcefully lured several thousand Chinese residents from Manila to Calamba to grow rice for the urban market (McCarthy 1970). Ill-prepared to do this kind of work and after hundreds of malaria deaths, the remaining Sangleys resolved to kill the local official and started back to the capital. Spanish and allied Filipino soldiers slaughtered a great number of Sangleys along the way, but enough continued on their march to inspire a much wider uprising at the Parian. During the following months, the Governor of the Philippines ordered the killing of thousands of Sangleys leaving a much-reduced community. A number of other Chinese protests and ensuing massacres occurred before and after this episode.

Spaniards were generally unwilling to include Sangleys as colonial actors in the way that was done for other foreigners, such as Armenians (Borao Mateo 1998; Aslanian 2011). Chinese migrants continued to be allowed to gain a livelihood in this colonial outpost, but their presence was always cause for suspicion. This was a contradictory position, because Spaniards relied on Sangleys to broker the import for all manner of goods, everything from rice to Chinese porcelain, into Manila. This unresolved tension, between needing Sangleys as intermediaries and wanting to welcome Chinese merchants on the one hand, and disparaging them on the other, coloured everyday life in Manila (Iusquets i Alemany 2006).

The colonial government periodically expelled Sangleys from Manila, usually when their numbers increased, which threatened to make them the majority population, or when officials blamed Sangleys for economic downturns. Their absence, however, always prompted the same officials to encourage their return, in a way conceding their central role in the colony's economy. Sangleys, for their part, repeatedly came back because it was in their financial interest to do so. Overall, the precarious status of Sangleys in the Spanish sphere reveals that the crown did not aim for their social or cultural integration into the colony. The standing policy, instead, was to accept, in some sense, that the colony depended on the presence of these outsiders, and that it was through the Sangleys that Spain had

access to the wealth of a much greater empire: China.

Native vassalage and slavery

Spaniards' orientation towards commerce, the centrality of Manila for governmental concerns, and the colony's vast distance from Spain produced a settler society in which pre-contact forms of social organisation remained largely in place for centuries (Scott 1994). The majority of Filipinos lived in rural areas that remained outside of the Spanish sphere. Spain divided Luzon, Mindoro, and other islands into administrative provinces such as Batangas and Cagayan, which were each ostensibly governed by an appointed official (*alcalde mayor*), with some additional powers accorded to local churchmen. The reality on the ground, however, was that native governors (*gobernador*) and municipal heads (*cabeza de barangay*) were the ones who carried out the legal and fiscal oversight of native communities, and also collected tribute (Alonso Álvarez 2005; Woods 2015; Cruikshank 2011).

Principales (usually from the nobility or *datus*) administered their regions according to their individual abilities and goals, which could range from seeking their community's well-being to prioritising self-enrichment. *Principales*, for example, employed the Spanish charge of recruiting and organising indigenous soldiers both to consolidate their own power vis-à-vis the Spanish government (which was wholly reliant on this military assistance), as well as to demand better terms for their men (Mawson 2016; Borao Mateo 2013). Indigenous people of the Philippines were thus far less politically subjugated to Spain than the crown professed, or that historians have subsequently acknowledged.

The allowance for indigenous slavery and other forms of forced labour underlines the bounded nature of Spain's sovereignty in the Philippines. In the wider empire, indigenous people who accepted Spanish sovereignty and Christian baptism were said to belong to the Republic of Indians, which made them native vassals of the crown. Tribute was paid in exchange for legal rights and privileges, including freedom from slavery. This governing model failed in the Philippines because the power and wealth of *principales* depended on bonded labour, including chattel slavery and kin-based dependencies. These economic structures remained in place into the eighteenth century. Forced labour was integral to the *encomienda* system, for example, which accorded grants of Indian workers to leading colonists and *principales* (Cushman 1976; Hidalgo Nuchera 1995). Such labour grants

maintained pre-existing forms of agricultural organization. Spain's reliance on *principales*, in turn, prevented colonial officials from intruding into local governance and administration even if they had sought to do so, which, in any case, seldom occurred. Abolishing existing forms of bonded labour would have undermined native power brokers and destabilised agricultural production. It was of slight concern, as such, that this allowance contradicted Spain's claim that vassalage imparted protection from human bondage, as articulated with the passing of the "New Laws of the Indies for the Good Treatment and Preservation of the Indians" in 1542.

Slavery and Christianity made for remarkable contradictions in the East Indies. The papacy granted Spain ecclesiastical control over its colonies in return for funding the missionary enterprise, which ostensibly aimed to extend the spiritual and spatial boundaries of Christendom, but also legitimised Spain's imperial ambitions (Phelan 1959; Rafael 1988; Irving 2010). Baptism, as such, symbolised entry into Spain's political order and was supposed to impart legal protections, but not in the Philippines. There, baptism justified indigenous slavery. As late as the 1680s, churchmen warned that Filipino slaves would "abnegate the faith they promised to His Majesty" and "abjure evangelic law" if they were not "subdued by force" (i.e., kept in legal bondage) (AGI Filipinas 24 R.5 N.28, 1684). The open disregard for the political significance of baptism in the Philippines should raise serious questions about the historical validity of Spain's sovereign claim to all of its colonies, especially as indigenous slavery was far more widespread than has ever been accounted for.

The Protector of Indians Office (*protectoría de indios*), charged with safeguarding the legal rights and privileges of indigenous vassals, struggled to do so in the Philippines from its inception in 1589, especially in regards to slavery (Hidalgo Nuchera 1998). As evidence, the *Laws of the Indies* published some 100 years later included reference to the ongoing practice, noting the necessity of having the High Court protect Indians in the Philippines who were "tyrannically enslaved by native chiefs" (Laws of Indies 1943, Book 6, title 2, law 9 of the Laws of the Indies). Court-appointed protectors, however, generally failed to secure the legal evaluation of individual people's captivity, even if that person came forward to denounce his or her master. This one outlet for enslaved Filipinos to secure their freedom thus remained closed into the eighteenth century.

Notably, Filipinos had a much easier time finding recourse to legal

protections in Spain, where a number of enslaved individuals appealed at court for their freedom (Seijas 2012). Pedro de Mendoza, a native of Jolo, and once slave of Governor Sebastián Urtado de Corcuera, was one such man. He successfully defended his belief in 1655 that “by royal decree all Indians are free” (AGI Filipinas 4 N.40, 1655). In this regard, indigenous people of the Philippines had a similar experience as those from America, who similarly gained their liberty in Spain—a great achievement even if they did find themselves so far from their native lands (Gil 2011a; Van Deusen 2015).

Chinos as an early modern Asian diaspora

The fourth group of “Asians” in the Spanish sphere formed a kind of diaspora, for most of them ended their days far from their homelands in Spain’s American colonies. Starting in the 1560s and through the 1670s, the trans-pacific slave trade carried people from culturally diverse communities in South and Southeast Asia to Mexico (Seijas 2014). A small minority of chinos ended their days in Peru as evidenced by a surviving census, but their story remains to be told (Cook and Escobar Gamboa 1968).

Upon arrival in Acapulco, Spanish officials and masters categorised all of them as chinos, similarly to how they grouped enslaved people from Africa as “blacks” (*negros*). Spain dictated the legal status of people living in the colonies, but the sprawling empire also allowed for contingency and individual agency. Such was the experience of enslaved Filipinos who fought in varied ways to cast off the chino category and regain their identification as indigenous vassals of the crown. Their joint achievement was that in 1672 a royal decree confirmed their identity as naturally free Indians and abolished chino slavery. Once manumitted, former chino slaves joined existing communities of free indigenous immigrants from the Philippines, who had long claimed membership in New Spain’s Republic of Indians. It is one of the many contradictions of Spain’s Indian legislation that individual Filipinos gained their freedom from chattel slavery first in Spain, then in Mexico, and finally in the Philippines.

Conclusion

The Portuguese and Spanish Empires wielded varying degrees of political sovereignty in their Asian strongholds; and their power on the ground, as a generality, remained much more circumscribed in

this part of the world than in the Americas. The varying degrees to which Asian peoples living in Portuguese and Spanish strongholds converted to Catholicism offers some indication of Iberians' command over local populations.

The Portuguese State of India claimed a vast geographic extension, but its territorial presence was uneven, as was Portugal's expression of political power and interest in sustaining the rentable *Carreira da Índia*. The Portuguese Crown also exerted varying levels of spiritual rule in Asia by virtue of papal donation (*padroado*), in a similar way as Spain in the Philippines (*patronazgo*). In most places, pre-existing laws and customs regulated the daily life of people throughout the region, as the Portuguese depended on the support of non-Christian local rulers, who retained their own social norms, until about 1530.

During the first decades of the *Estado da Índia*, métissage appeared to be a good strategy for re-socialising native inhabitants to become Christian subjects of the Portuguese Crown. This approach, however, was soon abandoned, and it became Portuguese policy, instead, to force cultural conversion through Christian indoctrination. Once baptised, indigenous peoples became vassals of the crown and subject to more direct rule; such was the case of Goa. For their part, Christianised peoples negotiated and collaborated with local government officials for their own purposes. Non-Christians who benefited from the financial infrastructure of Portuguese rule and the Asian trade also experienced a privileged condition by collaborating with colonial officials. At the same time, Christians and non-Christians also resisted, more or less openly, at different times in order to maintain certain degrees of political sovereignty.

Spain had a small political footprint in the Western Pacific for most of the so-called "colonial" period. That said, Spaniards stubbornly remained in their outposts (Manila most importantly) as a matter of imperial pride, and also to reap the benefits of trading with China. Silks, porcelain, and human chattel all sailed away from Manila bound to New Spain where these commodities sold for immense profits. Given this commercial orientation, as well as the poverty of the local royal treasury, the Spanish Crown mainly relied on Christianised native lords to administer local government beyond the walls of their capital and a few fortresses elsewhere. From the Spanish perspective, indigenous people of the Philippine Islands who converted to Christianity and accepted the king's sovereignty (always negotiated), and paid some tribute, were legally Indians—indigenous vassals in the same manner as natives of the American colonies. Indigenous peoples

who lived in the Archipelago under the sovereignty of Muslim Sultans were Spain's enemies. The other "Asian" group in this mix was Chinese migrants (*sangleyes*).

The tri-partite categorisation proposed here (Indios, moros, and *sangleyes*) is a broad generalisation of society, but suffice it to say that there was no "Spanish Philippines". Instead, diverse groups of people, including Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and so on (if we take religion as the main identifier), resided in different parts of the Philippines Archipelago, where individuals experienced similar challenges—from monsoon floods to ongoing warfare. Local powerbrokers determined the legal frameworks that bounded people's lives, be they Augustinian friars, noblemen (*datus*), Muslim judges, or Spanish governors.

In the case of Luzon Island and the Visayas in the Philippines, the Spanish colonial government, which arguably included the clergy and religious orders, had relative success in Christianising the native inhabitants, and it was in these areas that Spain could be said to have had a colony with indigenous vassals that paid tribute and with colonists that benefited from membership in the Spanish Empire. At the same time, the Sangley community outside of Manila remained relatively independent, refusing conversion and retaining instead their Hokkien culture and wide-reaching trading networks. Colonial officials may have expelled *Sangleys* on numerous occasions, and also carried out gruesome massacres against them, but they always returned to take control of the local economy and to reap great benefit from the Asia trade.

Iberians had great political aspirations in Asia and in some places they did indeed wield considerable power over local populations. In these colonies, Portuguese and Spanish officials, secular and ecclesiastical, sought to Christianise their subjects and impose legal and economic structures that would benefit themselves and their respective royal treasuries. Native communities, for their part, reacted to these impositions by negotiating for privileges that imparted varying degrees of social and economic status. Local elites were particularly successful in this respect, as evident, for example, in the experiences of native Goans who held local offices, or *principales* in Manila who participated in the Asia trade and retained their wealth in slaves into the early eighteenth century. Overall, Iberian colonialism in Asia remains a vastly understudied subject; future research should continue to question imperial paradigms that elide the everyday experiences of peoples who lived far removed from the claims of the

Notes

¹Asia is defined as the continental landmass that includes modern-day countries like India and China, as well as the island nations of Southeast Asia. ²Thanks to Bruno Feitler and Jaime Rodrigues for citations to these cases.

Abbreviations

AGI	Archivo General de Indias
ANTT	Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Amerindians in the Iberian world



Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida and Tatiana Seijas

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the varied means by which Amerindian peoples came into contact with Iberians and how indigenous societies negotiated their interactions with imperial actors like bureaucrats, churchmen, and colonists. The focus is on showing Amerindians as historical agents who shaped the development of colonial society, rather than mere objects of European policies. The Portuguese and Spanish Crowns wielded varying degrees of political sovereignty over the territories they claimed in the Americas. In vast swaths of land, indigenous people remained relatively untouched by

colonial structures and instead continued to determine their own existence. This chapter thus focuses on Amerindians who lived in regions where Iberians exercised considerable political and economic power, which was usually around urban centres, mining regions, and agricultural districts.

Amerindian societies with distinct ethnic and linguistic traditions and cultural backgrounds responded in myriad ways to Iberian intrusions. While many groups collaborated with Iberian colonisers, others carried out active military campaigns against them, developing relationships in the long term that vacillated between alliances and hostilities. The wars of “conquest”, moreover, were only victorious in so far as Iberians were able to make and maintain alliances with diverse indigenous societies. These wars, alongside mass epidemics, the ongoing enslavement of indigenous peoples, the imposition of forced labour regimes, and the destabilisation of certain forms of native social organisation were all responsible for demographic catastrophes, as well as the disappearance or re-articulation of an untold number of ethnicities throughout the Americas. Scholars have had controversial debates over the size of populations in the New World prior to European contact, but ongoing research reveals very high densities. Demographic estimates vary considerably but suffice it to say that in the first decade of the sixteenth century, central Mexico had a population of between 12 and 15 million, and Peru between nine and 12 million (Cook 2004; Covey, Childs, and Kippen 2011; Storey 2012). The calculations for Brazil stand between two and four million people, but the numbers may be considerably higher given the five to six million estimate for the Amazon region alone (Hemming 1978; Monteiro 1994; Denevan 2003). Overall, population everywhere plummeted after contact with the process of colonisation, constituting a horrifying demographic disaster (Henige 1998; Alchon 2003).

The underlining violence of the Iberian colonial project did not, however, impede Amerindians from finding ways to flourish in new colonial settings and developing adaptive forms of resistance (Salomon and Schwartz 1999; Stern 1987). In colonised areas, indigenous people actively sought to ameliorate their subject status and access rights and protections conferred to them by the Iberian Crowns. In this sense, they benefited from laws issued by the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns that sought to protect their Indian allies as vassals, even as they waged wars against “enemy” Indians.

In spite of some divergences, indigenous peoples in the Spanish and Portuguese America experienced similar socioeconomic and cultural

processes. Recent scholarship has emphasised the need to examine this history in a combined yet comparative perspective. As such, this chapter is divided into two sections with parallel content and focusing on key themes for understanding the Amerindian experience in the Iberian world.

The early conquest period is the first topic of each section, with the shared emphasis that Iberians relied on violence against indigenous peoples, as well as alliances with them, to take control over territories. In both spheres, Amerindians took part in military campaigns to further their own interests. A second topic relates to the missionary projects targeted towards diverse indigenous communities, and how Amerindians navigated these Church initiatives, such as in the Jesuit Missions in South America. Catechism in these arenas served a double function; it was a tool for Iberians to impose new cultural norms, as well as an instrument by which Indians affirmed their rights as Christian subjects to their respective monarchs.

Amerindians from central and peripheral regions maintained close interactions, so the third topic deals with how native societies navigated internal and external borders. Regional studies have discredited erroneous distinctions once made between sedentary and “barbarian” Indians, or “colonised” versus “frontier” Indians (Jong and Rodríguez 2005; Almeida and Ortelli 2012). Finally, the chapter covers the impact of the Bourbon and Pombaline Reforms, which differentiated between Indians living in frontier versus urban regions, as well as how native communities responded to these policies. The conclusion highlights similarities and differences between the two Iberian spheres, with an emphasis on how imperial policies towards indigenous peoples changed over time in response to local and external factors.

Spanish America

Introduction

The Spanish “conquest” of America was a drawn-out and incomplete process. Historians once wrote of victorious Spanish conquistadors and vanquished Amerindians, but this simplification of Amerindian-Spanish interactions is now invalid. Spaniards certainly used great violence to gain territorial control over distinct regions in the Americas, but they also relied on alliances with Indians to achieve this

end (Matthew and Oudijk 2007). More pointedly, in the long term, Spaniards were only able to wield economic and political power in those places where there were pre-existing indigenous states with large bureaucracies and hierarchical organisation, primarily the lands of the Mexica (Aztec) and Inka empires. The territories where Amerindian societies had smaller modes of social organisation and were based on semi-sedentary economies remained largely independent. This geopolitical reality makes for a far more complicated history of the colonial period than was once told.

Image 17.1 “Map of America” by Jodocus Hondius (Amsterdam, 1619)

Source: Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University, Providence, USA

A number of “myths” underlay traditional narratives of Spanish conquests, most famously of Mexico and Peru (Restall 2003). The year 1521 marked the end of the political entity known as the Triple-Alliance, but everyday life for most inhabitants in the Central Valley of Mexico remained relatively unchanged for decades to come, as evident, for example, in the cultural resilience of Nahuatl and other indigenous languages, which continued to be used for governmental record keeping and the writing of native history (Lockhart 1992; Townsend 2018). Native lords, moreover, continued to wield considerable governing power (Yannakakis 2008; Connell 2011; Benton 2017). The conquest of Peru was a similarly non-terminal event. The dynasty of Huascar Capac ended with the death of his sons, but Andean communities remained socially vibrant. Even large-scale colonial projects like the Great Resettlement of Indians in the Central Andes, ordered in 1569, served to strengthen native lords (Mumford 2012). This stress on the survival of native social organisations and cultures is a necessary corrective to outdated ideas about Spanish victories and Indian defeats. The early colonisation of Spanish America also included brutal military expeditions, the onslaught of epidemic diseases, and the horrors of indigenous enslavement, but these aspects of history should not obscure indigenous resilience and survival (Cook 1998; Zavala 1967; Seijas 2014).

The focus here is on those regions of the Americas where the Spanish colonial bureaucracy actually governed, which was largely achieved in Mexico and Peru through the legal incorporation of indigenous peoples as vassals of the Spanish monarch (Calero 1997). The governing structure in these central regions divided the population into two distinct republics (*repúblicas*) or political

communities (Borah 1982). The indigenous majority belonged to the Republic of Indians (*República de Indios*); Spaniards, free people of mixed descent, and all slaves belonged to the Republic of Spaniards (*República de Españoles*). The structure of the republics involved residential segregation, separate local governments, and distinct courts, which provided legal structure and certain rights to all native vassals, including protection from enslavement. According to the policy of residential segregation, Indians were supposed to live in indigenous neighbourhoods (*barrios de indios*) or villages (*pueblos de indios*) headed by indigenous leaders (González-Hermosillo 2001; Gutiérrez 1993). This form of organisation generally required the coerced movement of indigenous communities to new settlements called congregations (*congregación* in Mexico) and reductions (*reducción* in Peru).

Apart from the government's purported objective of isolating Indians from corrupt colonists, the primary basis for residential segregation was to ensure the orderly collection of tribute (Mörner 1970). Even though the Spanish government entrusted tax collection to local indigenous leaders, it was easier to maintain census figures and calculate tribute amounts and labour obligations if indigenous people lived together. Amerindians, as such, were discouraged from leaving their place of birth, and, if they did, individuals were supposed to report to local authorities to be included as tributaries in their new place of residence. Many, of course, did not, especially if they left rural communities to live in urban areas where they sought freedom from tributary obligations (Wightman 1990).

Tribute was a heavy burden, (Natives in Mexico City-Tenochtitlan, for example, had to pay numerous taxes: a uniform head tax (*tributo personal*); a cathedral-construction tax (*medio real de fábrica*), a service tax for royal expenses (*servicio real*); and the legal protection tax (*medio real de ministros*), but it accorded Indians certain rights and privileges (Gibson 1964). The colonial government, for example, encouraged Amerindians' engagement in the market economy through small-scale trading privileges, partly to facilitate the payment of tribute in cash. Amerindians, as such, were generally the only people who were legally allowed to sell native products, generally called fruits of the earth (*frutas de la tierra*), which included fruits, vegetables, fowl, and firewood, among other merchandise, and to do so without having to pay sales tax (*alcabala*) on goods sold. Indigenous traders claimed these incentives to make gains by building on short- and long-distance networks of exchange that existed prior to

contact and by building new ones (Ouweneel and Torales Pacheco 1988; Glave Testino 1989; Seijas 2018). In Spanish settlements, Indians found buyers for native trading commodities like pine nuts. This interaction also fostered indigenous industry and the manufacture of new goods, such as leather equipment for horses, in ways that enabled Indians to gain from the circulation of capital (i.e., tradable representation of value).

Spain's legal apparatus was charged with protecting the legal rights of Amerindians, generally through the Protector of Indians office, which was first tied to ecclesiastical and then secular courts (Saravia Salazar 2012; Puente Luna 2018). The General Indian Court (*Juzgado de General de Naturales*) in Mexico City, for example, was established in the early 1590s to oversee the legal affairs of the Republic of Indians in New Spain. The body was responsible for the "good government" and "prompt administration" of matters relating to the indigenous population (Borah 1983). The Juzgado provided legal counsel and served as a place where Amerindians could seek justice. It dispensed major civil (often related to land disputes) and criminal cases and attended to appeals sent from the lower courts by indigenous governors and councillors, who carried out justice for minor crimes at the local level (Stavig 2000). The court also issued special dispensations, writs of protection (*amparos*), and individual licenses. Amerindian merchants, for example, could acquire a trading license if they found themselves harassed by contracted sales-tax collectors. Overall, the high functionality of this court is a testament to Spanish bureaucratic process and the Spanish Crown's commitment to governing an "empire of law" (Owensby 2008).

Spanish missionary project

Spain's missionary enterprise followed a similar trajectory to colonisation; Christianity made significant inroads in the urban centres of Mexico and Peru, and less so in peripheral regions. There was no generalised "spiritual conquest" (Ricard 1966; Crewe 2019). Many regions of Spanish America became very devoutly Catholic, but popular religious practices everywhere were far from orthodox (Charles 2010). Indigenous peoples, moreover, tended to adapt Christian beliefs in ways that corresponded to ancestral cosmologies (Sigal 2000). Notably, churchmen at the time were well aware of native people's ambivalence towards Catholicism, which is why such great efforts were made to create indigenous language catechisms and

translate other religious texts (Burkhart 1989; Durston 2007; Christensen 2013). The hope was that Christian doctrine would be better understood and embraced if articulated in Amerindians' native tongues. The Church hierarchy also carried out ongoing campaigns to expurgate idolatrous practices, which similarly points to the sometimes-limited success of conversion (Tavárez 2011; Mills 1997).

The Spanish Crown charged religious orders (regular clergy) with the organisation and implementation of the missionary project among Amerindians, while secular clergy (priests) focused on ministering to the Republic of Spaniards. Chief among the orders were the Franciscans, Augustinians, Dominicans, and Jesuits. The administration of this enterprise was most complete in the urban regions of Spanish America, where regular clergy led doctrinal parishes (called *doctrinas*) out of specified churches, which were generally connected to monasteries. The separation of Indians from other Christian parishioners was based on the idea that they required special instruction as newcomers to the faith.

Religious orders similarly ran the ministry of Amerindians in frontier regions, with mission towns (*misiones*) acting as the base organisational unit. The rise of *misiones* began after the issuance of the "Orders for New Discoveries" in 1573. This royal decree specified that missionaries (as opposed to soldiers) were to be primary agents of colonisation, with "pacification" replacing "conquest". Henceforth, this "pacification" of newly contacted indigenous peoples required them to move to mission towns organised along Spanish lines.

Much beyond pastoral care, this form of living arrangement served the economic interests of surrounding Spanish ventures, such as mining in Northern Mexico, because tribute labour was often administered through the missions (Deeds 2003). Exploitative practices in missions were thus relatively commonplace, and Amerindians regularly left them when they no longer received material advantages from remaining (Radding Murrieta 1997). Missions, however, also became sites of Amerindian economic agency and independent administration. The Guarani missions of the Rio de la Plata region, for example, remained highly functional economic units after the Jesuit Expulsion in 1768 (Sarreal 2014). Recent re-drawings of mission life thus emphasise the varied lived realities of so-called mission Indians (Wilde 2009).

Interethnic relations

The ethno-linguistic diversity and settlement patterns of Amerindian societies in Spanish territories made for a complicated sociocultural landscape. The simplest distinction was between sedentary and more mobile societies, each of whose economies were based on the ecology of their different geographic ranges. Prior to contact and in almost all areas, groups of agriculturalists and pastoralists maintained close interactions through trading networks, which remained in place to varying degrees throughout the colonial period.

The Spanish government did, however, implement certain policies that changed the nature of this interaction, mostly by encouraging town-based societies to take part in the colonial project. Tlaxcaltecan society exemplifies this pattern. This ethnic group of Nahuatl speakers from Tlaxcala in Central Mexico allied with Spaniards to colonise northern territories, like present-day Nuevo León, that were inhabited by largely nomadic societies, which were despairingly grouped as Chichimecas (Valdés 1995). In these northern regions, Tlaxcaltecs established towns near Spanish settlements to continue the military alliance and purportedly to serve as an example for non-agriculturalists (Frye 1996; McEnroe 2012). Indigenous historical memories of Aztlan (Nahuatl ancestral land in Northern Mexico) were central in encouraging these movements as a kind of back migration, as was the case for Amerindians who accompanied, and perhaps led, Spaniards to New Mexico (Levin Rojo 2014).

Bourbon reforms

The Bourbon Reforms had the greatest impact among independent Amerindian societies in frontier regions, where Spain's "enlightened" policies wavered between desiring peace versus extermination (Weber 2005). In some borderland territories, officials improved relations with Amerindians through gift exchanges when Spaniards generally offered market goods in exchange for ceasefires. The military instability in such places, however, also encouraged soldiers to seek a more permanent solution, mainly by eradicating societies that continued to resist Spanish sovereignty over their lands. The Bourbon's desire to tighten their political control over these Amerindian populations generally failed, and a state of warfare continued into the national period, for example between Mapuche Indians and the Chilean government. A number of indigenous societies throughout Latin America never experienced Spanish colonialism, which is a reminder of the need to question and reconsider political

and geographical categories like “Spanish America”.

Portuguese America

Wars of conquest and the implementation of *aldeamentos*

Contrary to the image of a relatively peaceful occupation, the Portuguese territories in America were acquired through violent wars of conquest involving a number of Amerindian peoples from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, and in which they played major roles as either friends or foes (Hemming 1978). Mortality rates were extremely high. Despite also being those who suffered the most by these wars, Amerindians' actions and choices were decisive to the outcome.

Identifying and categorising indigenous societies was essential to the imperial enterprise. The Portuguese made distinctions between Amerindian peoples based on criteria that reflected their own interests and their misapprehensions about the languages and the sociocultural characteristics of Amerindian peoples. Thus, different ethno-linguistic groups were referred to indiscriminately as Indians and divided between allies and enemies of the Portuguese. As for ethnic designations, apart from the creation of new ethnonyms, often appropriated by the native peoples themselves, all were eventually subsumed under the broad and generic categories of Tupis and Tapuias (Monteiro 2001). The former, who were divided into various subgroups, predominated in the coastal regions of Brazil and had the most intensive contacts with the colonisers (Fausto 2000). For them, relations with the “other” through exchange, marriage, and war were essential. Tupis were consequently extremely open to contacts that incorporated the Europeans into the dynamic of intertribal relations as either allies or enemies (Fernandes 1989; Viveiros de Castro 1992). *Tapuia* was the name used by Tupis for other natives, and the Portuguese adopted both the term and its meaning. The Tapuia also comprised innumerable distinct groups, who were in general warier of interaction with the newcomers than the coastal Tupis. Nevertheless, both the Tupis and the Tapuias at various times formed alliances with or against the Europeans, and the relations between different Amerindian peoples, and between them and the Portuguese were fluid and unstable.

Portuguese presence on the coast was intermittent in the opening three decades of the sixteenth century, and their contacts with Amerindians at this time was relatively less disruptive, though the consequences of these relations were already evident: high mortality, the collapse of sociocultural structures, the intensification of warfare, greater incidence of epidemics, and enslavement. During this period, the principal source of wealth for the colonists was Brazilwood, the export of which was the subject of competition between the French and the Portuguese, rivals also for the allegiance of the Amerindians with whom they established trade relations (Marchant 1942). Meanwhile the latter made alliances, trade agreements, and wars in line with their own interests that often diverged from the economic logic of the Europeans (Schwartz 1985; Monteiro 2018).

As the Portuguese occupation of the land became more systematic in the 1530s with the creation of hereditary captaincies (1534), the colonists' demand for slaves increased. This need for labour provoked violent reactions from the Indians, which in turn were largely responsible for the failure of many of the new administrative divisions. Wars against other Europeans—mainly the French—for dominion over the land also became more frequent and involved various indigenous peoples. These wars became intertwined with indigenous intertribal wars, which became much more violent. Would-be conquistadors of various European countries vied for invaluable indigenous support, while Amerindians did not hesitate to take advantage of inter-European squabbles for their purposes, obeying the dynamic of their own societies (Monteiro 2018). If the Europeans were intent on controlling territory and procuring slaves, the Tupis were determined to defeat their indigenous rivals and obtain prisoners for ritual sacrifice (Fernandes 1989). All along the Brazilian littoral, various native peoples fought against or alongside Europeans, following the latter's pattern of conflict. Although the Amerindians continued to switch allegiances at their convenience, as had always been their custom, would-be colonial powers sought to entrench these divisions through the increasing militarisation of indigenous societies (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992).

The arrival of the first royal-appointed governor general Tomé de Souza was intended to assert Portuguese sovereignty over their claimed colony against rival European powers, but also, and perhaps above all, to facilitate the integration of “friendly” Indians, and subjugate those who remained outside Portuguese control. The royal ordinances by Souza contained the basic principles that generally

guided Portuguese policy towards Brazilian Amerindians for the remainder of the colonial period (Perrone-Moisés 1992). A basic distinction was made between “tame or friendly” (allies) and “savage” or “barbarian” (enemies) Indians; the former would be reduced to pacified villages or *aldeias*; while Just War was to be waged on the latter, who would be enslaved upon being vanquished. Just War was a theological argument positing that war could be declared on the enemies of Christianity, and it was employed by both Iberian powers to justify the capture and enslavement of hostile indigenous peoples who resisted colonisation and refused to convert to Christianity (Solórzano Pereira 1994). As a legal concept, Just War endured for virtually the entirety of the colonial period, in spite of numerous crown ordinances that sought to curb the excesses of colonists and local authorities. In Brazil, another legal justification with a religious sanction for the enslavement of Amerindians was the ransoming of captives, or the practice of exchanging prisoners of war with allied groups who were then sold into slavery (Perrone-Moisés 1992). To escape extermination or enslavement, large numbers of indigenous peoples chose settlement in *aldeias* and were thus incorporated into colonial institutions and legal structures. Portuguese legislation towards Indians varied throughout the colonial period, but was generally characterised as a series of decrees and laws that succeeded one another in ways that sometimes annulled previous dictates according to the interests of the authorities who issued them and those who lobbied for them, including Indians (Perrone-Moisés 1992; Almeida 2003).

The crown and the Church cooperated in the implementation of the policy of *aldeamentos*, central to colonisation, which was designed to reduce allied Indians to large *aldeias* close to major Portuguese urban centres where they might be more easily Christianised and re-socialised. Their transformation into Christian subjects was meant to enable the crown to shore up and even expand the frontiers of the colony, while also ensuring a supply of manual labour for colonists and missionaries. Jesuits arrived with Tomé de Souza, and it was they who were primarily responsible for the establishment of the colonial *aldeias* (Castelnau-L’estaille 2000; Metcalf 2014).

Parallel to the policy of *aldeamentos*, the colonial government continued to carry out intermittent warfare against hostile Amerindians until the nineteenth century. Some of these were major conflicts, involving large military forces and numerous indigenous groups (Puntoni 2000; Almeida 2003). But countless others waged to

quell localised Indian revolts by those who refused to collaborate with the Portuguese. In general, these occurred on the colonial frontiers, in the *sertões* (backlands) inhabited by the so-called “savages”, who defended their territories and impeded Portuguese colonial expansion, while also occasionally carrying out armed incursions into occupied areas (Russell-Wood 2005; Langfur and Chaves de Resende 2014). A number of these groups maintained their independence from Portuguese administration into the nineteenth century. Such was the case of the Botocudos, Caiapós, Xavantes, Guaicurús, Muras e Kaingangs, among others. Even though these societies had intermittent contact with *aldeados* (Indians in villages) and non-Indians, many of them were only incorporated through the expansionistic politics of the Brazilian state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Cunha 1992; Langfur and Chaves de Resende 2014). Wars of conquest as well as defensive wars persisted until the nineteenth century, continuously shaping the negotiation, strategies, and treaties between the authorities (civil and ecclesiastical), the colonists, and the Indians. Colonial wars, just wars, the numerous punitive and/or slaving expeditions, went hand in hand with the policy of *aldeamentos* since they made it harder for Amerindians to survive on the *sertões* and compelled them to reach an accommodation with the Portuguese and settle in *aldeias*.

The colonial *aldeias*: re-socialisation and the remaking of culture and identity

Although their purpose was religious indoctrination and the re-socialisation of indigenous peoples, and ultimately their integration into the Portuguese administrative structures, the colonial *aldeias* were not simply spaces of domination and of cultural imposition by the Jesuit fathers over the Amerindians, as suggested by the historiography. The profusion of laws regulating their growth and operation, as well as the numerous and varied disputes surrounding these settlements indicate not only their importance, but also the divergent expectations of different actors. Amerindians, missionaries, local authorities, and the colonists all attributed different functions and meanings to the *aldeias* and used the colonial legal system to advance their claims. Indians participated actively in these legal disputes, whose records make it possible to identify some of their motivations in settling in these *aldeias*. Land rights, and protection from the ravages of war and mass enslavement were their basic

expectations in treaties with the Portuguese. The colonial *aldeias* appeared to the Amerindians as a lesser evil, a space that held out the possibility of survival in the colony (Almeida 2003). A very similar process occurred elsewhere in the Americas. The missions were not simply a blueprint imposed on the Indians; these communities evolved through multi-stranded processes of negotiation often fraught with conflict (Levin Rojo and Radding 2019).

Indians paid a brutal price for this difficult choice, for they became subject to various forms of discrimination and forced labour, and also had to abandon (at least outwardly) their religion and culture and accept the imposition of Catholicism and European customs. However, by settling in *aldeias*, Indians became Christian vassals of the king, and thus assumed the status of a distinct social group within the colonial order. Along with many obligations, this status brought with it certain rights, including access to the commons within *aldeias* and exemption from enslavement—rights they vigorously strived to defend into the nineteenth century.

Indian vassals of the Portuguese Crown did not have their own court system as they did in Spanish America, but they nonetheless enjoyed guaranteed legal protections. Colonial law offered Indians various ways of accessing justice. The Rules of the Missions of 1686 provided the basic guidelines for the organisation and functioning of the *aldeias* for almost a century. Father Antonio Vieira's influence resulted in this regiment being first proposed for Amazonia, but was also applied to *aldeias* in other regions, and remained in force until it was replaced by the Directory of the Indians (*Diretório que se deve observar nas Povoações dos Índios do Pará e Maranhão*) in 1757 as part of the Pombaline Reforms (Beozzo 1983; Almeida 1997). Fear and violence, essential elements to the formation of *aldeias*, could not alone guarantee their proper functioning, which points to the necessity of legal structures.

The re-socialisation of the Amerindians was a complex process that apart from outright imposition also involved high levels of negotiation, especially with indigenous elites who were central to the growth and development of the *aldeias*. Civic and ecclesiastical authorities rewarded these leaders for their important role as intermediaries with coveted posts, titles, offices, and privileges (Domingues 2000; Raminelli 2009; Almeida 2003; Sommer 2014; Carvalho Júnior 2017).

By focusing on how converts understood and employed Catholicism and other new cultural elements, recent research has revealed the

complexity of Indians' relationships with missionaries, as well as their agency in acquiring the necessary tools to adapt to colonial governance. There is abundant evidence that Jesuits made considerable concessions regarding the retention of indigenous cultural elements, as well as the appropriation of Catholic practices as redefined by the Indians (Pompa 2003; Carvalho Júnior 2017). Daily life in the *aldeias*, included the re-articulation of old indigenous traditions in the face of new cultural and civic practices introduced by the Jesuit fathers, which Indians skilfully used to petition the king for favours in exchange for services rendered. In their petitions to the authorities, Amerindians used their baptismal names and acted as the representatives of the *aldeias* in which they lived, assuming the generic identity they had been given or which had been imposed on them: *aldeado* Indians and Christian vassals of the king (Almeida 2003).

Interethnic relations

The complex and multifaceted relations between the inhabitants of the *aldeias* and the *sertões*, and Indians and non-Indians, belie the notion that there was a rigid opposition between the colony and the *sertão*, or between “tame” and “savage” Indians (Almeida and Ortelli 2012). The Amerindians of the *sertões* did not live in absolute isolation from the colonial world. They continually came and went, and often negotiated with the colonists, missionaries, and the authorities. Numerous studies on the internal and external frontier regions have revealed the full range and variety of these interactions, including wars, cultural and commercial exchanges between the indigenous peoples of the *aldeias*, those of the *sertões*, and non-Indians. For instance, during the eighteenth century, the Caiapós, Guaicurús, and Paiaguás in Matto Grosso changed their mutual relations from conflict to alliance in response to Portuguese incursions into their territories, while also exploiting the rivalries among the Europeans. These peoples also intermittently inserted themselves into colonial trade circuits, trading in cattle and other goods, often stolen in one region and sold in another. The Paiaguás, for example, frequently sold their Portuguese, African, and mixed-race captives in Paraguay (Kok 2004). This kind of exchange facilitated their independence until the nineteenth century.

The interaction among the peoples of the *sertões*, and between them and non-Amerindians, changed with the intensification of conflicts and a new wave of colonial expansion during the eighteenth century,

which resulted from either Pombaline legislation that encouraged interactions with indigenous populations, or the escalation of border disputes between Portugal and Spain, especially after the signing of the Treaty of Madrid.¹ Beyond violence, Portuguese relations with the peoples who remained outside the colonial order also involved a great deal of negotiation, above all in times of war. Neither the pacified Indians of the *aldeias* nor the so-called savages of the *sertões* simply accepted the places and roles assigned to them in the indigenous policy of the colonial authorities. They continued to maintain fluid relations with one another and with the colonists, and to circulate across internal and external frontiers of the empire. The need to counter the perceived threat posed by “savages” rendered the Portuguese dependent on good relations with their native allies, thereby strengthening the bargaining power of their leaders—a situation that persisted until the nineteenth century (Farage 1991; Garcia 2009; Almeida 2010; Sampaio 2012).

Relations between Indians and Africans remain understudied in Portuguese America, but it is certain that they interacted frequently in *aldeias*, *quilombos* (maroon communities), ranches, plantations, urban centres, and in the *sertões* (Karasch 2016). Such interactions varied from quotidian living and intermarriage to antagonism and persecution. Allied Indians, for instance, frequently participated in punitive expeditions organised by colonial authorities against *quilombos*, fugitive slaves, and enemy Indians. Africans (free and enslaved) and Indians (*aldeados* or enemies) joined together and parted ways in these expeditions, which gained them standing and negotiated power in the colonial order.

Pombal’s Indian policy: assimilationism, negotiation, and resistance

In the mid-eighteenth century, the Marquis of Pombal introduced changes to the Indian policy of the Portuguese Crown. The new law, known as the Directory of the Indians or the Pombaline Directory, generally maintained the basic directives of previous policies, such as the division between allied versus enemy Indians, obligatory labour for *aldeados*, their status as minors (under the Director of Indians), and the guarantee of collective land within the *aldeias*. The most significant change was the introduction of the policy of assimilation, which aimed to transform the *aldeias* into Portuguese towns and “civilise” the Amerindians, so that they would be indistinguishable

from the rest of the king's vassals. A number of innovations were established following this logic. The Law of Liberties (1755) prohibited the enslavement of Indians under all circumstances, and the Law of Marriage (1755) promoted mixed matrimonies. The Directory also prohibited all forms of discrimination against Indians and encouraged non-Indians to settle in *aldeias*. At the same time, efforts were made to eradicate the use of indigenous languages and customs in the hope of hastening their disappearance as distinct groups. Jesuit expulsion in 1759 meant that Directors of Indians (*diretores de índios*) replaced them as the administrators of the *aldeamentos* (Almeida 1997).

The new laws, however, were applied selectively, depending on the region and the characteristics of the inhabitants. War was waged on the “savages” of the *sertões* in order to corral them into new *aldeias*. The “tame” Amerindians already long settled in *aldeias*, on the other hand, became the subject of discourses arguing that because they were civilised, their separate *aldeias* no longer served a purpose and should be abolished.

The new policies provoked a variety of reactions from those affected. Many Indians fled, some rebelled, while others took advantage of the new laws to secure offices, claim rights, and demand protection—above all from illegal enslavement, encroachment on their lands, and the extinction of their *aldeias* with their associated land rights (Domingues 2000; Martins Lopes 2005; Silva 2005; Almeida 2010; Sampaio 2012; Roller 2014). They defended their rights by reasserting their identity as indigenous peoples and invoking the longstanding treaties with the crown. These disputes continued until the mid-nineteenth century, when the Brazilian Empire abolished many of the old *aldeias*—a policy that maintained the assimilationist approach pioneered by Pombal (Cunha 1992; Silva 1996; Silva 2005; Almeida 2010).

Conclusion

Amerindian responses to Iberian incursions varied a great deal, shaped as they were by the particular needs of each society and in response to changing external dynamics. There were outright military hostilities, episodes involving trade, and also collaborative efforts to join European ranks and vanquish existing political structures. Amerindians were active historical subjects who developed multiple

strategies to survive European colonialism and secure their own interests.

The complexity of human interactions in this vast expanse cannot be reduced to colonial categories and institutions. As noted, Iberian colonisation and occupation of American territories would have been impossible without Amerindian allies, who took advantage of changing geopolitical circumstances to advance their own interests. Recent scholarship has overturned simplistic schemas that once divided indigenous combatants into two monolithic camps: allies versus enemies (Restall and Martin 2013). Moreover, in territories subjected to Iberian sovereignty, Portuguese and Spanish settlers continued to rely on Amerindians to construct colonial societies, of which they were an integral part.

The organisation of indigenous communities located within the Spanish and Portuguese spheres shared some commonalities. In the Spanish sphere, indigenous government remained largely independent, especially through municipal councils (*cabildos*), though churchmen administered mission towns more directly. In Portuguese America, on the other hand, Jesuits were the primary organisers and administrators of Indian communities. Amerindians living in the Republic of Indians, mission towns, and colonial settlements were Christian vassals of their respective kings, with rights and obligations defined by their respective laws. In spite of the demands of draft labour in both spheres, and tribute payments in Spanish America, indigenous people took advantage of their subject status via legal channels, taking their claims to Iberian courts into the nineteenth century. The Spanish legal framework via the protectorate of Indians facilitated this recourse to colonial law, but Amerindians in Brazil similarly appealed to royal justice and petitioned for favours based on their service to the crown. As evidence, Amerindians in both Portuguese and Spanish territories generally sought to mitigate conflicts via colonial legal institutions, rather than via outright rebellion. Mission towns, in this way, were not merely spaces for colonial domination, they were also communities built by Amerindians who found some benefits from congregating as Christian subjects of the king, including defence from slaving expeditions. Such was the case in missions from Southern Brazil to Northern Mexico.

Colonial legislation made distinctions between so-called friendly (sedentary) and “savage” or “barbarian” Indians, but these divisions bore little semblance to everyday relations in frontier regions, where there was free circulation among individuals residing in missions,

towns, and elsewhere (Poloni-Simard 2000; Almeida and Ortelli 2012). In fact, during the second half of the eighteenth century, officials from both spheres expended great efforts to attract “savage” Indians from frontier regions into settled territories, especially, as part of the delineation of new borders required by the Treaty of Madrid.

The Bourbon and Pombaline Reforms of the eighteenth century aimed to insert Amerindians more directly into colonial society. Different strategies were targeted towards indigenous communities living in colonial settlements versus in frontier regions. New legislation regarding land tenure, for example, sought to make communal lands more productive for colonial markets. For the most part, these governmental policies were detrimental to indigenous communities, as they served to diminish their already limited political and economic independence. By contrast, the strategy for semi-sedentary societies was to incorporate them via treaties and failing that through military force. The indigenous response, in turn, included some level of collaboration to gain concessions from the colonial order, as well as armed resistance. Whatever the colonial strategy, Amerindians everywhere had one primary concern: to preserve their collective lands for the survival of their communities.

Historical processes have transformed indigenous societies, in the same ways that change over time fundamentally altered Iberian cultures. This historical trajectory—the coming together of European and Amerindian peoples—has not resulted in the “extinction” of native cultures and identities (Mintz 1982; Barth 2000). The violence and disease of colonisation did not result in “disappearances”—as was once claimed (Reina 1997). Political and academic debates concerning the success of “civilising missions” and levels of ethnic mixing (*mestizaje*) have served, in part, to make indigenous peoples invisible. In most arenas, the rise of nation-states disenfranchised Amerindians, who were, until very recently, excluded from civic society. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century state formation left little space for ethnic and cultural pluralities.

Today, indigenous communities throughout Latin America have organised to secure full citizenship. Statutory directives have encouraged Indians to become involved in ethnogenesis movements and reassert their native identities in order to benefit from the rights accorded to them by national constitutions (Hill 1996; Boccara 2005). In Brazil, for example, indigenous activism, mainly in the northeast, was instrumental in securing protections in the 1988 Constitution. A similar resurgence occurred in Southern Mexico with the onset of the

Zapatista movement, as well as in many other regions of Latin America. These achievements testify to the longevity and strength of indigenous cultures and identities. Amerindian societies experienced significant cultural transformations in the past 500 years, but native continuities remain.

Note

¹A border treaty between Portugal and Spain signed in 1750, which established the frontier between the two Americas, Spanish and Portuguese. Among other things, the treaty stipulated that Portugal would hand over the town of Colônia do Sacramento to Spain in exchange for the Seven Peoples of the Missions, which provoked many conflicts involving the Indians and Jesuits, including the Guaraní War.

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
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	Brazil	Spanish America	Total for All American Regions
Pre-1581	4,100	84,900	89,000
1581-1640	261,400	444,900	706,500
1641-1700	523,000	61,700	1,088,700
1701-1760	1,084,600	56,800	2,714,200
1761-1820	1,696,600	298,900	4,210,000
1821-1867	1,269,400	558,800	1,898,600
Adjustment for intra-American trade	136,100	566,300	0
Total	4,703,000	2,072,300	10,707,000

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Portugal, Spain, and the transatlantic slave trade



Roquinaldo Ferreira and Pablo Miguel Sierra Silva

Introduction

The place of Portugal and Spain in the slave trade was in many ways shaped by the two Iberian powers' colonisation projects in the Americas and Africa. To begin with, Spain never had any significant foothold in Africa, a sharp contrast with Portugal, a country whose history of maritime expansion had since the fifteenth century been deeply intertwined with the African continent. In addition to positioning Portugal as a key force in shaping the history of the slave trade, this dynamic also led to a set of complex relationships between the two Iberian powers and their colonies during the era of the slave trade from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.

Similarities between the Portuguese and Spanish slave trades were legion. In both imperial powers, the trade paved the way for the rise of powerful colonial merchants, became deeply intertwined with the social and economic fabrics of colonial societies, and commanded strategic attention by policymakers in Lisbon and Madrid. Significantly, neither Lisbon nor Madrid necessarily objected to the increasing role of colonial merchants in the management of the Spanish and Portuguese slave trade. The merchant guilds of Seville did attempt to limit the influence of foreign slave traders, but with minimal success. Spanish American commercial networks generally benefited from access to foreign slave trading networks. The deregulation of the slave trade to Cuba was first proposed by Cuban creole elites, with Francisco Arango travelling to Spain to make the case that the opening up of the slave trade to Cuba was central to developing sugar plantations on the Caribbean Island (Ferrer 2014).

The early phase of the Iberian slave trade was deeply intertwined with Portugal's first encounter with African societies in the fifteenth century. Portugal had relied on African enslaved labour from Senegambia to develop sugar production on the Atlantic islands and continental Portugal (Almeida Mendes 2012). On the Gold coast, where Portugal had erected a fort in 1482 seeking to tap into thriving gold production, it became a key provider of enslaved labour to African powers (Heywood and Thornton 2007). To satisfy local demand for labour, the Portuguese established a maritime slave trade from central Africa, where Portugal had managed to establish a presence soon after its arrival to the Gold Coast. These experiences gave Portugal vital expertise in moving African people across the ocean (Alencastro 2000; Thornton 2007).

But the slave trade only became a dominant force with the rise of

the demand for labour in Portuguese and Spanish America. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, Portuguese trading networks had become critical to the procurement of enslaved Africans to the Spanish Caribbean and Mexico (Wheat 2016). Later, and perhaps more consequentially, the slave trade escalated again due to the growth of sugar production in Brazil. In both cases, the reliance on African labour was dictated by the depletion of Indian labour in Portuguese and Spanish America, where the spread of diseases brought by Europeans produced a significant setback in local indigenous populations, as well as laws restricting access to native people's labour (Schwartz 1978; Monteiro 1995). Of course, the enslavement of the native people of Brazil did not come to an end (Metcalf 2006). However, by the mid-seventeenth century, Africans and African descent individuals comprised the bulk of the slave population in Brazil.

The reliance on African labour to produce or extract natural products in the tropics was to some extent a continuation of previous Portuguese experiments in Africa, where Portugal had succeeded in creating a sugar based plantation society on the island of São Tomé by the early sixteenth century (Seibert 2016). São Tomé's global domination of sugar production was later replicated in Brazil, allowing the Portuguese to move beyond the bartering economy that had characterised the early phase of colonialism in South America to the large-scale production of a commodity [sugar] whose demand was skyrocketing in Europe. By the end of the sixteenth century, as São Tomé's sugar production declined among other factors due to slave revolts, Brazil emerged as the largest producer of sugar in the world (Schwartz 2004). To meet sugar production's increasing labour demands, the Portuguese turned to Africa, building upon trading networks and expertise that had preceded their arrival to Brazil in 1500 (Alencastro 2000).

Legality of slavery and the slave trade

Slavery in Spanish America and Brazil persisted for centuries because few colonisers questioned the legality or moral implications of enslaving Africans and their descendants. Fray Bartolomé de las Casas infamously called for the importation of black slaves to exempt the indigenous population of brutal working conditions but repented shortly thereafter. The abolishment of indigenous slavery was codified

in the New Laws of 1542 but enforcing them proved extremely difficult outside of Central Mexico and Peru. Nonetheless, Spanish religious officials were forced to confront the incoherence of abolishing the enslavement of Native Americans but accepting that of Africans. The Archbishop of Mexico, Fray Alonso de Montúfar, urged the Spanish monarch to stop “this captivity and business” in African captives in a scathing 1560 letter which was disregarded (Sierra Silva 2018). Tomás de Mercado, Bartolomé de Albornoz, and Luis de Molina raised similar critiques during the second half of the sixteenth century but failed to influence the leading theologians and jurists of their day (Malagón Barcelo 1974).

While the enslavement of the indigenous people of the Americas produced intense debates in the Spanish empire, the enslavement of Africans yielded a rather muted reaction in Portugal, largely because African slavery was already known in Europe prior to the expansion to Africa and Brazil. It would take almost 100 years for Spanish Jesuit scholar Luís de Molina’s analyses of enslavement in Africa to come to light. While framing enslavement as “unjust and iniquitous” and a sin, he challenged the view that the slave trade was legitimate because of its role as an engine of conversion of Africans into Christianity (Hespanha 2001). By then, however, having been under way for almost 70 years, the slave trade had already become integral to the economic fabrics of imperial Spain and Portugal.

By the early seventeenth century, the Jesuit priest Alonso de Sandoval could condemn the religious perils imposed on African souls, but he did not explicitly challenge slavery or the slave trade. After all, even he pertained to a religious order heavily invested in slavery throughout the Atlantic world (Sandoval 1987). The renewed abolishment of indigenous slavery in 1672 was extended to people of Asian descent—as *indios orientales*—in Spanish America, but otherwise reinforced the association between slavery and African heritage (Seijas 2014). Spaniards constructed disparate ordinances related to slavery, some of which were collected in the *Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de Indias* in 1680. However, they never produced a specific set of slave laws comparable to the French “Code Noir” of 1685. Two Capuchin friars, José de Jaca and Epifanio de Moirans, challenged the legality of enslaving Africans and their descendants during the 1680s. Unfortunately, their writings did not reach a wide audience and did not impact Spanish American views on slave ownership in the second half of the seventeenth century (López García 1982).

During the late eighteenth century, Spaniards did attempt to

regulate slavery through the Código Negro Carolino. Drafted in 1784, the Código attempted to produce a more efficient economy in Santo Domingo that required standardising the obligations of slaves and masters. Compared to the French codes of 1680 and 1724, however, the Spanish law was considered to favour the interests of the enslaved over their masters, especially in Louisiana. Slaveholders in Havana, Caracas, Nueva Granada, and even Santo Domingo protested aggressively to the point that it was never enforced (Malagón Barcelo 1974). The code was likely read and filed without further controversy in places where slavery was declining, and the slave trade was not as significant by the late eighteenth century. However, neither slavery nor the slave trade was banned in Spain or its American domains.

The prohibition of the slave trade to mainland Portugal in 1761 intended to prioritise the shipment of enslaved Africans to Brazil, Portugal's main colony in South America, where enslaved labour was in acute demand due to mining and agricultural activities. Slaves travelling from Angola or Brazil to Portugal with their owners could claim the 1761 ban as a means to secure their freedom (Ferreira 2012). In 1773, the Marquis of Pombal decreed a free birth law, which would end the enslavement of fourth-generation slaves born in Portugal (Nogueira da Silva and Grinberg 2011). However, as documenting these genealogies was not necessarily an easy task, most mainland slaves would remain enslaved. Ideologically, slavery was still firmly in place in Spain, Portugal, and most of their American dominions at the start of the nineteenth century.

Spanish America

The island of Hispaniola served as the initial testing ground for sugar production and the slave trade in the early Spanish Caribbean and mainland. By 1504, Spanish colonisers had sent enough African slaves in small groups and individual licenses to the island to elicit a formal complaint by Governor Nicolás de Ovando. Demand for Africans (as field hands, servants and military auxiliaries) grew considerably over these first decades of Caribbean colonisation. Approximately 4,000 enslaved Africans were sent to Hispaniola between 1519 and 1528, although half left the island for other destinations (Guitar 2006). Early planters and governors may have entered occasional contracts with Genoese slave merchants, but by the 1550s the Portuguese established themselves as the bona fide providers of enslaved Africans (Palmer

1976; Aguirre Beltrán 1946; Ventura 1999). The early to mid-sixteenth-century slave trade to Spanish America ran through Cape Verdean providers with ties in Seville (Torrao 2011). Early slavers drew heavily from the Senegambia region and benefited, for a short time, from the general instability surrounding the Wolof kingdom (Green 2014). Concerns about the introduction of enslaved Muslims to lands destined for Catholicism would gradually condition the entry of individuals from this region. Religious concerns aside, demand for Senegambia captives remained high among Spanish colonists throughout the colonial period (Sandoval 1987).

By the 1560s and 1570s, small populations of enslaved Africans could be found in most Spanish American urban centres (Saunders 2010; Blumenthal 2009). Elite city-dwellers counted on this enslaved population for domestic service of any and every variety. Slave men laboured as water carriers, bodyguards, coachmen and muleteers, while enslaved women worked as wet nurses, cooks, and maids. Ownership of large retinues of such domestic slaves became a mark of distinction among urban elites. Thus, we must understand enslaved Africans as far more than unremunerated labourers. Africans became extremely valued as status markers “who produced and performed wealth” for middling and elite Spaniards (Bryant 2014). Bishops, city regents and successful merchants invested heavily in the transatlantic slave trade precisely because they vied for political and cultural power. These dynamics were evident throughout the core areas of Spanish America by 1580, although less markedly so in peripheral areas of the empire (Chile, New Mexico, etc.).

Two late sixteenth-century developments led to the intensification of the transatlantic slave trade to Spanish America: epidemic disease and the Iberian Union. The demographic collapse of indigenous populations due to smallpox and typhus led to 80–90% depopulation rates in large swaths of the empire. Port cities, such as Veracruz, Cartagena, and Havana, were already dependent on black slave labour by the late sixteenth century (De la Fuente 2008; Siemens 1998; Wheat 2016). Faced with alarming depopulation, Spaniards increasingly turned to enslaved people of African descent for their labour needs. In the political arena, Philip II’s ascent to the vacant Portuguese throne in 1580 enabled the expanding Lusophone merchant networks to streamline the slave trade more effectively to Spanish America. The Portuguese had developed extensive commercial and political ties with West and West Central African states since the fifteenth century. However, it was the development of

São Paulo de Luanda during the late sixteenth century that truly enabled the Spanish monarchs to partially redirect the slave trade to Spanish America. Philip II and III of Spain heightened demand for African slaves by dictating pro-indigenous policies that restricted the type of work that Spaniards could expect from Native Americans. At the start of the seventeenth century, royal bans on indigenous labour in sugarcane plantations and textile mills stimulated the transatlantic slave trade (Zavala 1947). Spanish planters and mill owners initially resisted these costly measures, but by the mid-seventeenth century their operations relied almost entirely on enslaved Africans and their descendants.

Spanish colonists established a remarkable dependence on Lusophone slaving networks up until Portuguese independence. By 1641, no less than 529,800 African captives had entered Spanish American domains (Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat 2015). On average each slave ship carried 287 slaves during the 1581–1640, although fraudulent record-keeping could lead to considerable variations. The vast majority of these captives were introduced by Portuguese slave traders with commercial ties in West and West Central Africa. The establishment of Luanda, the capital city of the Portuguese colony of Angola, resonated with slaving interests in Veracruz and Buenos Aires (Schultz 2016). Upwards of 80% of the transatlantic slave trade to Veracruz originated in Luanda, a direct reflection of Portuguese militarism in West Central Africa (Vila Vilar 1977; Heywood and Thornton 2007). Officially, the crown only granted incoming slavers intermittent access to the merchants of Buenos Aires, leading to the rapid emergence of a contraband silver-slave trade. In New Spain a more established slave trading network connected the port of Veracruz with the planters of Xalapa, Izúcar and Michoacán. A simultaneous demand for enslaved Africans as status markers and textile workers also thrived in Mexico City, Puebla de los Ángeles and Coyoacán. Overall, mining centres drew considerably less African captives than urban centres and sugar plantations. All of these settlements were defined by a constant influx of young Kikongo and Kimbundu speakers up to 1640.

In the Viceroyalties of New Granada and Peru, the transatlantic slave trade evidenced greater diversity in terms of African zones of provenance. The influx of West Central Africans was often matched and, at times, surpassed by Lower Guinean captives (Wheat 2011). Despite its Caribbean location, Cartagena de Indias served as Peru's primary outlet for silver and entry point for African slaves (Newson

and Minchin 2007). The ports of Panamá and Portobello also served as auxiliary avenues for the slave markets of Lima, Quito, and Trujillo. Cartagena would become the primary slaving port in Spanish America by the first decade of the seventeenth century. As in Veracruz and Buenos Aires, a powerful Lusophone community dictated the terms of the slave trade. Manuel Bautista Pérez, perhaps the most influential Portuguese merchant in Spanish America, developed a vast commercial empire through the Cartagena-Lima slave routes (Studnicki-Gizbert 2007). His closest business associates could be found in the largest trading houses of Seville, Lisbon, Amsterdam, Cacheu, and Angola. Tellingly, Lusophone networks of this type would only be dismantled by Inquisition officials bent on exposing Jewish practices among Spanish America's resident Portuguese population. These systematic attacks on the greater Portuguese community disrupted the *asiento* trade and would factor considerably in the irregular slave trade from 1640 onward (Vila Vilar 1976).

The struggle for Portuguese independence (1640–1668) had a profound effect on the transatlantic slave trade to Spanish America. The scale of the trade to Spanish dominions diminished considerably in the 1640s, although latent demand for enslaved Africans remained high in subsequent decades and led to a trans-imperial slave trade that often facilitated the entry of contraband merchandise. In consideration of fragmentary and isolated data, far more archival research is needed on the slave trade of the 1640s and 1650s. Many Spanish colonists sought to continue the *asiento* trade with the Genoese merchants Domingo Grillo and Agustín Lomelín but (as before) the latter did not have access to African slaving ports. The Grillo and Lomelín slaving contract (1663–1674) relied heavily on Dutch and English providers, such as the Company of Royal Adventurers (Franco 1984). However, the Adventurers were rarely able to fulfil their obligation of delivering an annual 3,500 African captives to Spanish America (O'Malley 2014).

The slave dépôts of Barbados, Jamaica and Curaçao became the principal sources of African slaves for Spanish Americans during the 1660s. Recent research suggests that between 1658 and 1714, approximately 116,000 captives entered Spanish America through Dutch slave traders (Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat 2015). These interactions led to notable shifts in African provenance zones. Lower Guinean captives, labelled Arara, Mina, and Popo, arrived in larger numbers. The shift away from Portuguese slavers also resulted in the violent importation of thousands of captives identified as Loango. By the late 1670s, the Dutch had informally secured the *asiento* slave

trade to Spanish America by way of the powerful financier Balthazar Coymans and his dealings with several Spanish intermediaries. Under the Dutch, the slave trade to Spanish America was no longer transatlantic in its organisation. Instead, African captives were disembarked on the island of Curaçao for transshipment to Portobello, Cartagena, Havana, and Veracruz (Beltrán 1946).

The late seventeenth-century realignment of the transatlantic slave trade away from Spanish American ports (in favour of English and Dutch entrêpôts) affected certain regions more severely than others. Recent research on colonial Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador suggests that a transatlantic, trans-imperial slave trade thrived between 1660 and 1714 (Borucki 2012; Bryant 2014). Curaçao's proximity to Venezuela guaranteed a constant influx of African slaves. Portobello also emerged as a major slave market, even if most captives sold there were then redistributed to Peru and Ecuador. A series of sugar booms along coastal Pacific valleys allowed Spanish planters to continue investing in the transatlantic slave trade. During the 1690s, slave traders could make considerable profits in the Trujillo slave market by selling captives acquired from the Bight of Benin and Kongo (O'Toole 2012). By contrast, the transatlantic slave trade to New Spain diminished considerably. New African arrivals continued to arrive in Puebla and Mexico City during the 1670s and 1680s, but by that point creoles accounted for the overwhelming majority of slave sales. The sugar-producing region of Córdoba (in the modern-day state of Veracruz, Mexico) was likely the only area of New Spain where transatlantic slavers found an expanding market during the early eighteenth century.

The Spanish American shift from transatlantic to inter-Caribbean slave shipments forced African captives into a process of seemingly unending cultural disruption. The acquisition of basic vocabulary in English Jamaica or Dutch Curaçao was rendered meaningless by yet another forced passage into Spanish-speaking domains. Linguistic and cultural similarities among Iberian captors and slave purchasers during the Portuguese *asientos* likely mollified this process between 1595 and 1640. By contrast, the cultural, linguistic, and religious "adaptive process" was especially acute for enslaved Africans entering Spanish American society during the second half of the seventeenth century (O'Malley 2014). The tendency continued during the early eighteenth century with the signing of French and English slaving monopolies (Palmer 1982). Captives introduced to Veracruz, Cartagena, and other ports by the Portuguese Cacheu Company

between 1696 and 1701 may be an exception to the rule, although more research is needed on this brief *asiento*. The slave trade to Spanish America experienced a notable diminution during most of the eighteenth century, leading to a stunning contrast with Brazil from 1701 to 1760 (see [Table 18.1](#)).

Portuguese America

Portugal's well-established connections with Africa and the economic and geopolitical imperative of providing labour to Brazil's growing economy profoundly shaped the slave trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Angola, Portugal had succeeded in carving out a colonial enclave by the late sixteenth century, precisely as Brazilian sugar production entered a phase of exponential growth. In addition to founding a city in Luanda, a significant improvement vis-à-vis coastal commercial outposts that had until then been established in West Africa, the Portuguese managed to establish a network of internal outposts that enhanced their ability to procure enslaved labour in Africa. This process was initially marked by significant military operations that produced massive numbers of captives of war later shipped as slaves to Brazil (Heywood and Thornton 2007). By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the production of slaves had mostly shifted from military campaigns to highly opportunistic trading networks, fuelled by commodities from Brazil or obtained via Brazil, that radiated out of coastal cities under Portuguese control in Luanda and Benguela.

In many ways, the tight connections between Angola and Brazil were a function of the regime of winds and currents in the South Atlantic, which helped the two colonies to interact directly while preventing more maritime ties with Portugal. These connections were also strengthened by the strategic place of Brazil in the wider Portuguese empire, particularly after Dutch attacks that severely weakened Portugal's grip over the so-called *Estado da Índia*. While Portugal lost ground in the east, Brazil gained further prominence as a producer of sugar and then gold. Soon, Brazil would emerge as the most important player in the South Atlantic slave trade, providing commodities and funding for the internal slave trade in Africa.

However, it would be mistaken to reduce the slave trade only to the business of selling human beings across the Atlantic. By the end of the seventeenth century, connections between Angola and Brazil had long

matured into a complex set of relations that stretched well beyond the economic and business dimensions of the slave trade. It was from Brazil, for example, that a fleet had departed to retake Luanda and Benguela from Dutch forces in 1648 (Boxer 1952). Several high-end administrators from Brazil went on to hold high positions in Angola, and vice-versa. The flow and counter-flow of enslaved and free people in the South Atlantic was magnified by criminal and political exiles sent to Angola not only from Portugal but also from Brazil. Against this backdrop, the slave trade catalysed multiple social and cultural relationships across the Atlantic.

Brazilian labour needs were equally key to the development of the slave trade on the so-called Mina Coast (regions stretching the Gold coast to the Bay of Benin), where by the first half of the seventeenth century, Portugal had begun facing stiff competition by several European powers seeking to first benefit from booming gold trade and then procure labour for their colonies in the Caribbean (Eltis 1999). By the mid-seventeenth century, as Portugal lost ground first to Dutch and then British merchants, its commercial standing on the Gold coast was significantly damaged. However, the Portuguese presence never fully disappeared. First, the Portuguese language remained vital to trade relations, forcing northern Europeans to learn it so they could trade with Africans. Second, the Portuguese colonies of São Tomé and Príncipe served as the basis for extensive contraband with European nations along the Mina coast.

By the end of the seventeenth century, only a few decades after diplomatic treaties that had prohibited the Portuguese slave trade on the Mina Coast, Portuguese slave vessels had returned to the region, in defiance of Dutch constraints and in response to the increasing demand for labour in Brazil after the discovery of gold in the Minas Gerais. Gold production thoroughly changed the nature of Portuguese colonialism in Brazil, moving the centre of gravity of the colony south (Rio de Janeiro became the capital city of Brazil in 1763) and for the first time paving the way for the emergence of urban centres outside coastal regions. In Africa, in a highly competitive environment, Brazil-based merchants used gold and tobacco smuggled or brought legally from Brazil to successfully bypass trade restrictions imposed by the Dutch, while also using these goods to either outflank or collaborate closely with European powers trading on the Mina coast (Schwartz and Postma 2003).

Image 18.1 Prospect of the coast from El Mina to Mowri, mid-eighteenth century.
Based on accounts of Jean Barbot, *A Description of the Coasts of North and South*

Source: Tracy W. McGregor Library of American History, Albert and Shirley Small Special Collections Library, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA

The Brazil-Mina route of the Portuguese slave trade was facilitated by geographic proximity and cultural affinities between West Africa and Brazil. In Africa, the management of the trade depended on African rulers who favoured conducting trade with Portugal over engaging in trade with other European nations (Verger 1988). In addition to sending letters to Brazil to invite the Portuguese to establish themselves in their territories, African rulers eventually dispatched embassies with official representatives to the Portuguese colony in South America. On the Brazilian side, Portugal had by then mostly outsourced procurement of enslaved labour to colonial merchants in Brazil's major cities of Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and Recife. Between 1700 and 1800, while approximately one million enslaved Africans were taken to Salvador, around 50% of these Africans were shipped from the Bight of Benin.

Like in the Bight of Benin, Brazilian gold production deeply impacted Angola, provoking the rise of shipments of enslaved Africans and prompting the opening of new routes of the internal slave trade. In contrast to the Bight of Benin, the Angolan slave trade was not visibly fuelled by Brazilian gold and hinged instead on the widespread use of alcohol and Indian textiles. Both products were either produced in Brazil or obtained via Brazil, thus further tightening direct ties between the two Portuguese colonies in the South Atlantic (Curto 2004). By the end of the eighteenth century, in a bid to reassert itself in the slave trade, Portugal had established royal companies and protectionist rules in Angola. However, this development was not enough to seriously disrupt bilateral ties between Angola and Brazil (Candido 2013).

In the eighteenth century, the Iberian slave trade accounted for over 40% of the overall slave trade. Together, Portugal, Spain, and their colonies ranked second only to the British as carriers of slaves across the Atlantic. While the Portuguese transported around two million and two hundred thousand people across the Atlantic, Spanish territories were destination to only approximately 200.000 enslaved people directly taken from Africa at the time. This all changed, however, with the rise of the Spanish slave trade to the Río de la Plata and Cuba. The trade to Cuba, in particular, radically transformed the

overall history of the slave trade in the last century or so (see [Figure 18.1](#)).

Figure 18.1 Arrivals of enslaved Africans to Brazil and Spanish America to 1867

Source: Adapted from Borucki, Eltis and Wheat, “Atlantic History”, p. 440

The development of the Cuban slave trade is inextricably tied to the demise of sugar production in French Saint-Domingue as a result of the Haitian revolution in the early 1790s. From then onward, with the end of the British slave trade (1807), the two Iberian colonies – Brazil and Cuba – would become by far the most important destinations of the slave trade in the Americas. According to the slave trade dataset, the two colonies were the destination of almost 80% of the approximately four million enslaved Africans shipped to the Americas between 1800 and 1866. While two million and five hundred Africans were taken to Brazil, eight hundred thousand were forcefully transported to Cuba.

These numbers reflected the continuing demand for enslaved labour in the agricultural economies of Brazil and Cuba. In Brazil, the collapse of French Caribbean sugar production provoked a spike in production of sugar in the northeast of the colony near the city of Salvador of Bahia, propelling the slave trade from the Mina Coast. Due to the shared religious and cultural backgrounds of Africans brought into Bahia, a series of slave revolts convulsed the province in the first half of the nineteenth century, culminating with the Muslim revolt of 1835 (Reis 1988). Transatlantic contacts remained strong even while the slave trade dwindled and even survived the forced migration of Africans, underpinned by cultural, social, and religious ties that defied geographic distances (Parés 2015; Castillo 2011).

It is worth pointing out that the slave trade to Brazil was part not only of transatlantic, but also part of a trans-imperial network that stretched well into the Río de la Plata. While the transatlantic slave trade to the region can be traced back to the late 1580s, recent research on the ports of Montevideo and Buenos Aires proves that the slave trade peaked from the 1770s to the 1810s. Increasing collaboration between Spanish merchants and Portuguese slavers enabled a considerable influx of enslaved Africans to the River Plate region in the last years of Spanish colonialism. Merchants based in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador established lucrative slave trading networks in the Río de la Plata.

These networks were facilitated by deregulation introduced by the Spanish Crown that opened the slave trade in the region to merchants

of all nations. Silver from Potosí continued to drive slave purchases, which explains why some African captives purchased in Montevideo were sent on to Lima. The slave trade to the Río de la Plata only peaked between 1800 and 1806, when the region established especially strong ties with Mozambique-based slavers (Borucki 2015). Over 5,000 enslaved Africans entered Montevideo and Buenos Aires per year during this brief period. Only political events would lead to the temporary closing of the transatlantic slave trade to the River Plate in 1811. It is clear that were it not for the strife caused by Spanish American movements of political independence, the slave trade in the South Atlantic would have continued unabated. Even then, isolated groups of African slaves continued to arrive during the Argentine-Brazilian war of 1825–1828 that would eventually lead to Uruguay's independence.

Throughout Spanish America, the wars for independence and the abolition of the slave trade were closely interrelated affairs. During the second decade of the nineteenth century, royalists and insurgents debated whether to abolish slavery, curtail the slave trade, and/or decree free womb laws as recruitment strategies to gain the support of populations of African descent. In 1811, Chile was the first Spanish-American nation to abolish the slave trade and establish free womb laws, although final abolition would only be decreed in 1823. By 1824 Mexico, the Dominican Republic and the Central American Federation, countries whose economies did not depend on enslaved labour, had abolished the slave trade as well.

The abolishment of the slave trade was more difficult to accomplish in the Gran Colombia region and in the island territories that would remain under firm Spanish control (Cuba, Puerto Rico). While Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia all declared an end to the slave trade in 1821, slavery was firmly rooted within the social fabric and among the insurgents' leadership. The passage and extension of free womb laws in these nations (and in Bolivia and Paraguay) is a better measure of independent countries' unwillingness to liberate populations of African descent. Peru, a conservative bastion, allowed the entry of hundreds of slaves in the 1840s despite its early abolishment of the slave trade. Likewise, Argentina and Uruguay reopened their slave trades during the 1830s. Despite these considerable shortcomings, the slave trade to the Spanish American mainland was on its last legs by mid-century. In 1842, Paraguay and Puerto Rico decreed the abolishment of the trade, leaving only Brazil and Cuba as slave importers (Andrews 2004).

It is undeniable that the centre of gravity of the nineteenth century slave trade rested on Brazil and Cuba. In Brazil, production of coffee in the southern region of the colony and then independent nation drove the continuation of the trade well into the nineteenth century, despite suppressionist efforts. This slave trade's route remained centred on Portuguese controlled territories in Angola and coastal Congo. In addition to sugar and coffee, the fact that slavery was deeply interwoven in the social and economic fabrics of rural and urban Brazil contributed to continually rising demand for labour. By the early nineteenth century, new routes of the Portuguese slave trade had been opened up with East Africa (Mozambique) as well as Central Africa (Cabinda).

In Cuba, the slave trade gained momentum due to the Caribbean island's transition from a society with slaves to a slave society at the turn of the nineteenth century. Despite the fact that coffee production was integral to Cuban agriculture, sugar reigned absolute by the mid-nineteenth century, creating a sophisticated economy that drew on investments and proximity to the United States of America, which was not only the main market for Cuban sugar but also a major economic partner that contributed decisively to the development of a railroad system that in turn led to further production of sugar. As Cuba came to dominate the global sugar market, the island remained deeply reliant on Africa for labour and creole elites were defiant of anti-slave trade treaties signed by Spanish metropolitan power.

Interestingly, much of this transformation occurred against the backdrop of legislation aimed at banning the slave trade to the island (Norman 2012). The slave trade was controlled by a group of slave dealers who retained a cohesive identity as Spanish individuals and had direct access to colonial power (Lecuona 1998). Equally important, the sugar economy was deeply intertwined with the illegal slave trade (Zeuske 2014). Slave dealers were avid capitalists that invested in several sectors of the Cuban economy, playing a pivotal role in modernising and diversifying it (Lawrance 2014).

Despite the relative prominence of Central Africa, the Cuban slave trade drew on sources of labour that ranged widely in Africa from the Bight of Biafra and the Bight of Benin to Mozambique. By and large, the Cuban slave trade was significantly shaped by Spain's lack of possessions in Africa. As a result, and mirroring the early history of the Iberian slave trade, the two streams of the Iberian slave trade came to intermingle significantly, particularly in the last phase of the forced migration of Africans.

In contrast, Brazil remained tightly connected with the region that had supplied most of the enslaved labour for the Portuguese colony in the nineteenth century, Central Africa. Within Central Africa, however, the slave trade underwent significant transformations as a result of British withdrawal of Atlantic slaving in 1807, which opened up opportunities for slave dealers seeking to avoid heavy Portuguese constraints in Luanda by developing the trade in regions where the French and the British had previously been active, such as Cabinda and Ambriz. By expanding the geographic scope of the slave trade in Central Africa, this development bolstered the supply of labour to Brazil while also significantly complicating efforts to suppress the slave trade.

Both in Brazil and Cuba the slave trade would eventually be profoundly reshaped by the rise of abolitionism in the Atlantic world. After 1807, the British embarked on a global campaign to end the forced migration of Africans across the Atlantic and Indian oceans that unfolded through several decades, combining diplomatic and military tools. This campaign eventually led to the shutdown of the transatlantic slave trade by exerting diplomatic and military pressure on Latin American countries and colonies and by raising the risks of investing in the slave trade in Africa. But before the slave trade finally came to an end in 1867, another three million enslaved Africans were taken to the Americas, almost 30% of the overall number of people victimised by the trade.

Several factors explain why the slave trade thrived during the era of abolitionism. First, during the first decade or so of their campaign to end the slave trade, the British focused mostly on signing multi-country diplomatic treaties that proved only mildly effective in curbing the slave trade. In Brazil, this led to the end of the slave trade north of the Equator in 1815, which affected the supply of labour to the northeast of Brazil but did little to impact the slave trade from Central Africa. Later, the British seized upon significant political leverage obtained from their mediation of the treaty of Brazilian independence to impose a date for the abolition of the slave trade from Central Africa to Brazil. However, the law that emerged from this treaty was either not consistently applied or altogether opposed, thus only superficially impacting the overall slave trade to Brazil in its final decades. As a result, a large number of Africans, all technically free people as they had been brought to Brazil after the 1831 anti-slave trade law, were illegally held under slavery.

In Africa, growing anti-slave trade politics led to the shutdown of

the slave trade in places like the Gold Coast, the Bight of Benin, as well as Portuguese-controlled Luanda, the place where the largest number of enslaved Africans were shipped to the Americas. However, the rise of abolitionism produced unintended consequences such as the spread of slave embarkation in regions outside European jurisdiction in Africa, significantly reducing the effectiveness of measures to curb shipments of captives. Furthermore, in response to crackdowns of the slave trade throughout the Atlantic, slave dealers developed sprawling networks that drew on sophisticated business arrangements and state-of-art ships to bypass suppressionist measures.

By the 1840s, British abolitionism had morphed into a far more militarised movement, further reducing the number of African regions exposed to the slave trade and increasing pressure on Cuba and chiefly Brazil to end imports of captives. Due to anti-slave trade treaties with Portugal and Spain, the British had by then significantly expanded their ability to curb the then illegal slave trade. The British navy could visit, search, and apprehend slave vessels sailing under Portuguese and Spanish flags as well as release enslaved Africans they found onboard. They mounted naval patrols that significantly encroached on Brazilian sovereignty and lead Portugal to fear its ability to remain in control of imperial possessions in Africa.

Since Brazil became independent in 1822, Portugal had nurtured plans to develop Angola into a new Brazil. However, the continuation of the slave trade and Britain's increasingly assertive military presence in Central Africa posed a perceived and real risk to Portugal. In 1838, newly appointed governor of Angola Antonio Manoel de Noronha stated that "the continuation of that trade is now improper without exposing those provinces to insults by British cruisers and giving them a pretext to enter into direct negotiation with the [African] neighbours on the coast". Anglo-Portuguese imperial rivalry would feature prominently in the geopolitics of suppressing the slave trade in Angola and wider Central Africa. In many ways, Portuguese implementation of laws to end shipments of slaves across the Atlantic was a reaction to British manoeuvring.

The enforcement of Portuguese anti-slave trade policies initially faced significant obstacles due to the weakness of the colonial administration in Angola and Mozambique and widespread official complicity with slave traders. When an 1836 decree banning the slave trade was discussed in Luanda, merchants sitting on the Luanda *Conselho de Governo* promised to abide by it but only up to a point. A similar phenomenon occurred in Mozambique where half-hearted

commitment to ending the trade led to more shipments of captives to the Americas. Writing about Angola, British officials remarked that

it is perhaps right to state that it appeared to be the prevailing opinion that the authorities could not put it down because they were entirely dependent upon revenues derived either directly or indirectly from such traffic to support their colonial establishment.

(British and foreign State Papers 1857 Vol. 29, 366)

By the mid-1840s, however, Portugal had largely succeeded in enforcing anti-slave trade legislation in Luanda. This achievement was acknowledged by British authorities, who not only praised the dramatic reduction of shipments of captives near Luanda but also welcomed Portugal's newly found commitment to halting the slave trade. Portuguese suppressionist measures coupled with British naval patrols along the African coast, exponentially increased risks associated with Atlantic slaving and prompted merchants to move away from the sale of human beings across the Atlantic. "The speculation has become a much more hazardous; that many engaged in it have been almost ruined, and that none but such as have a large capital at command can venture to carry in it, is however certain" (Ferreira 2014, 235).

However, the slave trade was still rampant in regions outside Portuguese jurisdiction in Central Africa as well as Mozambique. On the demand side, efforts to end the slave trade were further undermined by British inability to obtain the right of visit and search of vessels sailing under the American flag. Slave dealers profited from the legal protection provided by the American flag to carry captives to Cuba after the shutdown of the Brazilian slave trade in 1850. In contrast to what they had done in Brazil, the British shied away from mounting any frontal military pressure on Cuba, which had by then come under the orbit of the United States of America, prompting the British to take a more subdued approach to the end of the Cuban slave trade.

The shutdown of the Brazilian slave trade failed to end shipments of slaves across the Atlantic, largely due to continuing demand for labour in Cuba and the re-directioning to Cuba of the trade networks that had supplied captives to Brazil. Between 1850 and 1867, almost 70% of the enslaved Africans taken to Cuba originated from regions in Central Africa near the Congo River where laws passed by European

powers had no jurisdiction and slave dealers could operate freely. A great deal of the trade was organised from New York City, taking advantage of extensive economic ties between the United States and Cuba, presenting a significant challenge to suppressionist forces.

By the 1850s, the slave trade had become part of a “triangular geopolitical struggle” pitting the British against the US and the Spanish over imports of enslaved Africans into Cuba. On the US side, there was growing concern about the destabilising ramifications of British suppressionist policies, which since the 1840s had become more active through activist diplomats sympathetic to the plight of enslaved Africans (Marrero 1992). While fearful that British action would lead not only to the end of the slave trade, but also slavery in Cuba, prompting slave revolts in the United States, American slaveholders were also suspicious of British free-soil policy, which had led the British to free enslaved people who made their way to British territories in the Caribbean. This situation led to calls to protect slavery through territorial expansion in Texas and Cuba as well as deep suspicion about British motives vis-à-vis the slave trade (Rugemer 2012).

By 1857, the British and American government had come to an agreement about an increased naval presence in Cuba, but this strategy backfired as presumed British abuses against American vessels pushed the two countries to the brink of war. To check Union perceived British abuses, and amid calls to war on the British by American public opinion, the American government dispatched more warships to Africa, for the first time assuming a more pronounced and consequential role in the suppression of the slave trade (Huzzey 2012). By 1861, however, the American squadron had been greatly reduced due to the beginning of the civil war in the United States.

Against this backdrop, with American authorities proposing to annex Cuba so that they could more efficiently end the slave trade, the Spanish government acted out of fear of American expansionist projects vis-à-vis the Caribbean island (Mason 2009). In 1862, the United States signed a treaty with Britain that included the right of visit and search, leading to a drastic reduction of the number of slave vessels sailing under the US flag. By then, American rationale was largely driven by the imperative of obtaining British support for the Union states in the context of the American civil war. From then onward, the number of captives taken to Cuba declined steadily until a complete halt in 1867.


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CHAPTER NINETEEN

Colonial societies in Asia

— • • • —
Jorge Flores

Introduction

The societies of Iberian origin that emerged in Asia from the sixteenth and seventeenth century obviously reflect the paths taken by the Portuguese and Spanish empires in this vast space that extends from the Cape of Good Hope to the Japanese archipelago. Considering its scope and “precocity”, it is not surprising that it was Portuguese Asia that created and moulded—since the turn of the sixteenth century—the overwhelming majority of such societies (Subrahmanyam 1993). Imperial Spain acquired limited control over some areas of Island Southeast Asia (namely the Spice Islands) and nurtured unrealistic plans to seize continental kingdoms like Cambodia and Siam. Needless to say, the most relevant Spanish colonial project in Asia was the Philippines, an imperial venture that began to take shape in the 1560s and 1570s (Headley 1995; Reed 1978). In the late sixteenth century, the Spaniards toyed with the idea of gaining access to China and Japan, their biggest (if brief) achievement being the foundation of a colony in Northern Taiwan (1626–1642), “la isla Hermosa” (Borao Mateo 2009; Andrade 2008). Also, the threads woven from the 1520s onwards between Southeast Asia and the New World raised Spanish interest in the Pacific islands, particularly the *Marianas*, which became a political-cum-religious objective in the last third of the seventeenth century (Coello de la Rosa 2016).

The political and institutional layout of the Portuguese empire in Asia was defined primarily by the foundation of what is known as the *Estado da Índia* in 1505, an entity governed by a viceroy, who was dependent on Lisbon, and with its seat in Goa (conquered in 1510 and the capital city since the 1530s) (Santos 1999). As to the Spanish empire, everything centred on Manila (founded in 1571 and made capital city in 1582), the base of power of a governor who answered to the Viceroy of New Spain resident in Mexico City; in both instances, we are speaking of more or less prominent nobles serving as *vice-reis* and *gobernadores*, sitting at the centre of considerable webs of power which included family members and large coteries. These men resorted to war, information, and diplomacy to deal with the diverse Asian neighbours of Goa and Manila. Simultaneously, they had to look inwards in order to govern and discipline the colonial societies under Portuguese and Spanish rule; to that effect, they had to either confront or compromise with several individuals, groups and institutions, Iberian, and Asian alike. Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas in Manila (g. 1590–1593) and the Count of Linhares in Goa (g. 1629–1635) are excellent

cases in point (Crossley 2016; Disney 1985; Flores and Marcocci 2018).

The *Carreira da Índia* was the *Estado da Índia*'s umbilical cord to Lisbon, while the *Galeón de Manila* ensured the connection between the Philippines—"so remote and separated by the distance of so many seas from the body of this monarchy" (Sherley 2010, 183)—and New Spain, through Acapulco. *Nueva España*, in turn, depended on the voyages of the *Carrera de Indias* between Vera Cruz and Seville (Cadiz from 1679) in order to maintain itself in the orbit of *España vieja*. Each one of these runs—whose ships represented, to a certain extent, a simulacrum of the presence of the colonial societies themselves—was extremely long, difficult, and dangerous; human lives, provisions, merchandise, luxury objects, and correspondence were frequently lost.

For someone who thought about the empire from Lisbon or Madrid, the objective was naturally to replicate in Asia the fabric of Iberian life. Just as olive oil, ham, marmalade, and lentils were sent abroad (Vasconcelos 2011, 68), so too councils, courts, fortresses, municipalities, brotherhoods, churches, and the Holy Office of the Inquisition were "exported" to these societies. These and other institutions were composed of thousands of captains and soldiers, bureaucrats and jurists, religious men, and commissioners (*comissários*); in other words, men who inevitably reproduced overseas the hierarchies and mentalities in which they had been educated. This society was characterised by a powerful martial, noble, Catholic, and masculine ethos with little space (especially in the Portuguese case) for Caucasian women and very much dependent on myriad indigenous servants and house slaves.

At the beginning there was a prevalent and somewhat ingenuous belief that one could govern colonial societies, which were thousands of kilometres away, constantly changing and hardly manageable, in the same way as one governed the Iberian peninsula. Indeed, the *reinóis* (men born in Portugal) who left every year for Asia and remained there, becoming *casados* (married settlers), were not a mere sounding board for Lisbon and soon developed their own unpredictable local connections on the ground in Asia. They were immediately exposed to (and entangled with) an enormous diversity of peoples, ethnicities, religions, and societies, which went well beyond the "familiar faces" of Jews, Muslims, *conversos*, and *moriscos*.

There were Ashkenazi Jews in Asia, but there were also Syrian Christians and Armenians, while the Sephardic Jews arrived roughly at the same time as the Portuguese; expelled from the Iberian

peninsula in the 1490s, they would soon enter the Indian Ocean world via the Eastern Mediterranean, the *Carreira da Índia*, or the trans-pacific route from Mexico. Often under the guise of new converts to Catholicism (New Christians) but playing with different identities, they rapidly became wealthy and influential businessmen in several port cities of Iberian Asia, like Goa, Cochin, Manila, and Macao (Boyajian 1993). More visibly, there were many Muslims throughout maritime Asia, and they represented a diverse range of origins, branches, schools and practices. In addition to various peoples who were considered to be “without religion” (similar to those who had been encountered in sub-Saharan Africa and in America), millions of people professed religions that were completely unknown on the Iberian peninsula, such as Hinduism and Buddhism. It did not take long for the Iberian colonial societies in Asia to reflect and absorb “the different ways, divergent from one another” (*os costumes desvairados, uns dos outros desviados*) about which Garcia de Resende wrote in 1532 with reference to India (Resende 1917, §62).

This chapter addresses the general features of these societies. Starting from the assumption that urban life was at the heart of these communities, the first section analyses the morphological, institutional, and social diversity of the cities where these societies developed. The second section looks at Iberian Asia in terms of its demography, the mobility of its population and the projects leading to the effective settling of certain regions in a permanent back and forth between state intervention and free choice. The third and final section returns to the cities and goes on to examine the tensions and contradictions found there between the social control imposed by political and religious powers and the resistance(s) to such restrictions, which inevitably raises the issue of the of identity-shifting for a myriad of peoples, groups and communities which composed Iberian colonial societies in Asia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Most of the material discussed in this chapter, which is largely based on analysis of individual case studies and micro-histories, comes from Goa, Malacca, Manila, and Macao.

Imagined Roman colonies, a handful of “loyal cities”, myriad “cages” and *bandéis*

Portuguese imperial Asia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a “floating” state based on dominion over—though

frequently this consisted only of influence or even a simple presence—a succession of port cities located between Sofala and Nagasaki. The actual territory comprising Portuguese Asia was always limited, despite the interest shown here and there in a number of more or less utopian plans for continental occupation. Besides the lowlands (*terras de baixo*) of the island of Ceylon from the late sixteenth- to the mid-seventeenth century, this territory encompassed the *Rios de Sena*—the “Rivers of Sena”, or the Zambezi Valley—and the *Província do Norte* (“Northern Province”), a strip of land, measuring 215 km in length and 50 km in width, that was situated between Diu and Chaul in coastal western India, roughly corresponding to 5,000 km² during the time of its greatest extension (1560–1580). These territorial experiences, which continued beyond the seventeenth century and constituted special social laboratories, were secondary to the vital, extensive web of port cities that was woven during the first half of the sixteenth century. In addition to Goa, this maritime network counted Malacca (1511), Hormuz (1515) and Macao (1557) as nodal points. The most expressive and complex societies of Portuguese origin in Asia would come to flourish in these four considerably distinct and geographically distant cities. Other urban centres, such as Bassein, Cochin, or Colombo, could perhaps be included in this group. Nevertheless, the most representative examples coexisted with many other, more discreet examples, found among cities, fortresses, and simple settlements (*povoações*). These examples were systematically presented in word and image by various authors, especially by António Bocarro in his publication *Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental* (1635) throughout the first half of the seventeenth century (Bocarro 1992).

A number of Portuguese, however, were not impressed by what they read and saw in such works. For men such as Jorge Pinto de Azevedo, who wrote from Macao in 1646, it was necessary first to gain effective control of some key locations, such as the island of Ceylon, whose effective colonisation would transform it into the nerve centre of the *Estado da Índia*. Because of this belief, Azevedo considered the Philippines a model for territorial occupation and social control that should be followed in Portuguese Asia (Matos 1996, 474). Nearly half a century before Azevedo, Francisco Rodrigues Silveira—a “veteran soldier” who served in India between 1585 and 1598—had already advocated transforming Ceylon into a Portuguese colony, likewise praising the Spanish precedent of the Philippines (Silveira 1996, 146). Characteristically, Silveira made a distinction

between colonisation by soldiers, who fought for the conquest of mainland areas (*domínio da terra firme*), and colonisation by merchants, who were satisfied simply with “trade and the utility of the sea” (*o comércio e utilidade do mar*). For this reason, he believed that the “necklace” of Portuguese settlements put on maritime Asia since the beginning of the century translated into dispersion and weakness; where others probably saw pearls, this author saw in these fortresses nothing but “pigeon lofts” (*pombais*) and “cages” (*gaiolas*), with defenceless Portuguese imprisoned inside them (Silveira 1996, 10, 201). According to Silveira, there was a distinction to be made between “dead fortresses” (the numerous stone fortresses, if inhabited, of the *Estado da Índia*) and “living fortresses”, that is, Roman-style colonies—populated by a “crowd of people”—which never became a reality in Portuguese Asia (Silveira 1996, 227, 230).

Contrary to the then prevailing perception of the Portuguese, the Philippines would never be Mexico or Peru and were far from constituting a “perfect” and highly populated colony, so much so that Madrid had even contemplated its alienation (Valladares 2001, 7). Characteristically, half a century after the foundation of Manila, someone such as Anthony Sherley could refer to the Philippines in his book *Peso político de todo el mundo* (1622) not as a colony, but rather as the key either to “the preservation or the loss of control over the Southern Seas, as well as of the profits from the Moluccan spice trade”. Sherley therefore privileged maritime commerce over territorial control, a position which would certainly disappoint Francisco Rodrigues Silveira.

The political and social life of the most important urban centres of the *Estado da Índia* were shaped by the actions of powerful local oligarchies whose authority, though with nuances in space and time, depended in large measure on control of two fundamental institutions. The municipal council, or *câmara* (Boxer 1965), constituted the first of these bodies, representing the *cabildo*, its Spanish equivalent (Alva Rodriguez 1997, Merino 1983). A *câmara* was created by royal decision whenever a Portuguese city was founded in Asia, usually receiving a formulaic title. Thus, in 1586 the settlement of Macao became the “City of the name of God in China” (*Cidade do nome de Deus na China*), to which was added, after the city’s recognition of the sovereignty of John IV in 1642, the distinction “there is none more loyal” (*não há outra mais leal*). In 1571, more than a decade before the recognition of Macao as a city, Philip II had conferred on Manila (through the *Adelantado* Miguel López de Legazpi) a similar title,

which had to be confirmed in Madrid in 1574: “distinguished and ever loyal city of Manila” (*insigne y siempre leal ciudad de Manila*).

Image 19.1 Portuguese nobles in India, Codex Casanatense, India, mid-sixteenth century. Anonymous, “gente honrada portuguesa da Índia”

Source: Biblioteca Casanatense, Rome, Italy, Manuscript 1889, illustration no. LII

The structure and functioning of overseas municipal councils were modelled on those of specific metropolitan precedents, but their responsibilities (recognised or acquired) could be much more extensive, which helps explain the frequent conflicts with crown officials, including governors and viceroys. These municipalities were governed by a handful of men (*oficiais da câmara*), but there were instances in which the “people” had to be broadly consulted, and so larger assemblies—often translating into critical moments of crowd action—were held on those occasions. These were the *juntas do povo*, in the Portuguese case (Boxer 1965), which corresponded in Spanish Asia to the *cabildos abiertos* in which undesirable persons often participated, such as “poor soldiers, beggars, vagabonds and scoundrels, full of the greatest indecency” (Merino 1983, 355; Alva Rodriguez 1994).

The other fundamental institution to the life of Portuguese cities in Asia, as in the rest of the empire, was the Holy House of Mercy, or *Santa Casa da Misericórdia* (Sá 1997 and 2011). Established in Lisbon in 1498, this charitable lay brotherhood spread to all parts of the country and came to acquire significant influence overseas, being associated to the early steps of the main cities of the *Estado da Índia*. The *misericórdia* also found its way into Spanish Asia; created by Portuguese merchants and committed to financing trade with Acapulco, there was a *misericórdia* in Manila since at least 1594 (Mesquida 2011). By receiving legacies, executing wills, and managing dowries, the Portuguese *misericórdias* in Asia truly shaped the communities where they were integrated. What is more, the *misericórdia* became a crucial institution as far the economic power and the social capital of the elite of Portuguese Asia is concerned. One of the main functions of the *misericórdia* consisted on the repatriation to Portugal of the goods and inheritances of those deceased overseas. The respective source material is fascinating, and it allows one to better understand the social world of the Portuguese living in Asia as well as the nature of the ties with their families back in Portugal—a world made of credit, commodities, slaves, exotic objects, and ordinary “things” (Amorim 1991; Sá 2016).

Despite the imperial rhetoric, the loyal and noble cities of Asia were not always loyal and noble, and local oligarchies often resisted the authority of the *Estado da Índia*. In Macao, the legitimacy of the city's first captain-general (Dom Francisco Mascarenhas, 1623–1626) was seriously questioned by the municipal council, to the point that they stipulated “that no one, be they married settlers, soldiers and outsiders, should comply with his orders” (Teixeira 1969, 357; Boxer 1968, ch. 6). This dispute would repeat itself countless times in Macao with different protagonists in the following decades (Flores 2001, 72). Manila likewise showed resistance to the adoption of royal decrees and, during moments of tension between the *cabildo* and the governor (as occurred after the death of Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo in 1583), the “collective fury of the people” was real (Merino 1983, 137). Even in Goa, open opposition to viceroys and governors was not rare and these conflicts invariably reflected fights between personalities, families, and factions (Flores and Marcocci 2018).

Characterised by rich and complex human relations, urban Iberian societies in Asia constituted microcosms marked by recurrent incidents of violence. At the end of the seventeenth century, a Jesuit wrote with reference to Macao that “when the lands are smaller and the inhabitants even less, people are prone to disunity and sometimes even to much hatred: Macao is not without some contagion of this plague” (Flores 2001, 109). For the violence between members and groups of the white elite, one need only read the diary of a seventeenth-century viceroy of the *Estado da Índia* to grasp the quantity and variety of the conflicts present in a city such as Goa (Linhares 1937–1943). There was also violence outside the “four walls” of the imperial capital, since in India, as another contemporary viceroy put it, “the lands are full of fugitives from justice and evildoers, and the justice system is helpless in these cases” (Pato 1880, 156). The power of *bandos*—groups of Portuguese residents or factions of *casados*, accompanied by their “armies” of slaves and making uncontrolled use of firearms—shaped the life of most cities of Portuguese Asia. Malacca constitutes an exemplary case (San Antonio and Vivero 1988, 92–93; Pinto 2012, 200–202), as does Macao, where the conflict which opposed Pero Fernandes de Carvalho and Jorge Cerqueira (and their respective *bandos* and armed slaves, who were often involved in trouble and skirmishes) occupied space in the correspondence exchanged between the viceroy and the king in 1627 (Flores 2000, 242).

In addition to violent conflicts between white settlers, there was

interethnic and racial violence through the segregation of non-whites and even of *mestizos* (Boxer 1963). Religious and social violence was based on the exclusion of non-Christians, or more specifically, non-Catholics (Xavier 2008). There was also violence against slaves and domestic servants, who were largely Asians and Africans living many kilometres away from their families and communities. There was likewise violence against native women, both slaves and non-slaves (Seijas 2014), and against Portuguese women and noblewomen: in Goa in 1611 Dona Margarida de Mendonça was abused by the *fidalg*o Nuno da Cunha, a drama which is known thanks to her own report on it (Boxer 1975, 115–116). Four decades later, a *casado* from Macao was accused of mistreating his wife, who would eventually die from the “blows that he had given her”, but the aggressor ended up going unpunished (Boxer 1985, 134). Stories of adultery and family tension are not lacking in the cities of Iberian Asia and significant cases are known from seventeenth-century Manila (Manchado López 2006). In 1590 in Mylapur, “a ‘rich, powerful and well-connected man’ kidnapped the wife of another settler, and held her captive within his house”, an instance of individual aggression which revealed the power of the clans of Portuguese settlers of this port on the coast of Coromandel (Subrahmanyam 1990, 66).

A place like Mylapur—which had been transformed in 1607 into the Portuguese city of *São Tomé de Meliapor* and benefited from the symbolic power of hosting the bones of St. Thomas the Apostle—formed part of a vast network of rather autonomous Portuguese settlements in the Bay of Bengal (Subrahmanyam 1990, 47–67; Zupanov 2005, 87–110). This is the region that Winius (1983) associated with the growth of a Portuguese “Shadow Empire”, though Subrahmanyam (1990) prefers to use the concept of an “Improvised Empire” to understand the very same reality. In any case, we are referring to the power of private interests which often surpassed the authority of the *Estado da Índia* as well as a process of “Asianisation” of a considerable number of Portuguese who for a number of reasons physically and mentally distanced themselves from the orbit of formal empire represented by Goa.

In this way, many Portuguese settlements (*povoações*) and *bandéis* (singular form *bandel*, from the Persian *bandar*, port) developed over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the Bay of Bengal, in an arc that extends from Nagapattinam, in southern Coromandel, to Chittagong, in eastern Bengal, in which the intriguing and long-lasting case of Hughli should be highlighted (Flores 2002).

There was also a second arc of “informal” influence to the east of Chitaggong, stretching from lower Burma to southern Vietnam, in which the port of Siriam and the Portuguese *bandel* of Ayuthaya were prominent. If for the same period we exchange the vast Buddhist kingdoms of the continent for the small Islamic states of insular Southeast Asia, the picture would be similar. It is possible to reconstruct an intricate network of Portuguese communities, or *mestizo* communities of Portuguese origin, from Malacca to the Moluccas, which helps us understand the life of a number of sultanates from the region, and even explains the early years of “turbulent Timor” (Boxer 1968, ch. 11; Andaya and Andaya 2012; Hespanha 2019).

Rudimentary forms of institutional organisation of communal power, created in emulation of the most prominent cities of the *Estado*, but governed by a more spontaneous and less regulated structure, can be identified in some of these *povoações* and *bandéis*. Instead of formal city halls (*câmaras municipais*), there were merely assemblies of the “elect” (*eleitos*) or “prominent men” (*homens principais*), who acted as representatives of the community (Subrahmanyam 1990, 65, 73, 77–79, 87). The same thing occurred with the Holy Houses of Mercy, which existed in many Portuguese settlements in Asia that never became cities and even in “settlements that ceased to be part of the Portuguese Empire” (Sá 2008, 149). The Holy House of Mercy of Nagasaki is interesting in this respect for there was a strong Catholic, and more specifically Jesuit, influence in this Japanese city, where the *Estado da Índia* had no formal presence. In fact, no native Portuguese men served on its board and, in 1602, all of its officers were Japanese Christians, including the *provedor* (purveyor), a certain “Dioguo Riúfa” (Elisonas 2008, 82–84).

But the “Shadow” or “Improvised” empire was also composed of simple freelancers, who were not necessarily integrated into Portuguese and Catholic communities of Portuguese origin that emerged to the east of Cape Comorin. These freelancers were found almost everywhere (there are significant examples in the Safavid and Mughal empires, in the Deccan sultanates and even in Ming-Qing China), frequently in the service of local sovereigns and taking advantage of their panoply of skills, whether real or imagined. They likewise worked for the English and Dutch, as was the case with the “black” (i.e., *mestizo*) Tomás Dias, who made a reconnaissance mission to Central Sumatra at the end of the seventeenth century for the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Dias wrote a report on the expedition in

Dutch, addressed to the “Honourable Sirs” of Malacca, but during his voyage he had the opportunity to speak in Malay with the ruler of Minangkabau, who considered him to be “his courtier” (Barnard 2013). These kinds of people, whom we will follow more closely in the third part of the present chapter, caused innumerable problems for the *Estado da Índia*, namely to its very demographic balance. There is an estimate from 1685 (in João Ribeiro’s *Fatalidade Histórica da Ilha de Ceilão*), which, though certainly exaggerated, counted 5,000 Portuguese living east of Ceylon.

Demography, mobility and “human engineering”

The Iberian colonial societies in Asia suffered from a chronic shortage of “whites”, a situation which would impede any imperial plan of effective control. The numbers available for Portuguese Asia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are insufficient, fragmentary, uneven and even contradictory, which makes it difficult to accept the validity of any single estimate. Nevertheless, it is probable that the Portuguese population of the *Estado da Índia* numbered about 7,000 around 1540.

The difference in numbers between those who arrived every year in Goa and those who left it to return to Lisbon was likely consistent with a cumulative increase of the Portuguese population in Asia. The number in question varied annually, depending on the decade, between 150 and almost 700 persons, but this estimate does not consider the mortality of whites on the ground. This figure would have been considerable since in Goa’s hospital alone between 300 and 400 soldiers died annually at the beginning of the seventeenth century (Coates 1998, 125). Be that as it may, the demographic outlook of Portuguese Asia would not have varied significantly in the long run, for in the 1630s the numbers continued to indicate approximately 7,000 Portuguese living in Asia, including religious men (Subrahmanyam 1993, 216–224).

Similar to other places such as Luzon and the other islands of the Philippines occupied by the Spanish, Manila never counted a significant white population. Despite the differences in models of colonisation between Portuguese and Spanish Asia, as well as Portuguese perceptions of these differences, it was true that it took a long time for the number of *vecinos* to increase and stabilise in the Philippines. For example, no more than six Spaniards lived in Vigan

(Villa Fernandina) in 1591 and Antonio de Morga confirmed in 1609 that “it is depopulated of Spaniards, very few live there” (Morga 1997, 297). Although Morga himself counted 600 houses inside (*intramuros*) of Manila on this occasion, the census realised a quarter of a century later mentioned only 265 *vecinos*, a number which would fall in the second half of the seventeenth century (Merino 1983, 26–36). Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognise that in some cases, such as happened in the Philippines through the *encomienda* and the *repartimiento*—both systems implying the existence of forced labour and the payment of tribute (“*Oh castillas* [i.e., the Spanish], *qué es lo que nos queréis? ... Porqué nos pedís tributo? Qué os debemos?*” a native peasant of Cainta asked as early as 1574) (Alonso Álvarez 2003, 13–14)—a small number of settlers and colonists was enough to cause a devastating impact on the native population, leading to its drastic reduction (Newson 2009; Seijas 2014).

With the intention of increasing or stabilising the white population (or at least a Catholic or simply Christian population), strategies were put into practice that implied the forced circulation of people between Portugal and Asia, within the *Estado da Índia* itself, and between Spanish America and the Philippines. In many cases, we are faced with actual exercises in “human engineering” involving women and men, slaves and free natives. The island of Ceylon provides some of the most illustrative examples of this practice. In order to populate the recently conquered peninsula of Jaffna in the extreme northeast of the island, the Viceroy Dom Constantino de Bragança (r. 1558–1561) insisted in vain that the Portuguese settlers of São Tomé de Meliapor should move there. Similarly, there were various attempts to make the Paravas—a fishermen caste from the southern tip of India which had converted to Christianity as early as the 1530s—transfer to Ceylon (Flores 1998, 274). These forced movements of communities, which, however, did not actually come to pass, must be seen together with the forced circulation of a myriad of individuals and reference need only be made in this regard to the peripatetic existence of thousands of slaves in Iberian Asia (and beyond), moving about at the mercy of the market, the value attributed to their skills and the whims of their successive masters. To these practices, one should also add projects of “biological manipulation”, which, as we will see, reveal as much naiveté as racial prejudice. Such strategies assumed the decline of certain groups, such as unmarried women (single women and widows) and religious men. In each case, attempts were made to minimise the number of people who, from the point of view of imperial

demography and of urban colonial societies, were completely unproductive.

Degredados—who paid for their crimes with long exiles in areas of conflict such as the island of Ceylon or regions such as the Zambezi Valley, whose population the *Estado* wished to increase—were often pressed into service to meet the needs of war in Portuguese Asia. Some of the *Estado*'s frontier cities, such as Colombo and Daman, were transformed into lands of exile (*coutos de homiziados*) (Coates 1998, 115–135). At the same time, since the initial plans to bring colonists to the Philippines from Spain and Peru failed, many convicts were regularly sent to the Philippines from Mexico on board the Manilla Galleon during the seventeenth century, a practice which would intensify substantially during the following century (Mawson 2013; García de los Arcos 1996). There was some immigration of married couples to the Philippines, but this does not seem to have resulted in real demographic growth. Widows, widowers, single men, and minors represented half of the 626 white persons living in Manila in 1634. According to the same census, married couples without children corresponded to roughly 59% of couples in the city, while widows and widowers without children accounted for 60% of total widows (Merino 1983, 57–58).

In the Portuguese case, the emigration of families to Asia was rare, since the *Estado da Índia* was originally conceived as a space for white men, a world of warriors and bureaucrats more than of merchants and settlers. Nevertheless, an intriguing parallel can be established between the *encomenderas* of the Philippines and the *donas* of the *prazos* (land grants) of the Zambezi Valley with reference to the granting of land to women and succession by the matrilineal line and the immense power this represented (Manchado López 2011; Rodrigues 2000). Farther east, in Macao, it was not rare in the seventeenth century to encounter widows holding significant economic power and social influence. These were businesswomen, including *mestizas*, who still had to face countless obstacles. Such was the case with the *japoa* Isabel Reigota, daughter of a Portuguese, Fernandes Reigoto, and widow of Francisco Rombo de Carvalho (Penalva 2011, 115–142). The trajectory of Catarina de Noronha, a central figure in the life of Macao during the final 30 years of the century, is better known. Widow of the magnate Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, who will be discussed in more detail below, Dona Catarina arrived in the city in 1670. She was the owner of several ships and managed without too much difficulty to survive the economic crises

that cyclically devastated Macao during this time. When she died in 1701, she left a considerable fortune, including many objects, which constituted an eminently mobile form of wealth. This kind of wealth accumulation was typical of those such as Dona Catarina and her husband who lived as itinerants (Flores 2001, 114–115).

We are far from the early years of the Portuguese presence in Asia when women were prohibited from travelling to India, a situation which evolved towards a controlled movement of women between Lisbon and Goa. Since the middle of the sixteenth century it became common to send a limited number of orphans from Portugal to the *Estado* with the intention of obtaining marriages to *reinóis*, but that strategy did not produce tangible results (Coates 1998, 223–274). Once in India, it was absolutely necessary to avoid the “King’s orphans” (*órfãs del Rei*) to become “brides of Christ”. Many of the Portuguese women living in Asia—both the newly arrived orphans and the resident widows—aspired to religious life. Founded in the early seventeenth century (1606–1610), the Augustinian Convent of Santa Mónica de Goa was these women’s favourite destiny, whereas those looking at the convent from the viceregal palace did not usually like what they saw. The crown decided not to replicate the experience in Portuguese Asia, but a group of ten Franciscan nuns arrived in Manila in 1621 to establish the Convent of Santa Clara in the city (Alberts 2013). This convent’s demographic and social impact on the life of Manila was probably similar to Santa Mónica’s in Goa; five years later, the *cabildo* was vocal against the admittance of new nuns to the convent (AGI, Filipinas, 27, N. 138, fls. 741r–742v). Still, the nuns of Santa Clara found ways to “multiply” themselves; some moved to Macao, where they founded in 1633 a convent with the same name, which did not take long to attract the daughters of some of the most prominent Portuguese residents of the city (Penalva 2011).

It is, therefore, difficult to determine with precision population figures for whites in Iberian Asia. The estimates for the principal cities of the *Estado da Índia* are almost always vague, which makes a systematic presentation of the available data unwarranted. Two elements should be emphasised, according to what we know: on the one hand, we are dealing with an intricate human and social landscape, which is reflected in complex and imprecise classifications: *moradores*, *casados*—often distinguishing *casados brancos* from *casados negros*—soldiers, men of arms (*casados* and soldiers counted as one), *castiços* (born in Asia of Portuguese descent), and *mestiços*. Among *mestizos*, there is ample regional terminology to consider, including

manamuzungos in east Africa, *topazes* in South-East Asia, and *jurubaças* in the South China Sea. But the term *jurubaça* designated *mestizos* as well as Chinese Christians in Macao, while the interpreters and translators in the service of the Portuguese were also frequently called *topazes* and *jurubaças*.

Miscegenation, which was practiced as a regulating instrument of imperial demography, particularly to ensure population balance in a colonial city or conquered region, was much discussed among the Portuguese in Asia. There were those, such as Francisco Rodrigues Silveira, who were completely opposed to it. According to him, the colonisation of the island of Ceylon could not be achieved without white women from Portugal, which would avoid the “degeneration” resulting from “mixture” with the natives (Silveira 1996, 219–222). Others, such as Jorge Pinto de Azevedo, advocated effective colonisation of Macao based on the coupling of Portuguese men with Chinese women. Mixed marriages, but “whites”. In his view, the pairing of people with the same skin colour ensured the longevity of their offspring: “white children are born of both castes, and these have more chances to survive than in other parts of this Orient” (Matos 1996, 244). In 1651, resigned to the improbability of receiving soldiers from Portugal (*reinóis*), the captain of Macao expected at least to see the military power of the city reinforced with 500 *cafres* (black Africans), for slaves from the coast of east Africa would surely “fight as whites do”. The way in which the *cafres* had fought alongside their Portuguese masters to repulse the attack of the VOC on the city in 1622 was reflected in the judgement of Captain João de Sousa Pereira. On this critical occasion, the Portuguese did not even hesitate to praise the bravery of a black female slave who, “dressed in the clothes of a man”, killed some Dutch soldiers (Penalva 2011, 29–30). She was Macao’s version of Catalina de Erauso (1592–1650), the Basque Lieutenant Nun (*la monja alferrez*) who lived and fought in Chile and Peru (Erauso 1996). However, what the captain of Macao wanted to avoid at all costs was being sent “little *mestizos* from Goa” (*mistiçinhos de Goa*), people with no courage that “turn into monkeys when the going gets tough” (*que com os frios se fazem bugios*) (Boxer 1985, 134).

These and other cases show how, from the end of the sixteenth to middle of the seventeenth century, the strategies of war and settlement within the *Estado* were based on firm convictions about race and gender. In order to prevent colonisation from becoming synonymous with “degeneration”, it was imperative to choose Portuguese women and ignore native women. Even with reference to

domestic service in a city such as Goa, the *ouvidor geral do crime* (chief criminal judge) Jorge de Amaral e Vasconcelos could write in 1651 to his brother who lived in Portugal that “the work of one white woman from that Realm [i.e., Portugal] is worth more than that of twenty born here”. The absence of white servants (*criadas*) in the capital of the *Estado da Índia* was offset with the purchase of blacks from Mozambique, “whose skills are difficult to match” (Vasconcelos 2011, 71). The reasoning of the *ouvidor* from Goa regarding domestic service was entirely similar to that of the captain of Macao regarding military service: in the absence of Portuguese soldiers, it was necessary to recruit strong *cafres* and avoid weak *mestiços*. They favoured black men who fought like white men, as well as black women who fought like men (and sewed like white women, according to Vasconcelos).

But there were also people who enthusiastically supported miscegenation, such as the anonymous author of a report on the conquest of Ceylon written in the first half of the seventeenth century. He noted that

in this island there are many sons of Portuguese, or *mestizos* born in Ceylon, who are great knights, and they master the native language, and have more knowledge and experience than the natives themselves; and are very much acquainted with all those scrublands.

(BPE, CXVI/2–3, fls. 67r–67v)

At the end of the century with the need to colonise the *Rios de Sena*, some people recommended simply “to bring there white men, as well as natives from India, because white women are worthless; their offspring does not survive” (Flores 1988, 66). A religious figure expressed this position in 1697 after the failure of the colonisation plan for the Zambezi Valley, launched by the crown two decades earlier. Conceived initially as “white” colonisation—based on the sending of soldiers (preferably from the Alentejo, who could more easily adapt to the climate), craftsmen, women “capable of propagation”, married couples, and families from Portugal—it was perceived early on that this was not an adequate solution. In 1680, the region had no more than 50 white men, and complaints were already openly expressed that Lisbon had allowed the departure of “forced, inexperienced and incapable people, together with plagues of widows” (Flores 1988, 62–65).

The people populating this chapter almost always had a weak

connection to the land, lived mostly in port cities which depended on maritime commerce, and were extraordinarily mobile, following business opportunities throughout maritime Asia. Understandably, they owned more mobile property than landed property, but even their landed property was subject to a good deal of “circulation” too: the storehouses (*boticas*) of Father João de Espinhoza in Macao changed hands at least four times between 1623 and 1654 (Flores 2000, 240). In extreme situations, the decadence of a city or even the extinction of a *bandel* could cause considerable movements of populations. The economic decline of Portuguese Malacca, followed by its loss, provides a good example. Its gradual transformation into a “fortified ghetto” after the foundation of Batavia (1619) made it a much more militarised city, dependent on married settlers, soldiers, and slaves and less often frequented by merchants (Pinto 2012, 186–187). The Dutch conquest of Malacca in 1641 caused many Portuguese settlers in the city to transfer to other sultanates in the region. Some moved to Palembang in southern Sumatra, “making themselves” Malay and serving as intermediaries for business with Batavia; this was the path taken by men such as Pascoal Rodrigues de Andrade and Valério Gentil, the first secretary-ambassador in the service of the Pangeran sultanate and the second *shahbandar* (master of the port) of Palembang, after having been personal secretary to the king of Cambodia (Dumenjou 1992; Fernando 2004). Others decided to live and do business on Makassar (South Sulawesi), but Dutch control of this sultanate from 1667 forced them once again to change “home”. They eventually settled in the Buddhist kingdoms of continental Southeast Asia, namely, Siam and Cambodia (Halikowski-Smith 2010). This forced mobility which characterised Iberian Asia after 1640 also affected women and religious women. Following the “Restoration” of 1640, and the declaration of loyalty that Macao had made to John IV two years later, the Spanish residents of the city, including the nuns of the Convent of Santa Clara, were expelled. On their way back to Manila the ship wrecked, and the nuns landed in Cochinchina, where they found their way into the local court (Alberts 2013, 161–169).

Between social control and identity-shifting

As can be seen, the crown and Church hoped that the codes of conduct and forms of sociability followed by their vassals and believers in Asia

were in accordance with the “Iberian canon”. The clothes that they wore in Manila and in the cities of the *Estado da Índia*, as well as the books that they read, the feasts they attended (from the celebration of royal events and religious festivities to the bullfights and *alcanzias*), the weddings they celebrated, the religion they professed (including the manifestation of miracles, visions, dreams, and prophesies), all of this was supposed to replicate the life of any contemporary city of the Iberian peninsula.

In the same way as the chapter of this volume dedicated to “Asians in the Iberian World” demonstrates, a rigid legal and moral grid was adopted to classify the heterogeneous human landscape of Asia. It was an imperial regime framed by an overarching Catholic order that proved highly effective due to an impressive “army” of secular and regular clergy. The latter were particularly influential. From Soqotra to Taiwan, hundreds of (mostly) European missionaries in the service of various religious orders—Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, and Discalced Carmelites—competed among themselves to convert natives professing other religions as well as to transform local “heretical” Christians into “good” Catholics; they often succeeded in changing other people’s identities and regulating their daily lives. State and church stipulated who was a vassal and *vecino*, citizen and foreigner, true believer and infidel, Christian and gentile, slave and free, “chino” and “indio”. A highly delicate exercise, this “arranging” of people into “drawers” entailed choices which at any moment disclosed a set mental framework and revealed much ignorance about the outer world. Take the emblematic case of the “Indian” slave Pedro, originally from Pegu (lower Burma), a land that the judges from Madrid—among other geographical imprecisions and various cultural misunderstandings—confused with Peru (Van Deusen 2015, 212–216).

The continuous presence of Iberians and other Europeans in Asia and their systematic interaction with societies from various cultural zones between the Swahili Coast and the South China Sea contributed to the permanent transformation and increased complexity of identities. These identities became more flexible and unstable—among the Portuguese and Spanish who had become “Asianised” and the Chinese and Malay who had become “Iberianised” there are many nuances to consider. Such a human labyrinth made it considerably more difficult for those who held positions of authority and had to define affiliations clearly from an outsider’s perspective. Thus, somewhat fictitious identities were constructed, identities of

individuals, groups, and communities from which the European observer excluded himself peremptorily, often falling back on the antithetical game of “us” and “them”. But how would we classify the *sangle* Juan Felipe Tiamnio, resident “in the town of Minondo [Binondo], outside the walls of the city of Manila”, who in 1685 possessed silver reliquaries painted with the figures of Jesus Christ and Our Lady of Guadalupe (patron of Mexico), but who also read books “written in Chinese characters” whose contents are unknown to us today (Gil 2011, 765–772)? How would we explain the fact that in Malacca, the head of the Hindu community (bendahara, *bendara*) in the 1570s and 1580s was Dom Henrique, a Muslim who converted to Christianity and married the granddaughter of “Meale”, a Muslim prince exiled in Goa whom we will meet again later in this chapter? And what about the head of the Muslim community (tumenggung, *tomungão*) in the same city who during the 1610s was a married Christian called João Lopes de Amoreira (Pinto 2012, 212–213)?

Malacca, similar to the other cities we have been discussing, had an enormous variety of ethnic, “national”, religious and social identities which constituted fertile ground for paradoxes and ironies, such as those above, making it difficult for civil and religious authorities to regulate and control them. Places such as Goa attracted a considerable mobile population, beginning with many Europeans, who, coming from a number of different origins, visited, lived in, did business in, and wrote about the capital of the *Estado* during this period (Lobato 2012). Among the most notable examples, all from the period of transition between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we should mention the Dutchman Linschoten, the German F. Cron and the Flemish brothers Coutre. The attitude of the imperial authorities towards them—towards some of them, individually, and the communities to which they belonged as “foreigners” (even though many of them married Christian women in Goa)—was not consistent. The “foreigner” João Cavalry Ferrari, who lived in Macao with his wife Catarina Pinta, was accused in the 1620s of “trading and communicating with the Dutch” (Flores 2000, 242). It is no accident that the *Reportorio*—a list of almost 4,000 cases judged by the Inquisition in Goa between 1561 and 1623—contains a sizeable number of cases against Europeans, including Spaniards, Italians, French, English, Dutch, Germans, Flemish, Russians, and Greeks. But it should be recognised that this same document lists many people from almost every region of Asia, from Eastern Christians pertaining to different churches and traditions to those who converted to

Catholicism, here identified by their Portuguese names (*Reportorio* 1623). Among these converts we find many women from various geographical origins and if we add to this data the places of birth of the nuns who lived in the cloistered convent of Santa Mónica de Goa during the seventeenth century, we have to recognise the diversity and extraordinary mobility of women in the Portuguese Asian empire (Coates 1998, 258–270, esp. 266).

Macao is another important urban centre of the *Estado da Índia* which welcomed an eclectic Asian population: many Japanese, similar to what happened in Manila (Tremml-Werner 2015) and Malacca (Pinto 2012); Koreans, surely “signs” of Japan’s invasion of Korea between 1592 and 1598; Bengalis, Siamese and a mass of men and women from the Malay world, almost always domestic slaves of the Portuguese (Flores 2000, 242). In addition, there were the *muitsai* and *atai*, Chinese children stolen or purchased from their parents who circulated like “merchandise” throughout the *Estado da Índia* or, alternatively, remained in Macao, serving in the houses of the Portuguese. Many *muitsai* converted to Christianity, took Portuguese names, accepted Christian marriages, and were often included in the wills of their masters, who presumably treated them as their own children. Of course, it is necessary to relativise the rhetorical language of legacies, though examples such as that of Manuel Gomes o Velho, who “bought a small girl of Chinese caste” to whom he gave the name of Maria “to raise as if she were my own child”, are innumerable (Boxer 1968, ch. 13; Flores 2000, 245).

Image 19.2 *Macao, Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental* de António Bocarro (1635)

Source: Public domain/Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal

Similar to other cities considered in this chapter, Macao relied on the work of these individuals and also depended on indigenous labour to guarantee the essential functions of the *Estado*, particularly political communication. This was accomplished by a “silent” army of copyists and secretaries (some Christian converts, others not) and, especially, by translation experts. In Goa, official interpreters of the *Estado da Índia* (*línguas do Estado*), mostly Hindu Brahmins proficient in various languages, could work without ever having to change religions or names throughout the seventeenth century (Flores 2015a). In Macao, oral and written translation was carried out by Chinese Christians (Gebhardt 2014), whereas the *Audiencia* (High Court) of Manila employed mostly *mestizos de sangley* as interpreters of Chinese,

Japanese, and Tagalog (Gil 2011, 245–248, 678–681).

These professional writers and translators formed part of a “hybrid” elite (though they were not always biologically hybrid) composed of a plethora of individuals and groups. Among them were many exiled Asian princes, who lived under some sort of political and religious surveillance in Goa or Manila. Many of these princes converted to Christianity, sometimes leaving written testimonies signed with their Christian names, but one of the most interesting figures comes from among those who did not embrace the Catholic faith: the sixteenth-century Muslim Prince “Meale”, heir to the throne of Bijapur who saw his daughter “transformed” by the Jesuits into Our Lady of Overseas (*Dona Maria de Além Mar*) (Subrahmanyam 2011, 33). Side by side with these putative rulers in exile were *mestizo* intellectuals who were born and raised in the cities of Iberian Asia, often without ever having visited Lisbon, Madrid, or Rome. This was the case with the Franciscans Paulo da Trindade and Jacinto de Deus, both born in Macao and authors, respectively, of *Conquista Espiritual do Oriente* (ca. 1630) and *Vergel de Plantas e Flores* (1690) (Faria 2011; Xavier and Zupanov 2015, 172–189). For Manila, we have the sixteenth-century printers Tomás Pinpin and Juan de Vera (the first Tagalog and the second Chinese) and the eighteenth-century engravers Nicolau de la Cruz Bagay and Don Gaspar Aquino de Belen (Rafael 1993), not to mention an intriguing anonymous sixteenth-century hybrid work known as the Boxer Codex (Souza and Turley 2016). Manuel Godinho de Erédia (1558?–1623?)—Luso-Malay cartographer and mathematician who lived between Malacca and Goa—is another good example (Flores 2015b), as is Inácio de Brito, the Barnabite priest of Burmese ancestry who authored a history of the Portuguese discoveries in his native language at the turn of the eighteenth century (Guedes 1999). Finally, the city of Colombo offers us one of the most interesting cases: Dom Filipe Botelho. Botelho, who converted to Christianity and eventually became a religious man educated by the Jesuits, penned the *Jornada de Uva ordenada a maneira de dialogo* (1633), where he simultaneously “performs” as a loyal Portuguese vassal, devout Catholic priest and proud Sinhalese nobleman descended from the kings of Kotte (Flores and Cruz 2007, 104–106).

At first sight, the *mestizo* intellectuals—as well as the native interpreters and exiled princes—represent the triumph of an imperial order and the guarantee of its renovation and perpetuation. But the fact is that the life of these and other similar persons was filled with a permanent tension between different political, religious, and ethnic

circles. The Iberian cities of Asia were subjected to effective forms of social control, which was manifested in the division of the urban space. In Manila, the Spaniards lived inside the walls while the local Chinese inhabited the *parián*, a “Chinatown” that changed location many times (and multiplied itself) over the years. Key to the demography, economy, and everyday life of Manila, the Chinese residents of the city constituted a fluctuating population that nurtured close ties with the motherland. Converted or not, the *sangleys* were seen with suspicion and prejudice by the Spaniards, who needed them as much as they ostracised them; hence the three *sangleys* massacres that occurred in the seventeenth century (1603, 1639, 1686) (Reed 1978; Gomà 2012; Leibshon 2014; Gil 2011). Parallel to this, in Manila, was the distinction between “real citizens” (*vecinos efectivos*) and those who, living “in this city and its outskirts, both Spaniards and *mestizos*”, are “people who do not really belong (*gente que no hace vecindad*) ... , since most of them are married with *mestizas*, Indians and Bengalis” (Merino 1983, 115). Macao was also divided between the Christian city and the Chinese city, but far from Manila’s conflicts (Flores 2000, 244).

In Goa, if Hindu women living within the limits of the city became widows, then the goods of the deceased husband would be confiscated, while the children they had together would be taken away to be educated as Christians. Ramoji Shenvi Kothari—a Hindu Brahmin who served as *língua do Estado* for a number of decades during the seventeenth century—anticipated the problem in 1658, questioning (and contesting) Goa and Lisbon about the practice (Flores 2011). The same could happen in Malacca, which caused the Kelings—Hindu merchants in the city, originally from the Coromandel coast—to request in the 1580s “that neither the judge for the orphans nor the purveyors of the deceased seizes their goods nor makes an inventory of them nor interferes with their children, nor takes them away, or troubles them in any way” (Pinto 2012, 283).

Examples of ethnic and social segregation inscribed in these urban spaces could be multiplied. But it is of more interest here to observe the distance between theory and practice and reflect on the numerous breaches of the system. In Hormuz, the Portuguese, to the scandal of many, lived side by side with Muslims. In Manila, the inside walls (*intramuros*) were not an absolutely impermeable barrier. In this regard, Macao furnishes a long and interesting list of cases since, as a Chinese text from the seventeenth century noted, it was usual for the Portuguese there to intermingle with the Chinese. In fact, the

Portuguese frequently maintained houses outside the limits of the Christian city. In 1591 Simão Gonçalves possessed “a plot of land in China” where he lived. At the end of the seventeenth century, when the city already had walls, Nicolau Ribeiro de Carvalho, António Mesquita Pimentel, and Catarina de Vargas had houses (*estâncias*) “on the other side” (*na outra banda*) and paid tribute to the mandarins. The houses of the priest João Espinhoza bordered those of Luís Lopes, *homem chim*. Portuguese women, such as Francisca Pires, who had a son in Portugal, had meanwhile married in Macao—“at the Church’s door, like God commands” with Luís Figueira, *homem da terra*. And it was in vain that the municipal council repeated orders prohibiting the renting of warehouses (*gudões*), storehouses (*boticas*), and houses to the Chinese and forbidding “gambling between Christians and Chinese”. At the end of the seventeenth century, the Inquisition in Goa wanted to close the streets of Macao to Chinese ceremonies, but the municipal council—aware of the consequences of such a measure—adopted a more prudent posture (Flores 2000, 245).

When we switch our focus from Manila and the principal cities of the *Estado da Índia* to smaller urban centres or even settlements disconnected from the official imperial network, the sources available become more limited. However, it is here that individual examples of identity-shifting among the Portuguese become far more evident. The palette is rather varied, allowing us frequently to follow the transformation of loyal Catholic soldiers into *chatins* (traders), *alevantados* (rebels), and *arrenegados* (renegades). We can begin with a merchant-adventurer and political entrepreneur who had his own agenda, but still acted within the bounds of acceptability of the *Estado da Índia*. Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo (d. 1667), a man of considerable influence not only in the sultanate of Makassar, but also in the sultanate of Golconda and in Timor, personifies such a figure (Boxer 1967). This is also the case with many residents in Macao, such as Bartolomeu Vaz Landeiro and Pero Vaz de Sequeira (Souza 1986, 36–45; Sousa 2010).

There were also those who broke with the *Estado*, though never completely, adventurers and rebels who often played both sides. The examples are abundant and rich: on Ceylon, an island that represents a sort of boundary between the formal and informal Portuguese empire(s), two interesting cases deserve mention, both from the 1540s: Duarte Teixeira de Macedo, “more loyal to him [i.e., the King of Kotte] than to his own King and Lord”, and Nuno Álvares Pereira, who had great influence over the king of Kandy—“if he knew the local

language, he would rule the kingdom” (Flores 1994, 135). At the end of the sixteenth century, the power of Sebastião Gonçalves Tibau and especially of Filipe de Brito e Nicote at the court of Arakan was remarkable, while at the same time Diogo Veloso wielded influence in Cambodia (Subrahmanyam 1993, 151–152; Subrahmanyam 1990, 147–153; Guedes 1999). The Portuguese *bandel* of Ayuthaya assembled a group of figures with similar profiles with a certain Fernão Nabo Pessanha, “who is proud of being a mandarin of the King of Siam”, distinguishing himself at the end of the seventeenth century (Seabra 2004, 134). For Cambodia at this time, we should mention João da Cruz, who long served as “governor of the seaports” (Seabra 2004, 105). A canon founder and a *mestizo* born in Macao, João da Cruz and his son Clemente da Cruz enjoyed similar visible political influence in Vietnam (Manguin 1984). And even in Guangzhou (Canton), we find during these years a certain João Cortês, the “favourite” (*privado*) of the local governor (Seabra 2004, 87). The Portuguese “tribe”—composed of a plethora of adventurers, rebels, mercenaries, renegades, and, *last but not least*, sizeable *mestizo* Catholic communities rooted in several port-cities—soon became a recognisable “brand” in Southeast Asia (Halikowski-Smith 2011; Andaya 1995; Hespanha 2019).

The most charged colours of this palette correspond to Portuguese who abandoned their religion to become Muslims. These were men such as Fernão Rodrigues Caldeira, a renegade Portuguese resident in Masulipatnam and advisor to the Sultan of Golconda in the late sixteenth century (Subrahmanyam 1990, 132, 154). This phenomenon began early. In 1521, the anonymous interpreter of the first embassy of the *Estado da Índia* to the sultanate of Bengal encountered a Portuguese acquaintance in the city of Gaur. He was not able, however, to recognise him right away since this man—Martim Lucena—was wearing a “Moorish costume” on this occasion and looked “more like Mohammed than the mummy of him” (Bouchon and Thomaz 1988, 319). Lucena clearly personifies the challenges of identity-shifting that has concerned us in this chapter. It is clear that we could direct to him a challenging question that was asked in Shiraz (Iran) in September 1606 by an old Jew (who mastered the Portuguese language) to a Portuguese renegade from Goa: “My Friend: is your faith reflected in the language that you speak, or rather in the clothes that you wear?” (*Amigo, vós credes como falais, ou credes como vestis?*) (Serrão 1972, 118). Is a person’s identity defined by the language a person speaks—and by the community that embodies it—

or by the customs that a person adopts, reflected in the clothes one wears?

Conclusion

The “Iberian stratum” in early modern Asia was simultaneously colonial, indigenous and “spontaneous”. In a few instances, especially in Goa and Manila, the imperial order emanating from the Iberian centre(s) was quite apparent. In many other cases the Portuguese and the Spanish were challenged by a wealth of dynamic societies stretching from the Swahili Coast to the South China Sea and found very little room for political domination and religious control; negotiation and dilution were the most frequent outcomes in these circumstances. What is more, this Iberian stratum—which was far from constituting a monolithic body—confronted but also interacted with several other Western groups, be they diasporic communities (Jews and Armenians), myriad European freelancers (the Italians, most notably), or especially agents of powerful trading companies like the VOC and the EIC. Needless to say, the Iberian stratum contributed markedly to the formation of intriguing social and ethnic puzzles throughout maritime Asia. As the authority of Lisbon and Madrid waned in the region from the late seventeenth century onwards, the local societies of Iberian extraction were to face serious difficulties but also rich transformations. This is however a different tale, one made of a different Asia (or many) and a different Europe.

Abbreviations

AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Seville
BPE	Biblioteca Pública de Évora

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CHAPTER TWENTY

Europeans, Indians, and Africans in the making of colonial societies



Ida Altman and Thiago Krause

Introduction

The origins of modern Iberian societies were rooted in the centuries-long process of Christian reoccupation of territories in the Iberian peninsula that from the early eighth century had been held by Muslims. Although the Reconquista was mostly completed by the mid-thirteenth century, the Iberian monarchies continued to expand southward into North Africa and islands of the Mediterranean and subsequently the Atlantic. Although in North Africa, Iberian initiatives failed to take them beyond fortified strongholds and in sub-Saharan Africa trading posts (*feitorias*) predominated, the Atlantic Ocean offered many attractive areas that would be occupied by the expanding powers from the early fifteenth century onwards, first in the islands and then in the territories that would come to be known as the Americas.

As in the Middle Ages, Iberian dealings with native societies entailed a complex mix of conflict, cooperation, exchange, exploitation, and adaptation. Iberian Atlantic societies were diverse from the outset, a characteristic that intensified with the growing importance of the transatlantic trade in African slaves. Colonial societies also varied greatly according to location, demographic composition, economic activities, and relationships with other places and the metropolis itself. This diversity and variability were reflected in the urban networks that developed and the nature and role of towns of cities and their relationship to their rural hinterlands. The need to recruit labour for Iberian enterprises had enormous consequences for everything from the sites of European settlement and reliance on coerced labour in several forms to the laws and ideologies

that contributed to the ordering of colonial societies.

The occupation of the Atlantic islands in the fifteenth century set patterns that subsequently played an important role in Iberian America. This chapter will begin by emphasising the novel use of enslaved labour and sugar cultivation on the islands and consider settlement and European-indigenous-African interaction in the sixteenth-century Caribbean and Brazilian coast. Although they were foundational in the formation of American societies, these regions have been neglected in the scholarship that, for the most part, has followed the trajectory of Iberian expansion to focus on the wealthy and populous regions of mainland Spanish America. These areas will be analysed in the next part of the chapter, which explores the development of urban networks and the social transformations that they fostered, with due attention to the differences between Spanish and Portuguese America. Last, it examines the unprecedented mixing of Europeans, indigenous Americans, and Africans in a variety of settings that remade social hierarchies based on multiple criteria of stratification, giving rise to new groups, new elites, and new identities.

Atlantic precedents

The establishment of overseas Iberian colonial societies began in the early fifteenth century with the conquest and settlement of the islands located in the Atlantic and close to the African coast: Madeira, Azores, Cape Verde, São Tomé, and the Canaries (the only one occupied by the Spanish). As there were no native populations in the archipelagos claimed by the Portuguese, it seemed easy to transfer Portuguese society to these new lands. In order to avoid spending the crown's limited resources, the king turned the islands into private captaincies that would be ruled by a few aristocrats and lower-ranking nobles. In turn, these individuals, entitled *donatários*, would foster migration and invest in the new-born economies. A landowning elite quickly took shape, monopolising the land through intermarriage and creation of entails, even more common in Madeira and the Azores than in the Iberian peninsula. Although many of them were not of noble stock, they all adopted the seigniorial ideal of "living nobly" with servants, horses, and manors, wielding local political power and rendering services to king and crown in war, such as in the many conflicts of North Africa.

Though the Canary Islands had been known to Iberians since the fourteenth century, it was only toward the end of the fifteenth century that the Hispanic occupation started in earnest, after the resolution of a lengthy diplomatic dispute with the Portuguese guaranteed them sovereignty over the archipelago. The fierce resistance of the *guanches*, the original inhabitants of the islands, required protracted wars of conquest, setting precedents that would later play out on a much larger scale in the Americas. Some indigenous groups allied with the Spanish, while others were enslaved. A few were even sold to Madeira and the Iberian peninsula. Most of the rest were coerced into working for their conquerors. Thanks to disease, exploitation and the destruction of native communities, the aboriginal population was almost wiped out in a matter of decades.

Colonists needed to develop economic enterprises to sustain themselves. Wheat was profitably planted, but in the mid-fifteenth century sugar was transplanted to Madeira from Algarve, in southern Portugal, and afterwards to the Canaries from Andalusia. Thanks to European demand, sugar prices were high, and the start of Atlantic slave trade with West Africa at this time allowed planters to buy enslaved Africans for their medium-sized farms. Nevertheless, most of the labour was provided by landless men of European descent, forced to work for wages because elites had already monopolised access to most arable land in the islands.

The tropical climate of Cape Verde and São Tomé and the distance from Portugal did not favour sustained European immigration. The slave trade and sugar production attracted a few men, while *degradados* (convicted exiles) were sent there, including many New Christian boys, recently converted from Judaism. But the overwhelming majority of the population consisted of enslaved Africans and a growing number of freed people, many of them born of Euro-African informal unions and manumitted by their fathers. São Tomé became the first Iberian slave society and the world's largest sugar exporter in the sixteenth century, setting a template of large-scale production and slave labour that would cross the Atlantic almost immediately. The decline of the slave trade and of the sugar business in the second half of the sixteenth century made the islands even less attractive to Portuguese migrants, opening the door for the consolidation of insular elites known as “whites of the land”—mulattos descended from Portuguese who willed their wealth to their usually illegitimate mixed-blood progeny (Caldeira 2011).

Aside from providing models that would be adapted to the New

World, these islands also functioned as important connections for the extension of commercial and supply networks. Starting with Columbus, the Canaries became an essential steppingstone for ships departing for the Americas, while Madeira and Azores played a similar role in the Portuguese Atlantic; Spanish ships departing the Caribbean commonly stopped in the Azores as well. Cape Verde and São Tomé were instrumental in the beginnings of the Middle Passage, linking them to the Caribbean in the sixteenth century through the slave trade.

Caribbean and Brazilian beginnings

Columbus' initial transatlantic voyage of 1492 marked the beginning of a continuing and quickly growing European presence in the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean. Columbus and others used Española, and later the other large islands of the northern Caribbean, as bases from which to survey and then occupy other islands and nearby mainland territories—Venezuela and the isthmian region (*Tierra Firme*), then Florida, Yucatan, and Mexico. Columbus returned to Española in 1493 with several ships. They began construction of a walled town on Española's north coast (Deagan and Cruxent 2002). Although Spaniards subsequently preferred to establish their towns close to, or even at the very site of, native communities, Isabela was built in an area of fairly sparse indigenous settlement, a decision that probably contributed to its failure.

Isabela proved uncharacteristic of settlement and society in the islands or later in the mainland in other ways as well. Although Europeans tried to initiate agriculture nearby and the walled town took shape quickly, the severity of Columbus' regime and the mercantile model he sought to impose proved unworkable. Influenced by his seafaring experience in the Mediterranean and along the African coast and his expectations of encountering wealthy trading peoples, Columbus designed a town along the lines of a Portuguese *feitoria* to serve as a locus for trade and collection of goods to be shipped back to Spain and afford protection from attack. Almost all the people who accompanied Columbus on his second voyage were his employees, and many were suffering from exhaustion, illness, and hunger and soon returned to Europe or sought refuge elsewhere on the island.

An early "rebel" against Columbus, Francisco Roldán established

himself among the indigenous communities in Española's fertile and populous interior, where he and other men forged what they hoped would be advantageous kinship relations. This practice of forming relations with indigenous communities to gain access to their labour quickly took hold and was later reproduced in places as far away as Paraguay. The natives initially might have understood these relationships as a way to form alliances they could use vis-a-vis other Spaniards or indigenous rivals. There also might have been a perceived prestige in marrying one's daughter to the newcomers. When fray Nicolás de Ovando arrived in 1502 as royal governor he formalised rather than attempted to eliminate the practice. These allocations of labour were called *repartimientos* and their holders *encomenderos*. Only later did the term *encomienda* come into common usage.

The Laws of Burgos (1512) represented the first attempt to regulate Spanish access to indigenous labour and to afford some protections to the Indians. They further institutionalised the *encomienda* and mandated the Christianisation of the Indians. When Spaniards occupied mainland areas where populations and socio-political entities were larger and more complex, the *encomienda* in turn evolved further, entitling the holder to collect tribute as well as to use the labour of a specified group or community. Therefore, pre-existing native structures and practices were of utmost importance in determining many characteristics of these colonial societies in the making.

In the first couple of generations after Spanish occupation of much of Mesoamerica and the Andean region, the *encomienda* was the most important institution for providing indigenous labour for Spanish use and tying the productivity of the indigenous countryside to Spanish towns and cities. Therefore, the *encomenderos* quickly became the elite of these new colonial societies. Many of them were *conquistadores*, while others arrived later but benefited from connections with high-ranking officials. High status and close association with crown officials usually meant one was awarded bigger and more valuable *encomiendas*, reinforcing inequalities that crossed the Atlantic and creating new ones at the same time (Lockhart [1968] 1994, 11–54).

The New Laws promulgated in 1542, however, limited succession to the grants to one generation. Together with increasing competition for access to an ever smaller pool of native labour and the willingness of royal officials to move *encomienda* grants from private control into the royal domain, the New Laws undermined the strength of the

encomendero group and diminished the *encomienda*'s importance as an institution in central Mexico and Peru, although in more outlying areas such as Paraguay it remained important much longer, especially in the (illegal) form of personal service, for a while enmeshed with indigenous traditions of personal dependence.

Although the Caribbean generally has been overlooked as a significant arena for Spanish activity and seen principally as the launching-grounds for subsequent conquest and colonisation, in fact a number of other precedents were set there as well. Royal officials—treasurers, factors, accountants—appeared on the scene early. Representatives of religious orders built monasteries and churches and established schools for the sons of caciques and Spaniards, while bishops headed clerical establishments centred on cathedrals. The privileges of the Colón family created problems for the Spanish Crown with respect to the imposition of royal authority, but after some experimentation an *audiencia* or high court was established in Santo Domingo to act as the highest governing authority in the islands. Audiencias subsequently were created for all the capital cities in Spanish America. The Caribbean experience was, then, foundational, because it was in these islands that the trappings of Iberian society were first refashioned in the New World.

The officials of church and state formed part of the core of elite society in the large islands of Española, Puerto Rico, and Cuba as they would do later on the mainland. Royal and local officials played an active and often leading role in the economic life of the islands, holding *encomiendas* and involving themselves directly in the principal economic activities of gold mining, pearl fishing, commerce, and commercial agriculture. The full participation of officials in local society and the economic diversification that they and other wealthy individuals practiced subsequently became standard throughout Spanish and Portuguese America.

Initially the lure of gold mines meant that the islands attracted large numbers of mostly single young men. Gold mining and pearl fishing benefited the crown as well as some of the wealthier and better-connected men in the islands, but for the majority the promise of gold proved elusive. Even as they shifted to cattle ranching or commercial agriculture, the economic basis for many residents faltered as the indigenous population declined. By the 1520s officials in the islands were complaining about *despoblación*, meaning both the departure of many Spaniards for other destinations and the drastic reduction in the indigenous population. Yet the islands did not

depopulate. Spaniards imported increasing numbers of Africans to supplement their dwindling labour force as well as Indians captured in slave raids that drew thousands of people from Yucatan, Central America, Venezuela, and as far away as Brazil and emptied out so-called “useless” islands like the Bahamas. Rural estates soon came to depend on mixed labouring forces consisting of *encomienda* Indians, Indian slaves, and dependents called *naborías* (usually Indians brought from elsewhere), and African slaves, while Spanish-headed households included Indian and African slaves and servants as well as Spanish and mixed-race retainers. Even where Spanish wives were present, as probably became the dominant pattern for households in the larger cities within a couple of generations, they presided over ethnically and culturally diverse households. As a result, before the mid-sixteenth century island societies already resembled the multi-ethnic societies associated with the Spanish America of a later era.

The Caribbean and circum-Caribbean were notable as well for the internationalism that characterised them from the time that Europeans first arrived. Columbus was Genoese, and the Genoese played an important part in the early economy of the islands, helping to extend commercial networks connecting the Caribbean to Seville and the Canaries as well as to sources of slaves from Cape Verde especially, and sometimes settling in the islands. The Portuguese arrived on the scene early both as traders and settlers. Spanish officials at times actively encouraged Portuguese migration, especially that of married couples and families, perhaps influenced by the example of the Portuguese who had settled in the Canaries. Whether formally recruited or not, the numbers of Portuguese who settled in the islands and circum-Caribbean were substantial and may have helped to account for relatively low levels of Portuguese migration to Brazil in the same period, as Portuguese might have opted for destinations under Spanish control which they saw as offering better economic opportunities. The internationalisation of the region did not stop there, however. By virtue of their connections to the Habsburgs, the Welsers, a German banking family, received the right to exploit and settle Venezuela. The French were active throughout the Caribbean and along the Atlantic rim of South America, raiding Spanish ports and attacking Spanish shipping and establishing a presence along the Brazilian coast that through much of the sixteenth century rivalled that of the Portuguese and in Florida as well. The English presence was more limited in the early sixteenth century, but they too showed interest in the Atlantic coasts of North America and Brazil as early as

the 1530s. The Caribbean islands, and to a lesser extent the Brazilian coast, quickly became diverse, complex, and multinational.

Portuguese beginnings in Brazil were slower, probably because of their involvement in Asia and Africa and because they failed to find in Brazil a commodity as compelling as gold or pearls. Nonetheless, the Portuguese established a lasting presence there in the early sixteenth century, the main economic attraction being a valuable dyewood for which they bartered, offering European trade goods in return to the Amerindians that inhabited the coast. These semi-sedentary indigenous groups collectively known as Tupinambá understood their relationship with the newcomers as gift exchanging, essential to the creation of alliances and friendships.

In the early years there were no towns but rather *feitorias* along the coast where brazilwood was collected and then loaded on ships. The Portuguese and French were probably equally active in this trade, although the French did not establish forts but rather lived in indigenous communities. Both the Portuguese and French depended on their alliances with indigenous groups to function, as would be the case elsewhere as well. From the Caribbean to Brazil, New Spain, and Peru, such alliances greatly facilitated and indeed enabled Spanish and Portuguese expansion into, and eventual domination, of American territories. Native peoples had their reasons to cooperate with Europeans and understood these relationships on their own terms. Some avoided slavery this way, others enjoyed minor privileges—or at least kept part of their land. Many were moved to ally with Europeans by the prospect of defeating their traditional enemies.

Given a minimal official presence in Brazil in the early sixteenth century, a small number of men who acquired linguistic skills and familiarity with indigenous cultures acted as intermediaries between the Portuguese and indigenous groups, exercising a good deal of influence. Some of these men were *degradados* exiled from Portugal, while others had survived shipwrecks or voluntarily lived at least part of the time among Brazil's natives. In the 1530s the Portuguese undertook an ambitious project to colonise all of Brazil, dividing it into 15 captaincies to be settled by private individuals, *donatários*, at their own cost. It was an expansion of the model that had proved partially successful in the Atlantic islands.

For the most part the scheme failed, but captaincies such as São Vicente and Pernambuco succeeded, thanks to the establishment of alliances with some indigenous groups, which guaranteed the provision of labour and military support. Informal liaisons and

sometimes even marriages between Portuguese men and native women were instrumental in cementing these alliances, as was the case of the union between Jerônimo de Albuquerque, cousin of Pernambuco's *donatário*, and the daughter of a *principal*, baptised as Maria do Espírito Santo Arco Verde, which gave birth to numerous *mestiço* sons and daughters who perpetuated the Albuquerque surname (Monteiro 1999). Many of their descendants were part of the local elite, and a few even went on to become knights, *fidalgos* and governors in the king's service.

These captaincies were also home to the beginnings of the sugar industry in Portuguese America. Sugar planters in both the islands and Brazil faced the challenge of finding a workforce for this labour-intensive enterprise. In the Caribbean islands, where indigenous populations already were sharply reduced (or in São Tomé, where they did not exist), the main response was to expand the importation of African slaves; by the 1530s some estates boasted African slave labour forces of 50 to 100 or more. In Brazil, where substantial indigenous populations still were close at hand, Portuguese planters turned to the enslavement of the Indians who were enemies of their indigenous allies. As time went on, the definition of enmity was stretched to justify the enslavement of an ever-greater number of natives to supply the labour demands of a slowly growing population of colonists. Demographic catastrophe was hastened by the spread of European diseases and the destruction of native communities. At around the same time in post-conquest Mexico sugar cultivation got underway in the area of Cuernavaca and Tuxtla in order to supply the incipient local market. One of the principal forces behind the initiation of sugar production there was renowned conqueror Hernando Cortés. Recipient of vast estates and *encomienda* grants as the Marqués de Oaxaca, he relied on a mixed labour force of *encomienda* and enslaved Indians and small numbers of enslaved Africans (Barrett 1970). Sugar cultivation also got underway in northern coastal Peru, where Africans represented an important part of the labour force although they were still far outnumbered by Amerindians.

Urban places and networks

Town founding was the hallmark of Spanish settlement in the Americas. The strongly urban orientation of Iberian society meant that

economic enterprises, administrative and ecclesiastical institutions, and social and cultural life concentrated in towns and cities. Under the division theoretically established in the mid-sixteenth century between the *república de indios* and the *república de españoles* (Indian and Spanish Commonwealths) to protect the natives from overexploitation and avoid an even greater demographic disaster than the one already underway, the rural world would be the preserve of the Indian majority, while Spaniards would reside in their towns; for all practical purposes, though, the separation existed more in principle than reality.

The establishment of cities and urban networks in the Americas did not always proceed smoothly, however. Often it proved difficult to choose optimal sites for towns, whether because of climate and topography, relations with indigenous groups, or economic change over time. The Caribbean offers many such examples. Española's first town, Isabela, was abandoned, and Santo Domingo, founded on the south coast in 1496, within a decade moved from the right to the left bank of the Ozama River.

Perhaps the most famous town foundation of early Spanish America was that of Veracruz on Mexico's Gulf Coast, where Cortés' men created a municipality before any physical structures existed in order to legitimise Cortés' plans to move into the interior. Everywhere town founding served as both the symbol and vehicle of Spanish dominion over territory, as a result of which a network of towns on the mainland came into existence with almost astonishing speed, with towns often located at the very centres of indigenous society (Tenochtitlan, Cuzco) or in close proximity to them. *Encomenderos* and landowners (often one and the same) lived in Spanish-created towns and cities while their employees managed their rural properties, organised labour, and collected tribute. These employees often lived full-time on estates or in nearby Indian towns, creating the basis for a slowly growing Hispanic presence in the countryside. Indigenous towns and communities survived but over time could be transformed by the growing presence of Spaniards, *mestizos*, or Indians who migrated from other places, the imposition of Spanish municipal structures, Christianisation and clerical influence, tribute demands, and the introduction of Spanish-type commercial enterprises.

Although most of the new towns of the Caribbean and circum-Caribbean (Santo Domingo, San Juan, Havana, and Cartagena) and in Brazil were ports, elsewhere the urban network was oriented toward the centre of political power in the interior. Although ports like

Veracruz, Acapulco, or Nombre de Dios were economically important, for much of the colonial period they were unimpressive places with substantial transient populations of mariners and traders, some of whom were foreigners, with more stable populations consisting mostly of people from the non-white, non-elite groups of society. If major towns and the routes that connected them tended to replicate pre-existing indigenous patterns, mining towns, like ports, mainly were innovations in the landscape. Brazil lacked indigenous foundations for its towns, and the decimated Amerindian population did not provide a demographic basis for the creation of full-fledged urban networks.

Although initially Spanish town planning and construction were fairly rudimentary due to lack of specialists (architects, skilled masons) and sometimes the necessary materials, the now-famous grid plan prevailed in most urban foundations, perhaps in part because of the relative ease with which it could be laid out. Mining towns, however, might follow the haphazard layout of the camps, and port cities often were oriented toward the harbour rather than a central plaza. They also featured defensive structures (fortifications, walls) seldom found in other towns. Regardless of morphology, most towns and cities shared in common the basic features associated with Iberian municipalities, that is, churches, town halls, jails, hospitals, and an open plaza around which the wealthiest members of society built their homes.

The wealthier members of colonial urban society maintained large households—*casas pobladas*—that in addition to immediate family members included other relatives and retainers as well as Indian, African, and mixed-race slaves and servants. Indians, Africans, and people of African or mixed descent performed virtually all the menial and unskilled labour needed to maintain households and urban systems of supply and sanitation as well as much of the semi-skilled and, increasingly, skilled labour of production. Artisans ran workshops and *obrajes* filled with apprentices, slaves, and servants of all races, thus acting as sites for transmission of technology and skills associated with European culture to people of non-European descent. As a result, towns and cities were home to diverse populations in constant contact, even in the *trazas* or centres ostensibly reserved for the upper classes. The standard urban pattern featured a concentration of institutional headquarters and the houses of the wealthy in the centre, surrounded by the more outlying neighbourhoods or *barrios* of Indians who had lived in those places before Europeans arrived or subsequently migrated there permanently or temporarily, either

voluntarily or under pressure, from the countryside. In major urban centres like Mexico City not only were indigenous *barrios* extensive, native residents maintained their own quasi-autonomous governing institutions and officials, modified along Spanish lines yet retaining much of their older meaning and function. Even in entirely new urban creations like Puebla de los Angeles in Mexico or Lima in Peru, indigenous *barrios* quickly took shape around the Spanish centre.

Almost inevitably Brazilian towns were smaller and less diverse as Portuguese America was much less populous than its Spanish counterpart: for instance, Potosí had 160,000 inhabitants in 1610 while the Brazilian capital and largest city, Salvador, had no more than 6,000 in the same year. Therefore, Brazil's main urban centre was no more than a small provincial hub in the wider context of the Iberian New World. In fact, at that time around 50% more people lived in Potosí alone than in all areas of the New World under actual Portuguese control.

Even though there was no concept of formal division between two *Repúblicas* as in Spanish America, most of the non-enslaved natives under Portuguese dominion lived in *aldeias* similar to Spanish *reducciones*, under the authority of religious orders (mainly the Jesuits). Indigenous groups sometimes worked for colonists and received meagre wages, being therefore an active part of colonial society, but they likely had to shoulder a lighter burden than their Spanish American counterparts, because a growing number of enslaved Africans and a diminishing pool of enslaved Amerindians performed most of the required labour. As free people of colour were still a very small group, Brazilian towns at the dawn of the seventeenth century were divided between Portuguese (most of them poor) and slaves. Their social structure was not markedly different from the rural world, apart from a somewhat smaller proportion of slaves and a significant number of transient men who came and went with the fleets.

The growth of Iberian American societies

Europeans, Africans, and indigenous Americans interacted in a range of settings and relationships. Notwithstanding the numerical superiority of indigenous populations, devastating epidemics, conflict, the recruitment of native auxiliaries for military campaigns, dislocation and relocation of native groups, and European labour

demands all worked to reduce their numbers, reconfigure geographic, ethnic, and linguistic patterns, and make Native Americans and their communities increasingly vulnerable to external threats and influences. Where Indians lived and worked in closest contact with Iberians or culturally Hispanic people—in households, on estates, in mines—the impact of European-introduced language, religion, and technology was greatest. Indians who continued to reside in their own communities all or much of the time were able to retain older traditions and practices to a much greater extent, although almost invariably the colonial world fostered change. For instance, many natives were forced to move, either to comply with or to escape from taxation and European demand for labour, a phenomenon that seems to have been specially pronounced in the Andes, perhaps because of the *mita* (the rotating coerced labour system that lasted much longer in the region than in New Spain) and pre-Hispanic traditions of movement that connected highlands and lowlands.

Movement was obviously central to the European and African experience, but in very different ways. Although some free Africans or African-descended people emigrated from Europe, the vast majority of Africans were forced to cross the Atlantic against their will. Having done so, they occupied a wide range of positions and performed an array of tasks, acting in the earliest years as an extension of the European presence due to their shared familiarity with the technology, livestock, agriculture, and mining techniques of the “Old World”. Although their enslaved status imposed severe constraints on Africans’ mobility and the choices they could exercise, flight, marronage, relatively independent work situations, and manumission all meant that Africans and African-descended peoples in the Americas at times gained some or even a good deal of autonomy.

Their condition, though, varied greatly according to the labour regime under which they worked. In most of Spanish America they were an auxiliary labour force: even though they might have outnumbered the Spaniards in core areas such as Mexico City, their numbers were dwarfed by the indigenous majority. Therefore, they mainly worked in supervisory capacities and specialised tasks, while the most arduous tasks were often delegated to Amerindians. This situation, coupled with the market opportunities available in the dynamic urban centres of Spanish America, gave rise to a significant number of free people of African descent. African women were among the main beneficiaries of manumission thanks to their active participation in urban markets and sometimes their personal

relationships with their owners, both male and female. Children also had better prospects for manumission, especially those of mixed parentage who had free relatives to intervene on their behalf or even buy their freedom.

After the formation of the first American slave societies in the Caribbean in the sixteenth century (Wheat 2016), enslaved Africans became the key labour force and the majority of the population in the main centres of Brazil and some coastal regions of Spanish America, such as cacao-producing Venezuela, in the first half of the seventeenth century, largely as a result of the steep demographic decline suffered by the indigenous population and the profits from the exportation of agricultural commodities. In the second decade of the seventeenth century Brazil surpassed Spanish America to become the largest importer of enslaved Africans in the New World. Doing the backbreaking labour required for cane growing and manufacturing it into sugar, they had fewer opportunities to achieve manumission in Brazil than in the Caribbean or the urban centres of Mexico and Peru. Gradually, however, Africans and their descendants filled an increasing number of lower-level occupations in the growing cities and skilled jobs on sugar estates, starting a trend that would boom in the eighteenth century.

With the exception of *degredados* sent to Brazil and some of the questionable individuals who accompanied Columbus on his early voyages, most Iberian emigrants exercised choice about when, how, and where to move. The Spanish Crown tried to regulate who could travel to the Indies, hoping to prevent the emigration of people considered undesirable and to restrict the long-term absence of men who left behind wives and children. Although in the earliest years single young men predominated in the movement of people from Europe to the Americas, over time the participation of women increased and migrants included a growing number of married couples, with and without children, attracted by economic opportunities and frequently by the presence in the Indies of relatives or patrons who had preceded them. The importance of family and kinship in decisions regarding emigration meant that it often was more a collective than an individual undertaking. Wealthy men and high-ranking officials of church and state brought large entourages of relatives, retainers, and protégés, and people often arranged to travel with or follow other family members or friends. Emigrants represented a broad spectrum of Iberian society, from the higher echelons to the lower, although the very rich and the truly impoverished were

unlikely to move, the former because they already were well situated and the latter because they probably lacked the patronage ties that would gain them a place as a servant (*criado*) or retainer.

Migration to Brazil might have been less socially representative, though, as the stream was smaller than the one directed to Spanish America. While estimates of migrants to the latter run as high as 450,000 people in the first two centuries of colonisation, migration to Brazil surely amounted to no more than a third of this number. Nevertheless, assessments are sketchier, as the Portuguese did not regulate transoceanic migration and therefore kept no records that could be explored by future historians.

The transatlantic journey might be only one of a series of moves undertaken by emigrants. After arriving in the Indies people often moved on or returned home to visit or to remain. Mariners, merchants, and merchants' factors travelled back and forth across the Atlantic on a regular basis. Visitors and permanent returnees played important roles in communicating information about life in the Indies and encouraging relatives and acquaintances to emigrate (Altman 1989).

Amerindians, Africans, Iberians, and their descendants, often of mixed blood, thus formed complex societies in the Americas. These social formations inherited their basic hierarchies from Europe but all were transformed by the presence of a majority population of non-European descent and a plethora of new labour regimes. Social stratification was both quite distinct from the Old World and diversified among the different regions in the Americas. Inequality was characteristic of all Iberian societies in the Americas. There were multiple criteria of stratification, based on rank, wealth, occupation, religion, ethnicity, phenotype, gender, and behaviour. Power and prestige derived from these criteria were very unevenly distributed, even if we judge them by European standards at the time. At a higher level, these resources were wielded by a small number of families and there was a strong tendency for them to cluster around the same individuals, who fulfilled all criteria at the same time—or at least could believably pretend to do so (Schwartz 1985, 245–254).

Elite families were rich thanks to their control of land and labour, though their prosperity varied greatly. Some miners amassed huge fortunes quite quickly, but they could lose them even faster, making it difficult to establish dynasties or even coalesce into a coherent group, thanks to the mercurial nature of mining, an activity where luck played an outsized role. Miners' dependency on credit also meant they

could easily find themselves bankrupt if their mines were exhausted. Merchants also could be much better-off than landowners, but they were still under landed elites in the social pecking order in most places. Therefore, many of the more successful merchants and miners bought land and office and married into established families. There was, then, some integration between the individuals at the top of the different sectors of the economy, and most elite families in Spanish America had diversified economic interests. It was not uncommon for a wealthy clan to have stakes in land, mining, commerce, public office, and even manufacturing (the *obrajes*, one of the mainstays of Quito's elite). The market was an essential arena for the formation, reproduction and fall of colonial elites everywhere. Nevertheless, in less populated and economically integrated areas, such as seventeenth-century Brazil, elites commonly relied on a single product—sugar, for example—for the overwhelming majority of their income.

Wealth was never, though, the only thing that set elites apart. The ideal of a noble life defined by owning land, exercising dominion over others, and above all not working with one's own hands was a powerful one, although it was only possible to enact it if one had the means to pay for this expensive lifestyle. Powerful families quickly attempted to shore up their standing through intermarriage, selective absorption of outsiders who could boast noble credentials or wealth, land grabbing, and monopolisation of local offices (Fragoso and Krause 2019). After the upheavals of the first century of colonisation, the second half of the seventeenth century was a time of oligarchical consolidation in most areas, such as the sugar-producing Lambayeque valley in northern Peru (Ramírez 1986). Increasingly, many also sought badges of honour characteristic of European elites such as membership in military orders to affirm publicly their (often newfound) noble status, especially in central areas such as Mexico and Bahia. Nevertheless, creole titled aristocrats were exceedingly rare in Spanish America before the eighteenth century, when they became relatively common in Peru and Mexico, while they were non-existent in Brazil until the arrival of the Portuguese Court in 1808.

The existence of a multitude of subordinated natives allowed numerous Iberians to act on this noble ideal, even though many more had their dreams denied by the harsh reality of inequality. Therefore, the making of colonial societies was a moment of accelerated social mobility: the Iberian minority could enjoy their superiority over the majority of non-Europeans, while newly minted elites achieved heights that would be unthinkable if they had stayed in their Old-

World hometowns. Even after the conquest there was significant circulation at the top, as American elites had trouble keeping honours and rewards granted to them by the king and their formal privileges frequently eroded. Therefore, few of the first families established during the sixteenth century survived until 1700, and many of their substitutes had more wealth than lineage to back their claims to prominence (Raminelli 2015).

The picture of Iberian overlords exercising dominion over indigenous peoples is a simplification, though, because there was great variation among the positions occupied by Europeans and natives, especially in the core regions of Spanish America, where there were indigenous elites that forged relationships with the Spaniards and accumulated wealth through exploitation of their subjects and participation in the market. Miscegenation represents a further complication. In the first generation there were very few European women in the New World. Therefore, consensual and coerced relationships produced many mixed-blood children in formal and (more commonly) informal unions. Some of them were raised in Iberian society, and afterwards many elite families took pride in their indigenous ancestors—as long as they were sufficiently removed in time not to be an embarrassment. In the post-conquest generation mixed-blood daughters often were valued in a marriage market with few European women and many suitors who wanted to forge connections with established families.

Most *mestizos* were not part of the elite, though, and they quickly started to be categorised as a “new kind of people” apart from their parent groups, meriting a specific denomination. The growing number of Europeans gradually downgraded the position of mixed-blood people in Iberian society, making acceptance more difficult and reinforcing prejudices. Nevertheless, their social status was ambiguous and flexible, determined more by their social network than by their genealogies (Rappaport 2014). In peripheral areas with few European settlers and a labour force mainly composed of coerced and enslaved natives, such as Paraguay, Maranhão, and São Paulo, miscegenation was even more widespread and mixed-blood children fit more easily in Ibero-American society.

Social stratification became even more complex because of the presence of African-descended peoples. Prejudice against them was even stronger because of both the stigma of slavery and their greater phenotypical difference from Europeans. Iberian society emphasised genealogy as an important marker of status, even more so because

from the mid-fifteenth century onwards “purity of blood” (not having Jewish or Muslim ancestors) gradually became a focal point for Iberian definitions of honour. Those who were deemed “impure” were thought to have an innate inclination to heresy and treason and therefore suffered discrimination. Although New Christians were legally banned from migrating to the New World, they crossed the Atlantic in significant numbers, guaranteeing that this divide would continue to be relevant in the Americas.

As descent and religion were the basis for this prejudice, it could be easily transformed to encompass blacks and mixed-blood people, who would be strongly discriminated against—something facilitated by the physical differences between them and Iberians. Nevertheless, phenotype and genealogy never were the sole criteria for classification, as behaviour, dress, and wealth also determined how someone would be seen by society. These classifications were a process, always in flux, not set in stone but determined by specific circumstances (Martínez 2008). This classificatory effort started earlier and went further in Spanish America, but it can also be discerned in Brazil, for as the small, free mixed-blood group started to grow in the second half of the seventeenth century, prejudices against mulattos became stronger.

As discriminatory classifications were an unstable process, ethnic status was not determined by government fiat. It was an arena of conflict between various social groups and institutions, and elite definitions did not determine plebeian identity. There was significant social and spatial mobility, and people defined their identities according to their possibilities and needs at any given time. Therefore, the need for classification might appear only when one entered into contact with crown, Church, or local officials. For most of the free population, including some of European descent, poverty was an equalizer, though within certain limits: all groups tended toward endogamy, but there was a significant incidence of interethnic relationships (sexual and otherwise), mainly among blacks, *mestizos*, and mulattos. Social control was not guaranteed by ethnic segregation and repression, but rather by patron-client relationships that permeated the whole social fabric. Clients depended upon their social superiors for work, housing, or charity, and therefore were forced to acquiesce at their patrons’ demands. Economic constraints and socio-ethnic discrimination acted in tandem to reproduce unequal hierarchies (Cope 1994).

Honour was defined, then, by lifestyle, status and socio-ethnic

classification. Nevertheless, it went beyond these criteria, for it was also directly related to gender. Female sexuality should be controlled by men so that it would express itself only in Church-sanctioned relationships. Failure to do so revealed what was thought a shameful inability to control one's own household. Perhaps even more importantly, women played an essential role in intergenerational transfer of property and prestige through dowries and inheritance, but they could not perform this task if their sexual behaviour was deemed improper, as it would cast doubts about her children's paternity. Nevertheless, it is prudent not to overemphasise this obsession with female honour as it was a characteristic most salient in the upper classes. For most women of all ethnicities, public participation in the market was essential to their families' survival. Illegitimacy rates were much higher among the free population in the Americas than in the Iberian peninsula and even higher among slaves, a likely consequence of the extreme economic and socio-ethnic inequalities that facilitated female exploitation and made an expensive church marriage inaccessible to large segments of the population. This situation was especially marked in cities such as Lima, where only half of all baptised children were legitimate (Mannarelli 2007). Many women needed, then, to provide for themselves and their children, and some achieved a significant degree of economic success and financial independence.

In marriage, as in so much else, the Church played an essential role. It was not only an institution but an integral part of people's daily lives. For Iberians, Catholicism was a central main tenet of their identity. Many elite families sent their sons and daughters into ecclesiastical careers as a strategy to avoid the division of their wealth and because the accumulated social and economic resources of the Church allowed its members to wield a significant amount of power. Nuns and monks managed capital that functioned as one of the main credit sources available for the colonial economy and maintained close relationships with lay society. For some women the cloister could mean liberation from patriarchal authority and a way to assert their personal autonomy, as Kathryn Burns (1999) has emphasised in her study of the great convents of Cuzco. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the Church was far more developed in Spanish than in Portuguese America. For instance, Brazil's first convent was founded in 1677, at a time when New Spain alone had more than 30 such institutions.


As the Church was so important in colonial societies, it is not

surprising that new colonial identities were first clearly articulated within ecclesiastical institutions. In Spanish America at the turn of the seventeenth century, Creoles felt slighted by a monarchy that did not continue to reward those who descended from *conquistadores* as much as those *beneméritos* felt was their right. Reacting against Peninsular prejudice, Creole clerics in Mexico and Peru started to picture their elite families (even those that arrived after the Conquest) as a nobility born from the miscegenation of noble Spaniards and noble Amerindians, emphasising indigenous greatness as a way to fight for a more privileged position in the Hispanic monarchy. In this way they constructed an image of themselves as different both from the plebeian masses and from peninsular Spaniards, being the rightful rulers of the land. Therefore, they viewed the holding of royal and ecclesiastical office as their right. In Brazil, a similar process took shape in the second half of the century after the long struggle against the Dutch (1624–1654) ended with invaders’ expulsion. Brazilian elites emphasised their military service and financial aid to the crown in order to demand honorific rewards and control of local offices. They intended to gain more autonomy and buttress their position as local ruling nobilities by this means. Although there were conflicts within religious orders between peninsular and Ibero-Americans over control of leadership positions, at the close of the seventeenth century New World elites still felt themselves to be part of the same monarchies as their European brethren (Canny and Pagden 1987).

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CHAPTER TWENTY one

Imperial economies



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Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the overseas Iberian empires' economic systems and its main trends over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It outlines the type of productive structures dominant in each empire and examines the exchanges and connections within the two Iberian empires, and between the Iberian empires and the rest of the world. The first section of the chapter briefly discusses the motivations for the Iberian overseas expansion. The second section analyses the economic structures of the territories under colonial rule. It highlights the factors that shaped economic activity, such as pre-existing local conditions, goals pursued, and the institutional frameworks regulating land ownership and labour,

considering changes and shifts that both empires underwent across time and space. The third section takes up the Iberian commercial networks across the world and discusses their role as drivers of globalisation. It deals with the well-known intercontinental routes of *Carrera de Indias* and *Carreira da Índia*, while also examining the role of American silver in global trade. The last section looks into the impact of the Iberian transoceanic flows in the domestic economies.

The origins of Iberian overseas expansion

In 1581 when Philip II, king of Spain, was acclaimed as Philip I of Portugal he also became the legitimate ruler of the overseas territories, which by then had been incorporated into the Portuguese Crown. Until 1640 when the Union of Crowns came to an end, the Spanish and Portuguese overseas possessions were thus unified under the same ruler. Although run separately, together they comprised territories extending from the Americas—New Spain, Peru, and Brazil—to Asia—Portugal’s Asian strongholds and the Philippine Islands, including a few fortresses and trading posts in Africa. Despite its geographic dispersion, it was a worldwide empire, the largest the world had ever known, whose origins go back to fifteenth-century Iberian overseas expansion.

Various explanations have been put forward to account for this expansionist drive, several of which place its motives against the background of a national framework. Overseas expansion was, however, a European phenomenon, an assertion that requires examining the Iberian expansion within a wider historical context—late-medieval Europe’s commercial relations with the East and the search for precious metals to offset the adverse balance of payments. Recent studies have also brought attention to the influence of the *Reconquista*, as a common factor in the forging of the Portuguese and Spanish empires (Elliott 2015, 202). Other common factors include the geographic location of the Iberian peninsula—at the crossroads of Mediterranean and Atlantic sea lanes—as well as consecutive breakthroughs in nautical science, including shipbuilding. The caravel stands out among the innovations, considering that it became the main conduit of the early Iberian expansion. This was, in fact, the ship that the Portuguese used to circumnavigate Africa—before it was eventually replaced by the larger carrack (*nau*)—and that Castilians used to sail to the Canary Islands in the early fifteenth century and

Columbus used in his inaugural voyage to America in 1492. The precise characteristics of the process through which older Mediterranean traditions ended up constructing caravels apt to navigate across the ocean are still under debate. However, few scholars doubt that the caravel, and with it the European expansion to other continents, was the result of the convergence of northern European and Mediterranean shipbuilding traditions in the Iberian peninsula (Schwarz 2008, 23–42; Casado Soto 1991, 121–144). Early explorations also benefited from improvements in such navigational instruments as the astrolabe, the cross-staff, the quadrant, and the compass (Turner 1998, 29–37).

The concurrence of these factors led the Iberian powers into overseas expansionist ventures throughout the fifteenth century. Portugal took the lead with the successful conquest of Ceuta in 1415. Shaped by ideological and political motivations stemming from the *Reconquista* and engaging mainly the nobility and the royal house of Avis, the seizure of Ceuta proved, nevertheless, to be crucial for exploratory voyages given that it bolstered the hopes that Sudanese gold could be accessed by sea. Combining trade and plunder, probing expeditions southwards were soon periodically organised, eventually leading to the discovery or rediscovery of the Atlantic islands. Between 1425 and 1480, the Portuguese went on to settle the uninhabited archipelagos of Madeira, Azores, Cape Verde, and São Tomé. Together with the Canary Islands, whose conquest was first conducted by Castilian nobles before being reclaimed by Isabella of Castile in the late fifteenth century, the Atlantic archipelagos played an indispensable role as experimental laboratories of the social, economic, and institutional framework of Iberian imperialism. Colonising institutions—the Portuguese royal land grant system (donatory captaincy) and the Spanish *encomienda*—were first tried there before being implemented elsewhere, as was the setting up of the first plantation economies, based on slave labour and sugar production.

The economic structure of the Iberian empires

By the mid-1500s, the Portuguese overseas empire comprised an array of widely dispersed territories, strongholds and trading posts, incorporated by various titles of acquisition and stretching from Brazil to the China coast. Differently from the Spanish, this was a maritime

empire, connected by sea routes, which is best described as being organised in “two great subsystems”. On the one hand, an Atlantic system, encompassing Brazil, as well as the mercantile stations (*feitorias*) of western coast of Africa and the Atlantic islands and, on the other hand, Portuguese Asia with its string of trading posts, fortresses, and territories, spanning from the East African coast to South China Sea (Schwartz 2007, 20–21). Local conditions prior to the arrival of the Portuguese differed greatly and so did the economic goals pursued by central authorities and settlers in each of these complexes. Accordingly, different institutional solutions were implemented to develop and protect economic activities.

Built from scratch and going back to the first half of the fifteenth century, the economy of the first Atlantic complex was based on three pillars – sugar, slaves, and gold. In the island of Madeira, settlers concentrated on sugar production after a short-lived wheat production cycle. Benefiting from capital investments by Portuguese and foreigners (Genoese and Flemish), by 1480, the output of the 80 sugar mills processing cane was estimated at 100,000 arrobas (1 arroba = 32 lbs, or 14.69 kg). Beginning in the 1480s, the expansion of this cash crop in São Tomé was equally impressive, with output levels reaching 175,000–200,000 arrobas in the last quarter of the sixteenth century (Godinho 1982–1984, Vol. 4, 96). The emergence of a plantation regime in the Atlantic islands rested on an institutional framework—the donatorial captaincy – that replicated, with some modifications, the royal grant of lordship, common in late medieval Portugal. By royal gift (*doação*), private entrepreneurs were granted royal jurisdiction over a specified territory and, more importantly, empowered to allocate plots of land to settlers through a *carta de sesmaria*, a medieval Portuguese land title.

Originally intending to add economic value to unused or vacant land, the *sesmarias* became a powerful instrument to attract settlers, given that the plots, provided that they would be put to cultivation within a specified period (3–10 years), were given in full ownership (Saldanha 2001). As such, this land grant system became the basis of a wealthy group of landowners and was later on successfully introduced to promote agricultural production in Brazil. Sugar production in the Atlantic islands depended on slave labour, at first acquired in the Canary Islands and the Mauritania coast, later on from the Gulf of Guinea. Conducted by private individuals, the slave trade was organised around royal trading posts, of which Arguin and Mina (present-day Elmina) stand out. Data of the volume of slaves passing

through the Portuguese trading posts is scarce, although one estimate points to a yearly average of 2,200 slaves between 1450 and 1530 (Schwartz 2007, 24). Hence, long before the peak of slave labour demand from Brazil, the Portuguese were already controlling the slave trade, thanks to a chain of permanent trading posts along the African coast and in the islands of Cape Verde. The last pillar in the first Atlantic system—gold—was obtained via the Portuguese factory-fortress of São João da Mina. The king enforced a royal monopoly over the gold trade and between late 1480s and the 1550s, 332 kg of gold (ca. 25 million *réis*), on annual average, were shipped to Lisbon (Costa et al. 2016, 80–81). The gold flows decreased continuously after the 1530s, but this was largely compensated by the high economic returns from the Portuguese Cape route, following Vasco da Gama's inaugural voyage in 1498. Its success was backed by the establishment of the *Estado da Índia*, which in turn, justifies the empire's economic shift to the Indian Ocean in the first half of the sixteenth century.

The onset of the *Estado da Índia* dates back to the early 1500s, when the Portuguese acquired a few strategic sites (Goa, Malacca, and Hormuz) as part of their goal to replace the Italian cities in the profitable role of middlemen in the Asia-Europe spice trade via the Cape route. As an economic system, however, by the 1530s *Estado da Índia* depended heavily on intra-Asian shipping routes that linked port cities such as Malacca, Hormuz, and Mozambique to the main port of the *Carreira* (Cochin), carrying pepper, spices, and other commodities to be loaded onto the *Carreira* ships (Schwartz 2007, 26–27; Pearson 2007). The growing involvement of the Portuguese in intra-Asian port trade had been carved out through naval power and by eliminating competition from Muslim merchants. A complete monopoly of trade and navigation in the Indian Ocean was never enforced, but the *Estado da Índia* was nevertheless marked by an endemic state of war, mirrored in a string of factory-fortresses scattered from East Africa to Malacca and in permanent warships patrolling the seas. In those trading stations, royal officials were entrusted with supervising the royal monopolies over the intra-Asian trade of pepper, cinnamon, and nutmeg, among other products, established in the early decades of the sixteenth century. Private trade was, however, built in the system from the onset, with the result that many *casados* (settlers) and soldiers residing in Portuguese-controlled settlements were engaged in this intra-Asian trade.

By the mid-sixteenth century, the crown withdrew its direct

participation in regional trade, transforming some of the monopolies into regional *carreiras* and concession voyages, given as reward for military services or contracted out to private individuals (Subrahmanyam 1993, 137–142; Disney 2009, 155–157). Although bringing new opportunities to private entrepreneurs in the state-controlled trade, intra-Asian trade remained the most important single source of revenue of the *Estado* thanks to the collection of custom duties and to the enforcement of a system of licences (*cartazes*). Sold for a specific fee, the *cartazes* equated to a protection cost and granted Muslim allies safe passage across the Indian Ocean, provided they called at one of the Portuguese-controlled customs houses, being Goa, Diu, Hormuz, or Malacca. Not surprisingly, by 1580s customs duties amounted to 60% of the crown's total revenues in Asia, while ca. 25% derived from land rents, which is a reminder that land occupation was not absent from the *Estado da Índia* (Matos 1994). Recent studies have, in fact, brought attention to the fact that the incorporation of a handful of territories (Goa, Bassein, Daman, Ceylon, and Mozambique) led the Portuguese to create a framework for the regulation of land issues. In contrast to the *sesmarias*, largely used in the Atlantic Islands and Brazil, in Asia the Portuguese resorted to the juridical framework of emphyteusis, which proved flexible enough to translate the pre-existing land tenure system and to accommodate the goals of the colonisers. Indeed, by acknowledging overlapping rights to the same plot of land and its produce, the emphyteusis was better suited to regions where a well-defined set of property rights already existed and where colonisers aimed at collecting land revenue rather than exerting direct control over agricultural production (Serrão and Rodrigues 2012). The *prazos* system bears witness to a legal hybridity that characterised land regulation in Bassein, Daman, and Mozambique (Rodrigues 2013; Miranda 2014).

After 1590, fierce competition from the Dutch and the English, as by several Asian potentates, led to the loss of ports and strongholds and to a serious decline in trade operations, with the worst losses occurring between the 1620s and the 1640s. The Portuguese Crown kept a few disperse settlements (Mozambique, Goa, Daman, Diu, Timor, and Macao), but by then Lisbon's attention had long shifted again to the Atlantic, thanks to the rise of the Brazilian sugar economy in late sixteenth century. Brazil's colonisation had been a protracted affair that stands in contrast to the rapid pace of Spanish settlement in the New World. A comprehensive program of occupation only took shape in the 1530s, with the creation of 14 donatorial captaincies,

following the model successfully used in the Atlantic islands. By 1570, sugar cane production was expanding fast, as the number of sugar mills multiplied in the captaincies of Pernambuco and Bahia. In the first decade of the 1600s, Brazil produced ca. 735,000 *arrobas* a year and the output kept rising to reach between 1–1.5 million arrobas in the 1620s, a level that would not be surpassed until the mid-eighteenth century (Schwartz 2004). This growth was driven by rising prices in Europe and supported by capital investments from Portuguese merchants, but sugar mills were also funded by investors from elsewhere in Europe, notably from the southern Low Countries. Enslaved Amerindian labour was used to work on *engenhos*, which also existed in the Spanish Caribbean, but it declined rapidly, more so than in Spanish America, for reasons related to opposition from Jesuit missionaries and to their extremely high mortality rates. When Portugal gained a foothold in Luanda (1575), African slaves from Angola began replacing native labour in the *engenhos* (Schwartz 1985).

Linking Brazil and Angola, sugar and slaves thus formed the basis for the trade networks of the second phase of the Portuguese Atlantic system, which emerged by the end of the sixteenth century (Mauro 1983). Between 1600 and 1620, this complex yielded significant profits both for the crown, through taxation, and to colonists and merchants. In the following decades, the sugar economy would suffer changes as Portugal was dragged into the military conflicts that opposed Spain and the Dutch Republic in the Eighty Years War (1568–1648). Warfare and the emergence of competing supply markets in the Caribbean were among the pressures faced by Atlantic complex. Yet, peace with the Dutch (1661) created conditions for recovery, mirrored in the diversification of agricultural output, which included tobacco. By the end of the seventeenth century there was no doubt that Brazil was the cornerstone of Portugal's imperial activity.

The Spanish American colonial system differed significantly from the Portuguese Atlantic system, both in its main features as well as in its historical evolution. Despite containing regions suited for the production of tropical cash crops, the Spanish would only develop a large-scale plantation system in their Caribbean islands later than the Portuguese. This different situation had to do with such factors as the Spanish focus on the production and exportation of bullion, the initially limited labour supply of African slaves—in comparison to Portuguese—in Spanish Latin America, and the expansion of agricultural production and a proto-industry of textiles, ceramics and

metal objects, among other manufactured products.

Spaniards laid the economic basis of its American empire during the first half of the sixteenth century, parallel to the conquest of the discovered lands. The initial settlements of Spaniards in the Americas were in Cuba and Hispaniola. From the Caribbean, Spanish conquerors violently and quickly overthrew the most powerful pre-Hispanic empires of America—the Aztec Empire in Mesoamerica, and the Inca Empire in the eastern area of South America. In 1519, Hernán Cortes left Cuba bound for the coast of Yucatán. In 1521, he had already conquered Tenochtitlan, the capital city of the Aztecs. Francisco Pizarro, alongside Diego de Almagro and the priest Hernando de Luque, led the conquest of the Inca Empire. In 1533, Pizarro dominated Cuzco, and two years later the Spaniards founded Lima. The two leaders knew how to exploit the political differences within both empires and to align the enemies of Aztecs and Incas with their purposes. Mexico City-Tenochtitlan and Lima became the two capital cities of two Spanish Viceroyalties in America, New Spain and Peru, respectively.

During the early years of the exploration and conquest of America, the *Capitulaciones* of Santa Fe regulated the Spanish settlement in the new lands. According to them, the crown got half of the newly conquered territories, and Columbus, who was appointed viceroy of the new lands and whose titles would be heritable, would obtain a tenth of the wealth produced by the new lands. Furthermore, the *Capitulaciones* drew a model of conquest similar to that of the Portuguese, a model based on the establishment of trading posts. However, once the conquest of the main indigenous centres of power came to an end in the 1530s, the model of settlement changed. Charles V & I, Holy Roman Emperor and king of Spain, was able to prevent that the conquerors became feudal lords of American lands (Céspedes del Castillo 2009, 26–82).

As soon as Castilian conquerors realised that the discovered lands were neither Catai (part of present-day China) nor Cipango (Japan), they redefined the economic purposes of their enterprise. The major goals of the Spanish conquerors and their descendants became agricultural production and rent-extraction. In this context, it is worth considering the main forms of land and labour exploitation and how they changed over time. Initially, in the late fifteenth and early decades of the sixteenth century the enslavement of indigenous people (*naturales* or *indios*) extended over the territories controlled by the conquerors (Zabala Vallado 1981). Parallel to enslavement, other

forms of forced labour over indigenous extended and ended up overshadowing enslavement. One of the most important was the *encomienda*. Following the Spanish model of *encomienda*, American indigenous paid an *encomendero* a tribute, either in kind or in services or, more rarely, in cash. In return, *encomenderos* had to protect and guarantee the evangelisation of their *encomendados*. Although the *encomienda* of tributes in service was abolished in 1532, the *encomienda* of tributes in kind was maintained throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were some 600 *encomiendas* in New Spain, among which those of Nueva Vizcaya and above all the valley around Mexico City were the most important, and 500 in Peru, where Spanish conquerors and their heirs inherited *encomiendas* in the jurisdictions of Lima, Bogotá, La Plata, Quito, Chile, and Buenos Aires (Elliott 2015; Gibson 1964; Cramaussel 1992; De la Puente Brunke 1990). In the case of Peru, the coerced labour regime known as *mita*, which consisted in annual labour service granted to the king, continued during the colonial era and overlapped with the *encomienda* system. Another relevant form of forced labour was the enslavement of African peoples, who became the basis of the economy of plantations in the Caribbean (Philips 2011, 325–349; Eltis 2000).

Not all was forced labour in America. There was free labour in agricultural work, which grew over the sixteenth century as the demographic catastrophe that caused the conquest provoked a continuous demographic fall in each American region (Borah and Cook 1971, 1974, and 1979). Workers at mints and tobacco and earthenware factories were free workers. In the main cities of America, apart from artisan guilds to produce textiles and ceramic, there were *obrajes* – workshops that produced manufactured products such as wool, cotton and linen textiles, metal objects, and gold and silver objects. One or several European or Creole proprietors owned the *obrajes*, where indigenous massively worked in varied conditions—from waged labourers to forced workers who had been punished for crimes or must work to redeem debts. The rise of *obrajes* initially fostered imbalances in the Spanish Atlantic trade system, as their final product was commercialised in the American markets, which did not stop growing during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The spread of manufactured goods such as textiles, which had been produced in *obrajes*, limited the importation of Iberian textiles in America. Iberian producers, who had seen the market opening of America as a great opportunity, were adversely affected by the success

of this colonial proto-industry (Romano 2004, 159–241; Miño Grijalba 1993; Lorenzo Sanz 1986, 440–441). Last but not least, mining—especially silver mining—deserves a special mention because of its importance in the international economy of America. Silver mines were privately owned and worked by indigenous populations. However, owners had to pay a 20% tax (*quinto del rey*) over the value of gold and silver to the crown. Zacatecas in the Viceroyalty of New Spain and Potosí in Peru became the leading producer silver mines in America, especially after 1550, when the introduction of the patio process in the extract of silver, based on the use of mercury amalgamation to remove silver from ore, cheapened the production costs (Bakewell 1971, 1989; Lacueva Muñoz 2010). As a result, Spanish American silver production and transmission became one of the most important factors in the growth of the American economy during the seventeenth century. Even though silver coins barely filtered into the everyday economy of the majority of the American population, silver production fostered the economic growth of such important sectors as regional commerce and international trade of the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru (Romano 2004). It is worth noting that silver was not the only driving force in the rise of Spanish American economy, because there were many others—growth of Creole and Iberian population and end of the indigenous demographic fall, agrarian production growth, proto-industrial expansion and specialisation, and expansion of credit and improvement of credit techniques (Miño Grijalba 1993; López-Cano and Valle Pavón 1998).

In the Philippines, Spaniards developed labour and agricultural systems similar to those of America. Although Iberians had stepped on the Philippines in 1521 for the first time, Spaniards did not conquer the islands until the last third of the sixteenth century. In 1565, the American expedition headed by Miguel López de Legazpi and Andrés de Urdaneta discovered the Kuro Siwo ocean currents, which allowed them to sail back to America across the Pacific Ocean. After several years of conquest, the Spaniards controlled the island of Luzon, and partially that of Mindanao and other minor islands of the archipelago (Phelan 2010). The archipelago became a General Captaincy of the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Following the colonial Mexican model, the Spanish conquerors divided the native units of settlement (*barangays*) into new forms of settlement, which facilitated the extraction of tributes from natives through the *encomienda* (Hidalgo Nuchera 2002, 75–86; Alonso Álvarez 2002, 37–48).

To sum up, the economic structures of the Iberian empires in Asia

and the Atlantic were shaped by different pre-existing conditions in different local contexts, to which the Portuguese and the Spanish responded with different institutional solutions. Not surprisingly, some main features were remarkably distinct. Based on donatorial captaincies, *engenhos* (sugar mill), and on an enslaved labour force, the Portuguese Atlantic system was more market-oriented from the onset. The Portuguese benefited from an international network of investments and sought to produce tropical products for Europe and Africa. In the case of Spanish America, the exports to Europe in the sixteenth century consisted mainly of highly valued products, such as precious metals, given that the plantation economy and the production of such commodities as sugar and tobacco in the Caribbean remained a relatively small-scale operation until the late seventeenth century.

Similarly, the Iberian colonial offshoots in Asia also carved out significant distinctions between them. Portuguese Asia with its string of fortresses and strongholds was an enterprise based on trade and tax collection and, as such, stands in contrast to the territorial settlement of the Spanish in the Philippine Islands. Nevertheless, the institutional framework that shaped the land tenure system in both empires in Asia presents a striking similarity. Indeed, the institution transferred to the Philippines, an adaptation of the New Spanish *encomienda*, bears a resemblance to the *prazos* system that characterised land regulation in Bassein, Daman, and Mozambique, in that both aimed at rewarding military services and translated into the collection of land rents.

Iberian connections and global trade

The economies of the Iberian empires depended on maritime networks that connected the home countries with their overseas territories, while also linking the latter with one another. The Spanish *Carrera de Indias* and the Portuguese *Carreira da Índia* were the major shipping routes, through which not only commercial exchanges but also the circulation and movement of people took place. Linking New Spain with the Philippines, the trans-pacific trade conducted by the Manila Galleon (*Galeón de Manila*) became a third long-distance commercial axis in the Iberian worlds in the late sixteenth century. Although these three commercial routes were institutionally independent, porosity between them and participation of Portuguese in the Spanish commercial system was persistent. Given the significance of trade, it is

worth pointing out from a renewed perspective how the organisation and connection of the Spanish and Portuguese commercial systems, and silver trade, articulated both empires during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

For the early modern period, the Portuguese colonial trade is often depicted as an almost complete monopoly, run by state institutions by which earnings of the exchanges were mostly channelled to the crown's coffers. The *Carreira da Índia* is usually brought up as the best example to illustrate this notion. For one, the crown held monopoly rights over pepper and spices imports, while also claiming exclusive rights over the Cape route. As such, trade with Asia hinged on several restrictions: Lisbon was the staple port city, shipping was organised by the crown and vessels sailed under a compulsory convoy system. The most important institution for Asian trade, the *Casa da Índia*, was entrusted with organising shipping and trade in Lisbon, while a shipyard (*Ribeira das Naus*) and a warehouse (*Armazéns de Guiné e Índia*), both managed by royal officials, provided support to the *Carreira*. Like the Spanish *Carrera de Indias*, however, the Portuguese Cape route gave ample room for private trade operations, carried out by merchant networks operating in free competition. Private merchants traded in non-monopolised goods, and the value of their share carried in the *Carreira*'s carracks increased over time (Boyajian 1993, 29–52; Costa 2013). Until the mid-century, the cargos were mainly composed of pepper and other spices, with yearly averages of imports amounting to 35,000–40,000 *quintais* (1 quintal = 58.7 kg), but the amount of pepper imports decreased in the following decades (Costa et al. 2016, 81). This fall, which coincided with a rise of shipping costs and a decline in the rate of returns, was compensated by a shift in the structure of the cargos. Indeed, by the end of the sixteenth century, the *Carreira* showed a growing openness to private capital, eventually becoming a supply line for Asian textiles, namely Chinese silks and Indian cotton fabrics. Such a shift is intrinsically connected with an expansion of the slave trade in the South Atlantic, underpinned by increased demand for labour, both from the Portuguese and Spanish Americas. Given that cotton textiles were bartered for slaves, this shift provides evidence that the Cape Route became a conduit for trade flows with a global scope (Costa et al. 2016, 84).

Like the Portuguese *Carreira da Índia*, monopoly is the term normally used to characterise transatlantic Spanish trade. Monopoly must be understood here in its early modern context. Until the

eighteenth century, the *Carrera de Indias* trade was based on three pillars: (i) exclusivity of the staple port of Seville in Spain to trade with America, in the peninsula, and the staple ports of Havana in Cuba, Veracruz in New Spain, and Nombre de Dios-Portobelo in Tierra Firme, to trade with Spain, in the Americas; (ii) access to trade with the *Indias* was an exclusive right of the merchants' guilds of Seville—which had been established in 1543—Mexico City—founded in 1592, and Lima—created in 1613; and (iii) shipping was organised on the basis of a convoy system, whereby two annual merchant fleets—convoys—sailed from Spain to America and then made a return journey—one to New Spain and another to Tierra Firme-Perú. In addition to the merchant guilds, which ensured access to trade, served as a mercantile court for guild's members, and fixed the price of freights (*fletes*), the other institution that regulated the *Carrera de Indias* was the House of Trade (*Casa de la Contratación*). Founded in 1503 and state-run, the House of Trade organised trade and shipping in Seville, while fulfilling several other tasks such as collecting custom duties, registering immigrants, licensing captains, and functioning as royal warehouse and sailing school. The crown not only participated in trade but also collected import and export taxes (*almojarifazgo*) to fund the institutional operations that kept the *Carreira* alive. Ships of the *Carrera de Indias* were built in royal shipyards located in northern Iberia, but shipbuilding expenses were covered by merchants through the *avería* tax (García-Baquero González 1992). In light of English and Dutch commercial companies operating in Asia and America, traditional scholarship portrayed a negative view of the Spanish transatlantic system that preceded the “free trade” policies of the second half of the eighteenth century, because of its monopolistic nature. However, recent studies are offering a different interpretation. New research is emphasising that the number of participants in the Spanish transatlantic trade was larger than any definition of monopoly might denote. Many more merchants than the strictly allowed to trade, which is to say the members of the merchant guild, actually participated in trade (Cachero Vinuesa 2010). Furthermore, Baskes (2013) has recently argued that the fleet system proved to be a rational and effective structure at lowering the riskiness stemming from the unpredictability of supply, the danger of market saturation, and military threats.

Alongside the number of participants in transatlantic trade, new research is also looking into the formation of business partnerships (*compañías de comercio*) among *hombres de negocios* (businessmen) as

part of their strategies of operating in transoceanic circuits. Apart from merchant families who rose by making profitable businesses, ennobling their lineage and buying rural properties, people from different social sectors, especially relatives of emigrants living in America, seamen, and petty sellers, also invested in transatlantic trade (Vila Vilar 1991). How could these non-necessarily rich people invest in such a risky enterprise? The way these businessmen from America and Iberia found to lower riskiness in long-distance trade was the deployment of monitoring strategies to control investments. They resorted to the agency of sailors and traders travelling across the ocean to collect debts and information, which enforced the control and knowledge of the state of markets (Cachero Vinuesa 2010).

The main import product in Spain from America was silver from the mines of Zacatecas in New Spain and Potosí in the Viceroyalty of Peru, which served to articulate international trade within Europe and between Europe and Asia, and to finance the political structure and wars of the Habsburg Crown. Other products such as hides, cochineal dye, indigo, cacao, chocolate, sugar, and tobacco also arrived in the port of Seville from America. In exchange, merchants from Seville—and merchants from other European cities who used Sevillian merchants as front men—exported textiles, wheat, and wine to America (Lorenzo Sanz 1986). During the sixteenth century, growth of transatlantic trade was spectacular. Between 1503 and 1610 the number of ships and tons crossing the Atlantic went up by a factor of 5. Furthermore, according to official data of the House of Trade, silver imports in Seville did not stop growing until ca. 1610 (Oliva Melgar 2005; Hamilton 1934). From the 1610s onwards, official data show a drop in all trade indicators. For many decades, the interpretation of that declining pattern in transatlantic trade has been debated among scholars. In contrast to those who interpreted the fall during most of the seventeenth century in terms of crisis (Chaunu 1956, 1136–1296; García-Baquero González 1994, 115–135), today most historians agree that the fall in trade, as observed in the level of tax collection, was not a crisis of trade, but a crisis of the Spanish monopoly on the *Carrera de Indias*. English and Dutch growingly and illegally traded in the Spanish routes and Seville itself, and, for obvious reasons, these exchanges were not recorded in the tax accounts (Oliva Melgar 2005).

Differently from the Portuguese *Carreira da Índia* and the Spanish *Carrera de Indias*, trade with Brazil was conducted freely by private merchants from the onset, with connections extending to several port cities in the home country (Lisbon, Porto, and Viana). However, the

system excluded the participation of foreign merchants since 1605, when the crown explicitly extended already existing restrictive laws to commercial relations with Brazil. Against the backdrop of the global struggle against the Dutch, the situation changed. Coinciding with the chartered trading Company of Brazil (*Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil*, 1649–1663), which received the monopoly over the commerce with Brazil including the supply of African slaves from Western Africa, a compulsory convoy system was put in place for the trade flows with the three main Brazilian ports—Bahia, Pernambuco, and Rio de Janeiro. Given that the organisation of the fleets was organised in Lisbon, the capital became the staple port for trade with Brazil and indeed for the whole Portuguese colonial trade, considering that it was already playing this role for the Cape route since the early sixteenth century. The Company of Brazil went out of operation in 1663, but these restrictions, together with the exclusion of foreigners, remained in place and were a central feature of the Portuguese colonial trade until 1810.

The interconnectedness between both empires becomes evident when we zoom in on the role played by individuals and their networks in acquiring and transferring resources across borders. For one, during the Union of the Crowns, many of the approximately 2,000 Portuguese established in Madrid were active in the *Carrera de las Indias*, probably accounting for about a fifth of its total business volume (Boyajian 1993, 43–44). Within the different component parts of the Iberian empires, merchants' interests, identities, and juridical barriers determined the relationship between Spaniards and Portuguese and although their relation in Asia oscillated between collaboration and conflict, permeability across frontiers of the two empires grew during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Herzog 2014, 141–155; Centenero de Arce and Terrasa Lozano 2008, 289–302; Subrahmanyam 2007, 1359–1385). In the New World, Portuguese migration streams to Spanish America—such as Cuzco and Lima—bolstered the economic fusion of the two Iberian Americas, a fact that is mirrored in the popularity of the *peruleiros*, merchants of Portuguese origins with business dealings in southern Peru. Considering that they sought silver, their role was vital for sustaining economic transactions in Portuguese America. From the late sixteenth century onwards, a thriving contraband linking Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro involved slaves and sugar, bartered for considerable quantities of silver, provides evidence for the economic complementarities between the Rio de la Plata basin and South-eastern Brazil (Alencastro 2000;

Canabrava 1984). Furthermore, trade between America and China across the Manila Galleon route was as much a Spanish as a Portuguese enterprise, even though trade between the Portuguese port of Macao and the Spanish *entrepôt* of Manila was supposedly forbidden. Some of the most prominent Portuguese merchant families of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shaped commercial networks which went from Portugal to America across Melaka and Macao. In fact, some of the Portuguese who financed commercial exchanges of Chinese silk for American silver between New Spain and the Philippines across the Pacific Ocean were members of the same families—Gomes Solis, Fernandes Ximenes, Fernandes do Brasil e Tinoco, Frias de Salazar—who lived in Asian ports and in such American cities as Mexico City (Boyajian 1993, 64–85). In doing so, Portuguese trading families became truly globalising agents across the Iberian empires during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Silver bullion played an inescapable role in the rise of Iberian empires during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Since the patio process of silver extraction was invented in the mid-sixteenth century, American mines became the main producers of silver, followed by Japanese silver mines, in the world. Motivation for silver production in the sixteenth century is inextricably connected with China's voracious demand for silver, in the aftermath of the disintegration of its paper-money system (Von Glahn 1996, 48–70). International trade became driven by a 100% price premium for silver within China, which led most merchants of the world to ship substantial quantities of silver to China, in exchange for Chinese goods. Despite some changes comprising the crisis of the Ming dynasty and the fall of Chinese silver value in the 1640s, this pattern continued until well into the eighteenth century (Flynn and Giráldez 2002, 391–427; Flynn 2015).

Thanks to silver, Portuguese and Spaniards became the pioneers in the development of the world system trade by connecting American trade with European and Asian commercial routes. For one, Spanish America was the world's main producer of silver in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Furthermore, both Spanish and Portuguese were actively involved in shipping American silver to China, either through the Manila Galleon or the Cape route. In addition, for a few decades the Portuguese served as middlemen for the export of Japanese silver to China, by way of the “great ship of Amacaon”, until they were replaced by the Dutch in the 1630s (Boxer 1959, 7). English and Dutch commercial companies and traders displaced Iberians in

Asia and the Caribbean as the main European traders during the seventeenth century. However, the English and Dutch entrance into world trade was paved by sixteenth-century Spanish and Portuguese commercial expansion. Indeed, aspects like the Iberian sailing expertise, their opening-up of new commercial routes, their institutional responses to new economic challenges, and American silver production as well, formed the background for the English and Dutch empire-building and trade boom from the mid-seventeenth century onwards (De Vries 2003).

Empires and domestic economies

It is common to present the Iberian colonial ventures as missed opportunities—or, at least this is an oft-cited judgement which is rooted in nineteenth-century imperialism and based upon mercantilist policies that regulated intercontinental trade in the seventeenth century.¹ It is taken as given that colonies should supply raw materials to the mother country and, in turn, serve as protected markets for the mother country's manufactured goods. Yet the Iberian empires of the sixteenth century were not conceived of in this way, nor do they entirely fit within this model. Throughout most of the sixteenth century, overseas demand for European products in the Portuguese empire remained very weak. On the one hand, the colonial population was very small and grew only slowly in Brazil, whereas any effort to inculcate amongst the native Indians a taste for European habits of consumption depended upon a process of acculturation that proved very slow and complex. On the other hand, trade with Asia was conditioned by the fact that Asians wanted very little of what Europeans had to offer, due to their highly developed industrial centres. The Spanish empire faced similar conditions. Until at least the middle of the sixteenth century, it is difficult to think of a powerful pole of demand for European industrial products in the new worlds (Yun-Casalilla 2018). For a number of reasons, the Spanish did not systematically try to substitute original American industries. The Amerindian population was decimated, with catastrophic consequences, while emigration from Castile was relatively slow, so that by 1580 there were around 115,000 Spanish in America. Because of their habits of consumption, these groups formed the potential demand for peninsular manufactures. But, despite being significant in other senses, this market was not the panacea which it has often been

taken to be. Furthermore, for the Iberian monarchies the overseas trade mattered mainly because of its fiscal role. Indeed, central governments were more concerned in increasing revenues from custom duties or monopoly rights over certain colonial goods, than in developing markets into which domestic products could be exported. This was also the reason for the interest in mining and why the shipments of precious metals—first gold, later silver—fed the fundamental part of the imperial system (Hamilton 1934). These were empires based upon a rationale, perhaps flawed in the eyes of today's economists and protectionist politicians, but consistent in the context in which they acted.

The result was that, even if until 1570–1580 levels of emigration were notable, especially in the Spanish case, this was not, however, sufficient to generate a strong overseas demand for Iberian manufactures. Moreover, the influx of American silver coincided with a rise of demand in the peninsula, which contributed, together with urbanisation and demographic pressure, to a revolution in prices—an inflationary process—without precedent. International merchant networks were greatly strengthened: the Portuguese Jewish networks, which were increasingly influential in Brazil, Asia, and the north of Europe (Boyajian 1993; Studnicki-Gizbert 2007), and the networks of Castilian, German, Flemish, and Genoese traders, who formed a genuine “international republic of money”, upon which the financing of the international policies of the monarchy also depended. From this point two processes, seldom directly linked, took place from 1560–1580 onwards. The first originated in the American mining boom, which fed a rising tide of silver into the global economy and encouraged the development of the American plantation economy, which in turn brought about a greater demand for European products and an intensification and diversification of Atlantic commerce (Phillips 1990). The second major process consisted in the intensification and diversification of the Euro-Asian trade facilitated by the inflows of American silver. Both processes united to the extent that they coincided with the Union of the Crowns (1580), even if this was just one episode among many and did not constitute the only driving force of the process (Yun-Casalilla 2018).

Overall, the impact of the transoceanic trade flows on the Iberian domestic economies is a topic on which little consensus has existed among scholars. According to many, the colonial system produced mainly negative effects on the home economy, while others have been toning down this perception by underlying some of its positive

impacts in the domestic economic sectors. Framing the discussion within a comparative economic history of empires, recent estimates have shown that the input of resources and goods from the overseas possessions impacted positively on the domestic economies of the Iberian peninsula in that they contributed to keeping real wages at a higher level and to promoting urbanisation (Costa, Palma and Reis 2015; Palma 2016). However, the benefits from empire differed significantly across time and space. In the sixteenth century, at the height of the Asian imperial trade, the contribution to Portugal's domestic economy was very small, which might be surprising given contemporary descriptions of the riches accruing from the *Carreira da Índia*. Spain reaped even smaller benefits from the empire in the same period, despite the inflows of silver, because the value of per capita trade with its colonies was lower. Both Portugal and Spain's real wage then increased slightly in the seventeenth century, but the returns from empire still produced larger effects in Portugal as opposed to its neighbouring kingdom where they were moderate (Costa, Palma and Reis 2015; Palma 2016). Larger in Portugal or moderate in Spain, the positive impact of colonial trade was ultimately not enough to counteract the economic divergence with the core economies of England and the Dutch Republic which probably opened in late seventeenth century, for reasons that are to be sought in the domestic economic structures ([Chapter 9](#)).

Conclusion

The imperial economies of Spain and Portugal laid the foundations for the worldwide economic performance of both monarchies during the early modern era. Spain and Portugal began their imperial enterprise approximately at the same time and were shaped by similar factors. Not surprisingly, Spain and Portugal's imperial economies shared some similarities, while also showcasing contrasting features as a result of different responses to diverse local conditions.

For one, part of the institutional framework which regulated the Spanish and Portuguese worldwide trade was similar and the crown played a crucial role in defining monopolistic enterprises. However, monopoly here must not be understood from a modern perspective. Both the Spanish *Carrera de Indias* and the Portuguese *Carreira da Índia* shared similar features. The two commercial routes entailed a tight control of the crown by way of staple ports and a convoy system,

while merchants conducted private trade operations in non-monopolised goods. The same could be said about the Manila Galleon (*Galeón de Manila*), even though in this case the concentration of trade in fewer hands was greater than in the *Carrera de Indias* and the *Carreira da Índia*. The Iberian imperial economies were, thus, probably less a monopoly than the trading companies of the Dutch and the English. Furthermore, Spanish and Portuguese merchants conducted operations and transferred resources across the boundaries of their respective overseas territories, notably Spanish America, Brazil, India, Macao, and Manila, providing ample evidence of the interconnectedness between both empires.

Image 21.1 Japanese screen with the image of the Great Ship of Macao

Source: © Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga, Biombo, Namban Art, school of Kano, photographer: Luisa Oliveira/José Paulo Ruas, Direção-Geral do Património Cultural / Arquivo de Documentação Fotográfica (DGPC/ADF), Lisbon, Portugal

As for the dissimilarities, they had more to do with production than with the trade of Asian and American goods. The Portuguese imperial economic system was dual. On the one hand, Portuguese Asia with its string of factory-fortresses and merchant communities depended on pre-established intra-Asian trade flows and on tax collection. With its main Asian *entrepôt*—Manila—Spain could hardly have ever developed a similar system. On the other, Brazil rapidly built its colonial economy on plantations and *engenhos*, in which slave labour became the basis of sugar production, leading to the inclusion of trading stations of West and Central Africa in the Portuguese Atlantic system. In Spanish America, on the contrary, the production and export of bullion and the expansion of agricultural production and a proto-industry of manufactures were predominant, especially during the sixteenth and part of the seventeenth centuries. In spite of the expansion and relative strength of the Iberian overseas enterprise, from the seventeenth century onwards the Dutch Republic and England shot up as main European trading powers and, in due course, their domestic economies would grow at a faster pace than the Iberian peninsula. Nevertheless, Spain and Portugal were successful in keeping vast territories across the world under the same political structure and, thanks to wide-reaching merchant networks, draw returns from them, which ultimately produced positive effects in their domestic economies. This is the reason why the Iberian colonial ventures were not missed opportunities. On the contrary, they marked the path to the opening up of a new historical period.

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CHAPTER TWENTY two

Artistic experiences in the Iberian world, sixteenth–seventeenth centuries



Introduction

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw extraordinary transformations in world art thanks in part to the changes brought about by Iberian voyagers. Artistic production and circulation in the Spanish and Portuguese territories in America, Asia, and Africa involved new and fascinating objects and processes. Each of the various territories where Portuguese and Spaniards established themselves had its own characteristics and in each of them the forms of settlement varied according to attending circumstances. This means, of course, that the artistic and architectural solutions developed in each location were not necessarily similar to those that emerged in other areas. Furthermore, while geography was one of the main variants, the other one was time. The solutions that were deemed valid in the early sixteenth century were no longer necessarily optimal 100 years later. The Spanish and Portuguese understanding of their imperial projects in 1550 did not necessarily survive intact and unchanged in 1680, while the nature of the local societies that had come into contact with them also changed significantly.

Despite the major differences between the contact and colonisation histories of Spain and Portugal in America, Asia, and Africa, there are strong commonalities in the nature of the *processes* regarding the creation of art and architecture in these territories. In the following chapter we will outline the major ways in which artistic production reflected issues of cultural negotiation in the territories of contact and even sometimes in Europe, varying according to both internal (artistic) and external (religious, political, cultural) factors.

If there is one single feature that distinguishes the Iberian expansions from those of other empires later on, it is their confessional nature. The Iberian presence in the New World, Asia, and Africa brought about the Christianisation and acculturation of very diverse peoples inhabiting these parts of the world. Iberian colonisation came with the mandate to transplant Iberian culture, including art and artistic practice, to the new territories. However, as numerous historians have demonstrated, Latin American art is by no means Spanish art in Latin America; neither is the art of the various territories touched by the Portuguese a straightforward transfer of

their European ways. European artistic practices and models had to adapt to the new territories for three basic reasons: first, because the materials and conditions that had informed artistic development in the Iberian peninsula were always different from those found elsewhere, thus thwarting straightforward imitation; second, because the artists working in colonial settings were often indigenous, *mestizos*, or of mixed race, Europeans born and raised outside of Europe, or Europeans whose life and career developed, for the most part, away from Europe; and finally because there were cases in which the artistic traditions of the colonial territories exercised some (and sometimes considerable) influence on the imported European models.

In the process of acculturation, it became evident that the indigenous cultures could and would inevitably bring something to the Iberian cultural models. The resulting negotiation was to a certain extent familiar to Iberians given their prior history of culture contact through the *Reconquista* experience in the Iberian peninsula. Nonetheless, one of the fundamental differences between this precedent and the new, early modern empires was the enormous geographical scope of Christianisation and the concomitant cultural and religious heterogeneity of their inhabitants prior to the conquest. As a result of this diversity, cultural negotiation took on many different forms and looked quite different from place to place.

The processes that have come to characterise these fascinating experiences have been described in various ways, as examples of syncretism, *mestizaje*, hybridity, acculturation, transculturation, accommodation, and cultural translation (Burke 2009; Russo 2014). Intimately connected to these terms is the issue of indigenous agency and the way to describe survivals or continuities from the pre-colonial period, as well as resistance to imposed models, new creations, and the emergence of distinct local traditions (Gruzinski 1993). By contrast to the current variety of approaches and questions raised regarding colonial art, the early twentieth century relied mostly on two extremist and opposing paradigms. The dominant interpretations were of an imperial triumphalist nature, in which the new society and its products (including art and architecture) were seen as Spanish or Portuguese transplants, with the implication that previous cultures had been effectively erased and that the artistic (and cultural) transfer had been complete. There was also a “soft” version of the triumphalist approach which saw the colonial experiences only as fruitful, peaceful, and productive encounters of different civilisations whose differences were systematically resolved in successful synthesis. A

different approach saw the local context as one of indigenous resistance in which conversion was only half baked (“idols behind altars”), paradigms that were first applied to religious history (Taylor 1996, ch. 3). From the 1970s–1980s, these dominant models of study began to change as increasing research demonstrated the extent to which neither theory was entirely satisfactory. In the arena of art history, specific object (and families of objects) histories have been largely responsible for changing the earlier paradigms: the more works of art that are given their due attention, often from a multidisciplinary perspective, the more evident do the variety of responses and experiences involved in colonial art become.

Artistic processes in early contacts

For the Portuguese, Morocco was the first colonial stage. From 1415, Ceuta and then a series of other strongholds were conquered in order to set up a network of fortresses that secured one another. While metropolitan Portugal was mostly at peace for the entire century, major technological changes were taking place in conflict scenarios, especially in Italy, Germany, and Flanders, due to the ongoing introduction and development of fire weaponry. The Portuguese control of such military novelties, which were not yet developed outside of Europe, gave them a great competitive advantage and explains to a considerable extent the success of their early expansion. Morocco functioned as a major laboratory in which new architectural forms were tried and tested in order to adapt old medieval castles to the usage of (and resistance to) canons. Asilah and Azemmour constitute important examples of such experiments that eventually led to the final, modern fortress built in the 1540s, in Mazagon, where the triangular bastion and the principle of crossing fire organised the whole building. While the Portuguese were impressed with the luxury of Moroccan houses, the pragmatic goals of securing the cities and Christianising them made it so that cultural contacts with the proverbial Muslim enemy were almost exclusively marked by rejection. Nevertheless, the military architecture solutions attained in Morocco were exported to all other Portuguese colonies and to metropolitan Portugal itself (Moreira 1989).

Down the Atlantic coast of Africa, which the Portuguese explored throughout the fifteenth century, contacts were established with peoples who for the most part did not spark particular artistic interest

(with one exception mentioned below). The same seems to have happened, from 1500, in Brazil, which formed a kind of white canvas. Pero Vaz de Caminha travelled in Cabral's fleet, in 1500, and authored the first text on the newly found territory. In it, Caminha describes a people without any apparent political order, with no religion, and no material culture to speak of: they have no notion of shame (meaning that they walked around naked), he reported in awe (as did other chronicles about certain areas of Spanish America, especially the frontier zones). Throughout the centuries, the Portuguese had to rely on the raw materials available in the territory (though many were also imported) but were in no way influenced by local material traditions (architectural or otherwise), nor did they try to adopt or adapt any of them (Senos 2007).

The early contact history of art of the Caribbean, where the Spaniards first settled after the "discovery" of Columbus in 1492, is also spotty and, moreover, troublesome, in so far as the period was characterised by death and destruction through conquest and devastating epidemics. Testimony to the devastation in the Antilles is the fact that very little survives of these pre-Hispanic cultures and artistic traditions, such as Taíno art in Puerto Rico. However, as in the Portuguese-controlled North-African territories, it is in the architectural history of the Caribbean that one finds the earliest surviving evidence of artistic endeavours under colonial rule. Although the local population undoubtedly participated in the building projects, little is known or documented about these processes so that this history is mostly about Spanish dominance and the imposition of the Iberian tradition. As in the Portuguese outposts in Africa, the Spaniards placed great importance on erecting fortifications and soon encouraged the construction of churches, hospitals, and palaces as well: ambitious urbanisation, following European renaissance ideals, was underway. From the early years of the sixteenth century, royal decrees were issued urging constructions of a permanent and dignified nature in Santo Domingo, the most important city of La Española and the Antilles (Angulo Íñiguez et al. 1955, Tome I, 79–83; Aguilera Rojas 1994, 137–140). Effectively, starting in the 1510–1520s, the *Casa del Almirante* (the palace for Columbus' son, don Diego Colón), a cathedral and a hospital, all of which followed Spanish models and styles closely, were begun. Although the Caribbean is often overlooked in larger histories of Latin American art and little remains of this early period, with regard to urban development and early building typologies it was a fundamental

laboratory for the more extensive building history to follow in Central America.

Image 22.1 Cathedral of Santo Domingo, 1521–1541

Source: Mario Roberto Durán Ortiz (Own work)/Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 4.0

Early artistic negotiations

For a history of early artistic negotiation in the Spanish Viceroyalties, by which one means to be able to identify active indigenous participation, the first major scenario was the missionary context of the central Valley of Mexico in the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Starting in 1524 and during the first decades of colonisation, the mendicant orders, Franciscan, Augustinian, and Dominican friars, arrived to organise the territory into networks of missions. None of the early churches they built as precarious constructions survives, but by the 1550s–1560s more permanent structures were raised. Many of these still stand today as early examples of the complex and original organisation of artistic production in Latin America (Bonet Correa 2001; Sartor 1992). One of their dominant characteristics is their monumental size. Most of them were built as single nave churches, a design preferred by the missionaries—also in the Andean region in South America (see, for example, early surviving churches there, such as La Asunción in Chucuito and San Pedro in Andahuaylillas) (Gutiérrez 1983; Mesa and Gisbert 1997). The long naves offered a means to clearly and efficiently communicate the religious message from the pulpit and high altar to the entire congregation. This monumentality has been explained in various ways: as a propagandistic tool capable of impressing the local communities and thus aiding in the conversion process; and, as a practical spatial necessity given the elevated number of inhabitants in many of these communities (although the numbers quickly and tragically diminished due to epidemics). At the very least, such arguments indicate that the early churches were ambitious enterprises in which sixteenth-century concepts of magnificence met with missionary aims and aspirations.

Stylistically, the churches in New Spain (classic examples include San Miguel in Huejotzingo and San Agustín in Acolman) tend to combine various traditions, including gothic elevation and ribbed or groined vaulting, often concentrated around the apse, with Mudéjar-style woodwork ceilings in the rest of the church, sometimes replaced

later by classical barrel vaults (López Guzmán et al. 1992). At the same time, some church façades followed the Spanish Isabelline or plateresque style, embroidering a classical frame with sculpted relief details such as vegetal motifs, medallions, pinnacles, and fancy cartouches. The variety of architectural styles was in part the result of adaptation. While professional architects arrived in New Spain early on, they were often itinerant, and the actual execution and supervision of projects was left to the friars and the indigenous builders. Seeking to impress, achieve height and considerable length in these churches, the friars relied on the artistic vocabulary they were most familiar with, the gothic and Spanish late medieval tradition. In addition, both professional architects and friars used prints in renaissance architectural treatises to provide the models for the more splendid parts of their projects, such as the façades (Angulo Íñiguez et al. 1955; Bonet Correa 2001; Sartor 1992). The resulting variety of styles that come together in these churches has sometimes led to discussions of this art as anachronistic or archaic. While it is true that Latin America often fostered greater freedom in the way in which artistic forms coming from Europe could be recombined, regarding this issue it may be helpful to recall that to a certain extent, such heterogeneity was also present in Iberian Spain at this time. It may seem outdated for churches to use gothic elements in the sixteenth century, but some late Spanish cathedrals in the peninsula (Segovia, for example) were also erected with these features (Chatenet 2007).

Although the monastic buildings seem to be the most “Spanish” art of the colonial period, they were in fact built by the local population, and looking below the surface and inspecting details reveals indigenous elements. These are sometimes found in the construction materials and techniques. For example, the local masons must have informed the friars about the benefits of constructing with *tezontle* or volcanic rock as had been done prior to the conquest: used as filler for some walls and vaults, this light-weight stone was well-suited to the highly seismic territory of Central Mexico. There are also churches with stone inscriptions in indigenous languages, such as in the open-air chapel of the Dominican church of St. James the Apostle in Cuilapan, Oaxaca. Here, the inscription records the dates of construction and so seems directed at creating a sense of community through commemoration. Officially, missionaries were supposed to teach Spanish to the local population, but the indigenous languages did not disappear. Although one could interpret such an inscription as a sign of resistance to acculturation, its public nature and visibility

suggests that it was approved by the friars. For this reason, details such as this can also be regarded as indicators of the mendicants' flexibility. They allow one to introduce the concept of collaboration and negotiation as an operational dialectic in artistic production during this period.

If one looks further at the ways in which these churches were decorated, the number of indigenous elements increases significantly. Baptismal fonts carved in stone and atria crosses with symbols of Christ's Passion are often described in terms of syncretism in so far as some of them included pre-Hispanic motifs which must have remained significant to the local populations (or Christian symbols and designs that could also be interpreted as such) (Reyes-Valerio 1978; Lara 2004). Despite the difficulties in interpreting these details and the lack of consensus on the matter, these are eloquent objects, and they facilitate visualising the indigenous hands at work and their successful efforts at interpreting European sources and making Christian art while also maintaining some of their traditions.

The same can be said regarding the mural painting that in the early colonial period in New Spain covered the walls of churches, chapels, and convent communal spaces, such as refectories and cloisters. Mural painting had been practiced widely in pre-Hispanic times. By opting for this kind of decoration, the friars were adapting their needs to the available local talent, materials, and to a certain extent technique, while introducing European style and subject matter. Little of this mural painting remains and much of it is damaged since, after the 1580s, it was mostly destroyed or whitewashed, and chapel decoration began to rely on the gilded wooden Spanish *retablos* or altarpieces. Most of the mural painting decorating the churches and convents followed European print models provided by the friars, another example of how Europe's print culture was crucial for the development of a visual economy in Latin America. Nonetheless, among the surviving examples, there are a few which demonstrate a willingness to innovate by introducing pre-Hispanic motifs to European iconography. In the cloister walls of the Augustinian convent of Malinalco, for example, a luscious Garden of Paradise is depicted, complete with Christian symbols such as grape vines and a serpent. However, it also includes local flora and fauna and Nahuatl words or iconic-script referring to concepts of precious things, sacrifice, and regeneration extracted from Aztec beliefs (Peterson 1993). Such convergences were only possible because of the active participation of local indigenous elites. Although impossible to

reconstruct, the discussions they must have had with the friars about iconography are some of the most intriguing missing links in the art history of this era. Invoking these ghosts here is a means to incorporate the experience of production into considerations about imitation and adaptation to European sources.

The situation regarding issues of culture transfer and negotiation was somewhat different for the Portuguese in Asia. While they were the only ones to sail the waters of the South Atlantic, in the Indian Ocean they faced an already well-established commercial network mostly dominated by Muslim traders. Islam was a well-known religious enemy and as such was severely targeted: mosques were systematically destroyed, and the Muslim cult strictly forbidden. On the other hand, Hindu practices, which the Portuguese encountered in India, were not immediately perceived as a threat. Taxes on Goan Hindus were lowered, marriages between Portuguese men and Hindu women were encouraged, and even Hindu temples were spared almost without exception. In fact, some of the earliest Portuguese testimonies about the Hindu buildings they encountered in India (such as the comments by Viceroy D. João de Castro or the naturalist Garcia de Orta on the temples of Elephanta, near Mumbai) praise them in very flattering terms and even compare them with those of ancient Greece and Rome (Moreira 1995).

Such a climate of coexistence, however, did not have a direct effect on the buildings that were erected (Bethencourt and Chaudhuri 1998; Gomes 2011). While very few in number, the earliest remaining examples (such as the main portal of the Franciscan church in Goa or, in a lower latitude and a different context, the chapel of Our Lady of the Bastion, on the Island of Mozambique) show that *manueline* architecture was exported along with masons trained in Portugal to spread the vocabulary of the motherland in the various parts of the empire.

In Japan, on the other hand, the Portuguese presence was never one of conquest but rather one of negotiation. There, the Jesuits were given the city of Nagasaki, where Jesuit priest Giovanni Niccolò set up a painting school in 1583 (Curvelo 2009). In this specialised school, indigenous male youths, usually of elite extraction, learned the skills necessary for the production of choral books, embroidered liturgical ornaments, and musical instruments. In Niccolò's school young converts were also trained in European oil painting and taught how to use perspective and *chiaroscuro*. Most resulting objects consist of small-scale oratories intended for domestic usage, composed of a

frame that functions like a triptych made of lacquered wood and decorated in Japanese fashion (geometric and vegetal motives in gold and tiny fragments of mother-of-pearl) containing a painted depiction of Christ, Mary, Joseph, or some other religious figure. These works rely heavily on local Asian techniques combined with European materials and representational rules, and Catholic iconography.

As in Japan, community life around the mission churches in the Spanish American Viceroyalties included more than straightforward indoctrination. Missionary churches and monasteries were also centres of knowledge and learning, and the Franciscans were especially active in the establishment of craft schools and workshops as part of their acculturation and Christianisation project both in Central Mexico and also in Quito (Ecuador), among other locations. One of the best examples of how collaboration operated in these schools is Mexican feather painting (Russo, Wolf, and Fane 2015). Practiced widely before the conquest as a sumptuary Aztec art by specialised craftsmen (*amantecas*), feather painting is one of the best examples of the survival and reformulation of a pre-Hispanic art form after the conquest. The technique remained mostly unchanged in this early period, but it was used for the representation of Christian subject matter. The earliest surviving work of this kind is also one of its greatest masterpieces, a small painting of the *Mass of St. Gregory* dated by its inscription to 1539 and intended as a gift for Pope Paul III in order to publicise the success of the mendicant enterprise.

Image 22.2 *Mass of Saint Gregory, New Spain, 1539, feather mosaic with paint and gold on wood, Musée de Jacobins, Auch (France)*

While early interpretations of *Mass of St. Gregory* concentrated on the documentary information provided by the inscription and its technical perfection, which framed it as a clear example of how indigenous hands were able to copy European print sources, recent analysis has turned attention to the unusual presence of pineapples posed on the right ledge of Christ's sarcophagus and suggested that it may be a reference to a special kind of *pulque* (alcoholic beverage) used in pre-Hispanic sacrificial rituals. Gerhard Wolf (Russo, Wolf, and Fane 2015, 82–86) explores this possibility and suggests convergences of beliefs and materiality coming together in this small but magnificent piece. Seen in this light, *Mass of St. Gregory* helps understand how even under European tutelage the indigenous artists were doing more than merely translating prints into paintings and other media. As in the Japanese example from Niccolo's school described above, while contact resulted in the establishment of

schools to teach European art, both works demonstrate the extent to which sources were negotiated and hybridity was inevitable.

Objects, material culture, and global trade routes

It is perhaps in the domain of the decorative arts that the result of cultural contact becomes more apparent. The first objects to have resulted from non-European techniques put in the service of European (often though not always patently Christian) demand were the so-called Afro-Portuguese ivories (Fagg 1959; Mark 2007). Made mostly in Sierra Leone and in Congo, such ivory objects conform to a restricted number of types: saltcellars, spoons, pyxes, and oliphants. They are the result of an artistic, well-established skill that the Portuguese encountered (and recognised) in the Gulf of Guinea and that generated a series of commissions supported by prints and drawings with European iconography (both Christian and secular motifs such as coats of arms) that were incorporated in the resulting objects. The arrival of such objects in Portugal is documented from the end of the fifteenth century and by the 1530s they could be found in Florence, in the Medici collections.

In sub-Saharan Africa the Portuguese established small outposts where fortresses supported commercial activities. But Goa was a completely different endeavour since a whole city and its surrounding territory was subjugated (from 1510) and eventually functioned as the centre of an enormous commercial and political network spanning East Africa and a good part of coastal Asia all the way to Japan. With an ever-growing population that passed 200,000 inhabitants at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Goa became the largest Portuguese city in the world. The need for objects was therefore much greater. While Afro-Portuguese ivories could have been viewed as curiosities, a city such as Goa had substantial needs for objects to sustain everyday life in all of its variety from religious practices to domestic life. Imports were available, but they could hardly meet such vast demand and therefore an incredible wealth of locally produced objects came to life resulting from a variety of processes (Távora 1983; Trnek and Silva 1991; Silva 1996; Carvalho 2008).

Asian-made objects relating to secular life and domestic practices were the most easily adopted by the Portuguese. Small caskets covered in ivory (from Goa or Ceylon/Sri Lanka), translucent tortoiseshell, or small scales of mother-of-pearl (from the Gulf of

Gujarate, in Northwest India) did not require any sort of adaptation to a Portuguese taste that had already become familiar with foreign objects in Africa. In a very straightforward commercial reaction to the new demand, Asian artists often adapted their production to the taste of their new costumers by adopting European shapes (by using hexagonal lids for the caskets or by making multi-drawer *contadores*, for example) and iconography. Here too prints and drawings played a major role and again both religious and secular iconography can be found.

Image 22.3 Gujarati tortoiseshell casket, India, Gujarat. Tortoiseshell with silver mounts

Source: Jorge Welsh Works of Art, Lisbon, Portugal/London, UK

The exact same situation was found later, when the Portuguese arrived in Japan (in the 1540s) and set up in Macao, China (in the 1550s), and was further extended by the arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines and the creation of the Manila Galleon (1565), which connected the Philippines to their American Viceroyalties and eventually Iberia itself, sometimes stopping in Macao or in one of the Japanese ports (until the 1640s, when all Europeans were expelled from Japan). Much of the artistic production of China and Japan was highly valued and coveted by Europeans, often in the way it presented itself immediately, that is, without the need of any adaptation or adjustment. Chinese porcelain, imported by the hundreds of thousands, is the most obvious example but Japanese lacquered objects too were acquired directly from the local markets. In these cases, no cultural negotiation was required. Nevertheless, in China, Japan, and the Philippines, like in Africa and India before them, artists also understood the commercial potential of their new costumers and therefore adjusted part of their production for export in the exact same ways: by adopting new shapes and iconography. Porcelain is a particular case in point because of the sheer volume its trade attained towards the end of the sixteenth century and because of the many (failed) attempts Europeans made to reproduce its creation process up until the second decade of the eighteenth century.

Image 22.4 Saucer dish with the armillary sphere of King Manuel I and the “IHS” monogram, China, Ming dynasty (1506–1521)

Source: Jorge Welsh Works of Art, Lisbon, Portugal/London, UK

Through such trade routes, objects such as Indian, Sri Lankan, Japanese, and Hispano-Philippine caskets found their way to European churches frequently, where they were used to keep relics or

even the Holy Host during Easter celebrations. There are numerous examples in both Portugal and Spain still kept in the churches to which they were originally gifted that show that even when transferred to religious contexts most of these objects did not require great changes. In some cases, minor silver mounts in the shape of cherubs or crosses were added to discreetly Christianise these containers; nothing more drastic seemed necessary.

Eventually, other European costumers became interested in such objects and started collecting them. Examples found in French and Central and Northern European collections tend to show the addition of complex silver mounts, precious stones, and enamelled decoration, suggesting that outside of the Iberian peninsula these objects went through a much more imposing process of Europeanisation. As far as these objects are concerned, cultural negotiation thus seems to be more apparent at the European end of the cycle than at its production and first consumption end (Senos 2015).

Religious imagery and some other liturgical implements necessarily required more adjustments. Ivory was the material of choice in India, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines for carving crucifixes and other images of Christ, the Virgin, and various saints. Because of their nature, the production of such images must have been tightly controlled since they conform, almost without exception, to the dominant Catholic orthodoxy. The same can be said about the pyxes made in Africa or in Japan, or the *nanbam* Bible stands, all of which can also be found in Iberian churches. Each of these families of objects retained stylistic features that make their geographic origin identifiable, but they do not challenge Catholic orthodoxy and seem to result from an Iberian fascination with foreign techniques and materials put through a well-supervised production process.

One type of object resulting from Portuguese contact in India, however, stands out for the originality of its iconography: the sculptural representation of the Good Shepherd. So far, historians have not been able to fully explain or even satisfyingly date the production of this peculiar imagery. In any case, the iconography of the Good Shepherd—representing Christ as a child, wearing an animal skin, half asleep with his legs crossed and surrounded by sheep, sitting on top of a mountain that is itself composed of several horizontal layers in which one finds Mary Magdalene, prophets from the Old Testament, or the pelican feeding its own blood to its offspring, sometimes with a tree crowning the whole composition—is certainly not of European origin as it lends itself to different readings

depending on the point of view of the beholder. Catholics would read it in the way just presented but Hindus (the majority of the original population of Goa) could recognise in it a depiction of Dakshinamurthy, an aspect of the god Shiva who is usually depicted in meditation, sitting under a tree with his legs crossed, surrounded by sages and sometimes wild animals. Even Buddhists (a small minority in Goa but a larger one in Sri Lanka) could recall Buddha's second vision, which took place in semi-asleep state, under a tree (Lopes 2011). The Good Shepherd is therefore undoubtedly the result of the specific hybrid society that emerged in Goa and the product of complex cultural negotiation. It allows us to factor in the process of reception into the history of these objects and acknowledge the way any given work of art can transmit different meanings depending on the audience; while this is a universal truth, reception is particularly complicated for the history of Iberian expansion worldwide given the heterogeneity of viewers in many places. Furthermore, it shows very clearly that, contrary to what the centre-periphery model claimed for a very long time (and sometimes still does), original artistic creation can happen in colonial settings as well.

The orthodox turn

Portuguese tolerance towards indigenous Hindu and Buddhist populations and their practices in India, and the kind of intense artistic collaborations that took place in Spanish America described above did not last long. By the 1560s, as the Council of Trent came to an end, a new sense of stricter orthodoxy was set in place in Goa and its dependent territories. Viceroy Constantino de Bragança captured and subsequently destroyed the relic known as the "Tooth of Buddha", which was venerated in Sri Lanka, deciding to reject the immense ransom, the king of Pegu (in present day Myanmar) was willing to pay for it. Goa, a bishopric since 1533, was elevated to an archbishopric in 1557 and in 1563 its first archbishop authorised a Jesuit church to be built in nearby Margão on the location of a former Hindu temple, the first of several to be erected in similarly Hindu sacred grounds. As previously done during the Reconquista in Iberia, a strategy of substitution with local religions and their temples was also systematically pursued in Spanish America. Only occasionally were parts of the earlier constructions left visible, as in the Church of Santo Domingo (or Coricancha) in Cuzco, Peru. In 1567, the first Council of

Goa approved a series of decrees which amounted, to a considerable extent, to a systematic attack to non-Christian beliefs and practices. Similar church councils were celebrated in Spanish America (Lima 1552 and Mexico City 1555), and new campaigns for the extirpation of idolatry took shape in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, especially in the Andean regions.

In the Portuguese territories and in architectural terms, this turn towards orthodoxy translated into the rigorous adoption of a classical, unquestionably European (and also unmistakably imperial) vocabulary in all newly built churches. The first of these was the Jesuit church of Saint Paul, in Goa, whose ruined remains are still visible, and which replaced the original church (for which we have no visual record) from 1560. Serlio's imagery was of great importance for the stylistic definition of this church where the discourse of the classical orders was rigorously adopted, coffered barrel vaults covered the nave, and one of Serlio's prints closely inspired the main portal; Serlio was also one of the most frequently used treatises in the construction of churches in Spanish America. While Saint Paul was the first classicising church in Goa, it was the cathedral that exerted the greatest influence. In 1562 it was decided that the old church of Saint Catherine, commissioned by Afonso de Albuquerque immediately after the conquest of Goa and functioning as its cathedral since the 1530s, was not splendid enough for the city's newly acquired dignity of archbishopric. Thus a new, magnificent church was commissioned.

Image 22.5Cathedral of Goa, India, 1562–1652

Source: Leena DAlmeida (Own work)/Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 4.0

Its construction, whose chronology remains to be determined with precision, was hazardous and lasted well into the seventeenth century (it was not finished until 1652); likewise, we are uncertain as to the architects in charge or the masons involved (and to the origin of both). In any case, it stands for the newly adopted classical architectural discourse through and through: pilasters and columns abide to the classical orders and support correct entablatures, windows are topped by triangular pediments, and barrel vaults are coffered. The only visible concession to models other than those of the Italian Renaissance consists on the introduction of two towers in the façade (one of which collapsed in the nineteenth century), a feature taken from Portuguese earlier cathedrals, almost all of which have them. In fact, the central section of the façade is directly inspired in one of Serlio's illustrations and the towers were slightly set back in

order not to disturb its balance (Bethencourt and Chaudhuri 1998; Pereira 2005; Gomes 2011).

The strict obedience to the classical discourse is a remarkable feature of this building, which has been called the most classical Portuguese building in the world, even more so than the cathedrals that were built in metropolitan Portugal at the same time. This gives one the measure of the engagement in this new orthodox vocabulary. No less important are the sheer dimensions of the church, the largest ever built by the Portuguese anywhere in the world, again indicating the authorities' commitment to the confessional nature of the empire. Nothing, however, could be more telling than the image set in a niche at the top of the façade, showing Saint Catherine subjugating the *Sabaio*, the Muslim leader of the city defeated by the Portuguese in 1510. Religious tolerance belonged definitely in the past.

The construction of Goa's cathedral continued well into the seventeenth century but the original plan and stylistic options do not seem to have been either abandoned or substantially changed. Classicism remained valid as an architectural discourse for the Portuguese in India. In fact, it had been adopted in several other churches throughout the Portuguese territories such as the Jesuit seminary of Rachol, near Goa or, further north, the church of Saint Thomas in Diu. Moreover, when the Theatines settled in Goa, under the auspices of the Propaganda Fide, and built their church of the Divine Providence (1656–1672), it was to the church of Saint Peter, in Rome, that they turned as a model for their Indian façade.

The period of Mendicant and indigenous collaboration in New Spain (and elsewhere in Spanish America) also began to decline in the 1570s and 1580s for a number of reasons, some analogous to the situation outlined for the Portuguese territories above. These included a shift in Spanish ecclesiastic and royal policy aimed at curtailing the wealth, power, and privileges of the regular church over vast land holdings in the New World, which led to the closing of some of the art schools described earlier. In addition, with the dramatic decline in the indigenous population and the development of more urban centres, there came a rise in the immigration of Spaniards, including many artists and craftsmen. For the indigenous artists, the European arrivals were unforeseen competition. Increasingly, art produced by the Indians under Mendicant guidance was regarded with suspicion and, by the late sixteenth century, many of the earlier mural paintings in Mexican monasteries were whitewashed to make way for Spanish-style *retablos* produced by the new arrivals. The latter increasingly

monopolised artistic production, especially in cities and large towns, and the Spanish clients (and sometimes the indigenous ones too) preferred their work. They also organised themselves legally through the establishment of guilds, and in some craft professions they were able to block access to the highest professional level to their mixed-race and African counterparts and impede easy advancement for the indigenous artists.

Overall, the following period of the seventeenth century saw a rise in the Hispanisation and urbanisation of viceregal society with significant repercussions on artistic production. Architecture remained grounded in European forms, and the major cathedrals erected in the seventeenth century (Lima, Cuzco, Mexico, Puebla, and so forth) show cases of a shift to baroque classicism; however, each in its own way developed signature particularities which spread to the construction of imitative regional churches so that by the end of the seventeenth century, distinct local baroque styles had developed, just as they existed throughout Europe (Bérchez 1992; Gutiérrez 1983; Mesa and Gisbert 1997; Mesa and Gisbert 2005).

In this process of developing local identities, it is interesting to note that the European artists arriving in America were not exclusively from Iberian Spain. The best example of this is provided by the names of three talented Italian painters who worked in the Viceroyalty of Peru towards the end of the sixteenth century: Bernardo Bitti, a Jesuit from the Marche region who arrived in 1575; Mateo Pérez de Alesio, who disembarked in Lima in 1589 and was well received especially because he had painted one of the frescos of the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican; and Angelino Medoro, thought to be of Roman origin, who would start working in Santa Fe de Bogotá upon his arrival in 1586. These painters brought a reformed Italian mannerist vocabulary to the Viceroyalty of Peru and through their local followers—many of them indigenous and *mestizo*—they established a strong pictorial tradition unlike the more Hispano-Flemish style that had developed slightly earlier in New Spain through the arrival of other artists from Spain (Andrés de la Concha and Simón Pereyans, for example). By the 1630s, local schools of art began to emerge, and as the century transpired viceregal artistic traditions, with their own distinct characteristics, crystallised (see, for a general history of colonial painting, Alcalá and Brown 2014). Although traced here through painting, this overall trend extended to all areas of artistic production, including architecture and the decorative arts, which although still understudied, are of impressive originality throughout Latin America.

Towards the formation of local art histories

Local, original creation is an important analytic tool in approaching the artwork throughout the Spanish and Portuguese territories since there are aspects which were neither purely pre-contact or indigenous in nature nor solely rooted in Iberian and European tradition. In Spanish America, certain characteristics developed out of the new missionary context, its challenges, and the capacity of people (Spaniards and Indians) to invent and create from very early on. For the Mexican missionary architecture, one of these early features are the open-air chapels used for exterior ceremonies in the large enclosed atria built in front of the churches. There are only a few known precedents for such chapels in Iberian Spain while in New Spain their recurrence underlines the extent to which a new tradition was taking shape. In addition, the atria in New Spanish mission churches often included four small corner chapels: known as *capillas posas*, they were also not common in Europe.

In the middle Spanish colonial period, as a result of the paradoxical combination of trends described above—an orthodox turn, a willingness to accommodate, and an increasing tendency for a new local art to emerge—the kind of vocabulary and concepts necessary to describe the artistic production are quite different from those of the earlier period. Cultural negotiation still took place in a number of areas, as attested by iconographic developments which are sometimes considered syncretic, such as the emergence of a cult to the Christ Child in certain Andean locations (Cuzco and Potosí, for instance), where his representations in painting and sculpture include the attributes of the Inca (emperor), most notably the crown or *mascapaycha*. While originating already in the late sixteenth century, this cult is also related to the overall Incaisation of images in the Andean region which especially flourished during the second half of the seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century. Sometimes referred to as the “Inca renaissance” (Wuffarden 2005), this pictorial corpus includes portraits of indigenous nobility, representations of local conquest history, and even themes related to miraculous cults (Cummins 1991; Majluf 2005; Mújica Pinilla 2003). As numerous scholars have shown, the new subject matter emerged in part through collaborations between Spanish (for example, Jesuit) and Christianised Inca elites. Overall, in the Spanish Viceroyalties in Latin America, art, and especially painting and the decorative arts, increasingly became interested in the colonial “Indian” as subject matter (Cuadriello 1999;

Estenssoro Fuchs 2005); although the “Indian” represented was an ideologically loaded construct, rarely true to the lived reality of most of the contemporary population. This art was no longer about “contact” situations or accommodation between the conquerors and the conquered. Rather, it was about meeting the diverse needs of a mixed-race society, including its desire for self-representation, and its growing sense of difference vis-à-vis Europe.

In this later period, syncretism is thus rarely the best lens from which to observe artistic developments (with the exception of new mission territories founded on frontier zones [Paraguay and California, for example] or territories where Christianisation met greater resistance). Hybridity is perhaps more appropriate for an understanding of a wide range of objects, especially those often ascribed to the category of the “decorative arts”. As a racially neutral term (and especially in opposition to *mestizo* art), hybridity has the added benefit of bringing the artistic production of Latin America into conversation with objects from around the world that were also produced in response to situations of cultural exchange and contact brought about either through colonisation, diplomacy, or, increasingly, global commercial circulation. It thus allows one to discuss art produced under the Iberian empires in the context of early modern material culture on a global scale.

Among the objects from the Spanish Viceroyalties that belong to this category are ceramics, such as the Talavera ware from Puebla (Mexico) which imitated Chinese porcelain in its blue and white colouring and often exotic designs. Just as Asian craftsmen responded to European interest in their products by adapting European forms and iconography, so too did craftsmen elsewhere in the world respond to the exotic Asian arrivals through processes of imitation and assimilation (Curiel 2009; Pleguezuelo 2003, 111). Talavera ware, however, was not trying to substitute for imported Chinese porcelain; contemporaries distinguished easily between its rougher surface texture and the Asian product (Liebsohn 2012, 30). However, the popularity and massive production of Talavera ceramics attests to the way in which global circulation of porcelain fostered creative responses in local production; in part, it sought to compete with the Asian market but, interestingly, the result was that it contributed to forging a new “viceregal” consumer taste in the process. Japanese folding screens or *biombos*, which arrived in the Viceroyalty of New Spain as diplomatic gifts in the early seventeenth century, and subsequently through the Manila Galleon from other parts of Asia as

well, became so popular that local artists were encouraged to produce their own variety, especially in Mexico. By the late seventeenth century, *biombos* in New Spain were made of diverse materials, techniques, and styles: they ranged from loose imitations of painted Chinese lacquerware with a red colour field dominating the background against which vignettes of daily and festive life—real, imagined, or exoticised—were arranged; to completely Western-style paintings with no Asian elements remaining except for the object format (Sanabrais 2009; Castelló and Martínez del Río del Redo 1970). Further south and into the eighteenth century, in the Andes, the widespread circulation of Chinese silks inspired local weavers to adopt new motifs, such as the mythological winged dragon (*qiling*) and enlarged peonies.

Image 22.6Tapestry with Pelican, Andean, late seventeenth–eighteenth century

Source: The Textile Museum, Washington, DC, USA, 91.504, Acquired by George Hewitt Myers in 1951

Some of the resulting textiles are among the clearest examples of hybridity in so far as the Asian elements are combined freely with the repertory of flora and fauna that had developed in the Andean textiles after the conquest and which also did not derive entirely from European influence (Phipps et al. 2004). Combined with other elements borrowed from European iconography (such as crosses, lions, and Christological pelicans), such textiles reflect the processes of assimilation and resignification which to a certain extent were happening for the decorative arts quite spontaneously and naturally in many parts of the world through greater contact between the continents, especially between Europe, America, and Asia. However, what is also of great interest in this history of art is that all these objects—and many more – are generally easily identifiable as from one region or craft tradition or another. By the late seventeenth century, Spanish American society, multifaceted and multi-ethnic, had come into its own. At the very moment in which the Spanish monarchy was at its most expansive and contact between geographies was at its highest, each region in the New World had developed its sense of self and place, thus weaving its own identity into what were ultimately new art forms.

In the Portuguese realms, orthodox classicism remained valid throughout the seventeenth century, but other options were also formulated from the end of the sixteenth century mostly through the action of the Jesuits. For them, European orthodox styles were not the

most effective way to address the local populations of Asia. They felt that adjustments and concessions to local tastes and sensibilities had to be made and thus they developed accommodation solutions. The Jesuit strategy of accommodation was implemented in various parts of Spanish America as well, and this has been studied in a number of contexts, including the famous Paraguay mission churches or those of the Chiquitos population in Bolivia. Another example is provided by the Inca Christ figure discussed above whose promotion is associated with the Jesuits (Estenssoro Fuchs 2005, 137–141). As the word itself implies, accommodation took different shapes according to location and in this way relates to the concept of negotiation discussed earlier in this chapter for Spanish America. It involved not only imagery and architecture but also practical aspects such as dress codes and ritual practices, for instance. For the Portuguese territories, it was perhaps in India that this need was first felt because of the confrontation between Roman Catholic and Syrian Malabar liturgical practices. The latter were used by a Christian community from the coast of Malabar, in the Southwest of India, that pre-existed the arrival of the Portuguese, also called the Saint Thomas Christians. In their quest to impose Roman orthodoxy, Goan authorities declared the Malabar rite to be heretic, and tried to force the Christians of Malabar to conform to Catholic practices and to accept the authority of the Roman Catholic bishops. The Jesuits, in turn, believed that some flexibility towards such differences would be more effective. At the same time, missionary work in India, from the beginning of the sixteenth century, had created a large population that was no longer Indian, but neither was it entirely European. Thus the Jesuits presided over the creation of a local language that was itself the result of this new society. The earliest architectural experiences took place in Goa, in the Jesuit church of Bom Jesus (1594–1605).

Image 22.7 Jesuit Church of Bom Jesus, Goa, India (1594–1605)

Source: Bikashrd (Own work)/Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 4.0

For the most part, this church conforms with European building and stylistic practices, but its façade displays a taste for dense decoration that is not altogether European, but feels rather closer to what one finds in Hindu temples. No Indian motifs are used but the intensity of this façade's carving makes it very unlike the churches that were built in Portugal (or anywhere in Europe for that matter) at the same time. As the future would show, a local discourse (often called Indo-Portuguese) was in the making. In time, such trends

spread to other parts of Portuguese (Jesuit) India and even beyond. Soon after, the church of Saint Paul in Diu was built (1601–1606), adopting an even more decorated discourse, the same one the Jesuits maintained throughout the following century as can be seen for instance in their church of Saint Anne, in Talaulim (a parish of greater Goa), already dating from the late seventeenth century (1682–1689) (Gomes 2011).

Further East and often in conflict with Rome, the Jesuits persevered on their accommodation approach. Their church in Macao (ca. 1620–1644) is perhaps the most spectacular of the architectural results of such policy. Built on top of a hill, and thus particularly visible, its only surviving component is the stone façade; the body of the church was built in wood and disappeared in a fire in 1835, never to be rebuilt. From a distance, the Serlio-inspired façade with its rich discourse of detached columns and superimposed orders looks European. However, as one gets closer and takes a more detailed look, one starts to see the figures carved on the upper floors, a beast of many heads crushed under the Virgin's feet, a winged demon, a skeleton.

Image 22.8Detail of the façade of the Jesuit Church of Mater Dei, Macao (ca. 1620–1644)

Source: Bjørn Christian Tørrissen (Own work)/Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 4.0

There are even Chinese inscriptions making it very clear that the iconographic program of this façade was meant for a local, Chinese audience not for the Portuguese who lived in Macao, most of which could not speak, let alone read Cantonese. Japan posited a number of specific problems, including a prohibition to build churches. There, the Jesuits were given pagodas to use for their rituals, which they accepted even though these were not necessarily the most orthodox spaces. While certainly less surprising (for today's observer) than the churches the Jesuits built in India or in Macao, the pagodas they used in Japan were perhaps the most extreme spaces in which accommodation allowed the priests to celebrate mass.

In contrast to the processes that took place in the various parts of the world mentioned above, one does not even find traces of accommodation in the art and architecture of colonial Brazil simply because there was nothing the Portuguese deemed worthy of adopting or incorporating. It is therefore frequent to find traveller reports, even contemporary ones, that claim to feel as if in a Portuguese village when visiting the historical centre of, say, Salvador da Bahia (Smith 1949 and 1953; Bury 1984; Whistler 2001). Architectural practices

were transferred from Portugal to Brazil along with the conventions of sculpture and painting, gilded wood carving, and silversmithing. The crowning example of such practices is, perhaps, the culture of tiles, a form of wall covering in which Brazil is particularly rich even though its production was forbidden by law in the territory during the whole colonial period (Senos 2012). The hundreds of thousands of tiles that one invariably finds in Brazilian colonial churches and palaces were all imported from Portugal. Local production did play a major role in the formation of the artistic landscape of the colony, but it tended to follow metropolitan models rather than developing a discourse of its own (Senos 2007). It took a few centuries for Brazil to develop the strong, independent artistic personality that we all recognise today.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the early modern age, Portugal and Spain were two European monarchies that decided to expand their sovereignty beyond the borders of their historical, continental territories. They both did it with a fundamental mission to Christianise and in such endeavours they both had to deal with cultural otherness. In this text we tried to provide a summary of the roles art and architecture played in these processes. As we have seen, there were similarities and even instances of simultaneity, but there was also much variety of processes and artistic results. For a long time, art historical attention was dominated by the paradigm of direct transferal of European models onto the colonised territories; the conclusion was almost invariably that colonial artistic and architectural production was second-rate. More recently, cases of syncretism and hybridisation, accommodation and even resistance have gained more attention, and our understanding of these processes has become much richer and more nuanced. As a result, today an ever-expanding circle of researchers from various fields has at its disposal an extraordinary wealth of images and objects, the products of an astonishing variety of peoples and circumstances, and the testimonies of the extent to which the world really changed in the early modern period.

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Part 3

The eighteenth-century Iberian world







CHAPTER TWENTY three

Enlightened politics in Portugal and Spain¹

Introduction: old kingdoms, new monarchies

During the eighteenth century, the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies, each governed by their recently installed dynasties—the Braganças and the Bourbons—ruled over large areas of territory covering the four known continents. Their origins were ancient ones, but their subsequent evolution was defined by features dating from much later. Spain and Portugal shared many things in common: Catholic faith; territorial domains outside Europe; convergent institutions and dynasties; and many close and intersecting ties between the elites of both kingdoms. To a large extent, in the eighteenth century, the two Iberian monarchies also shared a negative image projected onto them by Europe's political and cultural centres, which attributed the peninsular territories with the stigma of being isolated regions dominated by superstition. In actual fact, such images were a reaffirmation of the Protestant ways of looking at the Catholics, now strengthened and renewed by Spain's loss of its central political and economic importance. To some extent, the reforms of the Iberian monarchies resulted from the incorporation of those images and the attempts to overcome the diagnosed lack of development.

After considering all the differences between the two peninsular neighbours, the question of the Iberian Enlightenments is largely a problem that arises from the general concept of enlightenment that is adopted, and from the acceptance, or not, of the fact that, despite everything, this was a cosmopolitan and unitary movement. The reforms and the reformers had their own particular chronologies. In Spain, a great impetus was provided by the arrival of Philip V in 1701. However, no one would define such reforms as enlightened, not even, for example, those introduced by Melchor de Macanaz. In Portugal, the great impulse was given by the Marquis of Pombal's accession to the government in 1750. And, similarly, his characterisation as an enlightened reformer is still far from being unanimous. On the other hand, it is proving increasingly difficult to uphold the view that the Iberians remained totally on the fringes of the cultural movements of eighteenth-century Europe, in all of their many different expressions,

although it has to be admitted that their subsequent inclusion in this world took place in accordance with each country's own rhythm and historical context. Lastly, it seems difficult not to acknowledge that in the last third of the century these Iberian enlightenments did, in fact, exist, albeit in a more restricted sense of the term.

Bearing in mind all the differences, the Iberian enlightenments seem to have been combined with the reforming initiatives of the two countries' respective monarchies, although without ever becoming confused with them. Some of the essential characteristics of the Portuguese monarchy were already part of the country's long history, while others resulted from the complete rupture with the Spanish Habsburgs in 1640, and yet others derived from the times of the Spanish War of Succession. The years (1640–1668) of the Portuguese wars with the Spanish monarchy in Europe and with the Dutch in the empire had brought some important changes in the short term: the affirmation of an anti-Castilian culture as part of the dynasty's identity (relating to the topic of the "natural king"); the restoration of the "constitution", initially expressed by the summoning of parliament and the reinforcement of the polysynodal system; the predominance of the Atlantic Ocean region and Brazil in the Portuguese monarchy's financial, institutional, and symbolic plans. The official designation given to Portugal and its empire as a whole was constantly changing. "Kingdom(s) and conquests" and then "kingdom and overseas dominions" were the terms that were most widely used. These names reflected the fact that the Portuguese Crown in Europe consisted of just one single kingdom and, at the same time, it indicated the undeniable importance of the overseas dimension, which also meant the State of India, but increasingly the "States" of Brazil and Maranhão. Salvador da Bahia and São Luís do Maranhão were already represented by proxy at the *Cortes* in the second half of the seventeenth century. But it was only in 1815 that the country and its empire as a whole came to be officially called the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarves (Cardim 2012).

In Europe, there did not exist any problem with regard to the integration of territories. Portugal consisted of just one single kingdom, without any political or administrative regions. The counterbalance to the central power was provided by the local authorities, namely the municipal councils, over whose actions the lords of the manor had drastically lost their control and influence, ever since the enthronement of the greatest of them all, the Duke of Bragança, in 1640. The new dynasty had been setting itself up in such

a way as to be able to resist its absorption by the neighbouring monarchy, and, from 1703 onwards, after the Treaty of Methuen and its participation in the Spanish War of Succession, Portugal could also count on its alliance with England. Furthermore, at the turn of the century, the arrival of gold from Brazil led to gradual changes in the political centre throughout the reign of Dom João V (1706–1750), seeking to reinforce the king's authority. The *Cortes* met for the last time in 1697–1698; the Council of State, the fulcrum of what later came to be referred to as an “aristocratic republic” of *Grandeess* (already evident in the last third of the seventeenth century), stopped meeting from 1725 onwards; the offices of the three Secretaries of State (of the kingdom, Foreign Affairs (and War), and the Overseas (and the Navy) were created in 1736, although there remain some doubts regarding their effective functioning. The reforms implemented by its Iberian neighbour necessarily made themselves felt, but their impact was rather a limited one in times of such financial prosperity. The direct exercise of political power by the aristocracy was curbed, but this increasingly restricted group continued to monopolise the revenues of the rents from commanderies of military orders and seigneuries that were distributed by the crown (Monteiro 2003), besides the military governorships, the most important ecclesiastical dioceses and viceroyships in the empire. Furthermore, the reinforcement of the royal power depended on the strengthening of the ecclesiastical institutions that it endowed, together with continued investment in the Holy See, most notably the transformation of the Royal Chapel into the Patriarchal Church of Lisbon and the closer links formed between the king and the Inquisition. That also led to a significant increase in the royal patronage of arts and culture.

At the same time as a scientific culture was being developed with new inspirations, the political criticisms that were made during this period were levelled precisely at the relationship between the royal and the religious power, at education, and, in a more unequivocal fashion, at the Portuguese Inquisition, echoing the European image of this institution, which had been reinforced by such works as those of Charles Dellon (Marcocci and Paiva 2013). The persistent persecution of the New Christians, in particular, lay at the very heart of such criticisms, largely produced by diplomats (like D. Luis da Cunha, cf. Furtado 2012) and other members of the monarchy's institutions, who were sometimes referred to later on by the name of “*estrangeirados*”—Portuguese intellectuals who promoted the circulation of foreign ideas (Macedo 1974). What these critics shared in common was a series of

doubts about the advantages of the commercial Treaty of Methuen signed with England, defending the promotion of manufactures within the kingdom. They considered the influence of the religious orders to be excessive, frequently had a negative perception of the agrarian structures, criticised the performance of the Inquisition and the persecution of the New Christians, sought to change the teaching methods, which some claimed to be dominated by the Jesuits, and denounced the “puritanism” of some families from the high nobility.

In the case of Spain, it is already quite a number of years since historiography ceased to identify eighteenth-century political reformism with the reign of Carlos III. There was a prior (and non-linear) path of development that consisted of the growing conquest of the social space by the sovereign, who was himself converted into the effective centre of the system of government. Such actions were accompanied by the *explicit wish* to expand the administrative apparatus, to tackle the serious financial situation and to set in motion a regalist policy designed to recover royal prerogatives. Elsewhere, intensive propaganda activities based on the circulation of pamphlets and manuscripts, which were typically found in war years, led to an increase in publications and the opening up of public fora for discussion. The crisis of succession and its final solution, the treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt, were foundational events that changed the territorial structure of the Habsburg monarchy, leaving its presence in Europe reduced to its peninsular portion and giving rise to a new system of government from an internal point of view. The Indies, that is to say the kingdoms of the Castilian Indies, “the Islands and Mainland of the Ocean Sea”, and the island territories of Asia and the Pacific, the East Indies, remained intact, albeit with important commercial concessions being made in favour of England. The figure of the king was reinforced as a link between the two parts of the monarchy, America and Spain, until these were both incorporated into one single kingdom in the 1812 Constitution, under the title of Overseas (Bellingeri 2000).

The war (1702–1715) brought an end to the organisation of its many different kingdoms under an almost confederal system that, with the exception of Navarre and the Basque territories, disappeared as a consequence of the dissolution of the Crown of Aragon as a historical institutional whole of medieval origin. This amounted to a radical change in the political model, which forced the key problems to be addressed: a greater centralisation of decision-making and the effective control of a territory which was divided into provinces with

somewhat confused boundaries. The so-called *Nueva Planta* decrees introduced, into the kingdoms of Valencia, Aragon and Majorca, and the Principality of Catalonia, the customs and habits of the Castilian government, but not in a uniform manner, because, although these decrees were punitive, there was behind them a political desire to change a system that many supporters of Felipe V, and therefore of Louis XIV, considered to be inoperative (Orduño Rebollo 2015, 185–201).

Yet behind this *Nueva Planta*, which affected the former Crown of Aragon, there were other plans designed to reform the Castilian institutional apparatus and to admit into it the nobility of Philip V, formed from soldiers, bureaucrats, and businessmen, among whom there was no shortage of Italian or Flemish subjects, as well as French subjects who had arrived with the king or Irish subjects who supported his cause. The first measures to be adopted, between 1713 and 1715, affected the councils, but they proved to be a failure. A solution was therefore sought that would enable the king to govern without their contribution and support. Above all, it was the successive divisions of the cabinet office that had been the key to the dynastic transition, with this being converted into the central hub of the new system in 1714. The nature of its concentration in the figure of one person and its powers over matters of government allowed for greater agility in decision-making, thanks to procedures that involved only a few people who were in direct communication with the monarch, and with business being conducted privately in conversation with the king. There were predominantly five departments – State, War, Treasury, Justice, and the Navy and the Indies, which were run by secretaries and ministers. This reform was instrumental in nature, altering the flow of information, which previously had arrived through the councils, and bringing a radical change in the form of government. The heads of these departments were increasingly less administrative and increasingly more political, complying with the king's wishes, but also guiding them in a difficult balance that depended on many different factors. Only two of them, Carvajal and Aranda, belonged to the high nobility: the rest were *hidalgos*, graduates from one of the kingdom's universities who had been rewarded for their services. Some of them were of Italian origin, such as Patiño, Esquilache, and Grimaldi, or of Irish origin, such as Wall and O'Farrill, and continuity in the post was the norm. There were also many who were promoted from within the institution itself, such as the Marquis of Villárias, Miguel Múzquiz, and Eugenio Llaguno,

among others. In their turn, they amounted to relatively qualified staff who, over two generations, frequented the salons and the court, and formed part of the large group of “organic intellectuals” who worked in the administration (Dedieu 2011, 53–73; López-Cordón 2014, 113–156).

If achieving a stable and non-deliberative government was a key part of this institutional reform, then confronting the serious financial situation was an absolute necessity. In order to carry out this task, Louis XIV sent Jean Orry (1652–1719) to Spain, a jurist who had made a brilliant career as a purveyor of the armies of the French king. He was in Spain on three occasions, 1701, 1705, and between 1706–1713, at the same time that the Marquise of the Ursinos. Although their proposals were hardly initiated, they were the basis of the measures that in this matter were taken between 1714 and 1718. These involved integrating the regional treasuries and the new taxation systems of the former Crown of Aragon, reorganising the Castilian treasury and dividing the various tax revenues into four categories (provincial income and its equivalent, general income, and income from the salt and tobacco taxes), and establishing another system of tax collection with the creation of a general treasury to centralise income. The Treasury Minister was the central hub of this process (Dubet 2008; Dedieu 2014, 161–187).

The measures did not change the bases of the Castilian tax system, but they brought an organisational improvement that increased the short-term collection of taxes. However, by the middle of the century, they proved to be insufficient, since they had not managed to break the monopoly of the local oligarchies and the war in Italy had multiplied expenditure. This brought the need for a tax review, based on wealth and population censuses, just as had been undertaken in Catalonia. With Campillo, the idea began to take shape and in 1749, the Marquis of Ensenada, the Treasury Minister, set it in motion. The *Catastro de la Ensenada*, which was named after him, or the Single Tax, was a large-scale undertaking that did not survive his later exit from the office (Durán Boo and Camarero Bullón 2002, 113–387).

The treasury was the key to solving another pending matter: a territorial organisation that was based on the province. In the Crown of Aragon, there was an automatic transition from a kingdom to a province; in the case of Castile, the organisation was centred around the cities that had a vote at the *Cortes*, but 1718 brought the institutionalisation of the intendants, with 21 being appointed for the whole of Spain, and then, in 1749, the Spanish territory was divided

into 26 intendancies, to which was added that of the Nuevas Poblaciones de Sierra Morena, with Carlos III. These formed the basis for the country's subsequent division into provinces and represented a first step towards reaching an agreement between the distinct territorial institutions (Garrigós Picó 1982, 3–106; Abbad and Ozanam 1992).

In a Catholic confessional monarchy such as the Spanish one, the Church formed part of the government apparatus, although it was, at the same time, independent from this. It legitimised the king, but, without the universal patronage and *restraint* of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, its sovereignty was limited. Without this being a new problem, the peak of absolutism and the reorientation of the Italian policy increased the tension between the two powers in relation to both jurisdictional and economic questions. Despite the failure of Macanaz (1670–1760), prosecutor of the Council of Castile over this period, whose *Pedimento fiscal* served as the guidelines for the negotiation of the first Concordat between Spain and the Holy See, his ideas, which also included the reform of university teaching and the control of the Inquisition, still went ahead (Martín Gaité 1992).

The previous concordats and secret negotiations, led by the Jesuit P. Rávago, the confessor of the king, and D. Zenón of Somodevilla, Marquis of the Ensenada (1702–1781), besides the official negotiations led by the Secretary of State D. José Carvajal and the secretary of Benedict XIV, Cardinal Valenti Gonzaga, were needed in order to reach the agreement signed between Madrid and Rome in 1753. The Pope did not recognise universal patronage as a privilege of the crown, but he accepted its dominion over the ecclesiastical benefices, except for 52 of them, testifying to the fact that this was a grace and not a right. In practice, the king's power over ecclesiastical appointments and benefices was complete. A harsh blow was thus dealt to the financial system of the Roman Curia, although not all the disputes were resolved (Alcaraz Gómez 1995, 505–530).

An abundant political and economic literature on these questions (Uztariz, Ulloa, Zabala y Auñon and Argumosa) shows that there was a good knowledge of the ideas that were circulating around Europe. A better evidence of the circulation in the peninsula of European ideas is the work of the empiricist and eclectic Benedictine Fr. Jerónimo Feijóo (1676–1764), a reader of Bacon, Newton, Gassendi, Descartes, Boyle and Locke, and a user of the dictionaries of Bayle and Moreri. From his monastery in Oviedo, he devoted himself to writing and maintaining an abundant correspondence with scholars and scientists

from within and outside Spain, as well as to writing his essays, largely included in the *Teatro crítico universal y las Cartas eruditas y curiosas*, probably the works most often printed in eighteenth-century Spain. He considered himself to be a “free citizen of the Republic of the Humanities”, thus confirming that not only he, but also his audience, were children of their time (Feijóo 1778, Vol. VII, Disc 13).

The cycle of reforms

In the multi-continental Portuguese monarchy, the beginning of the cycle of intensive reforms was, above all, associated with the reign of Dom José I (1750–1777) and with the services rendered in the different offices of the Secretaries of State by the de facto “Prime Minister”, Sebastião de Carvalho, who was later made the first Marquis of Pombal. His connection with the 1755 earthquake and the subsequent expulsion of the Jesuits and reconstruction of Lisbon was widely reported in the European press of that time. Yet the classification of his measures as “enlightened” is far from unanimous among historians. On one side of the balance, we must consider the unprecedented violence of his methods, legitimised by a new theoretical framework of absolutism and the broader scope afforded to the notion of the “crime of *lèse majesté*”, the suppression of the periodical press and the belated creation of monopoly trading companies at a time when this recipe was already being abandoned in Spain. And to be weighed against this, on the other side, were his anti-Jesuitism, the establishment of the so-called *Diretório dos Índios* (the Directory of Indians), in Brazil, the creation of privileged industries and the Board of Trade, driven by the need to diminish England’s proportional share in the national economy, the education reforms (including the belated introduction of modern natural law at the University of Coimbra), the suppression of the distinction between New Christians and Old Christians, and, in general, his obsession with placing Portugal among “Europe’s most refined nations”. The personal stamp that he imprinted on his actions means that we tend to talk about the “Pombaline period”, and more about the prime minister (in reality, only the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and then Secretary of State for the Home Affairs of the kingdom) than about the king, although the latter’s death led to the removal and trial of his former favourite, who escaped the death penalty that many had foreseen for him. One thing is certain: the concern for, and interaction

with, the European public space were central dimensions of the Pombaline government (Macedo 1982; Maxwell 1995; Monteiro 2008).

Image 23.1Portrait of the marquis of Pombal. 1882? Copy of the original painting by Louis Michel van Loo and Joseph Vernet, 1766

Source: Public domain/Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal

Born in the last year of the seventeenth century, Carvalho did not have any legal training and his first known activity was as a member of the Royal Academy of History, before his surprising appointment as the ambassador to England in 1738, and then later in Vienna. What is known about his political thought before he was made Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1750 is that this was founded on mercantilist precepts, theories of reason of state and readings of modern natural law, but from the viewpoint of international relations. When he joined the government, he was seen by many as a supporter of the Jesuits, since, like these, he was opposed to the Treaty of Madrid, negotiated between the two Iberian Crowns in previous years, which enshrined an enormous territorial expansion of the frontiers of Brazil in favour of Portugal. In fact, his position in relation to the treaty was “ambivalent”: he considered it to be prejudicial to Portuguese interests, as it provided for the return to Spain of the fortress and trading post of *Colônia do Sacramento*, but he knew that he should begin its implementation. The fierce opposition to the treaty in America, with the subsequent Guaraní wars, as well as to the monopoly trading companies that he created (Grão Pará and Maranhão (1755), Pernambuco and Paraíba (1756), in America, and the Upper Douro Vineyards (1756)) contributed to his change towards an anti-Jesuit stance, which then became the hallmark of his regime. Furthermore, the 1755 earthquake, to which he responded most vigorously, cementing his status as the king’s favourite, marked the beginning of a vertiginous political cycle. The rebellion in Porto against the *Companhia das Vinhas do Alto Douro* (1757) and the assassination attempt against the king (1758), in which various figures of the highest nobility were implicated, unleashed a wave of violent acts of repression. Such vehemence was combined with campaigns against the Jesuits, initiated by Portugal and only proving to be successful a decade and a half later. They were promoted with the printing of tens of thousands of leaflets justifying the repression in different European languages and, for a brief while, placing Portugal and the minister Carvalho under the spotlights of enlightened

European opinion. In the midst of all this, there was a prolonged break in relations with the Holy See.

The *Diretório dos Índios* (1755–1757) in Brazil was among the first and most innovative of Pombal's initiatives, although it was only made known to the European public rather belatedly through works such as those of the Abbé Raynal (1770, 1774, 1781). Responding to the need to replace the ecclesiastical administration of the missions, which already had an important role to play in the process of expelling the Jesuits, this measure not only sought to set up municipal councils of Indians, but it also provided incentives for marriages with Europeans and imposed the use of Portuguese as the official language (Domingues 2000; Almeida 2015). Much celebrated when it was put into force (because it was based on the principle of freedom for all the indigenous peoples), the *Diretório's* implementation was very heterogeneous and varied from one region to the other. It ended up being revoked half a century later. In the same way, although he continued a long tradition of military engineering in the empire, Carvalho's prompt action after the 1755 earthquake and the geometrical plans that were drawn up for the city's reconstruction earned Lisbon the subsequent name of the "City of Lights" (França 1965). The Inquisition was subject to close supervision and witnessed the disappearance of its main target with the end of the distinction between New Christians and Old Christians (1773) (Pedreira 2016), which preceded the publication of his new *Regimento* (Standing Order) of 1774 (Marcocci and Paiva 2013). Imports of slaves were prohibited (1761) and the "freedom of wombs" was decreed (1773). It is important to stress that these laws were only enforced in peninsular Portugal, not in the colonial territories, in particular in Brazil, where the enslaved Africans were the bulk of the labour force. The text of one of these laws explicitly states that its intention was to emulate "*outras cortes polidas*". In any case, one of the major motivations was to concentrate in the colonial territories as many enslaved persons as possible (Fonseca 2010). Also important were the efforts to centralise financial administration, with the creation—in 1760—of the royal treasury (*Erário Regio*). Finally, the reforms of the University of Coimbra (1772)—which at that time was the only one in the Portuguese monarchy—brought the introduction of natural philosophy and the new natural law, meriting the title of "enlightened" given to them by posterity. After reaching power, Pombal created a close circle of advisors, with figures who played a major role in determining the nature of the final stage of his reforms.

Meanwhile, in recent analysis of the European political and cultural history of the eighteenth century, growing importance has been given to the enlargement of the “public space”, understood as a sphere for the circulation of ideas, practices of sociability, and the consumption of cultural goods in a relatively autonomous fashion in relation to the court and to the political power of the monarchies, in which the press (legalised or not) played an important role. Portugal was a small monarchy in European terms. Lisbon’s macrocephalous predominance, with 6 to 8% of the kingdom’s population, and a disproportionate concentration of social, economic, and administrative elites, encouraged the accumulation of people in an almost unique urban space, area, which also facilitated their control and led to the subsequent gradual atrophy of the “public space”.

The conceptions of political power that prevailed during the reign of Dom José were fairly clear. Portugal had been a monarchy since its separation from the Crown of Leon, and the king’s power was only restricted by the Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom that established the rules of succession in the crown, and which, in the Portuguese case, were the so-called “Laws of Lamego”. They imposed just this one restraint: based on the ideas of Gaspard de Réal, it was said that it was a:

Monarchic Government, in which the Supreme Power lies entirely in the Person of just one Man, who must also be guided by reason and who must not, however, recognise any other power that is Superior (in the Temporal sense) other than God himself, so that he makes the Laws and revokes them whenever he deems this to be appropriate.

(Sylva 1768, Vol. 2, 393)

For this very reason, the simple disagreement with a law was repeatedly described as a “crime of *lèse majesté*”. The presentation of a petition and a subsequent vote upon the matter had previously formed part of the day-to-day business of the administration under the former system of councils. This system had been in force in earlier reigns and presupposed a considerable margin of discrepancy, allowing for a possible confrontation of different opinions. The most expedite and executive forms of “ministerial power”, especially in the extreme formulation that they came to adopt, thus entered into a head-on collision with this old way of doing things. Now it was the king who chose the ministers, and these then proposed decisions, as Pombal

would say, “in the secrecy of the cabinet”, after which the king signed the decree. It was not possible to state one’s opinion on any of these matters, much less disagree. These were the new and triumphant conceptions, which enjoyed an abundant translation into practice.

Despite the limited resources with which it was endowed, the creation of the General Intendancy of the Police in 1760 had provided the government with an instrument that it could use to supervise political suspects. From 1762 onwards, when the publication of the *Gazeta de Lisboa* was suspended, there had ceased to be any periodical press in Portugal, a situation that was maintained, with only a few brief interruptions, until the end of the reign of Dom José in 1777. The mechanisms of censorship were also changed through the creation, in 1768, of the *Real Mesa Censória* (Royal Censorship Board), which replaced the Inquisition and the bishops in this area of activity. Its actions were ambivalent, not just because it simultaneously banned the dissemination of pro-Jesuit and ultramontane books, as well as those that were reputed to be “enlightened” and “libertine”, but also because, through the criticism set in motion by its own acts of censorship, this institution with Jansenist influences also came to be regarded as the centre for the production of an official culture of the regime, including its notorious regalism (Marques 1963; Tavares 1997; Sousa 2004).

Educational reforms were similarly an integral part of official policy. While the reform of the minor studies, which produced the first network of royal teachers, was a direct response to the suppression of the Jesuits, the creation of the College of the Nobles and the Course of Commerce (1759) expressed different objectives and revealed a clear and deliberate effort to reform the elites, although the results only partly corresponded to the desired aims. The culmination of these interventions was, however, the reform of the University of Coimbra in 1772. It had been prepared by the Junta da Providencia Literária (Board of Literary Providence), a kind of circle of reformers, composed of jurists and regalist clergy (Vaz 2009). Along with the traditional areas—Theology, Canon Law, and Civil Law—the new faculties of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy were created. Institutes were formed to support these new areas, such as the Chemical Laboratory, the Anatomical Theatre, the Cabinet of Experimental Physics, and the Astronomical Observatory. The teaching staff at Coimbra University was profoundly renewed, with roughly 50 new admissions, including a number of foreigners. To a large extent, the effects of this reform were to become more visible in

the following reign (Araújo 2000).

In the Spanish case, the cycle of reforms coincided with the reign of Carlos III (1759–1788), especially after 1766, when the Esquilache Riots took place (Fernández 2016). Then, a coherent reformist team took power and brought improvements to the economy, promoting a new social model, through direct action in favour of greater productivity and education. This was followed by the policy initiated by Philip V and Fernando VI, aimed at recovering control over American trade and giving an impetus to manufactures, though the creation of royal factories and trading companies, as well as by granting commercial and tax privileges to private companies or manufacturers, as part of a general mercantilist policy. All of this was promoted and supervised by the Junta General de Comercio y Moneda (Royal Committee for Trade and Money), restructured in 1730 (Molas Ribalta 1978; Larruga y Boneta 1789). Just as he had done in Naples, Carlos III fostered the production of luxury articles, through the creation of factories such as the porcelain factories of Buen Retiro and Santa Bárbara de Telares, or the royal glass factory of San Ildefonso, as well as others producing linen textiles and cloths. However, the private manufactures were better than those of the Colbertian model, as demonstrated by the development of the linen industry in Galicia, the expansion of foundries in the Basque country or the changes brought to textile production in Catalonia, exemplified by the Compañía de Hilados de Algodón (Royal Company of American Cotton Yarn) in 1772 (González Enciso 2000, 137–171; Thomson 1996).

Image 23.2Portrait of Charles III of Spain, Rafael Ximeno Planes, 1783

Source: © Madrid, Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid, Spain

Reformists who were closely bound to the administration and traders who were favourably received at the court had the merit of promoting Spain's inclusion in the process of the circulation of economic ideas, through translations and original works. Among the first of these groups were to be found Bernardo Ward, a cabinet minister, who, in 1762, was the author of *Proyecto Económico*, or Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes (Llombart 1992; Castro 1996). The second group included Francisco de Craywinkel, who disseminated the work of Richard Cantillón, the *Essai sur le commerce*, whose references to Spain were interesting because of their criticism of the harmful effects caused by the overmining of precious metals, which confirmed the diagnosis that the *arbitristas* had made about the curse of gold.

Another successful trader was Simón de Aragorri, who in his *Reflexiones sobre el estado actual del comercio de España* adapted the physiocratic theories of Accarias de Serionne, the author of *Considerations sur les Finances d'Espagne*. This work, which influenced the *Reflexiones sobre el comercio español en Indias* by Campomanes, anticipated the reforms that he proposed in 1764 in *Respuesta fiscal sobre abolir la tasa* (Astigarraga and Zabalza 2014, 225–247; Astigarraga 2013, 13–44).

Two reforms were implemented under these influences: that of the grain trade and that of the colonial trade, both of which were liberalised. The relationship between the writings of Campomanes and the law known as the *Pragmática de libertad de comercio de granos*, on 11 July 1765, is evident. The measure, which was implemented in the depths of a serious subsistence crisis, had immediate negative effects. Prices rose, discontent became even more acute, and in March of the following year the riots broke out. Free trade was maintained, but duties were re-established until 1778. This experience meant that the Spanish government did not lend its backing to the liberalising offensives of France and Tuscany, and it also explains the official support that was given to the theses of Ferdinando Galiani, whose *Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds* were translated in 1775 and dedicated to Campomanes (Galiani 1775; Guasti 2013, 229–244).

The *Reglamento y Aranceles Reales para el Comercio Libre de España a Indias*, the free trade regulation promulgated on 12 October 1778, had more success. It was preceded by an important debate about a change in the mercantile policy and an alternative to the India Run, adapted to the international context after the Seven Year War (Walker 1979, 258–276). And it was also preceded by other measures, such as the *Decreto del Comercio* (Trade Decree) of 16 October 1765, which entitled nine Spanish ports to engage in trade with America and simplified the tax system. The results have been widely debated, leading to Fisher's figures, which showed an important increase in American imports and in the shipments of metals. The freedom of this trade was relative, and the result was not very uniform, being affected, from 1797 onwards, by the war against England and the decree about neutral boats, whose consequences could not be reversed by the brief truce of 1801 (García Baquero 2003; Fisher 1985, 89–90; Fisher 1993, 29–44).

The experience of the riots and the high prices meant that the decade of the 1770s was rich in debates, with political economy as its backdrop, already under the influence of Galiani, Genovesi, and

Filangieri, the writings and edicts of Turgot, as reported in *La Gaceta* and *El Mercurio*, while in the 1780s, these same debates were marked by the influence of Jacques Necker after the publication in 1776 of his *Mémoire au roi sur l'établissement des administrations provinciales* (Astigarraga 2011, 3–27). At the same time, the most widely disseminated works of Campomanes were published: the *Discurso sobre el fomento de la industria popular* in 1774; the *Discurso sobre la educación popular de los artesanos* in 1775; and the *Discurso sobre la legislación gremial de los artesanos*, which was published as an *Appendix* in his *Discurso sobre la legislación gremial de los artesanos*. With the attention that the press was showing in these questions, the publication of these works clearly demonstrated the role that this discipline played in the creation of a public sphere. Notwithstanding, agriculture was to play an even greater role, not only because of the impact of the riots, but also because of the continuous lawsuits that were generated by the disputes over the renewal of censuses, leases, and sub-leases (VV.AA. 1989). Yet none of this took place under the inspiration of physiocracy, as is proved by the most ambitious undertaking of the reign of Carlos III, the colonisation of Sierra Morena y las Nuevas Poblaciones, which had been achieved through “soft and gentle” legislation that sought to establish an agrarian model distinct from the one postulated by the French theoreticians (Llombart 2009, 109–136).

Somewhat riskier was the implementation of an agrarian law, the first of its kind in Spanish history. It was set in motion in 1766, when the Council of Castile initiated an inquiry to determine the “damage and decline that Agriculture suffers from, its reasons, and the means for its recovery and development”. Reports and statements were gathered together, some of them previously compiled, with most of the work being entrusted to the intendants and other authorities. This resulted in a huge pile of papers that, in 1777, were sent to the *Sociedad Económica Matritense* (the Madrid Royal Society of Friends of the Country), so that they could be organised and studied. They remained there for ten years until the Society requested Jovellanos to produce what was to be the *Informe sobre el expediente de ley Agraria* (Report on the Agrarian Law), a clear and systematic text written in a grand literary style. Contrary to the commonly accepted public opinion, he denied that Spanish agriculture was condemned to fall into decline, since it was not natural factors, but the very laws themselves, that were the cause of its poor state. His proposal was that these laws should serve as a stimulus for the agents, who were the

only ones capable of generating progress in the agrarian field. His sources were Spanish authors, ranging from the *arbitristas* to Uztariz and Campomanes, the French authors Buffón and Saint-Pierre, and the British authors Gibbon and Adam Smith, whose *Wealth of Nations* had been translated into Spanish by Alonso Ortiz in 1794, and, without its being a predominant influence, it was nonetheless very much present in Jovellanos' report (Anes 1991; Llombart 1996, 105–159).

The regalist nature of the reign of Carlos III was marked by the long period that he had spent in Naples. On his arrival in Spain, he immediately demonstrated his firmness and resolution by bringing into force the “Pase Regio”—the “Exequatur”—in 1761, which called for the prior censorship of the orders from Rome; he established the Spanish Court of La Rota in 1771, which restricted the delegated jurisdictions of the Nunciature; and, in 1778, he created the *Agencia General de Preces* (The General Agency for Petitions to Rome) in Madrid, to regulate the petitions and dispensations granted in Rome. No measure had such major repercussions as the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 for their involvement in the riots against Esquilache. Historiography has left no doubt that, behind the social unrest, there was a major subsistence crisis, although the case of Madrid had its own very specific features (Gállego 2003; López García 2006).

At the court, both the king and the queen mother, as well as the ministers of the Treasury and of State, Esquilache (1699–1785) and Grimaldi (1710–1789), both Italians, the first arrived with the monarch of Naples, or the Count of Aranda, Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea (1719–1789), military and diplomatic, president of the Council of Castile in the aftermath of the riots, were opposed to the Society of Jesus.

Yet it was the prosecutors of this institution who were the most decisive: Campomanes drew up the *Dictamen*, in which he accused the Jesuits of being responsible for the revolts; the other prosecutor, José Moñino, future Count of Floridablanca, collaborated actively in the process and, already in 1772, as the Plenipotentiary Minister in Rome, administered the definitive dissolution of the society in 1773 before Pope Clement XIV, a service that earned him the title of Count of Floridablanca. The arguments against the Jesuits, as set out in the *Dictamen*, left it clear that it was not a religious, but a political question. Once the proposal for their expulsion from Spain and the Indies had been ratified, this process was implemented from March 1767 onwards. It served as explicit proof of the king's determination to make his authority over the Spanish Church effective (Egido y

Pinedo 1994, 64–95; Guasti 2006, 181–188).

The consequences of these expulsions were important ones: the “temporalities” of the Jesuits, their urban and rural properties, were sold at a public auction, with the churches being left at the disposal of the bishops and the buildings being given over to other orders or used for educational purposes. Some were converted into diocesan seminaries; others were used for other purposes, such as the *Colegio Imperial de Madrid*, which was converted into the *Reales Estudios de San Isidro*, opened in 1770. It had a library and a laboratory and incorporated the teaching of such disciplines as ancient history, together with a chair in Natural and International Law, and with lessons being given in the works of Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, and Vattel, translated in 1771 by Olmeda y León. Also set in motion was the *Seminario de Nobles* (Seminary of Nobles), designed to educate the children of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, with other similar ones being created in its image and in that of the seminary in Vergara. In this way, the abolition of Jesuit chairs at the Spanish universities set in motion the reform of the universities, which had previously been subject to royal authority, in accordance with a plan developed by Mayans, who suggested a uniform regime and the secularisation of their teaching. These reforms were carried out between 1771 and 1786, with distinct rules for each case. Salamanca, whose legal studies introduced natural and international law, was followed by Seville, for which the project was drawn up in 1769 by the intendant Olavide (1725–1803), who at that time was carrying out the initiation of the New Populations of Andalusia, who proposed the secularisation of its teaching. These two universities were followed by Valladolid, Oviedo, Zaragoza, Granada, and Valencia, in 1786. A Royal Charter of that same year gave the Council of Castile responsibilities in matters of government and university administration (Andújar 2004, 201–225; Chaparro Sainz 2011).

The ecclesiastical policy of the Spanish Bourbons was firm and decisive, achieving a great number of successes, without in any way compromising the Catholicism of its ruling monarchs and their recognised piety. The same period also brought the development of Jansenism, which witnessed a great leap forward under the reign of Carlos III. Rather than being theological, this movement was related with regalism and episcopalism, being characterised by openness to new knowledge and the defence of an intimist and “reasonable” religiosity. Among Jansen’s followers were those who sought to bring an end to the Inquisition and promote a greater secularisation of

society (Tomsich 1972; Mestre 2001, 549–558).

Some specialists have suggested, without openly postulating the theory, that this institution entered into decline in the mid-eighteenth century. Others have spoken of a certain accommodation, or perhaps also of its transformation from within, since the Inquisition's activity diminished, and its members lost their privileges. Some public manifestations of its activity completely disappeared, such as the reading of edicts, but, even so, an auto-de-fé was still held in Seville in 1781. Its control was centred on the censorship of writings, which, on occasions, had already been authorised by the royal censors, as well as on “minor” crimes, such as blasphemy, superstition, bigamy, or soliciting (Defourneaux 1973; Domergue 1996; Martínez Millán 2007, 131–143).

The novelty under the Bourbons was not the protection afforded to culture, but the integration of initiatives and people into an institutional apparatus protected by the crown, directed towards a critical defence of national culture (Pérez Magallón 2002, 309–319). One of the responses to this aim was the foundation of the Royal Library, whose first statutes of 1716 established its public character and, at the same time, revealed an organisational bicephaly, by being under the supervision of both the royal confessor and the librarian (BNE, Mss. 2829, *Constituciones de la Real Biblioteca hechas por orden del rey N. Señor D. Carlos III*). The royal library's constitutions of 1761, approved by Carlos III, reaffirmed its integration into the administrative scheme of the monarchy, by dispensing with the royal confessor, and establishing strict regulations regarding its functions and its staff. In their own ways, the *Real Tribunal del Protomedicato* or the *Real Botica* (the Tribunal of the King's Physicians), the *Real Jardín Botánico* (Royal Botanical Garden), created in 1755, and the *Real Gabinete de Historia Natural* (Royal Cabinet of Natural History), created in 1776, also institutionalised these activities.

Another clear example of cultural patronage was to be found in the scientific expeditions. Under Carlos III, such expeditions included those of Ruiz y Pavón to Peru, in 1777, Mutis to Nueva Granada, in 1783, and Sessé to Nueva España, in 1787, while approval was also given to the one undertaken by Alejandro Malaspina (1754–1809), a noble and experienced Italian sailor in the service of Spain, which ended in 1794 (Pimentel 2008). Was this an enlightened form of government? Yes, if we consider that encouragement was given to the activities of the cultural elites and to laying the foundations of a civil history, complemented by another ecclesiastical one and resulting in

systematic archival and archaeological research (López-Cordón 2006, 151–173; Fernández Albadalejo 2007, 197–244). Writers, artists and scholars understood the advantages brought by official protection and it was not long before the gatherings and meetings that they held among themselves began to form part of a network sponsored and overseen by the crown in the form of the Royal Academies—the Spanish Royal Academy, the Royal Academy of History, and the Royal Academy of Fine Arts. Of course, such protection was not a mere manifestation of the king’s liberality, yet the dependence of these academies upon royal patronage scarcely led to conflicts, because their members, who held positions both in public administration and at court, completely shared the government’s strategies. The Republic of Letters itself was also able to take advantage of the opportunities that were offered, and its members began to open themselves up to politics, the press, and the market, thus leading to a weakening of the ideal of the Parnassus because of both the growing competitiveness and professionalisation of literary activity (Álvarez Barrientos 2006, 29–37, 84–87).

The *Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País* (Economic Societies of Friends of the Country), which numbered almost 100 between 1774 and 1808, echoed the proposal put forward by Campomanes in his *Discurso sobre el fomento de la industria popular*. Taking *La Bascongada* (the Royal Basque Society) as a model, we can see how political induction was beginning to take root in the social elites. These societies were an important channel for the spread of the enlightened ideals that were fundamental in shaping a space of sociability where communication and debate were encouraged (Astigarraga 2011, 235–260; Enciso Recio 2010). And nor can one ignore the development of the printing press. Favourable treatment ceased to be given to certain publishers and, by 1781, the *Imprenta Real* (the Royal Publishing House) was already up and running. There was also a considerable increase in periodicals, in their different types and in their geographical spread, with a notable shift in their contents, moving from an enlightened reformism to the adoption of more critical stances (Larriba 1998; Cruz 2013; Guinard 1973).

For a long time now, the Spanish reformists have been characterised as pragmatic men, interested only in concrete administrative, economic, and educational measures, considering the fact that most of them were servants of the crown and, as such, were in direct complicity with the seat of power. Yet this did not prevent scientists and writers of genuine intellectual stature from flourishing,

nor did it impede the implementation of reforms with a certain impact. The gradual imposition of a new sociability and the circulation of ideas between Spain and Europe, and between Spain and America, became an undeniable reality (Astigarraga 2015).

The crossroads at the end of the century

The fall of the Marquis of Pombal did not mean that the essential foreign policy of the Bragança dynasty was to change. Its main orientations continued to be an opposition to the country's absorption by Spain (with which it had already fought in the peninsula or in America in 1735, 1762, 1777, and 1801), and an intransigent defence of Brazil, the monarchy's financial base, through the re-exporting of its productions, supported by the English alliance. Nor did this represent the end of a model for the functioning of the central administration, which, having been designed earlier, had become truly effective under the rule of Pombal: the offices of the Secretaries of State had been turned into the centre of political decision-making, in detriment to the councils (Monteiro 2015). And, finally, the reforms continued into the reign of Dona Maria I, but now with a different complexion, drawing closer to the liberal political economy. After the king's death in 1777, the Marquis of Pombal fell from grace, being arrested, tried, and found guilty, although no punishment was imposed. The following years have become known as the period of the "*Viradeira*" (the overturning or reform of earlier policies). With the seal of official approval, a violent libel was published at that time, stating that "blood was still oozing from the wounds torn in the heart of Portugal by this blind and unlimited despotism that we have just endured" (AGS, Legajo 7312, *Oração à Fidelíssima Rainha Nossa Senhora no dia da sua feliz aclamação*, 1777). Deriving from this were the "wise measures of the present government", prominent among which were the release of prisoners, the granting of "graces and favours to the Nobility", "reverence to God", the authority given to the Courts, "freedom in trade". In fact, the entry into the government of leading figures from the aristocracy and the return of commanderies of military orders to the houses of the Grandees were the hallmarks of these years. The "*Viradeira*" became cloaked in two apparently paradoxical aspects: together with the dimensions that have already been referred to and which can be associated with a phenomenon of "aristocratic reaction", many of the political staff were

maintained and new “enlightened” initiatives were even introduced.

The decisive impetus in the dissemination of culture and science was given through the creation of the *Academia Real da Ciências* (Royal Academy of Sciences) in 1779–1780, at the initiative of the second Duke of Lafões (1719–1806), successor of one of the main aristocratic houses who had recently returned from a long period of exile. With the crown’s approval, the Academy was able to publish its works without any prior censorship. However, this undeniable impetus was limited by the fact that it coincided with a tightly imposed literary censorship and with the activities of the General Intendancy of the Police and the famous intendant Pina Manique. Globally, the dissemination of a new culture, with many forbidden books written in French, and the new enlightened sociability, including those of private individuals, was very strong and undeniable (Lousada 2011). But it was still subject to quite remarkable limitations. There was nothing in Portugal with a similar scope to that of the economic societies “of friends of the country” that existed in Spain. Naturally, these new sociabilities and interpretations should not be confused with the discussion of, and much less the opposition to, the political model of the monarchy (Araújo 2003).

In fact, the boldest reformist projects were formulated within the government itself. During those years, several scientific expeditions were conducted across Brazil (Raminelli 2008). Various new navy schools were created (1779, 1790, 1796). These schools played a highly relevant role in the implementation and dissemination of scientific knowledge. In addition, they also produced officers with a new technical profile (Carolino 2017). At the level of the basic principles of economic thought, although many different sources of inspiration had always coexisted with one another, it is possible to talk about a certain softening of mercantilist ideas in favour of what was already an economically liberal way of thinking (Cardoso 1989). The Pombaline monopoly companies in America were closed down and the factories lost many of their previous mechanisms of protection. In the midst of a certain commercial prosperity, with an emphasis on Brazil, there were great difficulties to be noted in foreign policy, as well as a split between those who accepted making concessions to France and those who refused to do so. Prominent amongst these was Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, an exponent of the so-called “English party”, as well as a minister on various occasions between 1796 and 1812 (Diniz Silva 2002–2006).

In order to maintain his circle of intellectual patronage, he reached

the point of encouraging the formation of what amounted to almost his own publishing company. Despite accepting forms of parliamentary representation in accordance with the British model, he was, according to his own words in 1789, a defender of an “enlightened despotism submitted to the public opinion of certain great nations in Europe” (Diniz Silva 2002, 260). Although he proposed completely different recipes, he claimed to have inherited the interventionism of Pombal. Unlike most of the thinkers from the *Academia das Ciências*, in many of his writings, Dom Rodrigo expressly questioned the agrarian constitution of the *Ancien Régime*, in keeping with an inspiration that, at the level of civil law and its theoretical foundations, may be considered to have been based on the liberal political economy. Considering that “a land will never be well cultivated when whoever possesses it is not its absolute owner” and, being concerned with the profitability of the capital invested in agriculture, he therefore defended the abolition of entailed estates, private chapels, emphyteusis, and the confiscation of church property. Greatly preoccupied with the financial question and with the duplication of taxation, he proposed the suppression of the *dízimos* (the religious tithes paid to the Church), the feudal taxes paid to the lords of the manors, and the *décima* (a tax that was to be paid to the State), replacing them all with just one single tax. Among other ideas, he also defended the suppression of all tax exemptions on the part of the clergy and the nobility and of their jurisdictional privileges. Only nineteenth-century political liberalism was to bring the implementation of these proposals. His ideas in matters of finance, education, and the creation of specialised schools, among others, were less important than his metaphorical conception of the monarchy as a multi-continental space, in which Portugal was not the “best and the most essential part”, so that, in the event of a European war, it would be left to the sovereigns “to create a powerful Empire in Brazil, from where it would be possible to reconquer what may have been lost in Europe”. This project, with both recent and more remote antecedents, ended up being implemented in 1807 with the departure of the royal family to Brazil, an event with lasting consequences. Just as had happened in the previous century, the destinies of Iberia and America were to cross paths with one another, but even so they continued, at the same time, to diverge from one another, at least in part (Alexandre 1993; Pedreira and Costa 2006).

After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1783, the monarchy of Carlos III reached its zenith. In 1787, as the prime minister,

Floridablanca established the Junta Suprema de Estado (Supreme Council of State), which performed the functions of a council of ministers, in order to coordinate and guarantee the imminent succession. Shortly after the king's death, the junta was accused of "obscuring the king", and the constant issue of government debt was accompanied by bitter and ingenious satires in *El Censor*, muted, but nonetheless reflecting some ideas that, while being enlightened, were no longer identified with the royal policy. Already under the rule of Carlos IV, this situation was exacerbated by the impact of the events taking place in France. The choice was firstly for silence, then subsequently for prohibitions and the control of suspicious publications, and, finally, in 1791, for the suspension of all periodical publications, except for the official ones, followed by careful surveillance of the frontiers and repressive measures against the French residents in Spain (Aymes 1999).

The worsening of the French situation and Floridablanca's attempt to intercede on behalf of Louis XVI led to his dismissal and the appointment of the Count of Aranda, who had been the ambassador in Paris for many years and was well regarded by French public opinion. He had sufficient experience to see not only the dangers of the revolution, but also those of the counter-revolution and the compromised position of the Spanish monarchy in the case of a reversal of the alliances. He opted for neutrality, which would be unsustainable after the impending trial of the French king. He was then replaced by a young man without any political experience, Manuel Godoy, who, with the title of Secretary of State, was the head of the government until 1798, and then, without it, filled the same post between 1801 and March 1808. He had moved in the circles of the kings when they were princes of Asturias, later accumulating a series of military promotions, honours, and an informal power that was made manifest by his appointment as Prince of Peace in 1795 (La Parra 2002).

The War of the Convention caused people to forget the unusual nature of his appointment, but he proved to be a destabilising figure for the administration of the monarchy, due to the unease felt by the councillors, magistrates, and government officials at the interferences taking place in their professional careers and the rapid advancements that were being made by those who replaced them. In turn, those who benefited from the generational vacuum also appreciated the effects of the network built up by the king's favourite, who was lacking in discretion. Its impact must be understood from two possible

viewpoints: that of the rupture of personal ties with the king, who was no longer involved in the promotion of his servants, and that of the awareness of individual merit at the time when such promotion was being sought. The disaffection that this caused aroused few republican dreams, because the majority did not question the monarchy, but instead the way in which they related with it (Andújar 2008, 179–211; López-Cordón 2008, 309–338; Dedieu 2010, 51–80).

In this context, once the Alliance with France had been resumed, the public sphere rapidly gained in maturity, and a more radical, but rather belated generation of enlightened politicians burst onto the scene: Aguirre, Arroyal, Foronda, Salas, Urquijo, and the magistrates, Jovellanos and Meléndez Valdés, whose approaches were no longer those of enlightened absolutism. This was a group that attained power between 1798 and 1801. Jovellanos only lasted for a short time as Minister of Grace and Justice, while Mariano José de Urquijo did not last much longer as Secretary of State. Long enough, however, to develop a regalist policy that greatly upset the regular clergy and obliged Rome to intervene before the kings. His target was not the privileges that the Church enjoyed, nor the episcopatism with which it was governed, but he sought instead to assert secular power over ecclesiastical power, or civil power over clerical power. The Secretary of the Treasury, Soler, who was under pressure from debt, also began to sell off the properties of the Jesuits and their pious works (Frieria Álvarez 2007; Bejarano Galdino 2005, López-Cordón 2013, 39–47).

Godoy's thirst for power and the mistakes that he made in international politics must not allow us to forget that, without being an enlightened politician, he understood the public dimension of a policy that was inspired by those ideas in order to justify his favouritism. Among his priorities was the support for useful sciences and technical advancements, the undertaking of scientific expeditions and support for some educational institutions, such as the *Real Instituto Pestalozziani*, created in 1806. He also sponsored publications of an economic nature, such as the *Semanario de Agricultura y Artes dirigido a los Parrocos* (1797–1808), in order to spread certain knowledge among the farmers (La Parra 2002, 176–180; Herr 1958, 290–313; Larriba and Dufour 1997).

During the reign of Carlos IV, social protests were scattered but constant. There were also conspiracies and riots that displayed an openly political intent, ranging from those promoted by Juan Picornell (1759) or Malaspina, to the return of their trips, both in 1795, to the Conspiracy of El Escorial in October 1807, in which Prince Fernando

was involved. It was one such protest, under the form of a popular revolt, the Riot of Aranjuez, in March 1808, which brought an end to his reign. But, in those years of political crisis and war, the fundamental problem of the Spanish monarchy was one of a financial nature. Until 1796, it had been possible to offset the expenses of the administration, the Royal Household, and those generated by the war against France, with the remittances arriving from the Indies. However, thereafter, the difficulties faced by maritime trade impeded the arrival of silver, reduced exports, and caused general revenue to fall, without any income to compensate for this. In reality, the cause was not just the war situation, but the government debt issues that had to keep being made (Ruiz Torres 2007, 571–584).

The Abdications of Bayonne and the war brought an end to a period of increasing politicisation. The supporters of José I were, broadly speaking, enlightened men who had become disenchanted, remaining faithful to an idea of a reformist and secularising monarchy, although they were relativists with regard to the dynasty within which this ideal should be embodied. The men who opted for the Regency and the Government of Cadiz were divided between those who strongly supported the idea of a constitution, in some cases following the English model, founded on tradition, or in other cases admiring the French Constitution of 1791, and those who supported a return to the old system.

Conclusion

Separated in the mid-seventeenth century, the two asymmetrical Iberian monarchies entered the eighteenth century not only by sharing common legacies and being neighbours in various continents, but also by having the same depreciative image projected onto them by the northern powers, with roots in ancient religious disputes that had taken on yet other dimensions with the affirmation of the new European hegemonies. To a certain extent, the proposals and initiatives for reform sought to respond to these images, which were now associated with a perception of the peninsular “backwardness”. There was a certain discrepancy in their chronology. In Spain, there was clearly a first stage with the arrival of Felipe V, with the reforms undertaken in the reign of Carlos III bringing renewed inspiration. In Portugal, the reforms increased in intensity during the so-called “Pombaline” cycle, with a clear renewal of models towards the end of

the century. In both contexts, but much more evidently in Spain, changes were conceived in quite autonomous areas, but the new ideas nonetheless remained closely linked to the initiatives of the monarchies themselves. This was one of the reasons why many have raised doubts about their qualification as “enlightened”.

Finally, it can be said that the destinies of the two monarchies were greatly conditioned by their European connections, which, to a large extent, tended to be confused with the links that they established between themselves, as well as with those that were being strengthened with their territories outside Europe. The links with America were fundamental in the trade, finances, and even the actual reform projects of the Iberians. And while everything was brought to a head by the Napoleonic invasions, it was in America that the end of the peninsular monarchies was consummated in accordance with the specific makeup that they had acquired throughout the eighteenth century.

Note

¹Translation by John Elliott with the support of ICS-UID/SOC/50013/2013.

Abbreviations

AGS
BNE

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CHAPTER TWENTY four

Enlightened reformism in Iberian culture and science



Hugh Cagle and Matthew Crawford

Introduction

From Paris toward the end of 1675—in response to dramatic Portuguese losses in Asia and the Atlantic—the diplomat Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo anxiously penned a policy brief to his peers back home in Lisbon. Macedo had spent the last several years in France, where he was Portuguese envoy to the court of Louis XIV. It was perhaps through his contacts at court that he learned not only of the Royal Society of London but also of its journal, the *Philosophical Transactions*. The London institution, its ambitious publishing program, and the contents of those pages deeply impressed Macedo. They also worried him. The capacity of the Royal Society and its journal to propagate new and useful knowledge about the inner workings of the natural world seemed, to Macedo at least, to strengthen the hand of the English at the very time when Portugal's empire, especially in Asia, was being torn from its grasp. Should his countrymen not act quickly, Macedo argued, Portugal was certain to lose out. A century later, in 1779, it seemed as though Macedo's fears had come to pass. That year, in his inaugural address for Lisbon's Academia Real das Ciências, Padre Teodoro de Almeida insisted that his nation's failure to create institutions that fostered the sciences had led to the continued decline of Portugal and its empire. Almeida argued that the creation of Lisbon's new Academia Real, modelled as it was on the Royal Society, would help Portugal regain its proper place among European imperial powers (BNP Res. Cod. 11377, ff. 63-90v; BNP Res. Cod. 11463, ff. 133-145v).

Interpretations of the Enlightenment in the Iberian world have often reflected the vision shared by Macedo and Almeida. The

conventional story of the Enlightenment is one in which a particular set of ideas—an attack on aristocratic power and privilege, the loosening of restrictions on individual economic activity, a stress on the rational capacity of the human mind, a distrust of traditional authority, and a concomitant rejection of what was seen as religious mystification and scholastic obscurantism—all emanated outward from the pens of Locke, Montesquieu, and Kant and, more generally, from England, France, and Germany. The rest of Europe and European dominions overseas were but passive recipients of these ideas (Hesse 2006; Withers 2007). Yet Enlightenment in the Iberian world was not merely derivative of—or a reaction to—foreign ideas and events. The Iberian world fully participated in the Enlightenment, and it did so in ways that reflected the particular priorities, possibilities, participants, and practices that characterised Spain, Portugal, and their far-flung colonies. As was true in London or Paris, Enlightenment in the Iberian world consisted of wide-ranging, multifaceted, and often contradictory projects. For Spanish and Portuguese rulers, these projects drew inspiration from intellectual currents at home and abroad—enlightenment and science were not initiatives that merely radiated from ostensible centres of empire—and they reflected a deep preoccupation with the fate of their dominions both within Europe and overseas (Paquette 2008, 2009).

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Iberian rulers and their advisors saw that mounting political, economic, and social challenges had dramatically diminished their standing within Europe and reduced their influence around the globe. Political power in both empires was diffuse. Administration was erratic. And colonial outposts were expensive and difficult to defend. Colonial agriculture had begun to flag, and as the production of silver in the Spanish Americas and of gold in Brazil dwindled, so too did the imperial economies of Spain and Portugal. In both Spain and Portugal, the Enlightenment emphasis on secularism, reason, and the rebuke of inherited privilege inspired dramatic reforms that were meant to reverse the ebb of wealth and power. A centrepiece of these reforms was increased support for science—the diligent and disciplined investigation of nature. The reinvigoration of mining, the expansion and diversification of agriculture, and the growth of industry across the Iberian world appeared to demand better training in such areas as mathematics, natural history, chemistry, metallurgy, geography, hydrography, and physics (Paquette 2013, ch. 1; Saldaña 2006; Maxwell 1995; Puerto Sarmiento 1988; Falcon 1982).

Importantly, the Iberian Enlightenment was not merely about science, nor was it solely oriented toward prosaic imperial concerns. The emphasis on human reason, on individual liberty, and on secularism at once propelled and reflected important shifts in cultural and intellectual life more broadly. New and often state-chartered academies emerged and promoted the reinvigoration of arts and letters—of language, rhetoric, and history—in both metropolitan Spain and Portugal alike (Cañizares-Esguerra 2001). Enlightenment influences inspired royal efforts to cultivate not only the talents of elite virtuosi but of poorer subjects too, as part of attempts to focus their minds and energies on pursuits that might serve a public good (Slater and Prieto 2009; Domínguez Ortiz 2005).

Nor, for that matter, was the eighteenth-century emphasis on the investigation of nature within the Iberian world without precedent. To the contrary: within Spain and Portugal and in their colonies scattered from Asia to the Americas, eighteenth-century investigative endeavours built upon earlier efforts. Though strongly influenced, as we will argue, by the international and imperial networks of the long eighteenth century, Enlightenment reforms within the Iberian world are best understood as an amplification of existing traditions and impulses in Iberian society. Indeed, for eighteenth-century imperial leaders, particularly in Spain, crown initiatives were consciously linked to sixteenth-century precedents. They followed as well upon reformist projects of the late seventeenth century and they spanned the entire eighteenth century (Marcaida 2014; Marcaida and Pimentel 2008; Barrera-Osorio 2008; De Vos 2006).

Here we focus on the latter half of the eighteenth century for two reasons. First, the developments in this period provide useful examples for illuminating the interactions between Enlightenment and science throughout the Iberian world. It was in the later eighteenth century that science was put at the service of Iberian states in ways that were often more centralised, more focused, and more sweeping than ever before. Empire increasingly became the scale of investigative practice, as Spanish and Portuguese rulers commissioned ambitious expeditions to chart anew the plants, animals, lands, and peoples that constituted their empires. Partly as a consequence, places as diverse as Mexico City, Goa, Quito, Luanda, and Rio all intensified their engagement with Enlightenment forms of natural inquiry. And this suggests the second reason for focusing on the late eighteenth century: it is in this period that more fruitful comparisons and contrasts between the scientific activities of the Spanish and

Portuguese worlds can be made.

What follows is a brief introduction to science and the Enlightenment in the Iberian world. Beginning with the Iberian peninsula, we discuss some of the most important cultural, institutional, administrative, and investigative developments in metropolitan Spain, Portugal, and their empires. There were important differences between the Spanish and Portuguese imperial experiences and we devote significant attention to these as well. But the history of science in both the Spanish and Portuguese worlds was part of a common, overarching transformation that spanned the eighteenth century. In 1700, the intellectual status of science across much of the Iberian world was contested, its institutional infrastructure was often slight, and its relationship with imperial economic activity and administration often tenuous. By the end of the eighteenth century—although the timing differed, and the particular institutional arrangements varied—science had become inextricably entangled with culture, politics, and society not only within Spain and Portugal but across their respective empires. Science and empire grew increasingly interconnected.

Science, culture, and metropolitan reform

To meet the demands of imperial renewal, the rulers of Spain and Portugal undertook the reform of old institutions and the creation of new ones. Beginning in the seventeenth century with the establishment of the Reales Estudios de San Isidro in Madrid and the Real Academia de Medicina y Otras Ciencias in Seville, this trend intensified in the second half of the eighteenth century, especially as investigative institutions emerged in which overlapping networks of people and texts—along with plant, animal, and mineral specimens—all converged. Royal support for the sciences in eighteenth-century Spain reached its peak during the reign of Charles III (r. 1759–1788). One major patron of the sciences was the Spanish military, which established several new institutions that focused on engineering, mathematics, astronomy, cartography, and medicine. The crown and its military sought to create a new generation of officers and elites with expertise in these areas. Cádiz, Spain's primary port city on the Atlantic Ocean, exemplified the “militarisation” of Spanish science in this period (Lafuente and Peset 1985). During the eighteenth century, Cádiz witnessed the establishment of the Colegio de Cirugía in 1748,

the Academia de Ingenieros in 1750, the Observatorio de Marina in 1753, and a learned society, known as the Asamblea Amistosa Literaria de Cádiz, in 1755. All of these institutions were associated with the Spanish military in some way and collectively they made Cádiz an important centre of scientific activity along with other cities such as Barcelona and Seville (Lafuente and Valverde 2003, 9).

Another important place for the sciences in Enlightenment Spain was Madrid, the imperial capital. In addition to several institutions established by the military and institutions focusing on language and the humanities established earlier in the eighteenth century such as the Real Academia Española (1713) and the Real Academia de Historia (1738), the city also became home to the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando (1752), the Real Jardín Botánico (1755), and the Gabinete de Historia Natural (1776). These institutions were tangible examples of the crown's commitment to an Enlightenment ideal of science as at once a symbolic yet practical form of statecraft. While the Real Academia de Bellas Artes trained the artists that participated in expeditions and produced illustrations of flora and fauna, the Gabinete de Historia Natural established Madrid as an important centre where natural objects and reports about natural phenomena were collected, compared, and displayed to showcase the reach and richness of the Spanish Empire (Cowie 2011a; Bleichmar 2012). The Real Jardín Botánico was the crown jewel as it occupied a central place in royal efforts to collect new and useful knowledge about the botanical resources of Spain and its empire.

Portugal witnessed the creation of similar institutions under the auspices, first, of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Mello, the Marquis of Pombal and powerful minister of José I (r. 1750–1777), and then under Maria I (r. 1777–1792). (Note that throughout the text we follow historiographical convention by referring to the minister simply as “the Marquis of Pombal”, although he was not granted the title until 1759.) The Junta do Comércio, Agricultura e Navegação was founded in 1755. Broadly responsible for the regulation of all affairs connected with commerce, it was meant to encourage the development of Portuguese manufacturing in strategic areas. The Colégio dos Nobres was founded in 1761 as a way to develop the human resources of the empire. With a curriculum that incorporated aspects of the New Science such as experimental physics, it was meant to provide children of the nobility with the skills and expertise to be more effective leaders of government and the military. In the middle of the 1760s, the Ajuda Palace became home to the Real Gabinete de

História Natural and the Jardim Botânico da Ajuda. These installations grew to include a chemistry laboratory, library, and a collection of scale models of factories and fortifications. As in metropolitan Spain, here too the study of nature had overlapping symbolic and utilitarian functions. The museum and garden hosted public demonstrations and expositions, became a place of entertainment for the royal family, and was frequently used to educate the sons of Maria I (Brigola 2003; Carvalho 1987; Lourenço 2013).

In 1770 the Junta de Providência Literaria began what would be a two-year process of rewriting the statutes for the University of Coimbra—the educational centrepiece of the Pombaline reforms. Fields ranging from theology, law, philosophy, literature, and the sciences were all swept up in the changes. Reflecting the broadening influence of Newton and Descartes, the biggest reforms were the creation of new faculties of mathematics and of philosophy, the latter of which now included not only metaphysics but also the natural and experimental sciences. The medical curriculum incorporated human dissection into its anatomy instruction. It began to emphasise hygiene and public health and included the work of William Harvey on the circulation of the blood and of Herman Boerhaave on pathology. The university also became home to a press, a new observatory, a botanical garden in 1773, and a natural history collection in 1775—one imported from Padua and expanded with material from Portugal's colonial possessions (Fiolhais, Martins, and Simões 2013; Pita 2014; Carvalho 1987; Braga 1898).

During Pombal's ministerial tenure, the intellectual and practical results of such reforms were decidedly mixed. And many of them came under fire or were reversed during the subsequent reign of Maria I. But there was also continuity. The aging Martinho de Mello e Castro remained in his post as Secretary of State for the Navy and Overseas Territories (*Secretário do Estado da Marinha e do Ultramar*, 1770–1795) and persisted as a steward of the sciences. Bishop Francisco de Lemos, an architect of the Coimbra reforms, remained as the university's Rector and vigorously—and successfully—advocated to Maria I for the preservation of the curricular reforms, stressing the New Science as the very basis for the apparent prosperity of England, France, the Netherlands, and Russia (Maxwell 1995, 98–107).

Much like the ambitious Pombal, Maria I viewed both the development of Portugal's human capital and the study of nature as foundational for the prosperity of the kingdom and the empire. And like Pombal, Maria I also created new institutions for the production

and dissemination of natural knowledge. The Casa Pia opened its doors to the public in 1782 as a boarding home for the poor that also provided instruction in a range of practical, manual trades ranging from surgery and obstetrics to veterinary medicine and agriculture. In 1779, the queen supported the creation of the Academia Real das Ciências de Lisboa. With its activities organised into three sections—sciences concerned with observation, sciences concerned with computation, and language and literature—the remit of the Academia Real reflected not only the diversification of natural knowledge that characterised the period, but also the ongoing linkage between natural inquiry and other forms of artistic exploration. Other new or reformed institutions where natural knowledge might be produced and put to use included the Academia Real de Marinha (1779), the Academia Real de Fortificação, Artilharia e Desenho (1790), the Academia Real dos Guardas-Marinhas (1796), and the Sociedade Real Marítima, Militar e Geográfica (1798), which was charged with the study of ocean currents and the creation of improved maps and navigational charts (Paquette 2013, 35–44; Simões, Carneiro, and Diogo 1999; Maxwell 1995; Carolina, Mota, and Figueiredo 2013; Cardoso 1989).

In both Spain and Portugal, foreign linkages were vital to these reforms. In late seventeenth-century Spain, a group known as the *novatores* strongly believed that subjects of the Spanish Crown would benefit from more emphasis on reason and empiricism as well as from greater familiarity with the ideas of Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and Isaac Newton. Benito Jerónimo Feijóo exemplified the activities and influence of the *novatores* in the early Spanish Enlightenment. The Benedictine monk was both a professor at the University of Oviedo and a member of the Real Academia de Medicina y Otras Ciencias, a scientific society established by the *novatores* with royal approval in 1700 (Pimentel 2015; Pérez Magallón 2002). Feijóo challenged what he saw as the superstition and ignorance of his fellow Spaniards and championed reason and empiricism. To those ends he published two multi-volume works that addressed fields ranging from medicine and natural history to philosophy and popular culture—his *Teatro crítico universal* (1726–1739) and his *Cartas eruditas y curiosas* (1742–1760) (Pimentel 2015, 87–90; Anderson 2000).

Intellectuals both at home and abroad were similarly central to the spread of ideas and the cultivation of natural knowledge in Portugal and throughout its empire. *Estrangeirados* were “Europeanised” (literally “foreignised”) Portuguese intellectuals who travelled extensively and in many cases remained abroad—often to escape

religious or political persecution. They comprised a loosely connected network of correspondents who served as de facto intermediaries between intellectuals within Portugal and those of Spain and northern Europe. As a group, *estrangeirados* included ministers, clergymen, aristocrats (often with diplomatic appointments abroad), physicians, and military officers. To refer to these as a unified group and to conceive of them as a network is less a reference to their level of philosophical coherence and epistolary interconnectedness and more to the common circumstances in which they lived and their shared intellectual vocation (Carneiro, Simões, and Diogo 2000).

Regardless, the influence of the *estrangeirados* within Portugal and across its empire was marked. The Marquis of Pombal and a number of other ministers—like Martinho de Mello e Castro and his successor as Secretário do Estado da Marinha e do Ultramar, Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho—were also *estrangeirados*. Some the most influential Portuguese writers of the eighteenth century were also *estrangeirados*. Fleeing from the Inquisition, the New Christian physician Jacob de Castro Sarmiento (1691–1762) moved to England where he became a member of the Royal Society, explored chemical medicine, translated the work of Newton and others into Portuguese, and continued to advise João V (1707–1750) on matters of health (for example Sarmiento 1735). António Nunes Ribeiro Sanches (1699–1782), also a New Christian, resided in England, Holland, Russia, and then France, where he collaborated on the French *Encyclopédie*. He too was concerned with education and his *Cartas sobre a educação da mocidade* (Paris, 1759) stressed knowledge of physics and instrumentation as essential for proper administrative and military service—a perspective that helped shape the curriculum of the Colégio dos Nobres. In 1763, Sanches' *Método para aprender e estudar a medicina* helped establish the importance of botanical gardens for medical study in Portugal. The single most influential writer was probably Luís António Vernei, who lived in Italy and was a member of the Roman Arcadia. Vernei advocated Newtonianism and stressed experiment and reason over traditional authority. His book, *O verdadeiro método de estudar*, published in Rome in 1746, was an eclectic one covering subjects ranging from logic and orthography to metaphysics. Taken together, the works by Sarmiento, Sanches, Vernei, and others amounted to a powerful argument that true knowledge of nature depended upon the combination of books, travel, precision instruments, and the examination of nature in museums and other collections. This perspective was given its most robust expression in José António de Sá's

1783 *Compendio de observações*, which would become an influential guide for the Portuguese scientific expeditions overseas that in 1783 were just getting underway (Carvalho 1987; Araújo 2003; Maxwell 1995; Carneiro, Simões, and Diogo 2000; Safier 2007).

Foreign nationals within Portugal played an important role as well. Many professors of the Real Colégio dos Nobres (such as Giovanni António dalla Bella) came from northern Italy. At the Ajuda palace, the Paduan native Júlio Mattiazzi took responsibility for the royal cabinet of natural history and the royal botanical garden. After 1777, the Venetian mathematician Michele Franzini oversaw the continued development of the Ajuda cabinet. Perhaps most influential was the Paduan polymath Domenico Vandelli. Originally a professor of chemistry, Pombal recruited him in 1764 to teach at Coimbra. Vandelli advocated for the reform of the university, championed instruction in the natural sciences, and was instrumental in the creation of both a botanical garden and a cabinet of natural history. It was Vandelli's own collection in Padua that would become the basis of the collections at Coimbra and Ajuda. Young men from throughout the empire, and especially from Portugal and Brazil, were trained by Vandelli, whose political ascent would later prove instrumental for the administrative appointments of his students (Cardoso 1989, 57–67; Simon 1983).

Vandelli, along with heads of other educational and investigative institutions, participated as well in international networks of exchange. Vandelli corresponded with Linnaeus, exchanged Brazilian seeds for those from Peru with some of his Spanish counterparts, and corresponded with Casimiro Gómez Ortega, the director of the Real Jardín Botánico in Madrid. There were a number of important cross-currents between Spain and Portugal. Benito Jerónimo Feijóo was widely read in Portugal, for example, and Vernei's *Verdadeiro método de estudar* circulated widely in Spain (Simon 1983, ch. 1).

Though strongly influenced by international and imperial networks, eighteenth-century reforms were, to varying degrees, the extension of efforts that began much earlier. In Spain, royal patronage of the sciences dated at least to the sixteenth century, when the crown and its advisors realised that they needed to know more about the peoples, places, plants, and creatures of their American territories. To this end, Charles V (r. 1516–1556) established the Consejo de Indias and Casa de Contratación, which oversaw all matters relating to governance of and trade with Spanish America (Barrera-Osorio 2006). These institutions in turn supported the collection of geographic, natural

historical, and anthropological information about the colonies. In 1570, Philip II (r. 1556–1598) appointed royal physician Francisco Hernández as director of the first scientific expedition to Spanish America with a charge to study its plants and animals (Varey, Chabrán, and Weiner 2000). At about the same time, Juan López de Velasco, the royal cosmographer-chronicler, used standardised questionnaires in an attempt to solicit commensurate information on a range of geographical, medical, climatic, and other issues from Spanish colonial officials—all in an effort to write a comprehensive account of the peoples and places Spain’s American territories (Mundy 1996; Alvarez Peláez 1993). In the late sixteenth century, Philip II also patronised the sciences and included a botanical garden and alchemical laboratories in the design and construction of El Escorial (Cañizares-Esguerra 2006, 35). Thus, by the eighteenth century, there was a well-established tradition of collecting information and producing knowledge about the natural world embedded in the Spanish colonial government (Crawford 2016, ch. 3).

Although in Portugal reforms variously appear to have been set in motion under either Pombal or Maria I, there were important precedents here as well. Diasporic communities of Portuguese physicians—often but not always New Christians fleeing persecution—had long facilitated the exchange of texts, objects, and ideas between Portugal and other parts of Western Christendom, a process that intensified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Silva Dias 1952; Farelo 2010; Jordan 2012). The Conselho Ultramarino, founded in 1642, had already undertaken efforts to centralise governance in the hands of better-qualified administrators: educated *letrados* and aristocrats with colonial administrative experience (often in Brazil) were favoured in appointments (Myrup 2015, ch. 2). Meanwhile, vigorous and at times heated debate over medical education and practice had begun to mount among medical practitioners in Lisbon during the middle and late seventeenth century. Proponents of reform asserted the superiority of experience gained either aboard ship or in the empire to traditional book learning and metropolitan practice (Cagle 2018, ch. 8; Curto 1988; Walker 2005). From Paris, Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo had attempted to discipline colonial plant exchanges and described in great detail how Asian plants should be packed, transported, and replanted in Brazil. It would soon be but one attempt among many. The Academia Real de História, founded in 1720 under Dom João V, was not strictly concerned with history and literature but fostered debates in the fields of medicine and natural

philosophy—a precursor to the Academia Real das Ciências later (Silva Dias 1952; Mota 2003).

If engagement with the Enlightenment in Spain and Portugal gave new life to existing investigative traditions and institutions, it is also true that in the eighteenth century the sciences became a part of Iberian culture in new ways. The proliferation of investigative institutions, the growing number of books and periodicals published in the vernacular, and the emergence of learned societies all combined to make the disciplined study of nature a much more visible, widespread, and popular endeavour. Knowledge of nature and ways to discipline its production were increasingly shared (Pimentel 2015, 86). Fashionable *tertulias*, in which like-minded intellectuals and elites assembled to discuss philosophical and literary topics, were one instance. Feijóo's publications were another. One reason for the popularity of his work was that Feijóo introduced his readers to scientific ideas not in the form of complex philosophical treatises in Latin, but in the form of short essays and, later, letters written in the vernacular and designed to spark his readers' curiosity. Feijóo followed the lead of other *novatores* who popularised science in more engaging published formats such as dialogues and even fables (Pimentel 2015, 89).

Another important development was the rise of periodicals. They first appeared in Spain in the mid-seventeenth century. By the 1730s, interest in science had reached the point in Spanish culture such that some publishers began to offer periodicals that focused on the sciences such as *Memorias eruditas para la critica de artes y ciencias* (1734) and its successor *Diario de los literatos de España* (1737–1742). Meanwhile other periodicals, such as *Correo de Madrid* and *Discursos mercuriales*, began reporting some of the important developments in the sciences of the day (Pimentel 2015, 90–92). Ultimately, such evidence shows that the increase in royal patronage of the sciences was the result of a complex interaction of existing structures of knowledge production and a broader popularisation of science alongside the engagement with Enlightenment ideals by reformers, officials, and elites in Spain.

In Portugal a few decades later, the work of both Casa Pia and the Academia Real das Ciências was similarly part of a wider effort not only to produce and deploy natural knowledge, but to do so in ways that made it more accessible to a wider audience. In 1770 the Junta do Comércio instituted the Aula de Comércio, which provided especially merchants' children with a three-year course of study in practical mathematics, finance, and administration. The Casa Pia gave

rise to a coterie of disciples of the mathematician Anastácio da Cunha. And the Academia Real published findings that its members hoped would spur industrial and agricultural innovation. The Lisbon-based Casa Literária do Arco do Cego undertook a short-lived publishing effort from 1799 to 1801 with the goal of disseminating works of agronomy in the Portuguese Atlantic. Among a number of similar serial or multi-volume publications were the *Gazeta Literária* and the *Jornal Enciclopédico*, the editors for which solicited articles from among their Portuguese contemporaries and ran extracts of foreign work in Portuguese translation. Books also found a more accessible home: the Real Biblioteca Pública da Corte was founded in 1796 with the library of the Real Mesa Censória as the basis of its collection (Simões, Carneiro, and Diogo 1999).

Imperial travels and colonial entanglements

In the early 1740s, a curious manuscript began circulating in Madrid. Now believed to have been authored by José del Campillo y Cossío, a Spanish political thinker and former government official, the document recommended setting up a system in which officials in the colonial government in Spanish America submit “samples” of any “bush, root, tree, fruit, resin, mineral [or] rock” that might have “some special virtue for health, pleasure or other uses”. In Spain, Campillo explained, “chemists” would analyse these materials to identify any that might prove “useful to the Monarchy” (Campillo y Cosío 1789, 151–152). In his linkage of imperial prosperity to natural knowledge as well as his emphasis on metropolitan expertise and the centralising function of metropolitan institutions, Campillo was not alone. Decades earlier, Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo had offered a similar vision to his countrymen. In the late eighteenth century at the Real Jardín Botánico in Madrid and the Museum of Natural History in Lisbon, Casimiro Gómez Ortega and Domenico Vandelli, continued to advocate for just such an approach. Imperial prosperity was to be built upon imperial science (Lafuente 2002; Sarmiento 1992; Carvalho 1987; Simon 1983).

Visions of a symbiotic relationship between science and empire also reflected the widespread Enlightenment notion that travel was a privileged source of knowledge about nature (Withers 2007, 87–111). This emphasis was partly a consequence of the distrust of colonial inhabitants and partly due to the increasing emphasis on the primacy

of first-hand experience of the world. Of course, something like that sentiment had been longstanding. Expeditions—whether for discovery or conquest—had been an important aspect of the Spanish and Portuguese imperial enterprise since the sixteenth century. Then, too, travellers stressed the importance of wide-ranging travel as a foundation for true knowledge (Silva Dias 1952; Almeida 1995). But in the eighteenth century, expeditions increasingly took the investigation of nature as their primary objective and they became state-directed, globalised, and purposeful in ways that they had not been before. With the implementation of educational reforms and the founding of new investigative institutions, naturalists in Spain and Portugal now possessed the infrastructure to train personnel, coordinate expeditions, and assemble ever greater collections.

The late eighteenth century in particular witnessed a number of concerted, state-commissioned efforts to chart the geography and hydrography of both Iberian empires, to more thoroughly catalogue the flora and the fauna they encompassed, and to inventory the potential sources of mineral and vegetable wealth they contained. The Royal Botanical Expedition to Peru and Chile (1777–1788), the Royal Botanical Expedition in New Granada (1783–1816), the Royal Botanical Expedition to New Spain (1789–1794, and the Malaspina Expedition (1789–1794) are only the best-known of the more than 60 expeditions that were sent to the Americas and the Philippines between 1760 and 1808 (Berquist Soule 2014; Bleichmar 2012; Cowie 2011b). In the Portuguese world, prominent cartographer Guilherme Joaquim Pais de Menezes set out to remap Angola in 1758, inaugurating a generation of reformist administrative itineraries between Lisbon and Luanda in the 1760s. João da Silva Feijó catalogued the vegetable and mineral wealth of the Cape Verdes from 1783 to 1797 and then travelled through Ceará in 1799 for the same purpose. Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira explored Brazil extensively from 1783 to 1792. Manuel Galvão da Silva, originally one of four naturalists in Ferreira's expedition, was posted instead to Mozambique, where from 1783 to 1793 he conducted land, mineral, and mine surveys; between 1793 and 1794 he also catalogued the flora and fauna of Goa. Joaquim José da Silva was also originally a part of the Ferreira expedition but was instead dispatched to Angola, where he worked from 1783 until about 1808 (Simon 1983; Santos 2010; Lopes et al. 2005; Raminelli 1998). With these expeditions, cabinets of natural history swelled with new specimens. Drawings, watercolours, travel accounts, natural histories, and other texts (print

and manuscript) multiplied in metropolitan libraries and archives. Iberian colonies were less a source of ontological mystery and increasingly targets of imperial mastery.

There were, however, important differences between the Spanish and Portuguese imperial approaches to the production of natural knowledge. For the Spanish these expeditions represented, in part, a renewal of the sixteenth-century efforts of Francisco Hernández and projects like the *Relaciones Geograficas*—earlier efforts to systematically gather information about the vast territories of Spanish America (Varey, Chabrán, and Weiner 2000; Barrera-Osorio 2006; Mundy 1996). But in the case of Portugal and its empire, with the exception of the disciplined creation of knowledge about sea and wind currents across the globe, there was no such project until the eighteenth century. Hence, in Portugal, the kind of centrally organised imperial science that Enlightenment reform enacted was a new effort rather than a renewed one (Cagle 2018; Cardim 2002).

In neither case was knowledge of nature simply the outcome of seamless global itineraries, the result only of the labour of men trained in metropolitan institutions, or simply an upshot of the unproblematic remittance of exotic specimens from far-flung colonial peripheries as men like Campillo suggested. Metropolitan writers like Gómez Ortega in Madrid or Vandelli in Lisbon attempted to discipline the eyes, hands, and imaginations of their agents—to turn students and colleagues like Hipólito Ruiz and José Pavón, who led the Peru and Chile expedition, or Ferreira who went to Brazil, into philosophical travellers (Bleichmar 2005; Safier 2007). But these men were not the only persons in the Iberian colonial world to claim authoritative knowledge of nature. Although observers in Europe increasingly imagined the colonies as culturally, intellectually, and bodily deficient, natural inquiry was never confined to urban centres of metropolitan Spain and Portugal (Scheibinger 2004; Bethencourt 2014; Smith 2015). Innovative approaches to natural inquiry predated colonial settlement everywhere and remained a pervasive feature of colonial societies. Moreover, investigation of the natural world was an enterprise that engaged the attention and efforts of a diverse range of participants from Amerindians and African slaves to Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries, from Hindu Konkani-speaking herbalists to Muslim midwives from Java, as well as Spanish Creole elites and Portuguese plantation owners in the Americas (Crawford 2016; Prestes 2000; Sweet 2011; Cagle 2018).

Here again, important differences distinguished the Spanish and

Portuguese empires. In the decades before the arrival of the royal expeditions in the 1770s and 1780s, many urban centres in Spanish America, including Mexico City, Havana, Bogotá, Quito, Lima, and Buenos Aires, already supported their own cultures of systematic investigation. As in Spain so too in Spanish America: in the eighteenth century, science became a more prominent part of society and culture. The study of nature became a fashionable and, for many, pragmatic pursuit among creole intellectuals and urban elites. José Antonio Alzate in Mexico City, Miguel de Santisteban in Bogotá, Eugenio Espejo in Quito, and José Eusebio Llano Zapata, Cosme Bueno, and Hipolito Unanue in Lima all adapted the investigative methods, values, and ideals of science and the Enlightenment to their local contexts. Institutions, meanwhile, popularised and supported the investigation of nature. These included botanical gardens (Mexico City, 1788; Guatemala, 1796), a cabinet of natural history (Guatemala, 1796), colleges of surgery and medicine (Mexico City, 1768; Lima, 1792), a royal seminary of mining (Mexico City, 1792) and a chemical-metallurgical laboratory (Lima, 1791).

Alongside these new colonial institutions, a colonial periodical literature devoted in part to propagating and disseminating scientific knowledge emerged. These included the *Gacetas de Literatura de Mexico* (1788–1795), the most successful of several learned periodicals edited by José Alzate in Mexico City, the *Mercurio Peruano* (1791–1795), a learned journal edited by Jacinto Calero and published in Lima, and the *Papel Peródico de Santa Fe* (1791–1797), established by Manuel Socorro Rodríguez as well as periodicals published in several other regions of Spanish America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the pages of these periodicals, Creole elites engaged not only the key scientific ideas of the time, but also provided descriptions of the plants, animals, minerals, and other curious phenomena of their regions. Finally, many of these activities were supported by and associated with the new learned societies that emphasised useful knowledge, known as Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País, established throughout Spanish America in the late eighteenth century, following the model of those established in Spain in the 1760s (Silva 2002; Nieto Olarte 2007; Arboleada and Soto Arango 2006).

In Portuguese colonies scattered from South Asia to South America, parallels appear to have been few and infrequent. Unlike Spanish America, not a single one of the Portuguese colonies could boast of a university. Only Goa was home to a press of its own. A rare and (for

the moment) understudied example of a colonial investigative institution was the short-lived Academia Científica in Rio de Janeiro, which was established in 1772 in order to foster polite debate in all areas of the arts and sciences (it persisted until 1794, though it had been renamed the Sociedade Literária in 1782). Brazil would only become home to institutions like those of Spanish America after the arrival of the crown and court in 1808. The event gave rise to the creation of botanical gardens in São Paulo, Bahia, Pernambuco, Mato Grosso, and Goiás. Rio became home to a botanical garden in 1810 and Olinda did so in 1811 (Jobim 1986). There were, meanwhile, repeated efforts to provide formal medical schooling in Luanda (d'Esaguy 1951; Walker 2016). And in the 1760s plans were hatched for an Aula de Geometria de Luanda to provide practical training in the sciences to would-be colonial administrators (Madeira Santos 2010). But across Portugal's empire, investigative communities of longstanding had emerged alongside of other, more familiar colonial institutions. Plantations, hospitals, missions, mines, and urban and rural households alike hosted lay-healers of diverse ethnic and confessional backgrounds, who possessed distinctive ways of explaining natural phenomena and highly varied approaches to health and healing (Sweet 2011; Walker 2013; Cagle 2015).

As members of state-directed expeditions commingled with colonial cultures of natural inquiry, they helped facilitate the exchange of Enlightenment ideas and insinuated the colonies into the broad collection of Enlightenment projects. Just as in Spain and Portugal, many in the colonies found common ground with the members of European scientific expeditions because they shared the view that material prosperity hinged on a more thorough knowledge of nature. Yet colonial natural inquiry was never simply an extension of metropolitan objectives. And the convergence of imperial and colonial investigative endeavours threw those differences into high relief. As metropolitan efforts were entangled with colonial cultures of natural inquiry, the very globalising pretensions of Enlightenment science were called into question. Consequently, eighteenth-century voyages did not simply disseminate metropolitan ideas and aspirations. They helped multiply the locations and meanings of Enlightenment itself.

Philosophical travellers collected specimens of plants and animals, and sampled, tested, and remitted potentially valuable minerals. As they did so, these naturalists often had wider metropolitan debates in mind. References to the work of such well-known figures in the European Enlightenment as Georges-Louis Leclerc (the Comte de

Buffon), Jean-Jacque Rousseau, William Robertson, and Adam Smith peppered their published and manuscript compositions. Spanish and Portuguese travellers quarrelled with La Condamine in favour of Montesquieu over the alleged degenerative effects of American environments. João da Silva Feijó and Joaquim José da Silva variously employed the *Systema Naturae* of Swedish natural Carolus Linnaeus in order to identify, describe, catalogue, and classify plants and animals in the Atlantic. In the Amazon, Ferreira hauled a small library with him that included French and German printed works, manuscripts of his countrymen, and the *Historia naturalis Brasiliae* (Amsterdam, 1648) by the Dutchmen Georg Margraf and Willem Piso (Simon 1983; Safier 2007).

Yet the extent to which metropolitan institutions, colleagues, and international correspondents could discipline their work was always partial. In New Spain, a debate over the Linnaean system emerged between Creole elites and members of the Royal Botanical Expedition in Mexico City shortly after the establishment of the expedition in 1787 and a botanical garden in 1788. As required by the Spanish Crown, members of the expedition adhered to the principles of botanical taxonomy and nomenclature developed by the Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus (Lafuente and Valverde 2005). As the expedition sought to institutionalise Linnaean botany in Mexico City, they met resistance from several prominent Creole intellectuals, most notably the priest and naturalist José Antonio Alzate. Alzate and his compatriots rejected the Linnaean system for its emphasis on morphology alone and its disregard for local knowledge of the plant, its medicinal properties, and local environment. In his refutation of Linnaean taxonomy, Alzate questioned the applicability of any European science to American nature, as he observed in 1788, “in New Spain there are products of nature that refute and overturn all theories and botanical systems hitherto devised” (quoted in Lafuente and Valverde 2005, 137). Creole elites in Spanish America and Portuguese travellers in Brazil alike echoed this “patriotic epistemology”, advocating for local scientific traditions as viable alternatives to metropolitan ones (Lafuente and Valverde 2005, 137).

Investigative efforts sponsored by metropolitan authorities also easily became ensnared in colonial politics, often redirecting the investigative focus of newly arrived naturalists. João da Silva Feijó was sent to Brazil as *sargento-mor* of the militia but also entrusted with answering various questions about natural history in the colony. The political independence of Ceará from Pernambuco in 1799, however,

raised questions of the viability of the regional economy and placed special urgency on the identification of exploitable resources. Feijó spent more time assaying silver, copper, and gold deposits, and scouting out iron, chalk, and sulphur mines; he spent far less time on the broader array of plants and animals of interest to colleagues like Vandelli in Lisbon (Lopes et al. 2005).

Other challenges emerged as well. In the case of the Portuguese expeditions to Angola and Mozambique, naturalists held dual appointments as colonial administrators. Colonial officials with advanced education in mineralogy or botany seemed better prepared to foster economic growth in colonies focused on mining or agriculture. In theory, such appointments made sense but these officials soon found that, in practice, the competing demands of administrative duties and the survey of local natural resources quickly became a source of tension. Both appointments required time, personnel, and expertise, which in the case of trained artists and other field assistants were in short supply. That, again, made it difficult to carry out the more extensive surveys of plants, animals, and landscapes that metropolitan colleagues requested. At the same time, the administrative reforms they were charged with implementing might earn them the ire of the very members of colonial society upon whose cooperation their investigative work depended (Simon 1983; Madeira Santos 2010). And finally, attempts to standardise the collection of information—to erect a colonial archive of knowledge with standardised questionnaires, tables for accumulating ostensibly commensurate information, maps drawn to scale, and other devices—all combined to create a vision of fixity that colonial realities did not support. For example, officials in Luanda attempted to establish fixed locations for the ethnic communities under their administrative charge but the capitals of individual ethnic communities changed with death of each *soba* (ethnic leader). Hence their settlements lacked precisely the permanence implied by administrative maps. In this and numerous other ways, colonial forms of knowledge often failed to reflect the human landscape they were supposed to represent (Madeira Santos 2010; Safier 2009).

Efforts to coordinate the accumulation of nature and discipline colonial knowledge also, at times, facilitated the appropriation of those efforts by colonial subjects. Amazonian men recruited to collect the *drogas do sertão* participated in these expeditions in order to serve their own commercial and curative interests. In Angola, literate *sobas* skilfully manipulated the growing colonial bureaucracy in order to

maintain their own privileges (Madeira Santos 2010; Roller 2010). In the Andean world in the late eighteenth century, local officials, merchants, and even indigenous labourers used their knowledge of cinchona bark, one of the most important medicaments in the early modern world, to thwart the attempts of Spanish pharmacists and botanists to assert the authority of European science in the context of Spanish colonial governance (Crawford 2018).

Questions about what kind of person in the socially, culturally, and racially diverse Iberian colonies was authorised to speak credibly about natural phenomena were at the heart of debates on topics ranging from the application and efficacy of medicines to botanical and zoological classification. Many prominent Enlightenment thinkers argued that overseas environments had a degenerative effect on the flora, fauna, and peoples there. Native bodies and minds were increasingly sexualised, racialised, and otherwise rendered inferior. Enslaved persons, indigenous healers, or other colonial inhabitants might hold considerable authority in their communities in the Americas, Africa, or Asia. Philosophical travellers tended to consider the testimony of non-Europeans as less sophisticated and, ultimately, less trustworthy (Gerbi 2010; Weber 2006).

For philosophical travellers, developing robust techniques for the production of reliable knowledge was always a fraught, uncertain, and incomplete endeavour. As had been the case since the sixteenth century, epistemologies variously drew on a combination of books and things, text and observation, erudition and experience. But in the eighteenth century the process of transcription, which was always distinct from the act of observing, became a tool of legitimation: it endowed claims based on personal observation with greater credibility. Ultimately these were the ways by which men like Ruiz and Pavón in Peru and Ferreira in Brazil sought to secure credibility for their work. But transcription entailed, in turn, both books and manuscripts that enabled cross-referencing and comparisons with earlier findings. And it required a community of artists and secretaries to construct the visual and verbal record of observations. Yet in the colonies, books were few and far between, access to a library could be intermittent and unpredictable, intellectual peers were scattered, and reliable assistants were hard to come by. In short, writing and correspondence helped legitimate individual impressions whose epistemic status was endangered by the very circumstances of their creation: nearly alone, far from metropolitan capitals, where indiscipline and degeneration seemed to scar the mind and body. No

amount of transcription could reliably resolve the dilemma—although a great deal of ink was expended in the effort on both sides of the Atlantic (Safier 2007; Safier 2008; Simon 1983).

Conclusion: post-Enlightenment ramifications

Eighteenth-century Enlightenment ideals inspired reforms that were meant to strengthen the empires of Spain and Portugal. By the turn of the nineteenth century—across the Iberian world—those reforms had fostered two interrelated but contradictory processes: the rise of independence movements that gave birth to new nations in much of Latin America, and the consolidation or extension of empire in Africa, Asia, and parts of the Caribbean. Science and the organisations that supported it were integral to both processes.

In much of Spanish and Portuguese America, the intellectual and cultural exchanges for which the study of nature was central helped sharpen distinctions between creoles and their metropolitan peers. In the Spanish colonies, private associations known as *Sociedades Económicas del Amigos del País*, which had sustained investigative enterprises into natural resources and new technologies, were often seedbeds of nationalist sentiment and home to clandestine meetings in which Creole elites plotted independence (Glick 1991, 327). The Napoleonic invasion of Spain helped enable the ensuing wars and even natural history was caught up in the turmoil. The materials of the Royal Botanical Expedition in New Granada became the spoils of war when, in 1816, over three decades' worth of manuscripts, drawings, and specimens were packed into 104 crates and shipped across the Atlantic to Spain (Appel 1994, 123). The wars for independence did not extinguish the scientific institutions and activities that had taken root during the three centuries of colonial rule. With independence, former institutions of imperial science were reimagined as the centres of national science. Patriotism continued to fuel the investigation of nature. Creole elites remained supportive of sciences related to agriculture, mining, and manufacturing in order to foster the economic prosperity of their new nations (Cañizares-Esguerra 2006).

With the Napoleonic occupation of Lisbon, Étienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire, member of the Académie des Sciences and later professor of zoology at the University of Paris, was able to comb through collections from the Portuguese expeditions to the Cape Verdes, Brazil,

Angola, and Mozambique. In Paris, those spoils fuelled the study of nature in imperial France (Simon 1983). In Brazil, the birthplace of many Portuguese imperial naturalists—Ferreira and the Silvas among them—eighteenth-century intellectual exchanges would enable the self-conscious articulation of a Brazilian identity in the early nineteenth century. With the arrival of crown and court to Portuguese America in 1808, colonial cities from Olinda and Recife to Bahia and Rio witnessed the development of museums, libraries, and botanical gardens. With independence in 1822, Coimbra-trained specialists like Hipólito da Costa and José Bonifácio became statesmen in a new Brazilian empire (Raminelli 2008; Coclet da Silva 2006; Lopes 2000; Nizza da Silva 1999). For colonies in Asia and Africa, meanwhile, the loss of Brazil led Portuguese rulers to redouble their efforts to locate, identify, and harness the most promising animal, vegetable, and mineral resources (Simon 1976). Throughout the Iberian world—in new nations and across lingering empires—Enlightenment-era institutions persisted, and so too did questions of evidence, expertise, and authority.

Abbreviation

BNP

Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal

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CHAPTER TWENTY five

Imperial competition in the eighteenth-



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Introduction

This chapter traces the various ways that imperial competition influenced the development of Spanish and Portuguese America in the long eighteenth century. The restoration of Portugal's Independence, recognised in 1668, brought a long epoch of symbiotic and peaceful relations between Portuguese and Spanish America to an end. It initiated a new period of intense rivalry that would shape the strategies of both Iberian empires, for the question of boundaries required resolution, particularly in areas considered economically valuable. Luso-Spanish rivalry cannot be considered in isolation, however. Portugal's alliance with an ascendant Britain had significant consequences for Luso-Spanish relations whereas Spain's seemingly interminable conflict with Britain in the Old World and the New shaped its own approach to rivalry with Portugal in the Americas. Imperial competition and collaboration are analysed in the context of major geopolitical disputes of the eighteenth century, particularly the War of the Spanish Succession, the Seven Years War, the American Revolution, and the French Revolutionary Wars, which contributed significantly to the crises of empire that ultimately unravelled the Iberian empires in the Americas.

The War of the Spanish Succession

While Luso-Spanish relations had their own dynamic in the Americas, bearing the imprint of the dissolution of the Union of the Crowns between 1640 and 1668, Luso-Spanish relations also must be situated against the broader panorama of imperial competition with other non-Iberian polities in the Americas. Of these, the most important were Britain and France in the eighteenth century. The Dutch Republic, of course, had been a major rival in the previous century, but after the Dutch were expelled from the northeast of Brazil, they were less a

rival than a nuisance in the eighteenth century, as its major Caribbean entrepot of Curaçao remained a mitochondrion of contraband with Spanish America. The respective relations of Spain and Portugal with an ascendant Britain and revived France during and after the War of the Spanish Succession are then an appropriate point of departure for studying imperial competition.

It must be recalled that Britain was the first major power to recognise the parvenu Braganza dynasty in the mid-1650s, a renewal of an alliance that dated back several centuries (even if latterly it had fallen into abeyance). The price of this alliance was steep, entailing the cession of Bombay. Yet it provided the fledgling Portuguese regime with an ally in the face of potential Spanish revanchism. Of course, as the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1714) and later the Seven Years War (1756–1763) showed, in continent-wide wars, Britain did not prioritise its Iberian ally to the degree that statesmen in Lisbon imagined that it should. Nevertheless, in the main, the British alliance served to keep Spanish ambitions at bay.

The eighteenth century began with the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, whose impacts were long-lasting, both on the equilibrium between the European nations, especially the Iberian ones, and on colonial conquests. It involved almost the entire continent and was the result of a confrontation between the Bourbons and Habsburgs for the throne of Spain (Borges 2003, 6–8). Behind this backdrop, however, various other questions emerged, such as the rivalry between France and England for global hegemony and between these and the Iberian Crowns; disputes for the control transoceanic trade, especially the slave trade, and for colonial spaces. For these reasons, the conflict was not limited to the Iberian peninsula, nor just to Europe, extending to the colonial territories, the case of South America, where France, Portugal, and Spain disputed territories (Furtado 2012, 253–276).

The absence of a direct heir to the Spanish Throne led Charles II, after examining various possibilities, to name as his successor Philip of Bourbon, Duke of Anjou, who as a great grandson of Louis XIV, also appeared in the French line of succession. The future Louis XV was the great grandson, not the son, of Louis XIV during childhood had delicate health, which created uncertainties about the succession to the throne. With the vacancy of the Spanish throne in January 1701, the *Cortes*, meeting in Madrid and Barcelona, recognised the Duke as the new king, naming him Philip V. Concerned with a possible Franco-Spanish union, Austria, England, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and

various German principalities established in the Treaty of the Hague, signed in September, the Great Alliance. The increase in tension between the parties triggered a war which began in the North of Italy and in the following 11 years, spread through the German principalities, the Low Countries, the North of France, and the Iberian peninsula, involving almost all the European nations against the Franco-Spanish coalition, which ended up reverberating in colonial possessions (Borges 2003, 8–13).

Portugal's initial position was favourable to the Bourbons' pretensions and the crown sought to maintain neutrality in relation to the conflict. Under the command of the then ambassador in France, José da Cunha Brochado, on 18 June 1701, Philip V was recognised as king of Spain. English reaction was immediate. In September of the following year, as the request of Ambassador John Methuen, this treaty was annulled and another signed with England (Serrão 1982, 223). Its text stipulated that at the end of the war, Portugal would have the right to territories on the frontier with Spain – in Estremadura and in Galicia—and a guarantee of the possession of the recently established Colónia do Sacramento, located on the northern bank of the mouth of the River Plate (Ramos et al. 2009, 344), reflecting the expansionist Portuguese desires on the two continents. In December 1703, solidifying this alliance even more, a commercial agreement was signed, which became known by the name of the English ambassador—the Treaty of Methuen (Cardoso et al. 2003). Both this commercial agreement and the defensive and offensive alliance divided the Portuguese ruling elite, which was reflected in the Council of State, which split between pro-French and pro-English factions, with the former being acid critics of the commercial advantages granted to England.

The Methuen Treaty enshrined British penetration of the Portuguese market. It permitted the duty-free entry of woollen goods into Lisbon and Porto while offering Portuguese wine (and other products) reciprocal advantages in the British market. From the early eighteenth century onwards, the massive influx of Brazilian gold was used by Portugal to reduce deficits and purchase foreign (mainly British) goods, with deleterious effects for Portugal's domestic manufactures. Portugal thus found itself in a curious and ultimately unsustainable position. Its possession of increasingly lucrative possession of Brazil was secured in exchange for British penetration of its markets and the attendant drain on gold, especially, that this entailed. In the short term, the benefits outweighed the costs, but

declining mineral yields made the Luso-British bargain less appealing than it originally had been as the century progressed.

While the British alliance structured Portugal's approach to imperial competition both in the Americas and in Europe, it was the French alliance and seemingly perpetual conflict with Britain that most influenced Spain's conduct. The result of the War of the Spanish Succession was that Bourbon monarchs sat on the thrones on either side of the Pyrenees. These powers entered into the so-called Family Compact, which meant that their foreign policy would be closely aligned. Given that both France and Spain had many causes for conflict with Britain, the successive Family Compacts (as several aspects of the alliance between the two Bourbon powers would be adjusted as the century progressed) set the stage for a century of rivalry and competition with Britain (McKay and Scott 1983). Of course, several causes of dispute predated Spain's alliance with France. Most prominently, Britain had seized the strategic territorial toehold of Gibraltar in 1703, upsetting Bourbon plans for dominance in the Mediterranean. In the Americas, conflict continued to simmer, as Britain refused to relinquish the territory it seized from Spain – notably Jamaica – in the mid-seventeenth century and its North American colonies prospered economically and expanded demographically, creating eager consumers for the tropical commodities of Spanish America.

The biggest prize Britain carried away from the War of Spanish Succession, besides Gibraltar, was the thirty-year *asiento* contract (1713–1739) it wrested from Spain at the Peace of Utrecht. By the treaty's terms, the English South Sea Company received the lucrative *asiento*, the exclusive right to import slaves into Spanish America. The *asiento* also served as cover for contraband trade. As Spanish America become more prosperous, and its population expanded, demand for European goods was high and contraband traders were all too happy to meet that demand. Burgeoning demand, combined with the breakdown of the *flota* system (convoy transatlantic transport), ensured that colonial monopoly was a legal fiction for much of the eighteenth century.

All of this had significant implications for Luso-Spanish relations. As Brochado feared in defending neutrality, the change in the direction of its foreign policy led war to its territories in Europe and overseas. In January 1704,

Franco-Spanish troops attacked Beira and Alentejo in force,

taking without resistance Salvaterra, Segura, and Zibreira, while Monsanto and Idanha-a-Nova fell by assault. ... Castelo Branco did not take long to fall, ... and afterwards Portalegre and Castelo de Vide. North of the Tejo River, Penamacor was attacked.

(Serrão 1982, 226)

In Southern America, the French advanced from Guiana to the northern bank of the Amazon River or Maranhão, and destroyed the remaining Portuguese forts, while the Spanish attacked Colônia do Sacramento in the south.

Throughout the eighteenth century, Portuguese and Spanish America was the stage on which the conflicts between the two Iberian nations reverberated, which demanded the redefinition of their territorial limits, systematically disputed in wars, and the negotiations in the treaties which followed them. For Portugal, this was much more than a simple question of frontiers, since during the eighteenth century Portuguese America gradually emerged, replacing Asia, as the principal ultramarine source of wealth for the kingdom. This justified the effort of moving its western and southern frontiers to more distant regions, populating territories which according to previous treaties were Spanish by law; these territories will be understood as *terra incognita*, as *sertões* waiting to be colonised, and rapidly claimed by the Portuguese Crown. *Sertão* referred to a region far from the sea and from all parties, or an area “between territories” (Bluteau 1739, 613). For Spain, competition with Portugal over the territory of the New World had two principal effects. First, it was a spur to cartography, natural history, and the improvement of infrastructure to connect frontier and coveted interior zones with populous and increasingly prosperous cities. Second, given rampant contraband and the maritime threats posed by the Dutch and especially the British, the resolution of conflicts with Portugal, which finally came in the late eighteenth century, was a geopolitical necessity, however reluctantly this was acknowledged by statesmen in Madrid.

The Amazon River and Colônia do Sacramento

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the points of territorial disputes between European nations on the frontiers between their South American conquests were concentrated in two regions: the Amazon in the north and the mouth of the River Platte in the south. In

relation to the former, the dispute was primarily between French and Portuguese and concentrated around the so-called Cabo do Norte, which ran along the northern bank of Amazon River, or Maranhão, and the Vicente Pinzón River. In relation to the latter, it was centred on the dispute between the Spanish and Portuguese over the northern bank of the River Platte, especially Colônia do Sacramento (Almeida 1957; Furtado 2012, 253–276).

France's interest in the northern bank of the Amazon escalated after 1663, when the French Equinoctial Company was created, with the aim of encouraging the occupation of the Guiana region under its flag. In 1688, "the French project to control the land and the Amazon was put into action" (Almeida 1991, 38). In this year, commanded by De Ferrolles, French troops threatened the Portuguese fort of Araguari, "but it was only in 1697 that they decided to attack the fortresses of Macapá and Parú, which were destroyed, leading to the beginning of the Luso-French conflict" (Almeida 1991, 38).

With the aim of resolving this dispute, in 1699, Louis XIV and Pedro II signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, in which they agreed to define the limits of their possession in the Amazon region. In November, a Portuguese commission was appointed to determine the frontier with French Guiana and in 1700 the Provisional Treaty was signed (Brandão 2002, 121). By the terms of this treaty, the Portuguese agreed to evacuate and demolish the forts constructed on the north bank of the Amazon; in turn, "France committed itself provisionally to not construct any settlement on the north bank of the river and to leave the land between Macapá and the Iapoc River (Oiapoque) or Vicente Pinzón to be regulated later" (Levasseur 1889, 2). However, during the War of the Spanish Succession, France again advanced on the north bank of the Amazon, imposing severe losses on the Portuguese, destroying the local forts which had not been abandoned, such as Araguari, Camaí, and especially Macapá (or Massapá). In addition, Rio de Janeiro suffered two invasions by French pirates (Jean-François du Clerc, in 1710, and René du Guay-Trouin, in 1711), though these invaders did not form any permanent settlements. The first was repressed, but the second managed to sack the city and to seize the gold that had been stored, awaiting the Portuguese fleet (Fragoso 1965, 73–203).

Colônia do Sacramento was established in 1680 on the north bank of the River Plate, near its mouth and opposite Buenos Aires, by a Portuguese expedition, consisting of five ships, with around 440 people, including settlers and military, sent by Dom Manoel Lobo,

governor of the Southern Department or *Repertição Sul* (Almeida 1976, 333–341). The foundation of the colony had the immediate objective of facilitating the access of Luso-Brazilian traders, especially those from Rio de Janeiro, to trade with Spanish possessions. As they were paid in silver, some of what was mined in the Andes came by contraband to Brazil (Almeida 1991, 167).

Colônia's establishment provoked an immediate reaction on the part of Spain and a few months later it was attacked and destroyed by an expedition sent by the governor of Buenos Aires. In 1681, due to the Provisional Treaty signed by Portugal and Spain, its territory was returned to the Portuguese, which sent a new expedition to restore the fortress and repopulate it. This treaty, "signed on 1 May 1681 between the king Dom Pedro, of glorious memory, and Carlos 2, king of Castile", defined that the possessions of the two crowns in the River Platte region would respect the principle of "*al presente la tiene*" (ANTT. MNE. Correspondência entre diplomatas portugueses e secretários de Estado. Cartas de dom Luís da Cunha para o Reino. Livro 793, Paris, 1724, ff. 285–286); in other words, in the case of the Portuguese it was limited to the fortress constructed in 1680. However, it was not only reconstructed, but the colonisation was expanded, establishing an agricultural belt of farms and plantations around it to support the residents.

In the context of the War of the Spanish Succession, the then Governor of Buenos Aires, Afonso Valdes Inclán, recruited the regular troops, aided by more than 4000 village Indians and, in October, lay siege to the fortress. With this strategy it was intended to starve the inhabitants and cause them to capitulate. Artillery attacks were intermittent until March 1705 when the Governor Sebastião Veiga Cabral abandoned the fortress, bringing with him the Portuguese troops quartered there, the civilian settlers, including those from around the neighbouring areas, and the arms and munitions which he managed to embark on the squadron sent to rescue them (Cesar 1970, 83–84).

The Congress of Utrecht and its impact on Luso-Spanish territories in the Americas

The peace terms that ended the War of the Spanish Succession were negotiated at the Congress of Utrecht. Its preliminaries occurred in London between 1711 and 1712, and the Congress itself in the Low

Countries between 1713 and 1715. Utrecht constituted a moment of inflection, since it shaped new forms of diplomatic policy and also was a great school for a generation of diplomats who debuted in this congress (Bély 1990, 327). The English served as mediators between Portugal, on the one hand, and France and Spain, on the other. While an agreement with the former emerged rapidly, signed on 11 April 1713, the latter agreement was reached slowly, being concluded only on 6 February 1715, after the Congress had been formally closed. For this reason, due to the protocol, the agreement was signed in the city garden (Furtado, 2012, 253–276; ANTT. MNE. Livro 787. Cartas do Conde de Tarouca e de dom Luís da Cunha as quais se continua a negociação de Utrecht para Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, 1713, f. 7, 6 de janeiro de 1713).

Image 25.1 Portuguese and Spanish diplomats sign the Treaty of Utrecht. In “Memórias da Paz de Utreque oferecidas a El-Rei Nosso Senhor por D. Luís da Cunha, 4^a e última parte”, 1715

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The image is between page 864 and page 865

In relation to South America, the principal point to be negotiated with the French was “that the banks of the Amazon [river], on the north side, will stay free to us from the entrance to the cape” of Vicente Pinzón (BNL Reservados. Códice 11209. Cartas de dom Luís da Cunha para o cardeal da Cunha—Inquisidor Geral, f. 310), since it was considered that, under the treaties already established, the Portuguese had assured their rights over both banks of the Amazon. This right, which guaranteed them the exclusive navigation of the river and its tributaries, was essential to make the commercial monopoly in the region effective. The three points discussed were about France “ceding [to Portugal] the right it wanted to have land in Cabo do Norte and that [the former] would desist from navigation on the Amazon River, where it recently had wanted to remain, also consenting not to use its entrance” to the river (BNL. Reservados. Códice 11.209. Cartas de dom Luís da Cunha para cardeal da Cunha—Inquisidor geral, f. 312, Utrecht, 13 de abril de 1713). In relation to France, Portugal had been totally successful: it maintained its dominion over the northern bank of the Amazon (ANTT. MNE. Livro 787. Cartas do Conde de Tarouca e de dom Luís da Cunha nas quais se continua a negociação de Utrecht para Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, f. 75, 15 de abril de 1713), guaranteeing it the exclusive right to navigation and, despite the resistance of the former, managed to prevent it gaining access to ports located near the mouth of the river,

although in the future the French Crown would make new attempts to capture them.

In relation to the Spanish, the negotiations in the Americas concerned Colônia do Sacramento, which was returned to the Portuguese, and the restitution of ships seized by both sides, having been accused of contraband. While Portuguese ships were held in Buenos Aires, Spanish ones suffered the same fate in Rio de Janeiro. Various difficulties stood in the way of an agreement. Behind the scenes the Portuguese negotiators complained about the imprecision of the orders received from Portugal and the lack of support of the English in forcing the Spanish to accept their demands, previously agreed with John Methuen, in 1701. Finally, with a certain liberty and without information or maps which could be used to demand the exact size of the territory of Colônia, the phrase “*al presente la tiene*” was removed from the text of the treaty and the expression the “Territory and Colônia do Sacramento” was inserted. This ruse aimed to ensure that the Portuguese possession was restricted neither to the old fortress nor its nearest surroundings, but instead extended to the entirety of the northern bank of the River Plate, including the region of Montevideo, situated to the West. “In 1723, the Portuguese government founded Montevideo, which served as support for Colônia. However, in 1726, the Spanish razed this settlement” (Ferreira 2001, 39). It thus favoured the expansionist project of the Portuguese in relation to the southern part of Brazil (Franzen 1992, 255–259).

The treaty also allowed for, within the period of a year, the colony to be exchanged with the Spanish, but the Portuguese were only interested in a proposal covering territories along the borders of the two nations in Europe, such as Albuquerque or Puebla. As they did not reach an agreement, Colônia was formally returned to the Portuguese in 1716. However, new difficulties emerged, since at the suggestion of the Governor of Buenos Aires, who believed that the Portuguese recovery of their territory would be a threat to Spanish interests, the latter insisted on defining the term “territory”, as inserted in the agreement, as only corresponding to the countryside, in other words to the agricultural surroundings of fortress, and would only restore a limited amount of land, with the range of one cannon shot (Possamai 2006, 84–85). This corresponded to around three miles, which forced the continuity of negotiations in the following years. This resolution was supported by the already established consensus between European countries (England and Holland were the first), in relation

to the diplomatic dispute between the ideas of *mare clausum* and *mare liberum*, and the belief that the maritime dominion of a nation extended the distance of a defensive cannon shot of three maritime miles from the coast. Spain used this measure in the definition of territory around the fortress. The conflict of interest caused by Colônia, together with the contradictory terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, aided Portuguese expansion to the west, meaning that throughout the eighteenth century, and even in the nineteenth, new territorial conflicts and disputes in South America brought Portugal and Spain into conflict.

In spite of (or perhaps because of) innumerable concessions of territory to rival powers, the huge financial outlay for the defence of such vast territory, and the de facto destruction of the colonial monopoly already described, Spain's empire in the Americas remained largely intact in the eighteenth century. Small enclaves and some entrepôts had been surrendered irrevocably to rival powers, Britain first and foremost, but Spanish control over both its less developed peripheries as well as its core viceroyalties was undiminished. In order to prevent further losses, Spain embarked on a naval reconstruction program in the 1720s (Storrs 2016). In 1722, there were a meagre 22 ships in the Spanish fleet, whereas by 1760 there were 52, the upkeep of which accounted for about a fifth of overall state expenditure (McNeill 1985, 68). Yet Spain's revamped navy lagged behind Britain's, which necessitated a continued reliance on fortified ports. Although Spain would implement an elaborate coast guard (*guarda costas*) system in the eighteenth century, it studiously avoided naval battles with its more powerful adversary. Spain fought a single major naval battle with Britain between 1713 and 1762, and that was triggered by a flagrant and potentially catastrophic attack on the silver fleet.

The first half of the eighteenth century also witnessed the gradual reorganisation of the garrisons of the fortified ports into fixed (*fijo*) battalions: the first was established at Havana (1719), followed by Cartagena (1736), Santo Domingo (1738), Vera Cruz (1740), Panama (1741), and San Juan (1741) (Kuethe 1986, 4–5). But maintaining effective fortifications, troops, and coast guard patrols entailed a massive outlay of resources. By the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739–1742) with Britain, more than half of Lima's treasury revenue was earmarked for defence. Havana offers another example of the high costs necessitated by military preparedness. Besides a garrison of 1,500 peninsular soldiers, whose upkeep in the Americas was three

times as great as it would have been in Europe, a supplemental militia raised the total force to just over 6,000 troops (McNeill 1985, 101–102). What is remarkable is that so few men in a mere handful of scattered fortresses managed to stave off Britain's superior forces for so long. Part of the explanation lies in differential immunity to Yellow Fever, which was endemic to the Caribbean from the late seventeenth century. As the historian John McNeill has observed, "Spain's hold on the region was inexpensively buttressed by mosquitos and microbes". The toll of disease on invaders was ghastly. When Admiral Vernon led 29,000 soldiers and sailors in amphibious invasions of Santiago de Cuba and Cartagena (1741), 22,000 of his men were dead within a year, with a mere 1,000 of those battlefield casualties. Yellow Fever therefore proved a crucial, and reliable, ally in maintaining Spanish dominance in the Americas against encroachments from Britain (McNeill 2010, 136, 166).

The discovery of gold and diamonds in Portuguese America

Portuguese expansion westward in South America, from the end of the seventeenth century onwards, resulted in the creation of extensive new zones of territorial disputes on the Luso-Spanish frontiers of Brazil. This demanded from the Portuguese a significant effort to redefine these frontiers, still roughly governed by the Treaty of Tordesillas. This advance was the result of the discovery of gold and diamonds, which also provoked a redefinition of the economy of Portugal.

Starting in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, successive expeditions – known as *Bandeiras* while those responsible for them were called *bandeirantes* – left the *vila* of São Paulo heading towards the interior. The chronology of the discovery of gold in what came to be known as the captaincies of Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, and Goiás is uncertain and doubtful. What is known is that between 1695 and 1698 the first discoveries in Minas Gerais began to be made public and attracted a multitude of outsiders. The discoveries in the mines of Cuiabá, in Mato Grosso, occurred around 1718, and those of Goiás, between 1725 and 1735, the latter along the Tocantins River. Although the official notification of the discovery of diamonds in the northeastern region of Minas Gerais, around the *arraial* of Tejuco (now the city of Diamantina), dates from 1729, since the beginning of that

decade they had been found there (Furtado 2007, 303–320). Diamonds were also found during the century in Mato Grosso; in the region of the Claro and Pilões rivers in Goiás; and in the Abaeté River, in the southwest of Minas Gerais. It is calculated that in Minas Gerais alone, during the eighteenth century the official production of gold amounted to 650 tons, while diamonds reached the astonishing figure of a little over three million carats. The occupation of these territories was, thus, decisive and the wealth in gold and diamonds so great that it triggered the expansion of Portuguese colonisation to the centre-west of Brazil (Cortês 2012) and the reorientation of the dynamics of the Portuguese Empire in the eighteenth century, with the progressive movement of its economic centre from Asia to Brazil (Furtado 2014, 61–110). This meant that Portugal had to make efforts to maintain at any cost the territories under its effective dominion, since Goiás and Mato Grosso lay beyond the boundaries set in the 1494 Luso-Spanish Treaty of Tordesillas.

Although treaties covering borders in specific regions of South America had been signed by Portugal, Spain, and France during the first half of the century, generally speaking the terms of Tordesillas remained in force. This constituted an impediment to the expansionist yearnings of the Portuguese Crown, since it left Spain with control over the centre-west of South America, which was being systematically explored and colonised by Luso-Brazilians. This expansionist dynamic required new territorial configurations for the frontier, expressed, after Utrecht, in successive armed conflicts, which were followed by diplomatic pacts.

At the end of 1735, Colônia do Sacramento returned to the centre of the dispute, when, after a diplomatic incident, Spain imposed a new blockade. This episode was called the “Great Siege”, and “for almost two years, it left the inhabitants of Colônia close to starvation” (Prado 2002, 119). It was provoked by the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid, the Lord of Belmonte, Pedro Álvares Cabral, when his servants broke diplomatic rules and freed (and housed in the embassy) an individual who had been arrested by the local justice authorities (Silva 2001, 112–115). While the diplomatic problem provoked the siege of Colônia, this in turn led to a broader bellic conflict, known as the Luso-Spanish War (1735–1737), which extended over the entire northern region of the River Plate. One of its consequences was to precipitate a more aggressive, systematic occupation of the southern region of Brazil by Luso-Brazilians, with the construction of forts (the principal being that of Jesus Maria José, in 1737) and the arrival of

immigrants from the Azores to settle the region, especially the Island of Santa Catarina (1740) (Kuhn 2007, 103–121).

The war ended with the signing in September 1737, in the Low Countries, of a new treaty, intermediated by France and England, but which, once again, did not definitively put an end to the differences between the two nations. On the contrary, alongside Portugal, there grew the perception that neither Tordesillas nor the other agreements already signed accounted for the actual colonisation or their true territorial interests in South America. In this way, in the eighteenth century, which witnessed a “succession of congresses” (Bély 1990, 12), the pending questions between the two Iberian nations related to South America were again raised in the treaties of Breda (1747) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), which resulted in the agreements of Madrid (1750), El Pardo (1761), and San Ildefonso (1777).

The Treaties of Madrid and El Pardo and the impacts of the Seven Years War

What became the Treaty of Madrid could be glimpsed from 1746 when, following the death of Philip V (on 9 July)—who had been pro-French and openly averse to reaching an understanding with Portugal—Ferdinand VI ascended the Spanish throne, having been married since 1728 to Maria Bárbara de Bragança, daughter of João V. In the episode known as the exchange of princesses, the future king of Portugal, Dom José, in turn, married the Spanish princess, Mariana Vitória de Bourbon. In September 1746, the Portuguese ambassador, Tomas da Silva Teles, Viscount of Vila Nova de Cerveira, left for Spain to assume his position (AUC. CDLC. Doc.894, Carta de Tomás da Silva Teles para dom Luís de 3 de setembro de 1746, f. 1), and the negotiations with the Marquis de la Ensenada soon began. An epitome of an enlightened reformer, Ensenada had been one of Philip V's advisors, and continued to enjoy great prestige in the reign of Ferdinand VI. He was, successively, Secretary of Finance, the Navy, War and the Indies, and Secretary of State. Supported by Maria da Bárbara, he was appointed her secretary in 1747. In the first conference between the Portuguese diplomat and the Spanish minister, on 12 November 1746, they discussed the “possibility of resolving the dependencies of Colônia do Sacramento and the commercial relations between the two countries”, beginning lengthy negotiations, which dragged on until 1750 (Cortese 1953, 23–26).

In the following year, 1747, there was a new gesture favourable to approximation with Portugal, with the appointment of Don José de Carvajal to the position of Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He was another who counted on the support of the queen, in addition to be a friend of Vila Nova de Cerveira, who was expected to facilitate the agreement over the South American frontiers. However, in the following years, Spanish foreign policy was quite ambiguous, oscillating between an approximation with France and England, with the latter hindered by the obstinacy of the English in maintaining dominion over the peninsula of Gibraltar.

Despite these fluctuations, on 13 January 1750, the Treaty of Madrid was signed (Almeida 1990; Cortesão 2001). As the Portuguese desired, it was a wide-ranging agreement over the Luso-Spanish frontiers and its terms were not restricted to the Colônia do Sacramento, nor indeed to South America, but also included the Moluccas, located in the South Sea (the Pacific Ocean). This is because this archipelago, purchased by the Portuguese from the Spanish in the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza, was located, according to recent measures of the Tordesillas meridian (Furtado 2013, 105–106), in Portuguese territory, which meant that the purchase was contrary to the terms of the treaty. Colônia do Sacramento was, according to these measures, actually Spanish, but was in the possession of Portugal. These two territories were the great bargaining chips offered by the Portuguese for Spanish possessions in the South, the case of Sete Povos das Missões; in the centre-west, guaranteeing the gold and diamond deposits in Goiás and Mato Grosso; and in the Amazon region, which ensured its dominion over contiguous territory on both banks along the length of the river. Although they were discussed, no equivalent exchanges of territory in Europe were made (Furtado 2012, 517–527).

The adjustment of frontiers was based on the *uti possidetis*, in other words to each one what they effectively occupied, guided whenever possible by the natural landmarks and what had been stipulated in previous agreements (Furtado 2012, 276–285). This resulted in the consolidation of the territory of Portuguese America in continental terms, with a triangular format, very close to that of present-day Brazil. It ran, in a north-south direction, from the Amazon region to Rio Grande do Sul, and in an east-west direction had extreme points such as Lagoa Mirim and the former Spanish and hereafter Portuguese missions in the South; Mato Grosso and Goiás in the Centre-West, guaranteeing dominion over the large rivers in the region (Tocantins, Araguaia, and large part of Madeira); and in the north, covered the

entire channel of the Amazon River, the culmination of a slow process of the construction of Portuguese hegemony over the river. Portugal, in turn, gave Colónia do Sacramento to the Spanish and renounced the entire northern strip of the River Plate.

In 1751, Colónia do Sacramento was formally handed over and the organisation of the demarcation parties began, also stipulated in the clauses of the treaty. There were a total of three of these (to the south and centre-west), with the final one starting in 1753 (Pereira and Cruz 2016, 207–2017). However, not even this ended the disputes, and intense opposition to the terms of the treaty emerged in both countries. The handing over of Sete Povos das Missões encountered great resistance among the indigenous peoples and Spanish Jesuits, resulting in the Guaraní Wars (1750 and 1756), from which the Luso-Brazilians suffered severe losses. In turn, the Spanish complained of the excess of land conceded to the Portuguese, while the latter rebelled against what they considered the “surrender of Colónia do Sacramento”. The death of João V in 1750 and the coronation of José I, the deaths of Carvajal in 1754, Maria Bárbara de Bragança in 1758, and Ferdinand VI in 1759, and the accession of Carlos III created the climate for the treaty to be finally abolished with the agreement of both parties.

At the same time, Spain’s bungled entry into the Seven Years War (1756–1763) severely jeopardised its dominance in the Americas and had an important impact on later territorial negotiations with Portugal in America. The British capture of Havana and Manila in 1762 underscored not only British naval supremacy, something long established, but also the inadequacy of existing fortifications and the shortcomings of manpower. It also provided Spanish critics of the Family Compact with ample ammunition. After peace was made in 1763, accompanied by the return of Havana and Manila, Spain sought to form a genuine colonial army for the first time. Though the scope and timing were specific to each viceroyalty, the number of regular forces in the two most important Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru tripled in the last four decades of the eighteenth century. Given its geographical expanse, the number of regulars remained paltry, a mere 6,100 in New Spain and 3,000 in Peru. Regular forces were supplemented by the colonial militia, which was reorganised and expanded after 1763.

The reliance on the militia made virtue out of necessity for Spain did not possess unlimited resources to lavish on America. As the Minister of the Indies, José de Gálvez, noted in 1779, to supply all the

troops, military supplies, and fortifications that Spain's colonies required "would be an impossible enterprise, even if the King of Spain might have at his disposal all the treasure, the armies and the storehouses of Europe" (Weber 2006, 162). The growth of the militia was prodigious: by 1800, there were approximately 24,000 militiamen in New Spain and over 18,000 in Peru. Maintaining this post-1763 army and militia proved expensive. In late eighteenth-century New Spain, for example, over 60% of the treasury's expenditures went on defence and the total outlay doubled between the early 1760s and 1780s. The economic expansion and efflorescence in late colonial Spanish America, however, meant that revenue continued to pour into Spain's treasury. In 1770, for example, revenue from the Indies accounted for almost one-quarter of the treasury's overall receipts (Elliott 2006, 355). In other words, Spain could keep up with and contain Britain's ascendancy with difficulty, but in general it could not outflank Britain, with the one notable exception of the (British North) American Revolution, addressed below.

But the developments of the 1770s were barely foreseen during the Seven Years War, when Spain continued to pursue its policy of limiting the number of rivals with which it was simultaneously at war. Thus, on 12 February 1761 the Treaty of El Pardo was signed, which revoked the former treaty, annulling all its clauses. It was determined that all boundary marks placed had to be destroyed and that what had been stipulated in Tordesillas would return to effect. However, between the treaties of Madrid and El Pardo, and after the latter, Portuguese policy for South America sought to construct real foundations to ensure in the future, under the concept of *uti possidetis*, Spanish recognition of its sovereignty in the disputed border areas.

Alongside great power politics and manoeuvring, Spain sought to make clear its title to those territories coveted by other powers but not yet openly disputed. One approach to consolidating control and blocking territorial expansion of other European powers was to reduce the turbulence of the frontier where Spain had established no permanent settlements. Strenuous efforts were made to encourage emigration and found new towns in the rustic peripheries of Patagonia, the Mosquito Coast, and Florida, all three of which were strategic locations. New garrisons were established at San Diego and Monterey in 1770, followed by San Francisco in 1776. Perhaps most notable were the state-led and financed naval expeditions of the 1780s and 1790s, entrusted with the task of mapping and surveying the economic resources of these frontier zones (Weber 2006; De Vos

2006). Spain was especially concerned about Russian penetration of the northern coast of North America, westward expansion of British subjects, and British interest in what is today British Columbia. While the scientific expeditions produced a great deal of “useful knowledge”, Spanish schemes for a full-fledged Pacific empire, in one historian’s judgement, “collapsed as a result of insufficient funding, inertia or instability in their settled colonies ... there were no fur traders, whalers, private investors or merchants to follow in the wake of the scientific expeditions” (Archer 1986, 36). Spain could not assert its claims on the distant periphery with its treasury stretched so thin. In spite of sabre-rattling, Spain acquiesced to British claims in the Pacific Northwest after the Nootka Sound dispute (1789–1793). The limits of a self-financing empire could not be pushed too far.

Pombaline policy in Portuguese America and the Treaty of San Ildefonso

The reign of José I coincided with the gradual ascension, as Minister of State, of Sebastião José de Carvalho, future Earl of Oeiras and afterwards Marquis of Pombal. His administrative actions, known as the “Pombaline Reforms”, had important reverberations in South America (Monteiro 2006; Maxwell 1995) and the critiqued previous policy reached its most strident peak during his long ministry (1755–1777). Already during his diplomatic stint in London in the 1740s, Pombal had heaped opprobrium on the 1703 Methuen Treaty, blaming it for the “notorious decline in our marine and in our foreign and domestic commerce”, adding that this disadvantageous treaty had been further “abused and violated” by English merchants in Portugal (Carvalho e Melo 1986, 76). Yet Pombal was faced with a conundrum that had bedevilled his predecessors: how to balance Portugal’s reliance on Britain’s indispensable military-diplomatic guarantees while simultaneously circumventing (or surreptitiously diminishing) Britain’s commercial advantages in Portugal’s continental and ultramarine markets (Maxwell 1995).

Unsubtly lifting a page from England’s seventeenth-century geopolitical playbook, Pombal’s proposed solution to the conundrum was to establish monopoly trading companies for the north and northeast of Brazil to foment new export commodities, such as cotton and rice, which went unmentioned in previous commercial treaties. It must be conceded that not all of these developments can be attributed

directly to commercial rivalry with Britain; some were a direct response to new requirements provoked by declining mineral yields in Brazil, plunging gold prices on the world market, and the escalating costs of securing the southern frontier with Spanish America (Alden 1968, 353). Pombal would describe such companies as the “only way to reclaim the commerce of all Portuguese America from the hands of foreigners”, by which he meant the British (Maxwell 1973, 19). Overseas companies formed part of a broader strategy to break the chain of credit established by British merchants, depriving them of the sums they were owed from the long-term credit they had extended to Portuguese merchants and intermediaries. While in the short term, these trading companies did not bring about the changes which Pombal foresaw, which ultimately led to their dismantlement, certain commodities and tropical products encouraged by Pombal produced a huge, abundant economic impact, including cotton. The planters of the northern regions of Maranhão, for example, exploited the unmet demand in Britain precipitated by the American Revolution (1775–1783) and used windfall profits to finance their purchase of African slaves. By 1790, Brazilian cotton comprised 30% of British imports of that product (MacLachlan 1997, 110).

Pombaline policies helped to reinforce Portuguese presence in the border areas of Brazil aimed at future negotiations with Spain. In 1748, in the context of the demarcations of borders, the regions of Mato Grosso and Goiás were dismembered from São Paulo and two autonomous captaincies created: Mato Grosso, with its capital in Vila Bela da Santíssima Trindade, and Goiás, with its capital in Vila Boa de Goiás, locations which were specifically constructed to house the two administrations (Ferreira 2010, 267–297). The captaincy of Rio Grande do Sul was established in 1760. With these measures the Portuguese Crown reinforced its predominance over the centre-west and southern extremes of Brazil, seeking to consolidate its presence in these two regions. Not by chance, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, Pombal’s brother, was chosen as governor for the captaincy of Grão-Pará and Maranhão, where he served from 1751 until 1759. He was responsible for the creation of the Grão-Pará Company (1755), the beginning of the secularisation of indigenous missions, and the creation of various urban settlements. Pombaline policy for the Americas culminated with the expulsion of the Jesuits (1759), the creation of the Directorate of the Indians (1761), and the creation of the Royal Diamond Extraction Company (1771), measures with great impact. With these, control was assured over important economic

resources from the interior, such as the so-called drugs of the *Sertão* (plants and spices grown in the *Sertão* region such as cocoa, guarana, and Brazil nuts) and diamonds; the integration of Indians as subjects was encouraged; Indian villages and Indian education were completely secularised under state control; and the settlement of the Amazon and Center-West regions was strengthened, with the creation of numerous settlements and planned *vilas* were created.

These measures ensured the effective presence of Portugal in Western frontier regions, from the north to south of Brazil, allowing it to demand new negotiations concerning the frontiers, now enjoying a significant advantage. In the same year as José I's death (1777), the Treaty of San Ildefonso was signed. In a general manner, this returned to the borders defined in the Madrid Treaty, with the exception of the southern region, where the Portuguese handed over to the Spanish not only Colônia do Sacramento and the land up the Northern bank of the River Platte, but also Missões, and São Gabriel Island. In exchange, they were guaranteed possession of Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso, Cuiabá, Goiás, Grão-Pará, and the Amazon region.

Surveying the Americas

The negotiations over borders demanded from the Portuguese a greater dominion over the geography of the regions which penetrated the interior, with the aim of negotiating their South American borders. Starting in 1722, during the reign of João V, various efforts were made to undertake a cartographic survey of Brazil, specifically of the frontier regions disputed with the Spanish. The first and most significant decision was to send Jesuits Diogo Soares and Domingos Capacci, known as mathematician-priests, to Brazil in 1729. The following year they established the measurement of the meridian of Rio de Janeiro, which they use to orientate their cartography of Brazil. However, due to the immensity of the task, they only managed to map parts of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Colônia do Sacramento and the River Platte, Rio Grande (do Sul), and Santa Catarina (Almeida 1991, 112), priority regions in the negotiations with the Spanish Crown. The geographic survey removed any doubts about whether or not Minas Gerais was situated in extra-Tordesillas territory. At the same time, the restructuring of the education of military engineers gave them recent knowledge and prepared them to be able to assume during the following century the tasks related to the

geographic survey of Brazil (Bueno 2011).

In the second half of the eighteenth century, added to the cartographic enterprise was the need to survey the potentials of a local nature from a renewed enlightenment and utilitarian perspective. Portuguese and Spanish demarcation efforts after the Treaty of Madrid in the 1750s, and of San Ildefonso in the 1780s, produced a broad scientific survey of the spaces covered (Raminelli 2008, 74–79; Pereira and Cruz 2016, 207–2017), and were able to count on, in addition to military engineers from both crowns, various foreign specialists, including Jesuits skilled in mathematics and cartography. In order to better prepare the human resources necessary for the scientific survey of the empire, in 1772 the Marquis of Pombal commenced a series of reforms in the University of Coimbra. The study of Natural Sciences, Law, and Mathematics were introduced, while even the course of Canon Law, the most traditional, included the study of nature in its first two years. A Botanical Garden and Science Laboratory were also set up. The wide-ranging inventory of the colonial natural world was to be carried out jointly by the Luso-Brazilians, under the control and direction of the state.

Another institution which assisted this task, after its creation in 1779, was the Royal Academy of Science in Lisbon, which became a core space for the linking of those who had been trained to work with the Natural Sciences for the advantage of the empire: the naturalists. Philosophical or natural voyages, organised by the University of Coimbra and the Secretary of Overseas Affairs, became important instruments for the formulation of an internal policy in harmony with the natural resource potential of each area (Cardozo 1971, 153–167). In the case of Brazil, it was sought to study in detail its wealth—principally in relation to agriculture, mining, fishing, vegetation extraction, etc. – favoured by the large size of the territory and its natural diversity, seeking to encourage better rationalisation and development in its exploitation. Among the numerous voyages to survey Brazil was the scientific mission undertaken by Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira between 1783 and 1794 in the Amazon region and Mato Grosso.

As in Portugal, the reformers in Spain in the second half of the eighteenth century endeavoured to assert the crown's rejuvenated sovereignty over its far-flung empire against rival imperial states. They took practical steps—though sometimes tentatively, erratically, and with few tangible results—in both the Old World and the New to further this aim, especially in the aftermath of the debacle of the

Seven Years War (Paquette 2015, 149). The scope of reform was widened. What was once a term that described a narrow range of government actions—for example, modifications to fiscal policy, trade regulation, and the penal code—now encompassed many additional areas, including the creation of learned academies, societies, and libraries; the revamping of universities; the quest for agricultural improvement; investment in infrastructural projects (the construction of canals, roads, and bridges, along with the modernisation of existing ports); and the outfitting of scientific expeditions. The Royal Academy of History became an important institution leading these reforms. Count Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes (1723–1802) combined his duties on the Council of Castile with the post of director of the Royal Academy of History, not to mention the important tracts on industry and education he penned in his spare time (Paquette 2009, 11). Campomanes was also instrumental in catalysing efforts to “improve” agriculture and sponsored Economic Societies throughout the Spanish Atlantic World that aimed to produce and disseminate “useful knowledge”. Sites of experimentation and the exchange of ideas, Economic Societies incubated notable texts in the history of political economy, including Gaspar de Melchor de Jovellanos’ *Report on the Agrarian Law* (1795) (Paquette and Caso Bello 2016).

The turbulent context of the *fin-de-siècle* and the impacts of the French Revolution

Nevertheless, emphasis on the limits of Spanish military power in the Americas should not diminish its considerable achievements in the late eighteenth century. If Spain (together with France) could not deal a death blow to Britain in the Americas or in Europe by itself, and largely found itself on the defensive, making incremental concessions and seeking to neutralise or otherwise diminish the significance of those concessions, it helped to reduce the British threat to Spanish America by aiding the rebellious colonists who rose up against Britain in mainland North America in the 1770s. An enlarged army and revived navy permitted Spain to join France in aiding the revolutionaries of British America from 1779, in spite of fervent British efforts to dissuade Spain from honouring the Family Compact with which it was disillusioned (Scott 1990). The triumph of the rebels could not have been possible without the Bourbon navy, and men, materiel, and money from the French and Spanish colonies.

Spain seized advantage of Britain's vulnerability to reconquer West Florida and the Gulf Coast (which had been surrendered after the Seven Years War) (Ferreiro 2016). The Caribbean was as close to a Spanish "lake" as it had been at any time since the early seventeenth century. As a leading historian has concluded, "Spain had gained from its involvement in the American war of independence, in military victory, territorial gain, confidence and prestige" (McFarlane 2006, 36). The British were also forced to abandon the Mosquito Coast in 1786 (though in exchange for a clear title in Belize). Giddy Spanish officials viewed these successes as a prelude to the repossession of the Malvinas/Falklands and Gibraltar, which after all had been the chief objective of its involvement in the American war.

But these more grandiose fantasies were soon dashed by the outbreak of the French Revolution. Spain's involvement in the French Revolutionary Wars, however, proved an unmitigated disaster, attenuating the links between Europe and America. In particular, Spain's ill-fated alliance with France incurred the wrath of the British navy. The defeat of the Spanish fleet off Cape St Vincent in 1797 foreshadowed Britain's three-year blockade of Cádiz, which disrupted irreparably the supply chain between peninsular merchants and Spanish American markets. The British Navy wrought further havoc by seizing the island of Trinidad in 1797. The centuries-old link between Spain and its Americas had thus been severed well before the *coup de grâce* delivered at Trafalgar in 1805, the naval battle in which most of Spain's warships were lost.

Through careful manoeuvring, then, Portugal managed to derive benefits from the British alliance without being asphyxiated by it. The alliance was a protective cloak against geopolitical tempests, permitting the Luso-Angolan complex to develop relatively unperturbed. From time to time, Portugal managed fleetingly to get the better of its more powerful ally, as when the balance of payments briefly shifted in Portugal's favour in the 1790s. But, by and large, the alliance was an expensive, mandatory form of insurance. Nor was it, beyond Britain's siphoning off wealth that Portugal preferred to retain in its own colonial system, an especially onerous alliance. Portugal managed to avoid the worst of the Seven Years War and remained above of the fray during the American Revolution. Later in the century, during the French Revolutionary Wars, it managed to cling consistently to a precarious neutrality, continuing to nurture its own imperial economy and distribute its tropical commodities indiscriminately to the markets of Europe's belligerent and pacific

states. To have reaped the advantages of the British alliance while extricating itself from costly military engagements must be considered among the great achievements of eighteenth-century Portuguese diplomacy.

In 1795, with the rise of Dom Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho to the position of Secretary of Trade in Portugal, enlightened reform accelerated. Rewarded by the context of instability which characterised the final quarter of the century, both in Europe, with the French Revolution, and in the Americas, with the threat of the impact on the independence of the United States to be followed in Brazil—as aspiration which emerged in the Mineira (1789) and Baiana (1798) *Inconfidências*; Coutinho prepared an audacious plan for political and economic reforms, based on the co-option of local colonial elites.

Imperial competition was not only a phenomenon involving European states. As in Portuguese America with the late century rebellions, threats to Spain's dominance in the Americas did not come solely from rival European powers. There were internal challenges as well, primarily responses to territorial aggrandisement and economic exploitation. Beyond the frontier were Amerindians whose continued autonomy was deemed a threat to Spanish rule. An obsession with both policing and expanding the frontier animated colonial administration. Even in the late eighteenth century, however, Spanish presence remained non-existent in many territories claimed by the crown. At the close of the colonial period, independent Indians controlled over half of the landmass of modern Latin America, from Tierra del Fuego to Mexico, and it has been estimated that 2.7 million independent Indians lived within the boundaries of the Spanish empire. As late as 1780, two-thirds of Chile's Indians did not recognise Spanish sovereignty. Moreover, Comanche country, the *Comanchería*, exceeded the size of Central America and served as a barrier to Spanish expansion. The lack of soldiers and funds, combined with the geographical size of the territories involved, forced Spain to abandon plans for further offensive wars of conquest and instead recognise containment and accommodation as strategies better suited to reality (Weber 2006, 12, 61, 72, 164–165).

With the aim of neutralising the independence aspirations which were beginning to explode in Portuguese America and also of modernising the economy of the empire, Luís Pinto de Sousa Coutinho subdivided the portfolio and, in 1796, invited Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho to direct colonial trade policy. Open to Enlightenment and aware of the fragility of the ties which at this moment linked Brazil

and Portugal, Dom Rodrigo listened to the demands and frustrations of the colonists, in order to counteract any stirrings of insurgent nationalism. He consulted the Municipal Councils about their needs, put Brazilians in positions of command and designated various Luso-Brazilian naturalists to carry out in-depth studies in various areas and about diverse economic activities in the empire. He sought in this way to reduce the tensions which were building up and to encourage the colonist to forsake the path to independence, signalling the possibility of the division of colonial profits and the promotion of the political rise of this local elite. Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and, especially, Minas Gerais captaincies were the principal objects of Dom Rodrigo's interest.

It was in the context of the economic modernisation carried out by these two ministers that the Napoleonic War broke out and the Portuguese posture of neutrality between England and France became untenable in the first years of the nineteenth century. As Napoleon sought to implement his Continental System to isolate Britain diplomatically and debilitate it economically, Portugal was the leak that had to be plugged. Yet to acquiesce to Napoleon's demands, renounce its neutrality, and effectively become a satellite of France, which would have seen its ships engulfed into the French Navy and, most likely, having Brazil put at the disposal of the French state and its merchants, was too much for the Luso-British alliance to bear. Britain demanded that Portugal comport itself as a reliable ally and rebuff Napoleon's entreaties, threatening to burn its fleet if it failed to comply. In exchange for the protection of Britain's navy, which escorted the Braganzas across the Atlantic to escape the invading Napoleonic armies, Portugal was compelled to make concessions so massive that the Methuen Treaty looked by comparison like a pact between equals. Portugal's legal monopoly over colonial trade was shattered by the opening of Brazil's ports to foreign ships in 1808, permanently sanctioned by the 1810 commercial treaty with Britain (Cardoso 2008). Unlike the Methuen Treaty, which retained the trappings of reciprocity, the 1810 treaty denied entrance to British markets of Brazilian products, including sugar and coffee, similar to those produced by Britain's own colonies (Manchester 1972, 69, 72, 89). The immediate and dramatic impact of the treaties is notorious. In 1814, Viscount Strangford, chief negotiator, boasted that "the entire annihilation of the Old Colonial System of Brazil has been effected by the late treaty" (Webster 1938, I, 173). By 1818, the value of English exports to Brazil exceeded those of the Portuguese; of these

British exports, almost 90% were wool and cotton manufactures (Manchester 1972, 97).

The British presence in Brazil's markets, however, must not be overstated. Jorge M. Pedreira has shown that between 1812 and 1821 Brazilian imports from Britain remained fairly stagnant; only in 1818 did they match the value of imports from Portugal (Pedreira 2000, 858–859). Yet this story of dispossession and exploitation must not be taken too far. For it was only with British military might that the French were dislodged from continental Portugal. The Braganzas managed to keep their transatlantic empire intact only because an English army of occupation, based at Lisbon under Lord Beresford's command, ensured that the two branches of the monarchy remained bound to the same trunk. In this context, on 29 November 1807, with the invasion of Portugal by Franco-Spanish troops, the Portuguese Court left for Brazil, which they reached at the beginning of the following year. With a significant delay the advice of Ambassador Luís da Cunha was followed, who in the first half of the eighteenth century had warned that “the prince, to keep Portugal, needs all the wealth of Brazil, and in no way that of Portugal ... and it thus follows that it is more comfortable, and safer, to be where one has more, than to wait where it is lacking” (Cunha 2001, 371).

The French invaded Spain the following year, as Napoleon deceived his erstwhile Spanish allies. The forced abdication of Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII paved the way for Napoleon's brother, Joseph, to be placed on the throne of Spain. This act further inflamed the resistance to the French occupation in the peninsula, where the opposition consolidated itself into a Junta Central based in Atlantic port city of Cádiz. The effects of the Napoleonic occupation of the Iberian peninsula reverberated across the Atlantic. The transfer of the Portuguese Court to Brazil required the political, administrative, and infrastructural restructuring of the old Portuguese colony, which was made concrete through numerous modernising reforms. In Spanish America, various juntas sprang up to contest Napoleon's actions, claiming that in its acephalous state that the sovereignty formerly exercised by the legitimate sovereign now reverted to the people, in whose name they claimed to govern. The vacuum of power in the Iberian metropolises, provoked by the flight of the Portuguese monarchy and the abdications in Spain opened a new chapter in the relationship between the Iberian empires and their old American conquests.

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MIRABILE FŒDUS:

Et Rex & Pontifex
 Occupant Academiam.
 Civis hæc de sæculo
 Dilectum gratæ
 Compulsum prosequitur & Ecclesiam
 Utinam pacis?
 Rempublicam iura humanis
 Venustique literis,
 Rationum mensuram, æquæmodi
 Veræ Philosophiæ, veræ naturæ,
 Apollinearum artium,
 Bonarum legum,
 Et, ex ea hæc nascuntur,
 Scientiarum studio:
 Ecclesiæ servit sanctis
 Scripturæ, commentariis,
 Divinarum Theologiæ;
 Christianæ eloquentiæ,
 Sacræque fori
 Exercitiis.
 Hinc inde laborat,
 Quæ melius possit
 Tum ceptis providere, tum eruct.
 REGIA AC PONTIFICIA

GUATEMALENSIS ACADEMIA.

In cuius gloriam hoc problema, seu titulus melius satisfecerit, Regiæ ob plurima de reipublicâ bene meritis, ex Pontificiæ ob res in Ecclesiâ præclare gestas? in signum grati animi discutiendum proponit L. D. Josephus de Leon & Guicoychea in oratione præviâ ad Doctoratus lauream in sacra Theologiâ.

Hæc non

Die 25. Novembris anno M.DCC.XCIV.

Impressum.
 Dr. Juarros.
 Rector.

Apud
 Bracamonte.

GAZETA DE LIMA

DESDE 10. DE OCTUBRE HASTA
3. de Diciembre de 1762.

NOTICIAS DE EUROPA.



OR carta del Señor Ministro de S. Mag. en *Estado, Marina, e Indias*, con fecha de 15. de Mayo de este presente año, se ha dado al publico la importante noticia de quedar el Rey N. S. el Principe y Señores Infantes, Reyna Madre, y Sr. Infante Don Luis, gozando de perfecta salud, lo que ha manifestado la Ciudad con el repique acostumbrado de campanas.

Por noticias, que hemos tenido de *España* por otras Gasetas antecedentes de Madrid, del Mes de Enero de este año de 62. se sabe, que el Rey N. S. y el Rey Christianísimo en 25. de Agosto de 761. concluyeron un tratado de amistad, y union con el nombre de *Pacto de Familia*; y que se firmaron en 3. del Septiembre siguiente las ratificaciones.

Dicho tratado o *Pacto de Familia* contiene 28. articulos, de los quales los principales son. Que en adelante tendran por enemiga a qualquiera Potencia, que lo sea del uno, o del otro contratantes: Que se concedan mutuamente la garantia de todos sus Estados en qualquiera parte del Mundo, que se sitien; pero estipulando, que solo esto, se entiende de las posesiones respectivas segun el estado en que se hallen, quando las dos Coronas tengan Paz con otras Potencias; y que esta garantia la ofrecen ambos Monarcas al Rey de las dos Sicilias, y al Serenísimo Infante Duque de Parma, con la condicion de que estos dos Principes garantizaran tambien por si mismos los Estados de sus MM. Catolica, y Chri-

-(*)-

EL B. F. D. ANTONIO MARIA

Bucareli y Ursúa, Henestrosa, Laso de la Vega, Villacís y Córdoba, Caballero Gran Cruz, y Comendador de la Bóveda de Toro en el Orden de San Juan, Gentil Hombre de la Cámara de S. Mag. con entrada, Teniente General de los Reales Exércitos, Virrey, Governador y Capitan General de esta Nueva España, Presidente de su Real Audiencia, Superintendente General de Real Hacienda, Presidente de la Junta de Tabaco, Juez Conservador de este Ramo, y Subdelegado General de la Renta de Correos marítimos en el mismo Reyno &c.



REVINIENDO, ENTRE OTRAS COSAS, S. M. (que Dios guarde) por Real Orden de doce de Noviembre de mil setecientos setenta y tres, que los Sujetos que en esta Nueva España se hallan empleados en el laborio de sus Minas, se juntasen en Cuerpo formal y autorizado, á manera de los Consulados de Comercio; y que para tratar este asunto, y los demas que pareciesen interesantes á la Minería, se formase una Junta, presidida por mí, y compuesta de los Sujetos que allí se refieren: habiéndose verificado, y convocándose para ella los Diputados de los mas distinguidos Reales de Minas que en la citada Real Orden se enuncian para representar á toda la Minería, propusieron entre otros particulares que, respecto á que

CHAPTER TWENTY six

Reform in Spanish and Portuguese America

Introduction

When Spanish colonisers, soldiers, and churchmen landed in the Caribbean in 1492, the Hispanic monarchy already had many years of experience in colonial conquest and dominion. For a long time, these prior acts were lost in the shadows of two great adventures that coincided chronologically and later would help revive an unfinished national project after the loss of Spain's last colonies in America and the Pacific in 1898. Castilian territorial expansion in the New World followed quickly behind indigenous demographic collapse, the latter being the result of epidemics and the subsequent destruction of the great Amerindian political systems in Mesoamerica and the Andes. Castile's imperial beginnings thus were not auspicious in terms of easy stabilisation of that vast and remote territory, so far and so different from the European and Mediterranean worlds. Until well into the sixteenth century, the conquest was driven by destruction and slaving.

Imperial destruction and stabilisation took place at the same time as the Hispanic monarchy was acquiring hegemony in Europe, which lasted until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. During the previous century, the monarchy had had to accept sharing the Mediterranean with the Ottoman Turks after the Battle of Lepanto (1571) and absorb the enormous impact of the Protestant Reformation. In the early seventeenth century the rise of France and England turned Europe and its Atlantic area of influence into the scene of a prolonged struggle for hegemony, a nearly endless war that drained the Spanish Habsburgs' resources. This is the context for understanding the stabilisation of the Spanish-American world, notably Mesoamerica and the Andes. From that process of creative destruction would emerge a new silver empire that survived until the late eighteenth century.

Portugal's empire hardly resembled that of Spain. Its centre of gravity was the Indian Ocean world before 1600, where its hybrid military-commercial beachheads, *feitorias*, dotted the littorals of South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa. North Africa remained a target for those who conceived of territorial expansion as a means to extend the sway of Christianity at the expense of Islam, a persuasion that

resulted in the rout at Alcazar al-Keber and the death of King Sebastian in 1578. Even before this debacle, there has been a slow yet perceptible reorientation toward the Atlantic, discernible in territorial footholds in Angola and robust involvement in the kingdom of Kongo, as well as the rising importance of Brazil in Portugal's imperial portfolio. There an economy dominated by the extraction of Brazilwood was giving way to a plantation society worked, first, by Amerindian slaves and then by African slaves. Coastal cities became populous and government transitioned from the decentralised donatary captaincy system to one which had royal authority superimposed though still leaving local elites with ample autonomy and a modicum of self-government through their town councils (*camaras*).

This context is crucial to understanding the purpose of the present chapter, which concentrates on the reform policies undertaken by the respective Iberian monarchies in the long eighteenth century. The chapter begins by examining the Portuguese and Spanish monarchies in the late seventeenth century, in the aftermath of the "restoration" of Portugal's independence and the crisis of the Spanish empire that accompanied it. It treats both the obstacles as well as the shortcomings of crown policies in the Americas. The focus then shifts to the first stirrings of more systematic reform undertaken by the newly esconced Bourbon dynasty in the first half of the eighteenth century. Ultramarine reform for Portugal came later, as mineral strikes in Brazil ushered in a period of unprecedented prosperity, and made structural reform appear, for the moment, less urgent. The bulk of the chapter centres on the reforms undertaken in the second half of the eighteenth century, when both Iberian monarchies moved to expand and consolidate crown authority, with equivocal effects. Such centripetal strivings coincided with (though perhaps did not cause) periods of economic revival with important geopolitical effects, temporarily elevating both monarchies standing within Europe. The chapter concludes with consideration of the impact of the reforms, particularly the resistance that they provoked, and how reform and the revolutions that would tear the Iberian empires asunder, were linked.

The Iberian empires before 1750

Commercial empires were never simply commercial, nor was the

silver empire based only on mining. Above all, an empire is a societal construction that is both a response to the metropolitan aims of expansion and a scheme that should be economically viable. If it is true that *entrepôts* among various worlds were vital for commercial empires, then Spain was not a merchant empire along the lines of the emerging empires of Portugal, Holland, and Great Britain even before everything got far more complex with vast territories and thousands upon thousands of slaves treated like beasts of burden. In the case of Spain, there was never a conspicuously mercantile moment, not even in the farthest corner of the empire, sixteenth-century Manila, the bridge to imperial China. There, friars and soldiers sent from New Spain did not take long before entering the interior of Luzón and the Visayas to try to reproduce, mostly unsuccessfully, the American model. Jesuits and the crown even had notions also of conquering China along the lines of the conquest of America (Ollé 2002).

The empire, then, was a great producer of precious metals. Only on a lesser scale did it export tropical foods and vegetable dyes. Its strength and survival were not the result of aggression toward European rivals beset with dynastic contingencies and military setbacks in the Old World and who fought like Prometheus unbound. Rather, they came about through Spain's capacity to defend its Indies fleet and the galleons along their long journey to and from Acapulco and the Philippines. Piracy, corsairing, naval manoeuvres, and merchant fleets thus were mixed up in such a fashion that the protoliberal economists of the eighteenth century had to throw up their hands in despair.

The Spanish empire, the great white whale, was something else entirely, with the great mines of Potosí and Zacatecas lying in the middle. The links that held everything together were the royal mints, taxation (the famous *quinto real*), and the subsequent transport of wealth through Callao, Veracruz, and then Seville and Cádiz, along with the galleon route between Acapulco and Manila. The routes would never change, despite warfare and piracy. In addition, financial assets (*situados*) were transferred for political reasons throughout the empire to bolster areas with insufficient resources that served as military or administrative headquarters; the distribution system has been called the "secret" of the Spanish empire as Marichal and Souto Mantecón cleverly named, given its longevity and efficiency. And, finally, profits and balances were deposited in royal treasuries and from there often moved straight to the treasuries of the crown's creditors, bankers who loaned money to a monarchy deeply in debt as

it defended its reputation and Tridentine Catholicism in Europe and around the world.

But the heart of the matter was not competition among empires, between mercantilist and Catholic, on the one side, and commerce, freedom, and Calvinism, on the other. The empire, that vast construction that was consolidated throughout the sixteenth century, rested on four axes: the first was the mining economy. Second, long-distance agriculture and commerce (fleets, fairs, consulates) grew thanks to the extraordinary dynamism of the silver extraction and minting; technology and labour solutions were also key factors, along with credit and raw materials (gunpowder and mercury) at discounted prices. Third, the social structure (re)constructed around this economic complex was entirely different from the pre-Hispanic world (Mumford 2012). The essence of the new social order was the *encomienda* and then, once that disappeared, the *pueblos de indios*, which were subject to forced labour and/or tribute requirements, of which the Andean *mita* was the epitome. For centuries, colonial cities hosted abandoned and marginal peoples along with African slaves and their descendants. These people of mixed blood were called *castas*, a new reality from a legal and fiscal perspective that would end up defining the development of colonial society, an immense ocean of conditions explored in depth by María Elena Martínez. (Martínez 2008) And fourth, labour and society evolved within the context of a Catholic and monarchical project that was ideologically homogeneous but highly decentralised in terms of viceregal, jurisdictional, lay, and ecclesiastical power.

The reform of the Portuguese empire in the mid-eighteenth century was preceded by the empire's reorientation in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth. By the 1650s, a "swing to the west" in the Portuguese empire had been completed. Brazil was now the focus of Portuguese Crown's interest and its most lucrative, productive colony. The *Estado da Índia* became a backwater. By the 1680s, revenue from the Portuguese empire in the Indian Ocean accounted for fewer than 3% of the crown's total receipts. But all was not well in Brazil. A search was on for new tropical commodities due to the decline of sugar's profitability. From 1650 until 1715, revenues from sugar declined by two-thirds of their previous level. The decline was attributable to competition from the French, British, and Dutch Caribbean colonies, chiefly. Brazil's share of world market suffered further as a number of Europe states began privileging domestic beet sugar. Demand for Brazil's expensive and inferior grade sugar proved

disastrous for what previously had been the centre of the colony's economic and demographic gravity, the Northeast (*Nordeste*). The situation was dire until disaster was averted by the discovery of huge gold (and diamond) deposits in the interior Brazilian region of Minas Gerais after 1695. With this mineral windfall, the Portuguese Crown succeeded in meeting some of its modernising objectives, including the scientific mapping of Brazil, the creation of libraries, including that of the University of Coimbra, and the construction of palaces, including the magnificent one at Mafra, outside of Lisbon. Public works projects in Portugal itself were also undertaken, including an aqueduct in 1730s and 1740s which brought drinking water to the residents of Lisbon.

If deposits of Brazilian gold breathed new life into the colonial economy and the metropolitan treasury, it also improved Portugal's geopolitical position, at least temporarily. The Portuguese Crown was literally obsessed with the preservation of its sovereignty, and with good reason. Beginning in 1654, a series of alliances were signed with England, as this seemed to be the best ally to check Spanish expansionist and revanchist ambitions. The Anglo-Portuguese alliances culminated in the 1703 Methuen Treaty. This agreement allowed for the unrestricted entry of British textiles into Portugal while granting reciprocal privileges to Portuguese wines and other agricultural products (including colonial re-exports from Brazil) on the British market. Wine, especially fortified wine (Porto and Madeira), and cork were among the few Portuguese products coveted on the world market. The Methuen Treaty also reaffirmed and expanded Britain's commitment to Portugal's independence from Spain and the place of the Braganza dynasty on the throne. This security was purchased at a steep price. Portuguese markets, both in Iberian peninsula and in Brazil, were inundated with British textiles. Portugal's "national" manufacturing was smothered as the demand for British manufactures outstripped demand for inferior Portuguese and Brazilian products. The balance of trade accrued in Britain's favour. To cover the deficit, Portugal paid in gold, of which it had a seemingly inexhaustible supply, at least before 1760. Some estimates, and it is hard to be exact, suggest that Brazil supplied about 80% of the gold hitting the world market in the eighteenth century. The influx of gold thinly disguised a semi-colonial relationship with Britain. Portugal relied on Britain for its defence, for the maintenance of its sovereignty, which meant its political means of manoeuvre was limited (severely).

Thus, if a snapshot of Portugal and its empire were taken in ca.

1750, one would observe an unsustainable reliance on Brazilian gold to compensate for Portuguese economic decline and the steady infiltration of the Portuguese peninsular and overseas interests by English merchants and their manufactures. But gold and precious gems had one important effect beyond the national defence and construction of palaces and public works. It helped the crown consolidate power within the peninsula as well as expand the colonial bureaucracy. It no longer needed the Cortes (essentially, the Portuguese Parliament) for funds, and with its usefulness obviated that representative body no longer was convened. The crown could do without it; the balance of power definitively shifted in its favour. In this way, the influx of gold served the interests of royal absolutism and bolstered sovereignty in the short term while imperilling both in the long term.

The success and limits of imperial reforms, 1750–1800

The transformation of international commerce with the Antilles slave plantations and rising consumption of tropical agricultural products in the metropolis placed the Hispanic monarchy in a difficult spot. While rival nations engaged in production learned to use tariffs to finance their military expenses, Spain proved notably rigid in this regard. Partly this was the result of the need to protect state control over such key sectors of the economy as mining and profitable monopolies such as tobacco and slaves' imports from Africa through contracts with the British (until 1789). The stability of the fleets and galleons required steep taxation on the re-export of Northern European textiles to America, a business that was in the hands of large Cádiz exporters and their partners in Mexico City, Portobello, and Lima. The succession of wars that led to the formation of the military fiscal state along the general lines drawn by John Brewer would end up strengthening the role of commercial empires (Holland, the United Kingdom, to some extent Portugal, and the "amphibious" France, with the largest plantation complex in the world in Saint-Domingue) while the Spanish empire hesitated to join the plantation rush (Brewer 1989; Torres Sánchez 2015). This can be seen in two outstanding examples: Spain's sugar plantations in the Caribbean took off only after the collapse of the French islands in the 1790s, and Spain continued using free labour on its sugar plantations in New Spain, something that very much

struck Alexander von Humboldt when he visited, as reported by Sánchez Santiró in a collective book on the Prussian geographer (Sánchez Santiró 2012). It was clear that with naval power, slave traders, and major distribution and consumption centres it was possible to expand influence in international commerce regardless of social consensus in the metropolis. But the societies of the Spanish empire, including Amerindian communities and free blacks, formed part of that consensus going a long way back, the outcome of negotiations and agreements based on varying amounts of authority and flexibility. For that reason it was impossible to reform the Spanish empire on a large scale without stirring up social tensions that the monarchy was unsure it could handle.

Image 26.1 Announcement of graduation theses for the Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1794

Source: Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University, Providence, USA

This dichotomy between types of empires was not good news for Spain. Its empire rose from the genocidal ashes, from societies destroyed by bacteria, physical and psychological exhaustion, and the elimination of pre-conquest rulers. The notion of Two Republics, the brainchild of Philip II's imperial Catholicism with which to separate Europeans and Indians into two distinct worlds, was not viable. Much later, when imperial reform was initiated in the period between the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739–1742) and the Seven Years War (1757–1763), it was understood that reform was impossible without undermining the very interests and consensus that had ensured imperial stability for nearly two centuries (Stein and Stein 2000, 2003, 2014).

With Spain unable to go down the same road as its imperial rivals, the reform program put into effect after the Seven Years War (with the traumatic captures of Havana and Manila, the front and back doors of the imperial system) focused on taxation, administration, and the military, which clearly were all related. New jurisdictions and treasury administration in the empire, that is, the intendancies, were the key element of these fiscal and military reforms. A new bureaucracy took form with the intendant system as the core of the imperial government, but it was done without totally dismantling the viceroys' power (Burkholder and Chandler 1977). Effective modifications began taking shape with a major reorganisation of commerce from 1765 to 1778, when the traditional fleet system was ended and individual shipping (*registros sueltos*) were permitted. Therefore, the *flota* system

finally ended and private merchant ships and several ports could participate in the Indies trade. But these measures did not mean the imposition of a totally deregulated free trade. Instead, the state's fiscal interests prevailed as the growth of new mercantile opportunities occurred simultaneously with new tariffs and old and new monopolies. Not to mention some of those monopolies and excises were placed or remained in royal hands in the most promising areas of production and commerce, not to say minting the highly valued *peso fuerte*. Cuban tobacco production is an excellent example, as it would be in the Philippines, starting when the tobacco monopoly was established in Luzón in 1817, the beginning of a new colonial stage in the far-off colony.

And that was not the only problem. It was no easy job, and not cheap, to break the old imperial structure. For one thing, American markets were not in a position to absorb the growing supply of textiles and – agrarian products from Europe. This rigidity became obvious with the price collapse of 1786–1787. This first market saturation crisis led to the imposition of a distribution system by which Amerindians were forced to purchase goods, causing unhappiness among consumers who were increasingly unable to pay their constantly rising tax burden with coin. There were efforts to compensate for the rigidity of the American market through slave labour, which was certainly never marginal but not of prime importance until well into the eighteenth century when continental America was lost for Spain (Fradera 2005). This is a good example of the nature and the slow pace of change; though the measure was aimed at more closely connecting America with the international market, the crown also wanted to profit from growing demand for slave labour in America through subcontracts with other countries and continuation of the agreement with Britain for slaves until 1750. Liberalisation for Spanish merchants in 1789 enabled private individuals to enter the slave traffic, which was highly profitable despite the risks and costs of protection. The traffic did not disappear even after Spain and Great Britain signed an agreement in 1817 to abolish the trade.

Image 26.2 [Gazeta de Lima, 3 December 1762. Lima, Peru \(1744–1801?\)](#)

Source: Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University, Providence, USA

The growing burden of tariffs in the so-called Bourbon Reforms and the simultaneous burden of rising taxes on commerce can be explained

only if we see the situation in holistic terms. The key can be found in the increase of re-export of European products and peninsular exports (either of Spanish products or products finished there such as flour made from US wheat or printed cottons originally from India or England) (Delgado 2007). Regions on the peninsular and American periphery were especially active in this commerce, which skipped the leading ports on both ends. Spain's nineteenth-century development after losing its empire can help us to better understand the successes and failures of the eighteenth-century reforms and the nexus between the metropolis and the empire. Briefly, nineteenth-century capitalist development was defined by the integration of food markets, especially wheat and other grains; by regional industrialisation, especially textiles; and the colonial nexus with the Antilles and the slave plantations. None of this would have been possible without prior disarticulation of the imperial structure as a result of neutral trade during the wars at the turn of the century and legislation by the Cortes in 1820–1823.

The American side of things is also crucial. As in Europe, Bourbon institutional reorganisation concentrated on military and fiscal aspects. An empire of magistrates and judges engaged in flexible and constant negotiations with varied segments of colonial society gave way to the authority of administrators and the military. Though such negotiations cannot be mistaken for powerlessness, it is also true that the isolated intendants often had feet of clay. With that in mind, the new institutional framework, including a viceroyalty in Río de la Plata in 1776 and intendancies for collecting tribute throughout the empire (including the Philippines), cannot entirely explain the success or failure of the reforms. Other variables would depend less on the changes we have described than on dynamics within American societies. Historical research has shown how demographic growth in America and the contribution of export agriculture and mining led to increased tax collection (TePaske and Klein 1982). If that is so, then the systematic implementation of ordinary and extraordinary taxes, plus tax increases on existing impositions (often to pay off debt), put enormous pressure on many sectors of colonial society as well as offering business opportunities for the privileged few. Colonial elites, Indians, free blacks, and mixed bloods struggled to maintain their positions (or to make gains), rowing upstream or downstream with the reinforced Bourbon bureaucracy. And here we see a series of breaks that would lead to imperial collapse when the international situation became increasingly challenging.

Natural disaster was a major impetus to reform in the Portuguese case. On 1 November 1755, a gigantic earthquake devastated Lisbon. The loss of life was staggering and the destruction of buildings was equally so. It seemed the end of the world not only to bereft surviving inhabitants of Lisbon, but the image of a city wiped off the face of the earth also exercised a deep impact in European consciousness, appearing prominently in Voltaire's *Candide*, for example. It was this disaster that set the stage for a far-reaching program of reform, both in Europe and in Brazil. In the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake, one of King Dom José I's ministers, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, known to posterity as the Marquis of Pombal, came to wield almost limitless, and certainly unimpeded, power. He rebuilt the city quickly and assumed almost unchallenged authority for the following two decades (Monteiro 2006a).

Pombal was not content with merely meeting the short-term crisis following the earthquake. He went further, seeking a diagnosis of the Portuguese empire's structural ills. Pombal was both an enlightened despot and an economic patriot, his policy attributable to his quest to revitalise the empire in order to reduce Portugal's dependence on other states, especially Britain. As historian Kenneth Maxwell elucidated, under Pombal the "vital props of the Luso-Brazilian commercial system, sugar, tobacco and gold were protected by regulation", numerous reforms to "rationalise and fortify" metropolitan power in the colonial sphere were enacted, and new revenue-generating institutions were established. Brazilian gold, sugar, and tobacco formed the basis of the South Atlantic commercial complex. Sugar and tobacco provided profitable re-exports while gold balanced the unfavourable trade with northern Europe and paid for the import of basic products in short supply in Portugal, namely grain and wood. Maxwell called Pombal an "enlightened Iberian economic nationalist" who "devised measures to retain capital within his own economic system ... and to diminish the negative economic impact of being [a] producer of precious metals". Pombal's imperial reforms were part of a wider program, in Maxwell's view, which was "a hybrid, part absolutist, part despotic", a regime which established "monopolies" of Portuguese royal power over "coercion, taxation, administration and law-making", which had formerly been diffuse and overlapping (Maxwell 1973, 1995).

Pombal clung to, and benefited from, the reinvigoration of what Adam Smith would deride as the mercantile system. Pombal sought a reinvigorated mercantilism, one which would allow Portugal to reduce

its dependence on foreign merchants, markets, and rival states. Pombal was seduced by the idea of privileged trading companies, their capacity to “fertilise” and “sprout” colonial commerce. Pombal described the situation as: “companies are the only way to regain the commerce of Portuguese America from foreigners” (Carvalho e Melo 1986). Trading companies thus became the basic building block in his grand design and were realised most fully in Brazil. In creating the companies of Grão Pará and Maranhão, and also one for Pernambuco and Paraíba, Pombal sought to develop new export commodities (such as cotton, rice, and coffee) and, remarkably, encourage the growth of colonial manufactures, which other imperial states forbade their colonies to develop. The export commodities encouraged were not those affected by existing treaties, notably the Methuen Treaty. Trading companies were at the heart of Pombal’s grand design to make the empire profitable for Portugal. The Company of Grão Pará and Maranhão enjoyed a 20-year commercial monopoly over those regions, which were less developed than other parts of Brazil. The advent of these privileged companies signalled the demise of the itinerant traders who previously had dominated trade and had been all too willing to engage generously in contraband trade, especially with English and French merchants, which had led to “leakages”, via contraband, of precious metals.

Where he did not establish companies, Pombal took some steps in the direction of less regulated trade. The fleet, *frota*, system was eliminated in 1765, as this system had been inconvenient: extensive contraband had flourished and perishable commodities often perished from irregular shipping schedules. In the place of the fleet system, licensed vessels were free to sail to and from the ports of Bahia, Rio, and other ports where companies do not hold exclusive rights. Partly, it must be conceded, these encouragements were not the result of “enlightened” economic doctrine, an embrace of “free trade”, but rather the exigencies of locating new sources of wealth amidst declining mineral yields and plunging prices of agricultural goods precisely when there were escalating costs of war with Spain in Southern Brazil.

In addition to his commercial decrees, Pombal also engaged in two forms of administrative reorganisation in Brazil: first, he carved new captaincies-general out of territories which were too vast to administer directly; second, the crown re-possessed the last remaining small captaincies which remained in private hands and frequently had been neglected. He relocated the capital of the *Estado do Brasil*, as

Portuguese America was then called, from the north of Brazil, in Salvador da Bahia, to Rio de Janeiro in the early 1760s. This move reflected the growing economic prominence of Southern Brazil. He also tried to gain further benefit from taxing and monitoring the gold and diamond mines, but these extractivist strategies were only so efficacious since the mines were already in decline. Pombal's intrusive actions vexed local society as much as anything else.

Other aspects of Pombal's program deserve mention and brief consideration: a unique aspect of Pombaline imperial policy was its attitude towards population increase. Pombal encouraged European-indigenous intermarriage as a means of increasing population especially in Brazil. Among other important reforms affecting the empire were: Pombal's abolition of African slavery in Portugal itself (1761 and 1773), the elimination of distinctions between "Old" and "New" Christians (1768 and 1773), and the granting of certain freedoms, to use a somewhat anachronistic term, to indigenous peoples in Brazil (1755 and 1759). Though one might be inclined to attribute these measures to liberal attitudes, it is more accurate to see them as predicated on reason of state. The abolition of slavery in Portugal was a clear example: Pombal sought to increase supplies of slaves for Brazil, but due to market pressures, many were disembarked in Lisbon instead. To discourage the bilateral traffic between Portugal's Angolan ports of Luanda and Benguela, and not out of any humanitarian impulse, Pombal abolished peninsular slavery.

Just as he had in matters of commerce, both domestic and international, Pombal sought to expand the power of the crown and its agents in other spheres as well. Here his elaborate campaign against the Jesuits in the late 1750s proved the crucial contest. Pombal expelled the Jesuits from Portuguese territory, across world, an action that would be emulated, sometimes in coordination with Pombal, by Spain, France, and other Italian states in the following decade. Both in Amazonia, but also in the South of Brazil, Pombal resented Jesuit control over Indian labour (concentrated in the *aldeias*, which Pombal soon would transform into towns with civilian administrators). He considered the Jesuits as rulers of a "state within a state". They were exempt from most forms of taxation and were able to reject direct oversight by the Portuguese Crown. This was because the Jesuits answered directly to the Pope, not to the secular ruler (i.e., the Portuguese monarch) in whose dominions they operated. Their control over vast tracts of land and huge numbers of Amerindians made the society suspect in the eyes of an absolutist state.

Not only did they control land, labour, and resources at the expense of the civil government, but Pombal targeted the Jesuits because of their control over education. He wrested the education of the nobility out of the hands of the Jesuits, setting up a special high school for them in Portugal. But what Pombal did regarding university education was even more ambitious. He increased the number of Brazilians who studied at the principal university of Portugal, in Coimbra. Legal education at Coimbra became the common experience linking civilian administrators to one another. Coimbra was the training ground for imperial service, where the “bureaucratic socialization which readied a man for the robe of office” occurred (Schwartz 1973). The sheer number of Brazilian students passing through Coimbra indicates the extent of this policy and suggests its impact. In 1766–1770 alone, 196 Brazilians matriculated whereas in 1791–1795, 80 matriculated. Overall, 866 Brazilian-born subjects studied at Coimbra between 1772 and 1822 (Fonseca 1999; Maxwell 2003). Many of these joined the transatlantic colonial bureaucracy after finishing their studies.

Fittingly, Pombal’s overhaul of Coimbra’s curriculum in 1772 was entrusted to a Brazilian, Francisco de Lemos. Lemos aimed to extirpate scholasticism, infuse the curriculum with new doctrines, and establish new faculties of mathematics and the sciences (Araújo 2000). As anticipated, the Coimbra curricular reform strengthened the connection between higher education and state service, symbolised by the preference for natural and civil law over Roman and canon law. The number of graduates in the final decades of the eighteenth century in medicine, mathematics, and natural science likewise increased at the expense of canon lawyers and theologians. The advancement of “useful knowledge” was prized above all else. By the early nineteenth century, such an instrumental approach to education helped to conjure a vision of a genuinely Luso-Brazilian empire, one which brought individuals from across the empire together for common training. Intentionally or not, such a tendency favoured a pan-territorial approach to reform which somewhat defused metropolitan-colonial tensions (Maxwell 2003). Pombal and his successors repeatedly turned down requests to found universities in Brazil and there were no printing presses until 1808, a situation which could not be more different than Spanish America, with its more than a dozen universities from the sixteenth century and its printing presses in every major city! By centralising university training at Coimbra, Pombal sought to undermine the attachment to locality which proved so pervasive in Spanish as well as British America.

The death of Dom José I in 1777 and the accession of his daughter Maria (who became Queen Maria I) augured ill for Pombal. He was relieved of his duties in the first moments of Maria's reign and many were glad to see him depart office in ignominy. But his fall did not mean that the entire Pombaline reform program was dismantled. True, the privileged companies were abolished, or at least the scope of their activities was severely reduced. But many of the other reforms remained on the books. After Pombal, there were no ministers of same stature, prestige, or authority, but many of the reforms Pombal introduced to education (reforming university curricula to encourage study of natural science over canon law) would bear fruit several decades later.

Even those who despised Pombal took their cues from him. The Portuguese state tried to encourage the study of political economy and natural history in Portugal. In 1779, the Academy of Sciences, in Lisbon, patronised by an inveterate enemy of Pombal, the Duke of Lafões, Queen Maria I's uncle, was founded (Monteiro 2006b). Among its responsibilities was the task of amassing, analysing, and diffusing information concerning Portuguese colonial products, commodities, minerals, and geography to better harness them. Historian José Luís Cardoso has shown convincingly that one of the Academy's chief functions was to disseminate manuals and *memorias* on best practices in agriculture and to encourage the adoption of these techniques (Cardoso 1989). The Academy of Sciences patronised and disseminated numerous tracts that advocated and described the best means of transporting plants from one part of the empire and planting them elsewhere, particularly Asian plants in Brazil. This built on earlier initiatives, of course. Exchanges of medicinal plants had been taking place for centuries. Tobacco from Virginia had been introduced in Bahia in 1757, whereas Carolina Rice was grown in Pará and Maranhão by 1765 (Silva Dias 1968). These experiments gathered steam in the early 1780s under the tutelage of the Academy of Science.

While the Academy was at work in Lisbon, there were other efforts outside of the capital to diffuse political economy doctrines, part of a broader effort to foment agricultural production and local craft industries. These efforts were spear-headed by the crown-chartered Economic Societies which sprang up across peninsular Portugal and the Eastern Atlantic archipelagos: the Minho (1779), Elvas (1781), Douro (1783), Évora (1784), Valença (1789), and Madeira (1790). Very few of these societies, in contrast to their Spanish counterparts,

survived for more than a few years. However, some of the publication and translation projects which these societies would have undertaken made their way into the publication program of the *Casa Literaria do Arco do Cego*, in Lisbon, which operated between 1799 and 1801. In this way, texts of political economy were fundamental to the creation of a public sphere in the Luso-Brazilian world, one which straddled its empire as well as Europe.

The Academy of Sciences and the Economic Societies were supplemented by additional institutions founded by the Portuguese crown with important implications for its overseas empire: a Royal Naval Academy was created in 1779; a Royal Academy of Fortification, Artillery, and Design in 1790; a Royal Public Library in 1796; a Royal Maritime, Military, and Geographic Society in 1798; and a Royal Coast Guard Academy opened in 1796. The Maritime Society attempted to improve maritime cartography, develop new navigational techniques and charts, study ocean currents, compile detailed tidal charts, and draw topographical maps for the military's use. All of these institutions were highly cosmopolitan and represented spaces in which books and ideas were exchanged. As an aside, it is instructive to point out that very few of these initiatives would have their counterpart in the colonies before the transfer of the monarchy to Brazil in 1808 (when coast guard and military academies would be set up in Rio de Janeiro in 1810). This is not to say that the ground was not fertile. A scientific academy had been founded in the 1770s, while a literary academy was formed in 1786. Both initiatives were short-lived. However, one important institution was created in the colonies: the botanical garden. The botanical garden founded in Belém do Pará in 1796 was supposed to serve as a model for others, though the second botanical garden, in Rio de Janeiro, would not be founded until 1810 while that of Olinda (in Pernambuco) would wait until 1811 (Sanjad 2006). Suggestions to create additional botanical gardens in Goa and Mozambique came to nought.

Broadly speaking, crown ministers endeavoured to tap civil society's epistemic resources to bolster policy initiatives across the empire. They encouraged leading scientists, ethnographers, travellers, and philosophically inclined bureaucrats to write reports (*memorias*) which offered descriptive, and sometimes analytical, accounts of various natural, economic, and agricultural phenomena. Natural scientists, mathematicians, engineers, and men of letters became dependent on the generosity and sponsorship of the crown, as the creation and dissemination of knowledge became a means of social

and professional advancement. Such dependence turned men of learning into the collaborators of a state intent on expanding the scope and efficacy of its power (Raminelli 2008). The aim was to put their erudition at the service of power, to use their knowledge of the periphery to bring it under the control of the imperial centre. This relationship suggests that the circulation of ideas, particularly of ideas of political economy, was never truly autonomous from the state, which often incubated initiatives through its extensive tentacles of patronage. Even where a modicum of independence from state institutions was enjoyed, the insights produced were easily encountered, appropriated, and utilised by these institutions.

Among the individuals holding the reins of power after Pombal, one stood out: from 1796–1801, Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, a minister in a pronounced Pombaline mould, and in fact the godson of the Marquis. While an admirer of Pombal's overall aims, he disagreed on tactics. Sousa Coutinho was greatly affected, unsurprisingly, by the collapse of the French monarchy in 1789, which he attributed to its fiscal situation. His opposition to monopolies and the contracting (farming) of tax revenues, as well as his fervent commitment to efficient, solvent financial administration, grew from his conviction that intelligent reform was necessary for the Portuguese empire to avoid a similar collapse (Maxwell 1973).

Though mineral yields continued to decline, Brazil grew wealthier in the 1790s due to geopolitical realignment. With the collapse of Saint Domingue (which became Haiti in 1804), France's sugar-producing colony in the Caribbean (and largest supplier at the time), into revolutionary tumult, the demand for, and prices fetched by Brazilian sugar on the world market soared. By 1805, Brazilian sugar accounted for 15% of world output. Rising demand for sugar felicitously coincided with the massive increase in exports of cotton, another slave-dependent commodity, in the North and Northeast of Brazil. It was sent to Liverpool from whence it proceeded to the early mills of an industrialising Britain. An average of 23,500 Africans were brought as slaves to Brazil per year between 1790 and 1810. Overall, exports from Portugal and its colonial possessions (chiefly Brazil) quadrupled between 1789 and 1807. By the middle of the 1790s, the Portuguese balance of payments had moved decisively into surplus. The curse of the Methuen Treaty seemed to have been lifted, or at least circumvented. Pombal's reforms, and those of his successors, had not born fruit immediately, but privileged trading companies had encouraged the cultivation of new export commodities (Paquette

Conclusion

No Atlantic empire in the second half of the eighteenth century was able to undertake profound social change to respond to the demands of the emerging fiscal-military state. The old explanation for the collapse of empire that rested on a Creole elite in opposition to the alliance between the Bourbon administration and Spanish business interests must be set aside, except possibly in places such as Buenos Aires, where British invasions situated the privileged groups in a different set of relations with the foreign Atlantic networks. But in the rest of the empire, the merchant elite who for centuries had found refuge in commercial consulates would, in general, remain loyal to viceroynal authorities. Their disagreements with the extraordinary taxation imposed, starting in the 1780s, in any case reflected multiple social tensions that would end up leading to civil wars and the final disarticulation of the empire in the 1820s. But we cannot understand the breakup of the Spanish empire without taking into account the general political landscape: maritime wars, the Napoleonic invasion, the division of the dynasty between those who supported Charles IV and those who supported his son, constitutional experimentation, and the restoration of absolutism until 1820.

Image 26.3 New regulation for mining activity in New Spain (1777). 26.3 Bucareli y Ursua, Don Antonio Maria. *El Bo. Fr. D. Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursúa...Previniendo, entre otras cosas, S.M. (que Dios guarde) por real orden de doce de noviembre de mil setecientos setenta y tres, que los sujetos que en esta Nueva España se hallen empleados en el laborio de sus minas.* Mexico, 1777

Source: Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University, Providence, USA

Loyalty by colonial elites should not blind us to waves of discontent from Americans. One such phenomenon was the response by Indians who repeatedly protested increased tributes, limits on circulation of merchandise, and other obligations that amounted to monetary transfers to the crown. These burdens affected standards of living for Amerindians, eroded old loyalties, and inspired a series of revolts. The first large one was in the Andes, led by José Gabriel Condorcanqui, known as Túpac Amaru II, in 1780–1782. The last was the Bajío, in New Spain in 1810–1812, the starting point of a process of ruptures with the metropolis by colonial elites there. In the case of Túpac Amaru, the uprising led to the reinvention of an Inca dynasty, a move

to fill the gap left behind by royal authority that was echoed in Venezuela by Francisco de Miranda and by the Tucumán Congress of 1816 when the provinces of La Plata were wavering between Buenos Aires and their secular link to the Andes. A second phenomenon of discontent can be found among the rising African population in the second half of the eighteenth century. Though by then black slaves, free blacks, and mixed bloods (*castas pardas*) were no novelty in certain imperial contexts, their greater local or regional density along with the appearance of plantations served to increase their relative weight. Spanish authorities were worried about their loyalty, increasingly so after the uprising in Saint-Domingue in 1791, given that they were both ubiquitous and socially undefined. But the concern was neither generic nor equal in all places and contexts. Attitudes toward the tension and violence stirring in the plantation world was quite different from those regarding the important presence of free blacks in artisanal guilds and in the hubs of the large American ports and cities. They were also distinct from the attitude toward the massive and formalised presence of free blacks in one of the grand gestures of the Bourbon reforms: the militias of free blacks and mulattos (Ben Vinson III 2001). In the 1790s there was noticeable discontent among slaves and urban guilds and even in the militias; this would spark fear of “pardocracy”, the evocative word coined by Simón Bolívar, that spread through Spanish America from Buenos Aires to Havana (Helg 2004).

The effort to refound the empire in the terms set forth in the Cortes of Cádiz emerged out of the crisis of the old equilibrium among American social groups. It was both a national and an imperial project that benefited from British finance and military protection on the battlefield and at sea; the Cortes offered Americans a consensus based on political equality (Portillo 2000). But this theoretical equality was quickly put in doubt by Spaniards, both the old Bourbon administration and the rising bourgeoisie who understood the political moment to be an opportunity to increase their power and correct the economic politics of the monarchical state. Two things, however, indicate the continuity of the old imperial model: first, political and military authorities continued on as ever in the key spots of the empire with their own anti-Creole program, sometimes opposed to the changes the metropolitan Cortes wanted to introduce. And second, the American representatives to the Cortes would continually be subject to attacks. The number and quality of the substitutes, or acting delegates, for titular deputies was called into question before the latter had even

arrived from their faraway territories in the New World and the Philippines, and the *castas pardas* (except those with special merit) were excluded from citizenship, which would be the cause of the most tortuous debates in the Cortes (Twinam 2016; Feros 2017).

The refoundation of the nation and the empire thus dissolved, either out of fear of reform or due to the limits imposed by the age-old consensus that had lent stability to the empire. The dissolution sent colonial societies spinning into a spiral of violence, revolution, and war, which would end up destroying the monarchical empire once and for all. At last the white whale succumbed, not just to the battering handed out by all the rising capitalists named Ahab, but also to the impossibility of self-transformation.

The late (and largely accidental) efficacy of the reforms in the Portuguese empire, however, could not disguise the fact that Brazil, a colony, had far outstripped Portugal, the metropole, according to almost every demographic and economic measure. This imbalance preoccupied the Portuguese ministers. Even before the Pombaline reforms, and the prosperity with which they coincided, some crown advisors urged that the king should transfer the court to the New World and take the title emperor of the west. Portugal, they claimed, could not survive without the riches of Brazil, whereas Brazil could survive without Portugal. The lack of proportion between Portugal's relative poverty and Brazil's teeming, indeed burgeoning, wealth was astounding, and this made such a discussion of a possible transfer rather plausible. Brazil had, unlike Spanish America, never been a part of a composite monarchy, even in theory, a kingdom in and of itself. It was clearly a colony, a subordinate appendage of a much larger, legally superior political entity. What the Luso-Brazilian reformers of the 1790s began to consider was the possibility of a transatlantic federation.

This discussion took place against the backdrop of the Age of Revolutions, but was to a degree insulated from it. There was not much concern, in Lisbon, that Brazil would break away from Portugal, as Britain's Atlantic seaboard colonies had done in the 1770s. With notable exceptions, before the royal family's arrival in 1808, there was a relative paucity of vocalised discontent with Brazil's colonial status and resistance to Portugal's rule. This fact is perhaps chiefly attributable to the notable cohesiveness of the ruling elite, conscious of the perils of living in a slave society and fearful of a Haitian-style insurrection in their midst. In 1800, Brazil's population was 37% slave, 30% free persons of African ancestry or those of mixed racial

background (termed at the time “*mulatto*”), 30% white, and 3% Amerindian. But there was a second reason for this as well: though Pombal had expelled the Jesuits and cut down on contraband and sought to extract more revenue, his centralisation efforts still left local elites with ample autonomy, considerable leeway to conduct their own affairs, and few reasons to resent metropolitan meddling. The Brazilian Viceroy, for example, wielded much less power than his Spanish counterpart. Furthermore, the vast physical distances between population centres, uncooperative topography and prevailing winds, and sparse infrastructure made local autonomy inevitable.

To be sure, the political ideas that inflamed the rest of the Atlantic world eventually reached Brazil’s shores and permeated its political culture. The most famous conspiracy, which was nipped in the bud, took place in the province of Minas Gerais in the late 1780s. This *Inconfidência Mineira* was animated by republican ideas. More alarming was the 1798 Tailors’ Revolt in Bahia. There *mulatto* soldiers and artisans plotted based on the principles of the Haitian and French revolutions. They called for independence, the declaration of a republic based on electoral democracy, the abolition of slavery, and full equality between blacks and whites. In a dangerously revolutionary world, the presence of the royal family in the New World after 1808, far from a burden, came to be viewed as a powerful buttress to the existing social, economic and political order, a prophylactic against the chaos enveloping their Spanish American neighbours. Political stability was the indispensable precondition of economic prosperity

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Social change in the eighteenth-century Iberian world¹



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Social change in the Iberian world: Iberian peninsula and Brazil²

This section identifies the major societal changes that occurred in the Iberian peninsula and Brazil during the eighteenth century through a comparative approach, with the end goal of analysing what these changes meant to these respective societies organised by privilege and inequality. Thus, the text addresses the social dynamics, rather than the ideas proposed by the reformists and critics of the period.

As the 18th century unfolded, Iberia's political units became peripheral in the European context and the difference was clear. It was a time of "great divergence", a term that marks the period to this day. A number of reforms developed in the enlightenment context that ultimately aimed to offset the divergence and to modernise Iberia according to the standards set in other regions of Europe. Indeed, there were many social actors in both Spain and Portugal who were conscious of the disparities, and not all of them were *estraneirados* (admirer, or cultivator of what is foreign). Economic societies of "friends of the nation", aware that change was paramount, blossomed in Spain after Campomanes' 1774 challenge. Foreign travel accounts underscored such backwardness in Portugal and Spain. The publication of which only served to rekindle and nurture the infamous Black Legend concerning Iberia. Certain regions in the Americas, however, were evolving as local elites became increasingly interested in political involvement. Never had social mobility in certain sectors occurred at such a rapid pace as in the Iberian overseas territories, and in Europe itself. Yet, the penetration of these changes was far from widespread in such highly hierarchised societies where

inequality was consecrated in law and ingrained in the dominant political culture. Our goal is to capture the ways in which social dynamics generated change vis-à-vis the standard political hierarchy, rather than simply discuss the proposals of enlightened thinkers and reformers of the period. Therefore, we begin with the evolution of society, not the ideas about how it should be.

The key questions within this framework are: what themes of change impacted the diversity of Iberian societies? What did change mean at this time of great transformations in France and North America? How did each social group react to change as they witnessed it? In the following pages we take stock of a number of such realities through the viewpoint of a comparative synthesis. We attempt to scrutinise the particularities, similarities, and differences, all the while aiming to study the reach of the registered changes.

From northern Iberia to the American continent

Contrary to what has been written, Spanish emigration during the 18th century did not dwindle. Although the number of emigrants from the traditional regions of central Spain and Andalusia slowed, emigration from the northern provinces actually increased. Canary Islanders also began to emigrate to the Americas, especially after 1680—according to Martínez Shaw's estimate, 25,000 people left during the 18th century (Martínez Shaw 1994, 167). High population density, land scarcity, and the economic crises of 1690–1695 and 1708–1718 in the provinces of northern Iberia, combined with the takeover of Basque cod fisheries by the English, caused many to leave. Push factors thus prevailed upon Galicians, who up until then had moved mostly inside Iberia (around 350,000 people in the second half of the 18th century). This group also began to emigrate to the New World as evidenced by data compiled by Eiras Roel for the county of Compostela. While in the 17th century only 4% of Galicia's children emigrated and only one out of 15 left for the Americas, in the eighteenth century that number grew considerably. More than 10% of the population emigrated and one out of seven left for the Americas—one out of three from 1792 to 1793 (Eiras Roel 1991, 19). From the 1760s onwards, during the time of the abovementioned agricultural crises, the increasing liberalisation of colonial commerce effectively ended the monopoly held by Cadiz since 1717, thus making it even easier for many Galician and Iberians from the northern coastline to move overseas.

The discovery of gold deposits in Minas Gerais (ca. 1695), Cuiabá (1719), Goiás (1725), and Mato Grosso (1734) broadened the Western Brazilian frontier. These findings became widespread. The newspaper *Gaceta de Madrid* of 29/01/1732 quoted news from London dated December 1731, with detailed information received from Lisbon. They described the gold and diamonds disembarked at Lisbon by the Rio de Janeiro fleet in great detail, concluding with the following remark: "This quantity of gold is the largest ever brought by any Fleet to this Kingdom." This Eldorado attracted many people from the North of Portugal. Portuguese America generated noticeable pull factors. The Brazilian population grew considerably during the eighteenth century—it probably multiplied tenfold. The settlement, the foundation of city councils and even of churches/parishes and other structures rapidly unfolded in the central-southern region of Brazil. In this region, the captaincies became more interconnected, and Rio de Janeiro became the main economic centre of the territory in the second half of the eighteenth century (Sampaio 2001; Osório 2001, 117, 121). Meanwhile, the exodus from Portugal was so strong that Portuguese King D. João V was forced to restrict it in 1720. Most people leaving the country hailed from Minho, the Portuguese region with the highest population density. Migration to Brazil was so massive that the Portuguese law of 1720 underscored the lack of people needed to farm the land in the province of Minho, "which, being the most populated, is now in a such a condition that it does not have the necessary people to farm the land or to serve the people". The aforementioned law was preceded by similar decrees in 1709 and 1711, both of which had no great effect.

The lure of gold from south-central Brazil that depopulated vast regions of northern Portugal simultaneously preserved the power of Baroque in the altars of many early eighteenth-century churches ranging from the already mentioned area of Brazil to central and northern Portugal, and the islands of the Azores and Madeira. According to the estimates, the rate of departure from the parishes of Minho was quite high, spanning from 20 to 44% of boys, with the most affected age group being individuals ten to 14 years old (Amorim 1999, 36–38). Many left after only achieving basic literacy in their local school. There was often a first phase of migration to Porto, or Lisbon, where relatives or fellow countrymen housed them. In these cities, emigrants frequently became servants or commission tradesmen and store cashiers. The departure to Brazil happened after they gathered some savings and underwent a brief initiation in commercial

routines, which most often happened spontaneously while working at the counter of a store or as a merchant assistant. Similar to Spaniards who left Cadiz for Spanish America, a large percentage of Portuguese emigrants were single males.

Some emigrants returned to Iberia in their forties with some money—at times even becoming rich. Others stayed in the colonies, and in the case of Brazil, got married, preferably to the daughters of other Portuguese already born in the colony. Here they enlarged the local elites, challenging the interests of people born in Brazil. Children of Portuguese emigrants in Brazil oftentimes became members of the clergy, and others were sent to study at the University of Coimbra. Contrary to the Castilian colonial experience, Portugal never established universities in non-European territories. This fact strengthened dependence vis-à-vis the metropole. In the 18th century, however, awareness of the place of birth by people born in the territory to the detriment of people from Portugal was consolidated. This trend began at the time of the war against the Dutch.

Refraining exclusion?

Societies from different Iberian geographies during the *Ancien Régime*, based on privilege and anchored to confessional political entities of Catholic brand, maintained a number of exclusions as if seeking to protect themselves from threats against their identity and ideology. We can speak about minorities, such as the New Christians and Gypsies. The bottom of the social pyramid in the Iberian world consisted of slaves, almost entirely of African origin. These individuals were easily identified by the colour of their skin and considered property, yet it was understood that they ought to be Christianised. What changes occurred in this framework? What drove social dynamics during the period of enlightened reformism?

Regarding Gypsies, both Spain and Portugal sought to control them and tried to banish them from their territories—a longstanding intention, fed by the character of ideological and religious levelling of these monarchies. In Spain, a 1717 decree tried to compel them to settle (i.e. to make them sedentary and force their integration). The initial list of 41 cities designated for this effect was enlarged in 1746. This law allowed central authorities to know exactly where Gypsies were located. In July 1749, the Marquis of Ensenada (1702–1781) put in practice what would become known as the “great netting” (*gran redada*), or general arrest of Gypsies, which was an operation

simultaneously carried out in all territories of peninsular Spain. As a result of this initiative, males over seven years old were separated from women and children. The purpose was to provide forced labour for Spanish shipyards. Female Gypsies were also forced to work in the production of manufactures. The overall aim of the program was to occupy Gypsies in the workforce and prevent them from populating. From the program's inception it became difficult to decide whether to include those enjoying the status of Old-Christians, those who married outside the group, or those who enjoyed permanent residence. An additional law in 1763 attempted to serve as a pardon for Gypsy prisoners. Again, an order adopted on the 19 September 1783 insisted on integration and stated that Gypsies were forbidden from being called Gypsies or New Castilians. It allowed them to choose their place of residence but prohibited their presence at the King's Court or other "royal places".

In 1718 the Portuguese government ordered the arrest of Gypsies with the goal of distributing them among different overseas territories. That year's deportation (around 144 people) was made public; a clear demonstration of the crown's desire for social control. Unlike Spain, from 1592 onward Portugal wanted its imperial domains to be the destination of these unassimilated populations. Brazil was particularly targeted by these 18th-century measures as groups were expelled from particular regions to others in that large territory. There they maintained their behaviours and were often associated with thefts (namely of slaves), which generated constant protests. The presence of Gypsies in Brazil triggered an important exchange of letters between Bahia and the Overseas Council, especially between 1755 and 1758. Legislation was issued in 1760–1761 that called upon Gypsies to abandon their peculiar and "criminal" lifestyle in Brazil. Punishment for failing to do so was set at permanent exile to the African islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. At the time, around 1,000 gypsies lived in the Bahia captaincy alone. The deportation of Gypsies from Portugal to Brazil continued into the 1780s. Some became slave traders after the gold boom. They also traded in the second-hand market, transporting slaves from the coastal areas to the Brazilian hinterland, along with other commodities, although such occupations failed to dissipate their social stigma as thieves. Their condition, however, was better than that of their coreligionists in Iberia. (B. M. Donovan 1992; Gómez Alfaro, Costa, and Floate 1999; Martínez Martínez 2014).

While socially reviled in Brazil, slaves were even more marginalised than Gypsies. African slaves in Spain were few during the 18th

century. Their numbers were bolstered somewhat by Mohammedan slaves, especially from the Mediterranean coast. These individuals arrived as a result of ship seizures. Most belonged to the state and were used as labourers in arsenals, prisons, and road construction. In 1766 around 800 were freed against ransom and returned to North Africa (Domínguez Ortiz 1990, 338).

Contrary to what has been argued, Portugal did not pioneer the abolition of slavery. It forbade the entrance of more slaves in Portugal's mainland and promoted the release of existing ones since 1761–1773. During that time of gold and economic crises, the purpose was to safeguard the free workforce. The Atlantic traffic however was stimulated almost singlehandedly by the monopolist companies of Grão-Pará-and-Maranhão and Pernambuco-and-Paraíba. These alone transported over 87,100 slaves from the shores of Africa to Brazil. The efforts of these two companies no doubt contributed to the global increase in the African slave trade from the 18th century until the first half of the nineteenth (Caldeira 2013, 220–225, 229–235, 252).

In Brazil's richest regions, skin colour became an increasingly important social factor that marked one's rank in society (Furtado 2006, 218). In Portugal, status according to the colour of the skin was slowly reinforced as a mark of exclusion towards the end of the eighteenth century, especially as purity of blood was officially abolished by a law issued in 1773. Twelve days after, the nuncio of Lisbon quickly sent the printed law to the Vatican secretary, saying it had been enacted to "completely erase the remains of an intolerable barbarity" (ASV, *Segreteria di Stato, Portogallo*, L^o 120, f. 73-86v). In Portugal the importance given to purity of blood had reached its peak in the 1670–1730s. During this period, it was not enough to have pure blood; one had to prove that reputation at all times. The families of this puritan aristocracy would not even allow their children to marry equally historic houses tainted by rumours of impure blood.

When it was abolished by crown law, the purity of blood was no longer a factor of significant differentiation. Many successful New Christians had reached social distinctions, for example obtaining habits in Portugal's various military orders or becoming members of the Inquisition brotherhood. From 1773 onwards, these insignias and memberships lost social importance, and their demand decreased significantly although families with New-Christian origins still sought to obtain them. Unofficially the status survived until the nineteenth century, especially in the marriage market. It was not easy to eradicate such practices ingrained in society at that time.

Even so, purity-of-blood statutes were only definitively abolished in Spain in 1865 after genealogical investigations were extinguished in 1833. They therefore survived the demise of Inquisition and the equal access of all citizens to civil service proclaimed in 1812. In the second half of the 18th century, however, their segregating power weakened. The *chuetas* of Mallorca were the only exception. For this reason, royal orders issued in 1782, 1785, and 1788 tried to integrate New Christians by erasing this label, acknowledging their right to live among common folks, and considering them able to apply for every post and occupation. Yet, social integration was not significant until the 19th century (Domínguez Ortiz 1990, 341). With regards to social exclusion, it was not easy to overcome something that was so deeply ingrained in the collective mentality.

Business elites, social mobility, and new distinctions

The eighteenth century may have aggravated the “great divergence”, but it sped up the social mobility process inside Iberia’s political entities. Never had such mobility been so strong. Following a 16th-century trend, colonial commerce, or other related businesses, constituted the main opportunity for a usually rapid social promotion—ranking second after service to the crown. This hierarchy of promotion pathways persisted over time since it was inherent to the institutional and political culture of Iberia’s monarchies. It was very clear in Castile, and especially in Portugal—an old political entity, more homogenous and centripetal at the institutional level. Service to the crown was paramount, but long-distance wholesale trade still secured the largest financial capital gains and short-term capital accumulation for those people with no proven family history. It also had the advantage of not being exclusive to major traders. In the eighteenth century, more than ever, there were opportunities to convert financial capita into social capital.

Except for certain regions in Spanish America and the mining areas of Brazil, Cadiz and Lisbon were the key places to watch such quick trajectories unfold, precisely because they were the nuclear poles of transoceanic Iberian commerce in the 18th century. Around 1729–1730 a French traveller, referring to Cadiz, said that “this city has a lot of people and commodities. There is no other place in Europe where money is more common, or flows more abundantly” (Silhouette 1770, III: 91). This status resulted from the move of Casa da

Contratación and the Consulate to Cadiz in 1717, where it stayed until 1778—when it became unnecessary to have the trade with the Indies based there. In the case of Lisbon, bidding for key crown contracts (*assientos*), both from the kingdom and overseas, took place in the city, which further increased its importance for the groups of the business elite (Salvado 2014, 134). In the second half of the eighteenth century, Lisbon traders benefited from 61.2% of the contracts awarded by the crown's Finance Council and Overseas Council, representing 87% of the revenue awarded. They were the principal holders of nearly 75% of the revenue entering the royal vaults: 62.6% of annual contracts up to, or exceeding, 50 million *réis* were held by a Lisbon businessman (Pedreira 1996, 360; Pedreira 1995, 122–123). At times these contracts also involved services to the monarchy, thus enabling them to strengthen their capital of social promotion and negotiate with members of central government, generating relationships based on the exchange of favours and dependencies. In truth, contracts were essential in defining the Portuguese trading elite in the second half of the 18th century, and as such, a small group of rich traders kept these monopolies firmly tied to their houses as if these were their “own assets”. This “innovation”, among others, was visible at the end of the century in the tobacco contracts. The prevailing seventeenth-century trend that most businessmen were of New Christian descent also changed. By the mid-18th century some of the most distinguished businessmen still belonged to the managing boards of the state-owned Pombal-created companies, or the royal Trade Board (Junta do Comércio). They were also the main providers of state credit in the final years of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth century (1796–1803).

As in Cadiz, most major traders in Lisbon were from elsewhere; foreigners being more numerous in Cadiz than in Lisbon, in relative terms. Despite the earthquake of 1755, Lisbon remained the greatest city in Iberia at the end of the *Ancien Régime*, attracting many from the *Minho* and *Trás-os-Montes* provinces. At the turn of the 18th century the city boasted around 125–150 individuals, not including 50 foreign houses (W. M. Donovan 1991, 86–87). In 1772, the city had around 640 traders, and between 1790 and 1800 that number varied between 308 and 402, most of them Portuguese (between 49 and 60%). Outside this metropolis, Portugal had no medium-sized cities; only small towns. Never was this so consequential in social terms. The second most important commercial centre was Porto; during the same

period, it had a concentration of around 133–217 traders listed in the almanacs, with foreign ones not exceeding 11.8–18% of that group (Pedreira 1995, 130; Cunha 2014, 31–32). At Cadiz the traders were around 138 in 1713, 529 in 1753 (46% foreigners) and possibly 907 in 1773 (45.7% foreigners). They did not exceed 2% of the population, with the same percentage more than likely mirrored in Lisbon (Bustos Rodríguez 2005, 126–128, 138–139).

Rapid social climbing in the eighteenth century was made possible mostly by increased venality. In Spain, it had already become accentuated in the reign of Philip IV, and especially of Charles II, but in Portugal this increase happened later. It became a striking phenomenon in the 18th century, especially in the 1750–1760s. It created opportunities for the wealthy on both sides of the Iberian peninsula who were eager to secure important positions and distinctions. The acquisition of *regidores*, that is, municipal ruling posts, was essential in many Castilian towns. Wealthy people already bought noble titles in the seventeenth century, such as Colaret from Cádiz who bought the seigneurie of *El Pedroso* along with the title of Marquis. Noble titles even became part of the agreed terms of some seventeenth-century royal loan contracts negotiated in Castilian lands. This top distinction, that Portuguese traders could almost never reach until the late eighteenth century (exception made to the family Castro do Rio, who were made Viscounts in 1671, and Gomes da Mata, who became Count of Peñafiel in December 1798), concluded a process that began with the acquisition or construction of noble houses and a change of lifestyle. This first stage was followed by the acquisition of membership in the Inquisition (*familiars*), the insignia of a military order and a coat of arms, as well as the foundation of an entail. Excluding the status of “grande” and nobility titles, the remaining pathway was generally identical to Spain’s. These social actors aimed to achieve nobility, not to alter the social hierarchy.

Regarding Spain, the work of García-Baquero, Bustos Rodríguez, Carmen Sanz, Francisco Andújar, Enrique Soria, Alberto Marcos Martín, and María del Mar Felices informs us of widespread venality in the field of honours. The phenomenon was more circumscribed and globally less evident until the final quarter of the seventeenth century in Portugal. It virtually did not include membership in the Inquisition (*familiars*) and did not touch upon noble titles and grandeur. Old nobility being poor in assets strongly depended upon crown reward as the management of venality in Portugal was conducted in such way that it did not question the grant-awarding economy. Caution was

taken to secure such situations at that time and the practice of venality, when directly vitalised by the crown, tended to occur in the empire (India, Azores, and Brazil).

In Portugal one could not buy municipal posts, but it became possible to acquire offices, or years of service to the crown, for requesting the due reward to the political centre. In other cases, one could even buy the right to a habit of the Order of Christ from a military officer (or from his widow) or from people living in Mazagão before they confirmed such grant. During the period, those who received a grant sometimes also got the ability to sell it. Since the trader who acquired it was generally an Old-Christian, the only obstacle he faced regarding genealogical inquiry for the Order of Christ was the contamination of craftsman descent, an objection often applicable. Since the mid-18th century there was also a solution for this problem, that is, paying a penalty to the Court of Military Orders or having previously acquired at least ten original shares from the so-called Pombaline Companies that were created in 1755. Initial shareholders enjoyed the privilege, as from February 1757, of automatically excusing buyers of such a number of original shares from the “manual worker” objection, as a means to promote the sale hindered by the 1755 earthquake. This prerogative was extended to later Pombaline commercial companies, to the sons and grandsons of the founding shareholders, and had retroactive effects for people who had already been reproved. This was another propelling mechanism for the quick rise of people with available funds.

In the eighteenth century, converging circumstances made social ascent easier, even along the span of only one generation—although two or three was more common. Furthermore, we should stress the “ennoblement” of certain occupations which occurred in Portugal. For instance, in 1722 low-rank offices in the king’s household ceased to generate the manual worker descent objection per se in the Board of Military Orders. In 1723 any farmer who farmed his own land was considered noble if he did not have any other “mechanic” descent objection, which vitalised the rise of many people who were sons and grandsons of farmers. In 1762 it was the turn of bookkeepers and cashiers, while in 1771 it was decided that the performing arts did not bring infamy to those practicing them (Moreau 1999, I: 22). In Spain, a royal order dated 18 March 1783 made the jobs of tanner, blacksmith, tailor, shoemaker, and carpenter honest and honourable: they no longer debased the family, nor disabled it for municipal offices (*Real cedula de S.M. y señores ...* 1783).

The trade-off for disciplining and promoting certain practices was often to grant a dignity inducing social ascension. Let us consider two examples. When the system of payment of the royal fifths on gold was altered in Brazil, a bill dated 3 December 1750 promised rewards to those who made deliveries of a minimum eight arrobas of gold in a single year at any mint, regardless of the ownership of the gold or the type of delivery, partial or total (*Collecção das leis, decretos ...* 1797). Usually those who complied would be given the habit of the Order of Christ and a pension of 12,000 réis. An order dated 20 February 1752 also promised manual workers who planted mulberry trees and produced three arrobas of silk the possibility of being considered fit “for holding any office in those towns and cities of the kingdom that require nobility”.

People nearly always took advantage of these opportunities, in particular the first one, as the range of social honours was more limited in Brazil than in the Portugal. The habit of Christ was the highest honour available, contrary to what happened in Castilian America where fortune could buy noble titles (Raminelli 2015, 126–127). In Brazil most people who received habits by way of gold deliveries were from Portugal’s mainland—43% of whom were traders, followed by those holding administrative jobs, many of them officers at the foundry house itself. Few owned mines and many achieved the minimum annual amount by convincing third parties to deliver gold in their name (Stumpf 2014, 276–278, 331–333). This means that people also competed and bargained in the exploitation of these opportunities, especially since venality was less common than in the neighbouring territories colonised by Spain.

Be it in Andalusia or Galicia, be it in the Cantabrian coast or Lisbon, wealthy traders were characterised mainly by having several active debts and investing little in the processing sector. Manufacturing plants were nearly always considered less profitable than colonial commerce. In all those places, the capital available for lending vitalised their relationship with a wide range of people.

Concerning social honours, one change occurred in 18th-century Iberia military orders, that is the appearance of grades, hierarchy, and, consequently, promotion. The orders even developed *numerus clausus* at some levels, emulating what existed in other European knighthood orders. Military orders, born in the Middle Ages, just as they were in the last decades of the eighteenth century, with many knights with the same insignia, did not reflect social differences as Iberian societies required. It was not possible to create a new

institution in Portugal, as happened in Castile (Order of Charles III, in 1771), but in 1789 the three Military Orders (i.e. Avis, Christ, and Santiago) were reformed under the sponsorship of the monarchy. In both Spain and Portugal, projects were developed at the king's initiative as the reigning monarchs became the Grand-Masters of the military orders. They strengthened their power, vis-à-vis the Holy See and the orders board (the order of Charles III did not even depend on it). Notwithstanding, the order of Charles III received the pope's confirmation (February of 1772). The king's founding decree imposed strict requirements in matters of purity of blood (going as far back as the great-grandparents on both sides) and demanded noble descent of the paternal lineage; it was only negligent regarding the occupation, but not for long. From March 1787 it also required the absence of manual worker descent up to the great-grandparents (Villalba Pérez 1990, 678). The order's highest dignity of the Great-Cross, whose bearers were called Excellency in both Castile and Portugal, only reinforced hierarchy inside the nobility. It reinstated the aristocracy of the orders and symbolically reorganised the bonds of loyalty between aristocracy and royalty. It is also in this context that we must interpret the creation of the Spanish *Royal Order of Noble Ladies of Queen Maria Luísa*, in 1792, the first feminine order recorded in Iberia; as from 1796, both its members and their husbands could be titled Excellency. When people recently awarded the order of Charles III received the insignia, their mandatory oath to the king was "to live and die in our Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion: never engage directly or indirectly against our Person, Household or States: serve us well and loyally in everything that we may see fit (if they are our vassals)".

In their conception, these initiatives were themselves a reaction against societal changes and increased social mobility. They meant to impose order over social disorder. It was not by mere chance that the order of Charles III was no less noble than the others and, despite inflated membership during the reign of Charles IV, it did not accept nobles involved in commerce or industry (Moreta i Munujos 1981, 331). These efforts however did not last for long, especially in the Portuguese case.

New sociability and the development of "public opinion"

The field of sociability also changed in the eighteenth century. Along with the academies and the traditional places (confraternities, taverns,

markets, parish and religious festivities, fountains and squares), new ways of association and social interaction (cafés, salons) cropped up in the late eighteenth century, whether legally accepted or not (i.e. masonic lodges).

Cafés, as shops for enjoying a cup of coffee or other drinks and sweets, were only beginning to develop in Iberia during the period. In Lisbon they seemingly appeared at the time of Pombal (Ruders 1981, 227). They were almost identical to pubs or liquor stores. In 1792 foreign and Portuguese newspapers could be found at some of these shops and cafés and, according to that year's report by the General Chief of Police, they were the basis for "speech writing and plotting". According to the same source, this was why "everybody now begins to murmur that you can speak freely at the cafés" (ANTT, *Intendência Geral da Polícia, Secretarias*, L^o 3, f. 290v–291v—*apud* Lousada 1995, 214, n. 96).

Aristocrats, traders, and administration officers and their families avoided attending cafés, as well as women. Female attendance was more significant in Madrid. In 1796 Jovellanos described the cafés as "public houses for conversation and daily entertainment", serving as a refuge for the unemployed to spend their time gambling and reading "public papers and magazines". He also considered them somewhat educational for young people who lacked proper education at home and could receive it from the world (Jovellanos 1858, 494–495). In the 1790s foreigners, among others, attended the tables of the capital of the Bourbons. Some individuals gambled there, while other people organised literary or politically oriented discussion groups. In Madrid, as in Lisbon, the police considered these places potentially capable of disturbing public order. In 1791 there were 27 cafés in Madrid, particularly in the districts of Maravillas (7) and San Jerónimo (11). They had to be located at the ground floor with doors opening to the street, so as to be more easily controlled. People were not allowed to read "gazettes nor other public papers". At the same date, card games, conversations about government or anyone were also unauthorised. It was also forbidden to smoke (López-Cordón 2004, 349–355).

As in many other European cities (Bordeaux—1746; Nantes, Montpellier, Nîmes—1745–1760, etc.), Lisbon had a "public promenade". In 1764 construction began north of the Rossio square in an area where the rubble from the reconstruction of the city had been dumped after the 1755 earthquake. This avenue had a central road and five rows of symmetrically aligned trees, some of which were ash-trees donated by a rich French trader who lived in Portugal. The

venue had benches inside and was surrounded by walls with windows. There was a homology with the salon “in which everybody may and must be shown off” and its symmetry underscored the notion of dominion over nature, transforming it in a tamed and civilised environment that penetrated the city (Turcot 2009, 647). Urban parks for leisure were also designed as gathering places during the period to bring social groups into closer proximity to each other. In 1766, however, Charles François Dumouriez wrote that

Portuguese people do not communicate much, and their sociability is poor, particularly in Lisbon. Government, which remains suspicious at all times since the plot against the king, has forbidden any gathering ... the city of Lisbon has no entertainment. A few balls are held, more for entertaining the foreigners rather than the nationals.

(Dumouriez 2007, 121)

Porto, remaining the second most important city of the country at the end of the eighteenth century, also had its public promenade built at Cordoaria in 1786, followed by others in the 1790s. In Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, capital of the territory since 1763, also built its public promenade between 1779 and 1783. Although these urban promenades were fashionable in eighteenth-century Europe, the promenade of Lisbon was not very attended during that time. People wearing cloaks were not admitted in order to prevent the presence of the common people, yet the upper groups also avoided the space, save foreigners and possibly dandies—called *peraltas* at that time. A 1778 leaflet commented on these: “Their burps are: Ladies, Floret, Counter-dancing, Public Promenade and Lisbon quay of Ribeira, Tea, cafés and Pool”. These characters were poor but pretentious, always dressed according to the latest fashion. The closing hours (it was not open at night), the garden profile, the lack of hygiene of the city streets, along with the custom of keeping women at home, all explained the low attendance of that garden by the Portuguese (Le Cunff 2000, I: 14–32). In Spain these tree-sided avenues were already traditional and their impact much stronger.

In Madrid and other Spanish cities (Málaga, Murcia, Zaragoza, Valladolid, etc.) which had their public promenades and avenues built or restructured (Alameda de Hércules, in Seville, 1764; Paseo del Prado, in Madrid, 1767 and 1775; Écija in 1769 and 1774, etc.), these spaces open to everyone were livelier, although the lower groups were

not welcome there. Madrid's urban sociability moved from Plaza Maior / Puerta del Sol to these promenades (Delícias, Atocha, Prado, Recoletos), that often separated the urban space from the suburbs or the disorganised countryside (García Gómez 1993, 15). In some Spanish cities, avenues were a source of pride to the residents as the business elite tried to have their mansions built there (*verbi gratia*, Málaga). This model was even transposed onto Castilian colonial cities. Madrid's Prado de Atocha was turned into an Illuminist and Neo-classic avenue of sciences. Public buildings were built there, including the Botanical Gardens (1774–1781), the Museum or Office of Natural Sciences (1785–1811), and the National Observatory, whose works began in 1790.

In the last quarter of the eighteenth century it became fashionable among the elites to entertain at home, whether to socialise, or talk, or, in the Portuguese case, celebrate any kind of anniversary. After the 1755 earthquake, while Lisbon's nobility had scattered themselves in the suburbs, the great traders lived close to each other, grouped downtown and in the western districts (Lousada 1995, 115–116). It was they who energised the broadening of the range of socialising or the “sociability and refinement”—according to Jacome Ratton. It was a change with the help of the Marquis of Pombal, who offered seats in the audience of the Ópera do Tejo to traders and their wives, alongside the British community and the effects of the earthquake. The great traders played a key role in breaking down the aristocracy's exclusivist sociability in Lisbon and other Iberian cities. In Lisbon, opera and instrumental music left the closed and selected world of the royal court, aristocratic houses, or parties hosted by foreigners, and conquered a broader public in the second half of the 18th century. In Cadiz and Lisbon, it became fashionable for ladies to ask their husbands for a harpsicord, as well as music and dance teachers (Romero Ferrer 1989, 404–405; Lousada 1995, 285). In Lisbon, the first public concert with a paid entrance regardless of their social status was held in the first half of the 1780s (Lousada 1995, 289). The same principle was already applied to theatre. Public theatres already existed in Madrid in the seventeenth century, although only two survived until the eighteenth century, together with the newly founded theatre Caños del Peral. In Cadiz, a city of many wealthy men, three public theatres coexisted in the 1760s and 1770s, with varied programmes including Italian opera, French comedy, and Castilian models such as the “*sainete*” comic opera.

Four public theatres were built in Lisbon between 1756/1759 and

1792 and the São Carlos opera house opened in 1793. From 1771 to 1775 a commercial company managed the Lisbon public theatres, whose funds were obtained by selling shares. According to the regulations of this monopolist company, women did not pay to attend the shows, neither did the valets or servants of patrons who rented loges (Moreau 1999, I: 22). Lisbon's São Carlos Theatre, although sponsored by the king, was built and financed through an agreement signed by the General Chief of Police and the shareholders of the aforementioned company, all of them large traders (Joaquim Pedro Quintela, Anselmo José da Cruz Sobral, Jacinto Fernandes Bandeira, António Francisco Machado, António José Ferreira, and João Pereira Caldas) who immediately began to manage it. Quintela himself gave the necessary land and demanded as compensation a noble loge, with adjoining chambers and an independent entrance. In Porto the importance of wealthy traders was also critical to theatre construction and maintenance, even though these pragmatic men received little literary education and did not travel abroad. When they did so, they almost exclusively travelled to Brazil to settle business affairs.

Theatre, particularly in Spain, allowed some sociability between the nobility and middle groups. Diversified social interaction also existed in Spain's various economic societies. The same happened in Portugal in the few masonic lodges that were clandestinely created in the eighteenth century, nearly always by foreigners, namely the English. The presence of these lodges slightly increased in the 1790s. In Spain, Freemasonry had less of a social impact during the eighteenth century.

Censorship notwithstanding, reading of newspapers in public spaces, theatre, and mundane interactions allowed a diversification of contents and spaces for creation (outside the royal court, the academies, and aristocratic palaces) and expansion of the profile of social agents who gave their opinions about the *res publica* and influenced public opinion. These actors helped to cement the role of the individual in Iberian society, as well as the role of public and private spheres in social life and their differences. This was a subtle but meaningful change.

By the late eighteenth century, we can longer describe society as tripartite, as a consequence of these recorded changes. Traders and other intermediate groups increasingly imposed themselves within the social classifications. Despite the existence of entities such as trade boards, traders were not a coherent group with an alternative social vision. For the most part, the increasing financial requirements of the

modern Iberian states allowed these ambiguously composed groups, elbowing with nobility, to consolidate their power. Although these modern states needed the *décor* of nobility and its military, as well as courtly and diplomatic services, they also needed the financial services of the wealthy. The same applied to the skills of university graduates and the military, both in Iberia and the Empires. All this, despite the pull factors of such territories as Brazil in which their echo reverberated loudly among the popular social layers and in some intermediate groups. The interaction between central government and society played an important role in this process. Individual merit, along with the inherited merit, became increasingly preponderant, as well as the respect for the individual versus family descent. The individual and private spheres began to differentiate themselves from the public sphere. Notwithstanding censorship, more people gave their opinion about political and social changes.

In short, all of these changes described were mere discontinuities in the general picture of a society that mimicked the upper ranks, and in the conceptual frameworks of neo-scholastic origin that still existed at the beginning of the 18th century, such shifts in social mobility were not viewed favourably. To these, social mobility meant disorder. As the century progressed, such changes were increasingly accepted as the process itself became a recurrent symbol of change. Change did not put an end to privilege, but it did bridge the behaviour gap between business elites and the aristocracy. They mingled at certain venues and contexts, but that did not mean there was a great deal of integration, especially in Portugal, where the *grandes* and title-holders lived closed in on themselves for a long time.

The eighteenth-century colonial elites: between Iberian identity and American aspirations

The process of colonisation in the Americas gave rise to an Ancién Regime society characterised by social relations that were structured, on the one hand, around a series of oppositions—between victors and the vanquished, the indigenous and the settlers, Creoles and peninsulars—and on the other by ethnic mixing and a dependent economy. These were, broadly speaking, the features that distinguished the Americas from the contemporary European world, the focus here being on changes that affected the colonial elites in the eighteenth century.

Two elements are central to understanding these changes. The first is the issue of social mobility. While skin colour and legal status continued to be seen as markers of social identity, the reality of *mestizaje* served to undermine the hierarchies constructed on this basis. Even more so, the preoccupation with wealth in the Americas all but invalidated contemporary classifications. On the other hand, the question of identity in the Americas, which is increasingly the focus of attention from scholars, is being considered in terms of sociability and social relations. With regard to the elites, this involves untangling the contradiction between, on the one hand, horizontal or “class” solidarities, understood in terms of “rulers” and “the ruled”, and, on the other, vertical solidarities that acquired far greater importance in the American context. Thus, while in Iberian America the elites replicated contemporary European social norms and hierarchies, more specifically those of the Iberian peninsula, they were nevertheless obliged to adapt the criteria to the American social reality, characterised by a relatively small nobility, and the demographic imbalance between the so-called “Spaniards” and the rest, as well as the prevalence of *mestizaje*. This American reality substantially altered the meaning of peninsular categories on which colonial society was founded, especially that of purity of blood (Bertrand 1999).

From the uniquely American context, two principal issues emerge. The first pertains to the question of social mobility. Was it more important in the colonies than in the metropole? The other refers to the emergence of an American identity under peninsular domination. What were the attitudes of the American elites to the metropole? These are the central questions analysed here by looking at both the Spanish and the Portuguese cases.

Defining the elite in Spanish America

The social group that was culturally Iberian was made up of those who were, legally speaking, members of the so-called “Republic of Spaniards”. It was essentially urban and distinguished by several other salient features. Among the most important of these was the firm adherence of its members to the sociocultural model that prevailed in the peninsula itself at the end of the fifteenth century. Two different elements of this model stand out above all. In the first place, the seigniorial framework, and the significance of interpersonal relations that offered protection within the client networks that coalesced

around a feudal lord (*señor*). The other element was the importance given to blood purity, which took on a radically different aspect to that which it had in the metropole (Zuñiga 1999). This invariably entailed the privileging of Iberian ancestry through exclusive forms of sociability, such as lay religious confraternities whose members were recruited very selectively. This late-medieval Iberian culture was also marked by the symbolic overestimation of landownership, not in the economic sense but as a symbol of social rank, crucial in demonstrating one's ability to live "nobly" or exercise "lordship". Another key aspect was the diffusion of feudal culture among the members of this social elite, which manifested itself chiefly through the affinity for the so-called literature of chivalry, the inclination towards arms and warfare, and everything associated with knightly life and art, all that was proper to every "caballero". Much of the colonial literary production reflects this affinity for the medieval aristocratic and feudal heritage, whether chronicles of the conquest—like the one authored by Bernal Díaz del Castillo—or histories of cities and their founders, such as the *Recordación Florida* by Francisco Antonio de Fuentes y Guzmán published in the seventeenth century, extolling the virtues of Santiago de Guatemala.

These were then the elements that marked out the American elites as members of the nobility, although this had a different meaning from that which it had in the metropole. The American elite did not take long to begin emphasising its role in the process of conquest, systematically predicating its belonging to the nobility on this military background. This conception led them to petition the king for titles, coats of arms, and honours as reward for "services" rendered to his majesty by their conquistador forbears.

This martial concept of nobility, directly inherited from the period of the Iberian Reconquest, manifested itself in America in the unbridled hunger for all forms of distinction that symbolised or demonstrated belonging to the nobility. The habits of the military orders or offices of familiars of the Inquisition thus performed an identical function: they were incontrovertible evidence of the incumbent's purity of blood, since they required the presentation of a genealogy, albeit often partly fictitious. Moreover, these honours often entailed exemption from ordinary justice and the right to the *fueros* associated with the titles in question. In the same vein, the generalised use of the titles of *Don* and *Doña* in America also point to this obsession with nobility. The same logic explains the attraction felt by the American elites for the mainly—if not exclusively—honorific local

offices, even though these did not confer nobility on their holder, as was sometimes the case in France. In sum, in Spanish America nobles and hidalgos were all those members of the elite who managed to live in keeping with the model of nobility brought from the metropole and adapted to local reality, which combined ostentation, generous religious legacies and chaplaincies, investment in an urban residence-palace, as well as the purchase of lands, all of it crowned by titles and honours.

The emergence of an American identity

On these Hispanic foundations, a sense of “Americanness” was progressively built, its privileged sphere of expression being the Church from a very early stage. This American identity nourished itself on the disdain with which the peninsulars treated the Creole elite, who were invariably suspected of the taint of “*mestizaje*”, and thus seen as degenerate members of the Spanish “race”. More to the point, the peninsulars were in competition with this native-born elite for the most prestigious royal appointments in the Americas, and thus their disdain was an obstacle to the attainment of honours for the Creoles, a state of affairs that was not mitigated to a significant or lasting extent by the venality of offices and/or titles. It is notable that two-thirds of the titles of nobility granted by the crown in the Americas went to peninsulars who had enriched themselves through their economic activities in the New World (Ladd 1984; Rubial García 2005; Zárate Toscano 2005, 2000). On the other hand, only 5% of the habits of the military orders were granted to American residents. The image of America based on the geographic determinism that was in vogue in Enlightenment Europe—in the works of Buffon, Raynal, and Voltaire among others—only served to reinforce this negative vision of the Ibero-American world.

In response, the Creole elite elaborated a discourse of American distinctiveness, refusing to accept the image of America as a pale, incomplete, or unfinished imitation of Europe, reclaiming the indigenous past as the basis of a new, unique identity. This discourse may be glimpsed in the various forms of expression and representation produced by the colonial elite, but it is within the confines of the ecclesiastical world that it undoubtedly flourished most beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century. From this point onward, the clergy was in the forefront of every dispute with the crown, whether over its progressive assertion of direct control through administrative

reforms culminating in the second half of the eighteenth century, or its perceived disregard for the descendants of those whose deeds had contributed decisively to the territorial expansion of the Catholic monarchy (Lavallé 2014).

There is no doubt that the contrarian role of the Church in America was given added impetus by two decisions, which came late but were of singular importance. The first was the expulsion of the Jesuits (1767), motivated by the Spanish state's desire to exert control over this institution. In many parts of the empire the expulsion led to abrupt "stirrings" ("*emociones*"), such as, for example, those of Michoacán, where the faithful, many of them indigenous, attacked all the symbols of royal power in America within their reach: the offices of the different trade monopolies, or the Spaniards (*Gachupines*) who held posts associated with those monopolies. The consolidation of the *vales reales* (royal bonds) introduced some years later (1804–1805) by a monarchy always looking for ways to cover its debts was seen as an act of plunder whose negative impact, although it affected the Church most directly, was felt by all those who relied on loans issued by the ecclesiastical institutions (through tithes).

Beyond the Church, the feeling of discontent was diffused widely across the colonial societies, giving rise to a series of revolts over the course of the eighteenth century, albeit vastly different in scope and objectives. These uprisings fell into two broad categories (Bertrand et al. 2016, I: 795–800; O'Phelan Godoy 1985; Katz 1990). On the one hand, in common with other predominantly agricultural early modern societies, there were uprisings of the lower social orders—around 90% of the population—in periods of dearth. These popular tumults were characterised by their lack of organisation and leadership, often by their brutality, and in most cases by their brevity. Their immediate cause was invariably the shortage of grain that resulted in sudden and dramatic price rises. These subsistence revolts were the inevitable accompaniment of even modest crises resulting from an unfavourable agricultural conjuncture and affected the rural as well as the urban world. Nevertheless, despite their ubiquity, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century, these periodic upheavals had no political character in the sense of being an attack on the colonial regime itself. They represented no more than the regular breathing rhythms of a social body that was heavily dependent on agricultural production and could not count on sufficient or reliable reserves of food.

These "*emociones*" have little in common with the more organised

rebellions with clearly defined goals, in most cases directed against the reforms imposed by the colonial authorities. These were invariably a form of opposition to the colonial administration and attempts to reinforce its power by increasing the fiscal burden. They represented a vehement defence of “custom” or local autonomy, both of which were perceived to be under threat from the reforms. Although in many cases, such as the great Tupac Amaru rebellion that shook the central Andean region in the 1780s, these revolts attracted widespread popular support, the leadership of these movements invariably came from the colonial “comfortable classes”, usually *mestizos* or Creoles, who lived in the urban centres, and who saw the reformist policies of the metropole as a threat to their own wealth and power. Although independence was not on their agenda until well into the nineteenth century, by clashing with the new colonial system that was taking shape in the second half of the eighteenth century and articulating a nostalgic view of the past as a period of “local freedom”, these social movements prepared the ground for a more radical challenge to the system that was to follow. At the very least they contributed to the construction of a specifically colonial identity contrasted to that of the metropole.

The features of the Hispano-American colonial elite identity

Two principal features stand out as the essential elements of a Spanish American elite identity as distinct from a European Spanish one (Análisis 2000). Common to both was the role of wealth. There was one ineluctable requirement for belonging to the social elite in America: the possession of an estate. Indeed, the first colonial elite in Spanish America were the first to establish themselves as landowners, which was the most easily accessible form of wealth, much more so than the gold for which so many of the conquistadors yearned, and in the pursuit of which so many of them had squandered their lives. These conquistadors were inevitably the first to divide up amongst themselves the vast American expanses, dispossessing the previous owners over whom they had triumphed militarily. But they were not alone. They were soon joined by the *encomenderos*, not all of whom were conquistadores, as well as the representatives of the fledgling imperial administration: viceroys, judges, royal officials, treasurers, urban magistrates, and governors (*corregidores*). By the end of the sixteenth century, the upper class of great landowners in Spanish

America included all the above groups, whose rights over the land were confirmed by a royal decree (*cédula*) of 1591. This process of land appropriation, the legacy of the conquest, had one enduring consequence for Spanish America: from this point onward, and until well into the twentieth century—and to some extent still evident in the twenty-first—the near-conflation of membership of the social elite and landownership. For an American elite whose values had been shaped by the conquest, the ownership of a landed estate was an essential requirement, even though the value of the land as such was never particularly high in the Americas, due to its sheer abundance. In other words, in America unlike in Europe, where since the Middle Ages membership in the social elite was associated primarily with access to luxury products whose value was precisely in their rarity—spices, silks, ambrosia—belonging to the upper social echelons was based on a paradox: the accumulation of something within reach of anyone able to take it by force.

Nevertheless, just as this model of a landowning elite established itself in Spanish America, the great demographic catastrophe among the indigenous populations meant that this model was already becoming less profitable in monetary terms. Thereafter, due to the lack of cheap labour to work the land, and in the absence of large-scale importation of slaves as had been done in Brazil, landownership largely ceased to be financially lucrative, although it retained its symbolic value as the supreme mark of social status and political authority.

Other sources of wealth thenceforth assumed far greater importance in Spanish America. By the end of the sixteenth century, when the colonial miners had mastered the mercury amalgamation process of extracting silver ore, mining was the basis of some of the greatest fortunes from Potosi to Zacatecas, although this was always a precarious form of enterprise (Salazar-Soler and Herrera Canales 2010; Bertrand et al. 2016, I: 795–800). The other great path to riches in the Americas was transatlantic trade, controlled by the great merchant guilds (*consulados*) of Lima and Mexico City (Ponce Leiva and Amadori 2008). Although not without its own risks, the commercial route gradually enabled the accumulation of vast fortunes, especially in the eighteenth century, which became the fulcrum of the economic life of the colonies. These great merchants, the owners of most of the capital, invested their profits in other economic sectors which thereby came under their control: they acted as financial backers of mine owners, in expectation of large returns on their

investment, and purchased land as a means of securing their fortunes, as well as adding a certain social lustre and prestige to which they aspired, in some cases obtaining titles of nobility. As a result, by the eighteenth century the foundations of the family fortunes of the American elite show the tight integration of the different sectors of the colonial economy. In Spanish America, it seems clear that having the resources to live as a noble, a lord of the manor, was key to being perceived as a member of the nobility. The Spanish American nobility thus had an essentially plutocratic dimension.

On the other hand, the very importance given to wealth and estates is a sign of the enduring preoccupation with securing fortunes gained in more venturesome economic sectors. The Spanish American elite was consequently obsessed with safeguarding the transmission of patrimony and to avert the risk of decline, thus giving the lie to the proverb about the supposedly transient nature of American fortunes: “padre comerciante, hijo caballero, nieto pordiosero” (“father a merchant, son a gentleman, grandson a beggar”). To protect their wealth and possessions, the Spanish American elites massively resorted to the *mayorazgo* (entail), a legal means of keeping family fortunes intact. From this standpoint, the true colonial elite were those who over time were capable of overcoming the risks inherent in the conditions of the acquisition and transmission of fortunes in America. The *mayorazgo* was an instrument that reduced the risk associated with the passing of generations, and the equal division of property between heirs envisaged in Spanish law. Yet this solution did little to hinder downward social mobility experienced by the Spanish American elite, most of whom were unable to maintain their high status beyond the second or third generation.

This in turn is closely related to the second distinguishing feature of the colonial elites: their desire for social stability, and adoption of strategies with that overriding goal in mind. Belonging to the world of the colonial elite brought with it a strong sense of social group/class identity. One of its concrete manifestations was the importance accorded to lineage, especially through the transmission of the family name and the manor house associated with it. This omnipresent preoccupation explains the prevalence of endogamy and inbreeding, or the strategic preference for social and ethnic fellows in the choice of marriage partners. It is no surprise then that during the period covered here, marriages of convenience predominate. Moreover, in the eighteenth century, and in order to preserve the purity of blood of their Creole subjects, the Catholic monarchy issued a royal *pragmática*

(edict) in 1776 whose stated objective was “to prevent the abuse of contracting unequal marriages”. The decree expressly reinforced paternal authority, as well as making it easier to obtain marriage dispensations for consanguinity. Thus, while the nuclear family had, ever since the Council of Trent, been enshrined in law as the basic family unit, the extended family was a lived reality. The cohabitation of several generations—up to three or four—under the same roof, or in close proximity, was therefore fairly common among this Spanish American elite. Moreover, this extended unit frequently also included other close relations and dependents—cousins, indirect relatives, and distant kin—many of whom had journeyed from the family’s village or town of origin in Spain to the Americas in order to work in the family business. It also sometimes included poor relations whom one was duty-bound to assist, for instance by providing a dowry that would help them settle down—entering a convent or getting married—and above all by offering protection.

This living arrangement presumed the overall authority of a patriarch—or someone who exercised that function, which could be one of the sons—with a view to ensuring the survival of the kinship group. This extended family unit thus became synonymous with a high degree of coercion, above all associated with the exercise of patriarchal authority. As a consequence, this elite family structure was not free of tensions, violence, and conflict. It was an environment conducive to extramarital relationships that resulted in a relative abundance of illegitimate offspring within this social group. The children born of such unions lived as part of the same family unit, mingling with the rest of the household staff. They frequently appeared in testaments as the recipients of a portion of the family fortune, usually a minor one. But it is precisely when it came to the subdivision of the family patrimony that these tensions and conflicts were most likely to boil over. These virtually endemic disputes represented the main threat to the stability of elite families. This was true to such an extent that in order to contain the destructive effect of such family feuds, the elites developed a number of broad strategies, which followed a number of rules that can be summed up more briefly:

- Forging alliances through the marriage of daughters. It was common in such cases to accept a socially or economically inferior match, especially when the proposed marriage was to an official recently arrived from Spain and of humbler social origins, or a relative from

the *patria chica* (hometown, village, or local region).

- Encouraging the participation of young men in family affairs at an early age, and the preference for contracting marriages with relatives or with other Creole families of comparable social standing.
- Limiting the risk of the dispersion of family property by imposing celibacy or a career in the clergy on younger sons. The latter option also had the advantage of giving access to ecclesiastical sources of credit in the form of pious bequests and tithes.
- The inclusion of illegitimate sons in the family “business”.
- The systematic resort to godfatherhood (*padrinazgo*), either by seeking the protection of the more powerful or wealthy, or the latter using it to forge ties with those below.

The colonial elites of Spanish America were the product of all these strategies and practices: they were constituted by a dense network of social relations that combined different kinds of ties: marriage, godfatherhood, clientelism, friendship, and shared economic interests, all of which combined resulted in the formation of complex “social relational networks”. The significant thing about these systems of relations was that while they were naturally entrenched in the urban spaces where the main family group resided, they also extended far beyond these limits. They might cover the local region, but they often extended across the entire viceroyalty, or even the empire, if they were able to take advantage of its institutional framework. The social life of the colonial elites was thus structured around great relational networks, which were engaged in a struggle for power and wealth at the local, regional, and imperial level. Each relational network that structured the world of the colonial elites strove to attract the recent arrivals who had something to offer: newly disembarked officials who could open the doors of the colonial bureaucracy, a successful merchant on the make ... Thus, the system was able to keep regenerating itself thanks to the controlled assimilation of new members. From this perspective, what stands out is the proximity—both in terms of identity and interests—between the two components of the Spanish American elites (Bertrand 2007).

Notes

¹This chapter has two different sections. The first section (Social change in the Iberian world: Iberian peninsula and Brazil)—authored by Fernanda Olival—identifies the major societal changes that occurred in the Iberian peninsula and

Brazil during the eighteenth century through a comparative approach. The second section (The eighteenth-century colonial elites: between Iberian identity and American aspirations)—authored by Michel Bertrand—is devoted to the formation of colonial identities across eighteenth-century Spanish America. ²Research work carried out within the scope of PTDC/HIS-HIS/118227/2010 and UID/HIS/00057/2019(POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007702), FCT/Portugal, COMPETE, FEDER, Portugal 2020.

Abbreviation

ASV

Arquivo Segreto Vaticano



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

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Decades	Amazon		Bahia		Pernambuco		Rio and Southeast		Brazil unspecified		Total
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	
1701-1710	1,072	0.7	60,798	38.9	52,861	33.8	41,609	26.6	105	0.1	156,445
1711-1720	1,041	0.6	81,257	45.5	40,060	22.4	55,360	31.0	892	0.5	178,650
1721-1730	600	0.3	91,074	49.4	38,714	21.0	51,207	27.8	2,785	1.5	184,380
1731-1740	669	0.4	91,494	50.6	23,176	12.8	64,017	35.4	1,491	0.8	180,847
1741-1750	799	0.4	91,322	47.7	29,427	15.4	69,268	36.2	714	0.4	191,530
1751-1760	5,559	2.9	74,749	38.8	30,207	15.7	81,391	42.2	880	0.5	192,786
1761-1770	12,144	6.3	66,645	34.7	28,166	14.7	84,673	44.1	351	0.2	191,979
1771-1780	13,547	7.0	78,639	40.6	21,799	11.3	79,410	41.0	188	0.1	193,583
1781-1790	17,540	7.4	82,622	34.9	27,256	11.5	109,660	46.3	0	0.0	237,078
1791-1800	18,767	6.7	97,204	34.5	37,730	13.4	119,965	42.6	8,074	2.9	281,740
Total	71,738	3.6	815,904	41.0	329,336	16.6	756,560	38.0	15,480	0.8	1,989,018





CHAPTER TWENTY eight

New imperial economies



Regina Grafe and Jorge M. Pedreira

Introduction

In this chapter we aim to offer an integrated view of the Iberian imperial economies of the 18th century. The picture is still far from clear and few if any historians have tried to interrogate developments

in Hispanophone and Lusophone America in close comparison and also within their peninsular context. The sheer size would seem to advise against such an attempt. Indeed, there are few survey texts that have even tried to depict eighteenth-century Spanish America, Brazil, peninsular Spain or Portugal on their own from an economic perspective (Bulmer-Thomas, Coatsworth, and Cortés Conde 2008). Yet, we will argue that such an integrated view offers a new perspective and brings common trends and substantial divergences into sharper relief.

The structure of this chapter will be thematic seeking to make developments in the Lusophone and the Hispanophone worlds speak directly to one another. We will begin with a short introduction to the peninsular economies. In the second section we will cross the Atlantic looking at the trading regimes that linked the Americas and the peninsula, and then turn to the sectors of production in the third section. The fourth section asks how the relationship between market and states developed.

The peninsular economy

For historians of Spain and Spanish America the year 1700 has always been irresistible as an historical watershed. The physical and intellectual frailness of the last Habsburg, Charles II *el Hechizado*, seemed to embody in cruel fashion the alleged decadence of the Spanish Empire. His demise was anticipated by Europe's other powers by schemes that in the name of balance of power planned the dismemberment of the Spains in Europe and the Americas. Charles' death in 1700 and the War of Spanish Succession (1705–1714), which pitched France and most of Castile against England, Austria, the Netherlands, Portugal, and most of Aragon, appeared to be a predictable fight over the spoils of the implosion of a dysfunctional polity with an economy in deep crisis.

In the event, neither French, Dutch, English, Austrian, nor Portuguese diplomatic and military endeavours yielded particularly important gains. Under a new Bourbon dynasty that had been anathema to Anglo-Dutch-Austrian-Portuguese plans, Castile and Aragon remained united in spite of the painful civil war that accompanied the international conflagration. The Italian territories were lost to the Spains (as contemporaries called them) temporarily but recovered in due course. The Southern Netherlands became

Austrian. Yet, most important the Spanish transatlantic empire remained fundamentally intact, and much to the dislike of the French the Spanish Bourbons turned out to be more Spanish than Bourbons.

Economic historians have insisted that 1700 marked a new era for two partially contradictory reasons in both the peninsula and the Americas. The first argument sees the reforms initiated by the Bourbon rulers of the eighteenth-century Spains as an initially slow, but eventually fundamental break with the economic governance of the imperial and peninsular economies. The second cites the rules established in the peace treaty of Utrecht as a deep intrusion of non-Hispanic economic actors into the Hispanic imperial realm benefiting especially French and English mercantile interests while constraining the room for reform within Spanish governance. Much of the historiography on the economy of the eighteenth-century Spanish empire is written with the tension between those two developments as guiding principles.

Similarly, the turn of the century has long been seen as a landmark for the economic history of Portugal and her empire. There are some specific reasons, such as the inauguration of what has been known as the “gold cycle”, after the discovery of large deposits in Brazil in 1693, but also reasons that have to do with the international order, namely with the choice of allies in the context of the War of Spanish Succession, and the signing of the notorious Methuen Treaty (1703). The treaty, in promoting the exchange of Portuguese wines for English woollens, allegedly established a new pattern of international trade of ponderous consequences for the long-term economic development of Portugal, which the reforms implemented after mid-century by the marquis of Pombal are supposed to have reversed.

Just like the Pombaline Reforms, the Bourbon Reforms are a contentious topic from the point of view of intellectual history. In this chapter, however, the focus is on the economy itself. An earlier historiography stressed the reform projects during the reigns of José I (1750–1777), in Portugal, and Carlos III (1759–1788), in Spain, as fundamental ruptures, while little progress was supposed to have occurred before. More recently a new consensus is emerging among scholars, which suggests that in Spain several phases of reforms begun in the late 1710s were instrumental in paving the way for the deeper transformations of the later years (Kuethe and Andrien 2014, 12–26). In many ways one could date the start of reforms even earlier. The ministers of the much-maligned last Spanish Habsburg had created the basis for a sounder peninsular economy by stabilising the monetary

system and the fiscal system in the 1680s (Grafe 2012).

At the same time, in Portugal, the count of Ericeira, minister of Pedro II, also adopted monetary and fiscal reforms and promoted import-substitution in the industrial sector. However, this proved to be a short-lived program, due to changing economic and political circumstances, in particular easier access to precious metals in America and the renewal of the English alliance as a means of fending off the Spanish threat to national sovereignty, which tightened bilateral trading relations in the terms defined by the Methuen Treaty and opened the Portuguese market to British textiles (Macedo 1963; Pedreira 1994). Even so, new measures sponsoring the setting up of large industrial units were again adopted in the 1720s and 1730s, although these were even more ephemeral and inconsequential initiatives (Macedo 1963; Madureira and Matos 2004; Pedreira 2004).

Meanwhile Spain entered the eighteenth century with the burdens of international and civil war still fresh but a first set of economic reforms in place. Economic production *per capita*, which had declined in the first half of the seventeenth century and stagnated in the second, expanded in the eighteenth century (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013). Reformers set to simplify the political map of Spain, unify fiscal systems, and support trade and industry. Their success was mixed. Even though some Spanish historic territories, notably those of the crown of Aragon, lost much of their political independence and tax regimes were changed, their economic and fiscal regulation remained separate. Major projects to rationalise the myriad of local and regional trade and consumption taxes that bedevilled the domestic market came to little. But the administration of the public purse was notably improved. After a reorganisation of the public debt in the 1730s and until the wars of the last decades of the eighteenth century the Madrid treasury's situation was stable. It owed its newly won stability to its low indebtedness by European standards, a peninsular economy where capital chased investment opportunities and where therefore the interest rates for the public debt were low, and to its ability to expand taxation in the metropolis (Grafe 2012).

In Portugal, recent research has suggested that, after a slight but long decline during the second half of the seventeenth century, the economy entered a phase of "strong intensive growth", the most significant in the early-modern age, which lasted until the mid-eighteenth century (Palma and Reis 2016). As in Spain, the financial condition of the state improved substantially, but in Portugal the

improvement was due to a large growth of receipts coming mainly from taxes on the extraction and transportation of Brazilian gold and from the rents of crown monopolies. In the aftermath of the War of Spanish Succession, the adoption of a strategy of strict neutrality in European affairs helped to keep military expenditure under control. King João V could thus afford the reduction of public debt through the redemption of *padrões de juro real* (treasury bonds) in 1743, in an amount nearly equivalent to the annual revenue of the crown (Azevedo 1929; Silva 2004). However, indications are that prosperity resulted more from structural change and the dynamics of the economy itself, and especially from the spread of maize cultivation, the growth of wine production and export, and the profitability of the empire, than from easier financial circumstances (although these were also related to the empire). During this period, the Portuguese economy seems to have been able, albeit temporarily, to escape the Malthusian trap, experiencing consistent rates of growth of both income and population (Costa, Palma, and Reis 2015; Palma and Reis 2016).

That is not to say that all was well in the peninsular economy of the eighteenth century. Demographic expansion started by the second half of the century to put pressure on food prices. Inequality increased, bad harvests still caused local and regional famines, and infant mortality remained painfully high in comparison to the rest of Western Europe (Abarca Abarca 2015). The growth of the economy was sluggish by the standards of Europe's most dynamic societies, Britain, and the Netherlands. In northwestern Europe a mixture of the availability of new consumer goods from Asia and America and more diversified domestic production brought about an "industrious revolution" (de Vries 2008) that integrated global and European markets. People worked longer hours so that they could join the consumer revolution of the eighteenth century, drink their tea or coffee from a Chinese (imitation) cup, and put on cheap but fashionable cottons.

Iberia by contrast experienced at best a "consumer evolution", new products were introduced more slowly, and most important domestic markets remained poorly integrated (Llopis, Yun Casalilla, and Torras Elías 2003). Even though there are some indications of a growth in the number of working days per year and a more intensive use of labour in agriculture, at least in certain sectors and regions—one of the dimensions of the "industrious revolution"—this was not enough to prevent falling real wages and the corresponding degradation of living

standards in the second half of the century, particularly after the 1760s.

In both Spain and Portugal, there is a lively debate about the origins of this relative economic underperformance or backwardness, as it is frequently labelled. Some see the reasons mostly in a domestic political economy that protected urban and territorial interests. That was good for political and social stability but limited economic development (Grafe 2012, 2014). Others blame the inability of a largely stagnant agricultural sector to adopt new techniques, raise productivity, and in this way make a positive contribution to growth. Others still point to the strictures imposed on the peninsular political economy by their integration into the international political order, and especially by the Methuen Treaty, in the case of Portugal, and the peace treaty of Utrecht in 1713, in the case of Spain (Pérez Sarrión 2016). Commercial privileges conceded to France, the northern Netherlands, and particularly England were said to have thrown the peninsular market open to foreign merchants, who benefited from exemptions from customs and regulation, and so reaped the best part of the gains from international trade.

Even more fundamental was the question of the role the legal framework would play in the development of the transatlantic economy and the domestic economy of Spanish America over the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century Spanish political economists were convinced that peninsular Spain failed to take full economic advantage of its American territories. Quantitative modern economic historians tend to agree. A recent attempt to estimate the benefit that common labourers in European imperial metropolises realised from their countries' colonies offers strikingly large returns for Portugal and later eighteenth-century Britain, as well as important ones for the Netherlands. For Spain, however, the numbers are meagre (Costa, Palma, and Reis 2015). Did the Spanish Empire let the economic spoils of empire slip away, where Portugal succeeded at reaping them?

Already in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the empire had made a larger contribution to the revenue of the Portuguese Crown than to the treasuries of the other imperial powers. Even in the heyday of the arrivals of precious metals in Seville, returns from the empire and intercontinental trade weighed proportionately more on the income of the Portuguese monarchy (Pedreira 2007). Thanks to overseas resources and particularly to the taxes levied on Brazilian gold, Portugal was probably one of the European countries with

higher state receipts *per capita* in the first half of the eighteenth century, and the economic weight of the empire kept growing until the turn of century (Silva 2004). At that time, according to recent estimates, almost one-fourth of the real wage of a Lisbon skilled worker could be accredited to the proceeds of colonial trade (Costa, Palma, and Reis 2015). Even if the combined impact of late century inflation and declining real wages may overstate the actual economic effect of that share, it is undoubtedly a most relevant contribution in absolute and especially in relative terms, when compared with the other colonial powers, particularly Spain.

When accounting for the remarkable divergent effects of empire on the Iberian economies, the disproportionate dimension of the empire relative to the mother country would seem to be an obvious explanation. But in fact, in terms of population Spanish America outstripped the metropolis while Brazil was still smaller than Portugal. Gold shipments from Brazil, which represented more than half of world flows, immediately spring to mind as another major factor. But in the calculation of the benefits of the empire, they are supposed to have played a secondary role, although the indirect effects of the continued growth of money supply and the corresponding injection of liquidity into the economy are difficult to compute. How were they distributed in both social and geographical terms, and did they stimulate consumption and foster capital formation, or did they cause a kind of “Dutch disease” (Costa, Lains, and Miranda 2016, Drelichman 2005, 199), harming the economy because of the effect of exchange rates on relative costs? More than any other economic effect, in Portugal the development of intercontinental trade and the exploitation of other opportunities emerging in the overseas dominions were the driving force behind the economic contribution of the empire (Costa, Palma, and Reis 2015). They could not, however, prevent the reversal of economic fortunes that set in in the second half of the century.

Given the outsized impact of empire in Portugal, the economic crisis after the 1760s has equally been explained by the decrease in gold remittances. But gold arrivals show the decline actually begins in the 1750s, even if it only becomes critical after the 1770s. The reduction of money supply was both limited and temporary. Still international trade contracted, in particular British textile imports, which in the aftermath of the Seven Years War moved away from European markets and found growing opportunities in the British American colonies (Costa, Lains, and Miranda 2016; Costa 2013;

Cuenca Esteban 2004, 193–210).

Another explanation comes from the losses incurred in the big Lisbon earthquake and fire of 1755, when most of the city was destroyed and probably more than 15,000 people lost their lives. Losses might have reached as much as 48% of the GDP, according to the more informed guesstimates, but apparently the economy responded quickly to that shock (Pereira 2009; Serrão 2007). However large, such costs cannot account for the difficulties in traditional agriculture, where familiar subsistence crises occurred in the 1760s. As in neighbouring Spain, the structural changes introduced in the sector were not enough to escape the Malthusian trap in a sustainable way, but the reasons for this reversal are still far from full elucidation. In Portugal, evidence for the exhaustion of the effects of an earlier structural transformation is far from obvious. For wine, both production and export show an impressive growth in the second half of the century, and even for maize, the few available data do not support the notion of a major setback.

All in all, the benefit derived from empire by the peninsular economy as a whole was always much more limited in Spain, notwithstanding the spectacular gains made by some individuals and in a few regions, such as Catalonia, in the eighteenth century. In Portugal the development of the economic ventures most closely associated with the empire could not offset the recurring difficulties of the more traditional sectors, which were still providing employment and sustenance for the majority of the population. Urbanisation did not advance, holding up structural changes and the move of resources to more productive endeavours. Hit by the regression of Lisbon, Portuguese urbanisation endured a slight decline, just as general demographic growth became stronger. It seems that the renewed vigour on the imperial front, which was remarkable in the last decade of the eighteenth century, could not prevent the relative degradation of real wages and the standard of living. It is not surprising, then, that the contribution of the empire, however impressive it may have been, could not help Portugal escaping from the wrong side in the process of the so-called “little divergence” which was then widening the gap that set apart the more progressive powers (Great-Britain and the Netherlands) from other European countries.

Intercontinental trade

Early modern European long-distance trade was an important source of revenue and practically everywhere strongly regulated by states, cities, and/or guilds. This was even more the case for European colonial intercontinental trade. All European Empires strove to enforce an effective “colonial exclusive” that reserved the right to participate in colonial trade to its subjects and resulting customs and taxes to its treasury. In Portugal and Spain, the discussion on this issue has clustered around the extent to which foreign merchants (mostly British in Portugal, French, Dutch, and British in Spain) diverted the benefits of that trade to their own profit (Novais 1983; Ricupero 2016).

Provisions had long been approved outlawing direct communication between colonies and foreign nations, whose vassals were banned from living in the overseas dominions and taking part in their trade. Time and again, the Portuguese monarchy and her agents expressly asserted the right to establish exclusive access to the territories and routes that had been conquered or discovered under her banner. Spanish commentators regularly blamed Spanish merchants who were entitled to trade to Spanish America for acting as *testaferros* (frontmen) for northern European business partners. The enforcement of exclusion lay beyond the capability of the administration (making contraband endemic to both systems). Furthermore, for lack of capital or expertise, rulers often admitted foreigners in their service and even encouraged their participation in trade under franchise. The seeming paradox consisting in the construction of a system that aimed at securing privileged rights on certain resources for the vassals of a state, but that could only be constructed with the collaboration of those that it meant to exclude, is an integral part to the making of early-modern Iberian empires.

As Philip V became King of Spain, transatlantic trade between Spain and the Indies was still regulated within the framework of the *Carrera de Indias* while Mexico and the Philippines were connected via the Manila Galleon. The set of regulations is often referred to as “a monopoly [operating] out of the port of Seville under the supervision of the *Casa de Contratacion*” (Kuethe and Andrien 2014, 39). Yet, from the point of view of economic theory, it was never a monopoly (Baskes 2013; Grafe 2012). Contemporaries distinguished the *carrera* clearly from proper monopolies (*estancos*), such as those that governed mercury production or the tobacco trade (Uztáriz 1757). Instead, the system combined a traditional “staple”, that is a requirement to take goods to or from a specific port (e.g., Seville/Cadiz, Veracruz,

Cartagena), with merchant guilds (the *consulados*) that managed licences for trade and adjudicated disputes and protected compulsory fleets (the *flotas y galeones*). Within the guilds, merchants competed on their own account in contrast to what had become the norm in the Dutch and English East India monopoly companies.

The confusion with regard to the conceptual history of the *Carrera* has led to a paradoxical assessment of its history in the eighteenth century. On the one hand, historians have focused on the apparent question why so much of the transatlantic trade ended up in the hands of foreigners rather than in the hands of the merchants of the *consulados*, that is why the supposed monopoly never functioned as a colonial exclusive. On the other, the history of the regulation of Spain's intercontinental trade has been written as a story of starts and stops of the abolition of a supposed monopoly culminating in the conveniently termed Free Trade (*comercio libre*) of 1765/78. But *comercio libre* was as little free trade as the *carrera* had been a monopoly.

Intercontinental trade in the eighteenth century saw nevertheless the same tensions between reform and stasis that would characterise most areas of economic activity. The most important legal commercial concession the English extracted at Utrecht was the right to supply Spanish America for 40 years with enslaved Africans under the so-called *Asiento* and a specified amount of trade goods. At the same time the French and Dutch received guarantees that certain rights offered to their merchants in the peninsula that had long since existed, such as consular representation, would be upheld facilitating their trade at Seville and Cadiz after the transfer of the staple to the latter port which began in 1717.

Kueth and Andrien (2014) and Stein and Stein (2000) have argued that these privileges undermined any mercantilist strategy the Spanish Empire could have pursued, while at the same time making a reform of the existing commercial system organised around the New Spain *flotas* and Cartagena *galeones* impossible. In that view the famous *Proyecto para Galeones y Flotas del Perú y Nueva España y para navíos de registro* that sought to reorganise the system in 1720 in the face of widespread smuggling especially in the Pacific was merely a "capitulation" in the face of foreign interests, who re-imposed an "archaic commercial system" (Kueth and Andrien 2014, 64–67) on a Spain that would have liked to reform. Others point to the ongoing reforms in a system that was no monopoly to start with. Also, the English South Sea Company had scant commercial success with its

slave ventures while other privileges confirmed in the 1710s merely reaffirmed what had long been practice.

The *Proyecto* also regulated the already existing single ships, so-called *registros sueltos*, which could be sent to a larger number of ports. Over the next four decades the fleets were regularly cancelled, for example during the War of Jenkin's Ear (1739–1748) and register ships became the norm. As an unintended consequence of that deregulation, much deeper transatlantic commercial networks emerged that persisted even when fleets were partially reintroduced in 1757 (Lamikiz 2010). The introduction of *correos*, packet boats with news sailing from A Coruña to Havanna once a month, reinforced this tendency after 1764. In 1765, nine peninsular ports were included in the staple and allowed to trade directly with the Spanish Caribbean. In 1778, the famous “free trade” decree de facto all but abolished the staple restrictions by extending them to four more ports in the peninsula (the Basque Country remained outside) and 27 in the Americas. It also formally ended the fleet system.

Even after the staple was relaxed, however, Cadiz retained about four-fifths of the trade until a British naval blockade shut down its port in 1797. Over the eighteenth century the initial concentration of the staple right had been increasingly widened, calling into question the notion of a sudden policy shift in the 1760s and 1770s. Changes introduced in 1739 had fundamentally transformed the flow of information across the Atlantic and in so doing created a wider and more connected Atlantic. Between 1757 and 1788 less than 15% of trade was conducted by the fleet system, the rest travelled in single ships (Lamikiz 2007, 258). Yet, traders still preferred Cadiz and insurance businesses that sprang up and failed in Cadiz in the wake of the deregulation. This suggests that agglomeration of business and the fleet system had indeed fulfilled an economic purpose. Rather than just enriching guild merchants, they had reduced uncertainty (Baskes 2013).

Somewhat ironically as part of the attempt to reform Spanish transatlantic trade, monopolies proper were introduced. The first successful Hispanic chartered monopoly company was created in 1728 as a joint stock company at the behest of Basque merchants. The *Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas* had a regional monopoly on the expanding trade of cocoa from Venezuela. Unlike the Dutch West India Company active in the nearby Dutch colonies, the company did not control production or introduce a full plantation complex. But its existence, just as the later creation of the Havana and Philippine

Companies, is one indicator that joint stock companies could be created within the legal and regulatory framework without major obstacles. And in the case of the Caracas Company they were commercially successful for decades (Gárate Ojanguren 1990).

The Company was in many ways emblematic for the challenges in transatlantic trade. One was to create a response to the rapidly expanding regional economies outside the old centres in Peru and New Spain, such as the Rio de la Plata and Venezuela, and a rapidly diversifying Spanish American productive sector. A second was to respond to the proliferation of Dutch, English, and French privateering/smuggling in kind; the Company had an express remit to prey on non-Spanish shipping and did so with some success especially in its early years. Finally, the diversification of agricultural production on the northern mainland mirrored changes in New Spain and elsewhere.

The transformation of agriculture in Spanish America went hand in hand first slowly, and then very quickly, especially in the Caribbean, with much greater reliance on slave labour. Slave trade was nothing new in the Spanish Atlantic of course, but Spanish merchants' direct involvement was limited before the 1790s. The Caracas Company for example never undertook slaving journeys to Africa. Instead, increased slave trade also meant increased inter-imperial trade offering new intra-American ways to undermine any idea of a colonial exclusive. The Company contracted with British and Dutch slavers and bought slaves in the intra-Caribbean networks. Slave arrivals to Venezuela had begun to accelerate in the second half of the seventeenth century and they increased further under the leadership of the Caracas Company. But they tripled again after the slave trade was de-regulated after 1789 as part of the "free trade" reforms and coinciding with a diversification of production from cocoa to tobacco, sugar, and cotton (Borucki 2012). As in other trades deregulation met with an already expanding market. But in the trade in humans it also led to a very pronounced increase in inter-imperial trade for slaves and foodstuffs.

Venezuela was an exception insofar as the commercial expansion took place in the context of increasing regulation. Elsewhere the slow but ultimately steady deregulation of Spanish Atlantic trade over the eighteenth century interacted with the Spanish regional economies and coincided in complex ways with the expansion of the domestic economy and with merchants' strategies. In Mexico new opportunities attracted creole investors who diversified from trade into investments

in agriculture and mining towards the end of the century. In the River Plate merchants became large landowners. In Peru the business of governance was the diversification strategy of choice as well as investments into the northern slave plantations (Mazzeo 1994).

In Portugal the protection of exclusive trading rights and fiscal prerogatives relied less on the single port regime, and more on the organised fleets, the *Carreira da Índia* for the East and the Brazilian convoys. Lisbon still held a virtual monopoly on shipping over the Cape Route and came to dominate connections with Brazil. It benefited from more centralised communications in the age of gold transportation, but the fleet regime had first been established in 1649 as a way of protecting navigation in the Atlantic against Dutch privateering. Then the organisation was entrusted to a chartered company, which soon lost its monopolistic benefits and in 1663 became incorporated into the crown. The reformed administration board kept the responsibility over the convoys which were retained even after Portugal was at peace.

By 1720, however, after decades of underfinanced operation, the company had accumulated huge liabilities and king João V opted for its closure and handed the fleets logistics over to the crown general stores (Costa 2002; Costa 2013). Financially, it was necessary to pull the resources together to fund not only the regular operation of the convoys, but also the repayment of the outstanding debts. In times of increasing gold shipments, it seemed natural that a duty of 1% be collected on the value of gold loaded onto the fleets. Convoys escorted by warships and carrying safe boxes where gold was stored during the voyage were the most secure means of sending gold to Lisbon. The costs of protection and transportation justified the duty (Costa 2013).

The fleets worked as a kind of insurance for gold transportation. Their advantage was not so obvious for general trade. As in Spain, individual ships (*navios soltos*) were often allowed to sail. The collection of taxes on the commodities they carried was farmed-out in the major port cities of Brazil, which shows its importance and regularity. But the crown tried to tighten the regulation of trade and in 1740 revoked the licenses, forcing ships to join the fleets. That decision had been heralded, between the beginning of the century and 1761, by two dozen measures intended to fight the admission of foreign vessels in Brazilian ports under the pretext of needing urgent repairs or food and water supplies. They imposed severe penalties for those who engaged in trade with foreign crews and for permissive officials who let them do it. Over and above illegal trade, the

authorities were concerned with gold smuggling. The recurrence of similar decisions shows the crown's determination in fighting the intrusion of foreigners but at the same time its relative ineffectiveness. As long as Portuguese shipping was almost absent from foreign trade, re-exports, mainly British textiles, accounted for more than two-thirds of the cargoes dispatched to Brazil it could hardly have been otherwise (Costa, Lains, and Miranda 2016; Pinto 1979; Sideri 1970).

Inter-colonial commerce and transatlantic slave trade also offered chances of circumventing the exclusive rights of Portuguese vassals. After the 1660s, the *Carreira da Índia* was kept alive through the Brazilian connection, but the crown still vacillated over the attitude it should take towards that relationship (Antony 2013; Cunha 2006; Lapa 1968). Outgoing ships stopped at Bahia to load tobacco under a royal monopoly that produced an important rent for the *Estado da Índia*, despite persistent complaints against extensive contraband. Closer inspection procedures, to fight tobacco and gold smuggling, made stops less frequent. From 1710 to 1750, only half a dozen *naus* called at Bahia on their way to the East, the same number as in Rio de Janeiro.

As for the return voyage, in 1694 permission was given to ships coming from the East to call at Bahia, and later at Rio de Janeiro as well, although some restrictions would afterwards apply. Galleons unloaded Asian goods in Brazilian ports, especially Indian cotton clothes, before they sailed to Lisbon. Those goods were sold on the local market but could also be used to feed the slave trade in Africa and contraband in the Rio de la Plata (an important source for silver) based on the Portuguese outpost of *Colônia do Sacramento*. Sometimes ships returning from Asia also made a detour to Mozambique or Angola where Indian clothes were exchanged for slaves that were then taken to Brazil, although legal limitations applied to the number that could be carried aboard the *Carreira* ships.

Asian trade was conducted to a large extent by officials and crewmembers. Their *liberdades* meant they had the right to load merchandise exempt from freight and taxes on the royal ships. Lack of capital for the Asian trade meant that most operated on behalf of East Indian merchants. In Brazil, more and more traders refused to accept as payment for the Asian goods anything other than gold or at most bills of exchange drawn on Lisbon merchants, who seem to have also engaged in that business through their agents in Bahia as a way to evade heavier taxes collected in Lisbon (Cunha 2006). Yet this branch of inter-colonial connections, because of the number of ships and

values involved, could have hardly menaced the colonial exclusive.

Slave trade was another story. Unlike Spain, Portugal was a leading direct participant in the trade. After the discovery of gold deposits, the price of slaves in Brazil stimulated the return of Luso-Brazilians to the *Costa da Mina* (Gold Coast), particularly on the route between Bahia and the Bight of Benin. Even though the pre-eminence of Brazilian-based traders may have been overstated in some historiography (Alencastro 2000; Florentino 1995), and recent research has suggested the significance of metropolitan capital participation (Menz 2013; Miller 1988), most of the traffic operated on the direct transatlantic connections, both to Angola and the Gold Coast. In contrast to Angola, Luso-Brazilian slavers in Benin could not count on a firm territorial foothold and so had to deal with rival traffickers (Dutch, British, and also French).

The secret of their success lay first in the fact that they accepted to play second fiddle to other merchants, from whom they bought slaves and European and Asian goods (mainly textiles) that could in turn be traded for slaves or smuggled to Brazil. Second, they benefited from accessible means of exchange—tobacco and gold (and also manioc)—that were used to settle transactions with both Africans and Europeans. Inferior tobacco was a cheap means of payment accepted by most African dealers in return for slaves. European traders, in turn, only accepted the finer varieties. Similarly, gold smuggled out of Brazil was used to pay for a substantial number of the slaves, and for goods purchased from the other European slavers (Lopes and Menz 2008).

Figure 28.1 Slave trade in Brazil (1700–1800)

Source: Transatlantic Slave Trade Database Estimates (20 December 2018). Number of disembarked slaves

The slave trade on the *Costa da Mina* stood in clear opposition to the rules of the colonial exclusive, but the authorities never seemed really committed to force a change even if they tried to limit to 24 the number of ships allowed each year to depart from Bahia. They could not suppress contraband and tax evasion, which were inevitable consequences of commercial operations that, although illegal, ultimately ensured the supply of labour to Brazil during the golden age.

Lack of commitment is something the marquis of Pombal could hardly have been accused of when it came to the protection of exclusive trading rights and the improvement of tax collection

capacity. While in government, he strove to break the system of commerce and credit which had enabled the English stranglehold on Portugal's trade. A system that, prohibitions notwithstanding, had let them drain a significant part of Brazilian gold, carried aboard navy ships or the Falmouth packet boats. His aim has been aptly described as "the nationalization of the Luso-Brazilian economy" (Maxwell 1968).

Pombal tried to tighten the bonds between colony and mother country. In 1750 boards of inspection were instituted in major Brazilian port towns to promote and control production and the export of sugar and tobacco (later local authorities were instructed to encourage other productions). In his attempt to strengthen the colonial system, Pombal would then resort to a familiar mercantilist tool, one that in Portugal had never met with significant success, i.e. the institution of chartered monopolistic companies. The first one of his age still suffered from the chronic problems of undercapitalisation and poor management. Established in 1753, it counted on special privileges on trade over the Cape route but could not withstand the losses incurred in the Lisbon earthquake and went bankrupt in a just a few years (Miranda 2007).

Problems did not deter other initiatives, as two companies were set up to develop trade and agriculture in North-eastern Brazil. Established in 1755 (for Pará and Maranhão) and 1759 (for Pernambuco and Paraíba) they were granted the monopoly of trade for these regions both with the metropolis and with the African coast. They were supposed to supply basic foodstuffs, manufactures, and slave labour, and to ensure the exports of traditional staples (sugar, hides, cocoa) and the promotion of alternative crops (tobacco, rice and especially cotton). As opposed to the *Companhia de Caracas* there was some room for participation of local interests. Resident management was recruited in the region, and local merchants and producers could transport merchandise on their own account in the companies' ships provided they paid for freight and insurance. Pulling capital together in a "powerful corporation" was a way of releasing intercontinental trade from the credit scheme on which English merchants had built their domination as the letter which conveyed the news of the creation of the *Companhia de Pernambuco e Paraíba* to the local authorities labelled it (Júnior 1950). Monopoly gave the Portuguese some leverage when dealing with their foreign counterparts.

Yet, the companies favoured first and foremost a small group of big

businessmen closely associated with the crown. They fostered the commerce of Northeast Brazil and launched new crops that would soon grow into very important staples (primarily cotton). They overcame the strains inherent in transatlantic trade and became solid corporations that managed to distribute valuable dividends to their associates. However, given the political resistance they had met in both Portugal and Brazil, they could not survive the king's death and Pombal's prompt resignation. Even so, because of the large sums they held in credit (mostly in Brazil), their liquidation was a very protracted procedure (Carreira 1983; Dias 2004, 1970; Menz 2013; Ribeiro Junior 2005).

Pombal trusted instruments such as monopolies and the ascriptive allocation of resources, but he was no orthodox mercantilist doctrinaire (Cardoso and Cunha 2012; Dias 1984). When circumstances so demanded, he took a different path. For instance, as a way of encouraging exchange with Angola, trade was declared free for all vassals in 1758. Three years later, a royal order determined that ships of the *Carreira da Índia* on their return voyage call on Luanda where the merchandise they carried could be traded. That instruction was then revoked in 1772 because apparently the Indian cotton textiles unloaded at Luanda were being re-exported to Brazil rather than exchanged for slaves, which was the original reason for ordering the stop. That reveals Pombal's pragmatist disposition, which also shows in his decisions about the fleet regime. After having tried to strengthen it, he opted to suppress it in 1765. The idea was to remove obstacles that hindered more frequent communication with Rio de Janeiro or Bahia and to speed up the rotation of merchandise and capital (Silva 1984).

Political change after Pombal's downfall did not spell any new trend towards deregulation, contrary to what the companies' suppression might suggest. Government even tried to approve a stricter "Colonial Pact", based on the division of labour between metropolis and colony. In 1785, a law banned manufacture in Brazil and many workshops were consequently shut down (Novais 1966). Nevertheless, trade regulation reforms introduced by Pombal and his followers met with only partial success. Effects cannot be completely disentangled from other concurrent circumstances, such as the great Lisbon earthquake, the Seven Years War, and declining *private* gold remittances from Brazil which might have helped to alienate British interest in Portugal trade. In the end, control over intercontinental trade was largely won back by transatlantic merchant networks

operating under a Portuguese banner, which concentrated on business chances in which they enjoyed substantial institutional advantages. As to foreign trade and shipping (including re-exports of colonial produce), it remained in the hands of European merchants and their agents in Lisbon and Porto, amongst whom the British still enjoyed a privileged position (Fisher 1971, 1981; Pedreira 1995).

In the late eighteenth century, Portuguese *entrepôt* trade (Daudin 2006) benefited from changing international circumstances. During the War of American Independence, Lisbon regained, albeit momentarily, its long-lost role as a centre for redistribution of Asian merchandise in Europe. The number of ships coming from the East grew from two or three a year, to eight, ten or almost 20 in 1784 (Godinho 1990; Lopes, Frutuoso, and Guinote 1992; Pinto 2003). At the same time, some private vessels were outfitted in Lisbon and allowed to sail to Surat (MacPherson 1812). To be sure, the largest share of the cargoes belonged to merchants of the contending nations who sought refuge under the Portuguese neutral flag and the input of Portuguese capital was modest, as compared to British and Asian participation. But some returns from this trade accrued to Lisbon's port economy.

Then came the French Revolutionary Wars, which completely disrupted communication in the Atlantic, especially in the French, Dutch, and Spanish empires, to the great benefit of Portuguese carrying trade. Exports of Brazilian produce through Lisbon and Porto, which had been on the rise at least since the 1770s, experienced a period of intensive growth, taking advantage of diminished competition and higher prices. At the turn of the nineteenth century, despite the uncertainties of a volatile international situation, Luso-Brazilian intercontinental trade was thriving, supplying cotton to Great-Britain and France, sugar, tobacco, hides, and also rice, cacao, and coffee to Northwestern and Mediterranean Europe (Andrade Arruda 1980; Pedreira 1994, Pedreira 2000).

The expansion of the exporting economy in Brazil was probably met by a parallel increase in contraband, but this did not call the colonial system into question, until the same problems that had beset other colonial powers finally hit hard on the Portuguese empire (Pedreira 2001, 2006, Pijning 1997, 2001 and 2001). In 1807, when the government delayed yielding to Napoleon's injunctions until it was too late, French troops invaded Portugal and the royal family opted to take refuge in Brazil with British support. On arriving at Bahia, the prince regent immediately declared Brazilian ports open to ships of

friendly nations (at the time it meant Great-Britain). This was the end to the exclusive rights of Portuguese vassals and, within a little more than a decade, the intercontinental trading empire itself.

Production

The Spanish American economy was not just geographically very large and demographically with about 13 million inhabitants larger than its metropolis (ca. 11–12 million) by the end of the eighteenth century. The core regions, New Spain and Peru (including Upper Peru, today's Bolivia), were also in terms of their productive capacity quite comparable to that of the European end of the empire. It was a fairly urbanised place, too. There was nothing small or peripheral about the core Spanish American regional economies in the eighteenth century. Brazil could not exactly boast the same relative grandeur. Despite the consolidation and integration of the vast territory and the impressive demographic growth (white population grew tenfold in the eighteenth century), at the turn of the century it still did not match up to the metropolis, as it had just over two million people (2.35 in 1808 according to recent estimates), as compared to Portugal's 2.85 (Alden 1963, 1987; Botelho 2015; Carrara 2014; Marcílio 1984). It was a mostly rural colony, but the major towns, the seaports of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, and to a lesser extent Recife, Belém, São Luís do Maranhão, São Paulo, and Ouro Preto (at least during the gold rush), compared well with most metropolitan cities, with the exception of Lisbon. Furthermore, Brazil played an utterly central role for the configuration of Portuguese society and polity and for the international integration of the empire, economic and otherwise (Pedreira 1998–1999).

Estimates of what an economist might call GDP per capita for the eighteenth century should be taken with more than a grain of salt. However, there is recently increasing evidence that Peru might have had a product per capita of maybe three-fourths or four-fifths of that of Spain over the eighteenth century while New Spain was basically equally productive as the peninsular economy (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013; Arroyo Abad and van Zanden 2016; Seminario 2016). Less central regions, such as Chile or Venezuela, were less productive but catching up quickly, and the Rio de la Plata was probably more productive. As for Portugal and Brazil, the only available comparative estimate indicates that, even after exclusive

trading rights had ceased, in 1820, there subsisted a sizeable difference between metropolis and colony, as Brazilian GDP per capita was just two-thirds of the Portuguese (Maddison 2007, 92).

In Spanish America, more than half of the economy was agricultural and somewhat less than a third consisted of mostly urban manufacturing and services. But in terms of the attention paid by both contemporary political economists and latter-day historians the stand-out activity in the most important areas of the Spanish Indies had been, since the sixteenth century, mining. The absolute numbers of free and unfree labour it employed were in fact not that large (Golte 2016, 74–75). The estimates are that throughout Peru about 6% of indigenous adult men worked in mines, though in some regions their share could be up to a quarter. Mining as such and the silver it produced are easily overestimated. However, mining centres early on became poles of regional integration that needed to be supplied with foodstuffs and manufactures, draft animals, and human labour that provided services for mines and miners (Assadourian 1983; Tutino 2011). In the Viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain, cycles of mining often mirrored those of overall economic activity, even if the sector accounted for only about 10 to 15% of the economy.

In Brazil, as opposed to Spanish America, mining was an eighteenth-century novelty, but it soon gained overwhelming weight. During the first half of the century, while Brazil was the world's leading gold and diamond producer, mining became the first and foremost economic pursuit not only because of the wealth it created directly, but because of the connections it promoted with other activities as well. In the eighteenth century, Brazil's contribution to world gold production may be placed at between 53 and 61 percent (Costa, Rocha, and Sousa 2013; Barrett 1990). In the heyday of Brazilian production (1745–1750) that contribution must have been considerably higher. However, this was meant to be a temporary surge. After mid-century, as deposits were depleted, and gold production declined, agriculture and cattle-raising soon regained economic ascendancy.

Figure 28.2 illustrates the trends and cycles of expansion of precious metals in Spanish America. New Spain (Mexico) had overtaken Peru with its famous mines at Potosí in the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century witnessed an unprecedented expansion that was only broken in the wars of independence. But the Upper Peruvian mines, too, turned the corner in the first three decades of the eighteenth century and expanded production until the late

eighteenth century. By comparison the expansion of gold and silver production in the new Viceroyalty of New Granada was modest, though it too grew substantially.

Figure 28.2 Production of precious metals in the territories of the Spanish Viceroyalties and Brazil 1680–1810 (in millions of Spanish American silver pesos)

Source: Palma and Silva (2016) and TePaske and Brown (2010)

What brought about this expansion? Mining was at the heart of much of the thinking about economic reform in the Bourbon century. In a simplified version, historians have argued that mining was easy to tax and thus reformers in Madrid and the Americas pushed for an expansion of the sector that would shoulder the increasing needs of the state. In intention this is certainly right, but the story was more complicated.

Mining in Spanish America was a private activity taxed in various ways by local treasuries, most directly through the *quinto*, which despite its name (the fifth) translated into anything between 5 and 20%. In New Spain the mines relied almost entirely on free labour, while in southern Peru and Upper Peru there was free wage labour and the *mita* labour draft, that forced indigenous villages to send labourers in rotations of one-seventh of the adult male population to work at artificially reduced pay in the mines of Potosi and Huancavelica. Often the same workers worked as draft labour for their assigned half or third of the time and hired on as (much better paid) free wage labour for the remaining weeks. African slavery played a role in some of the smaller mining regions in New Granada, such as the Choco. But overall free capital and wage labour dominated Spanish American mining.

For much of the mining sector the relation between labour costs, taxation, the price of mercury needed to extract the silver, and the quality of deposits determined profitability. The latter tended to decline; in the absence of large new discoveries, existing mines tended to suffer an erosion of the silver content of the ore over time. That gave special importance to the availability of mercury, more of which was needed to separate out silver from lower grade ores.

The supply of mercury and its price were at the core of the resurgence of silver production in the eighteenth century. The royal monopoly (*estanco*) on mercury from Huancavelica (Peru) and Almadén (Spain) was the one exception to the rule that mining was private. Theoretically, the royal treasury could maximise its fiscal income from mining by pushing up the price of mercury. Yet,

interestingly, towards the mid-century, with demand for mercury high and outstripping supply even at the prices asked by the *estanco*, policy seems to have shifted. Production at Almadén was expanded and prices were lowered well below the international price (Dobado and Marrero 2014). Production at Huancavelica also expanded towards mid-century but then fell back again (Contreras 2010, 139).

As Dobado and Marrero (2014) have shown, this expansion was neatly mirrored by the expansion of silver production in New Spain, which in turn raised tax receipts from the sector. In a process they call “mining-led growth” the colonial state quite astutely used its control over one small but absolutely crucial part of the sector as a means to jump-start mining as a whole. In Upper Peru, too, the state contributed to the resurgence by lowering the main mining taxes by half (Contreras 2010). But here labour paid at least part of the “subsidy”. Though overall wage labour dominated in Upper Peru, the persistence of *mita* subsidised mine owners’ labour costs by supplying a fixed share of the workforce at forcibly low wages. It is hard to say by how much (Tandeter 1981). By the mid-eighteenth century mine owners in the *mita* regions could still count on about 5,600 low wage *mitayos*. Over the eighteenth century the demographic expansion meant that labour became plentiful and cheaper at any rate (Golte 2016, 86–89). That meant that paradoxically the real burden of *mita* on the regions that had to supply labour for the draft decreased; but only because labour conditions worsened in general.

In Brazil, the quest for gold finally yielded results in 1693 when the first deposits were found in the region that came to be known as Minas Gerais. This encouraged extensive exploration and until mid-century new, smaller deposits were found in Bahia, Mato Grosso, and Goiás (Boxer 1962; Russell Wood 1984). Some 50 kilometres up north, diamonds were also found. The first consignments arrived in Lisbon in 1729 and in the next few years flooded the international market and almost ruined the East India trade. In order to fight smuggling and control prices, a royal monopoly was declared, which was exploited under lease until 1771, when the crown established the *Real Extração* to operate extraction on its own account (Pinto 1979; Vanneste 2011; Yogev 1978).

Contrary to diamond extraction, gold mining remained a private endeavour, as in Spanish America. Though it was heavily taxed and regulated, it retained much of its informal character. The administration’s authority was often misappropriated by officials’ and other powers’ self-interests and its capacity was limited in the face of

the irrepressible attraction that gold strikes aroused. In fact, soon after the discoveries, people from different regions and social statuses of both the colony and the mother country converged on the mining districts.

As alluvial gold extraction could do without much capital, small-scale operations, using only basic tools, became common. Unlike mercury, water, which was indispensable for sorting gold from mud and gravel, could not be controlled by the crown. So, despite the hardship and failure that many endured, numerous adventurers tried their chance at mining, triggering fierce competition, which sometimes led to violent outbursts and put pressure on the constantly strained administration. New regulation had soon to be adopted. Beside the collection of the crown's share (the royal fifth), the prevention of smuggling, and the definition of the supervising functions, the main concern of the authorities was the allocation of land concessions for prospection. Even so, access to water and labour mobilisation determined both the scale and the scope of operations, especially when more works and excavations were required.

Because of former widespread use of African slave labour, extraction depended from the outset on imported manpower to a much larger extent than in Spanish America. The size of concessions was established according to the number of slaves that could be put to work, although the number of requests as well as the way in which officials handled legal and informal privileges introduced inevitable adjustments to that rule. At any rate, such was the weight of slave labour that from 1735 to 1751 the crown chose to collect its part as a head tax on adult slaves. In the heyday of mining in Minas Gerais the number of registered slaves reached more than 100,000 and some ten years later, when slow decline had already set in, they probably accounted for 40 or 50% of the region's population of 225,000 (Bergad 1999).

Explosive population growth caused disruption. The demand for labour, foodstuffs, basic tools, and clothing grew exponentially in areas where there was no production and which focused on mining. Early on, shortages were frequent, and prices skyrocketed. For traders, mule drivers, and producers, unprecedented demand and high prices presented an outstanding opportunity, but their movement threatened economic stability. The crown strove to hold back the excesses of the gold rush. It tried to restrict migration, albeit with little success, and control the routes of trade to Minas Gerais, ultimately sponsoring Rio de Janeiro, which turned into the chief distributive centre.

The need for basic goods of a fast-growing population with easy access to means of exchange set the Brazilian domestic economy in motion. Demand was met in part by the colony's own production. Cattle raising was by far the activity most encouraged by such opportunity, but manioc cultivation also expanded. From Bahia and the northeast down to Rio Grande do Sul, most of Brazil took part in supplying Minas with meat. Along the paths that led to the region, many corrals were set up where herds taken on the hoof would feed and breed. Eventually, cattle ranches and farms (using both free and slave labour) were established around the mining district. Later they began supplying other regions, including Rio de Janeiro, allowing for the reconversion of the regional economy once gold deposits became exhausted. At the same time, small workshops were also established to attend to the local population needs (Bergad 1999; Boxer 1962; Carrara 2007; Russell Wood 1984; Zemella 1951).

The development of Minas Gerais marked a very important change in Brazil's economy. To be sure, the largest share of gold and diamonds found its way to the metropolis (and then Britain), by way of the royal fifth and other taxes, the compensation for imported supplies and other private remittances. Paradoxically perhaps, it was that seemingly extraneous activity that created new opportunities for domestic development. Trade and circulation fostered the interconnection between distant and formerly disparate regions and advanced business chances outside export agriculture. This was the reverse side of the gold coin.

During the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century, mining was undoubtedly the single most important economic activity in Brazil. Available estimates suggest that other merchandise never made up more than one-third of returning cargoes in Brazilian fleets until 1755 and never reached one-half up to the 1770s (Costa, Lains, and Miranda 2016; Morineau 1985). Available data for 1776–1777 confirm that the value of shipped goods still did not match gold remittances, even though these were down to 50% of what they had been and exports were on the rise (Pedreira 2000).

The relevance of mining can hardly be exaggerated, but Brazil never ceased to be a commodity-exporting economy based on the production of tropical groceries and raw-materials. Sugar remained the most important among these. The *engenho*, or sugar mill, at the same time a plantation and a manufacturing unit, persisted as a central social and economic institution of colonial Brazil. It established strong links with other areas of the economy, through the

relation with planters, from whom it took part of the cane, and the demand for labour, food, fuel, equipment, and livestock. Slaves formed an important part of capital and expenses, but salaries made up 15 to 20% of operating costs (Schwartz 1985).

Although it also produced rum, molasses, and low-quality sugar that could be consumed locally or used in slave trade (in Angola, rum played an important role), the *engenho* became specialised in a kind of clayed white sugar that didn't need to be refined and was largely exported to Europe. During the eighteenth century, the sugar market became one of the more integrated in the Atlantic (Rönnbäck 2009). At the same time, commodities and especially sugar showed very high price volatility, particularly in times of war (Jacks, O'Rourke, and Williamson 2011). Marketing opportunities and international price fluctuations, more than productivity and costs, determined the volume of production and export, even if the gold rush and the consequent demand for labour and basic goods generated much higher costs for export agriculture.

Up until the 1770s or 1780s, European markets did not show a positive disposition towards Brazilian sugar, and production capacity remained fairly stable. However, wars involving other colonial powers (the War of Spanish Succession, the Seven Years War, the War of American Independence) opened favourable spells that encouraged more intensive use of resources. In 1710, output was probably at one of its peaks, but competition from the Caribbean had greatly reduced the value of production, as the price in international markets had dropped to less than one-half of that of mid-seventeenth century. At that time, the value of production at the mill would have been between 1515 and 1685 million *réis*, which compared with 1835 million for the estimated annual average gold production for 1706–1710.

In the 1730s the combined effect of declining prices and rising costs exacerbated an atmosphere of crisis for sugar production. By mid-century, output was worth about one-fifth of the estimated gold production, before the wars of the 1760s and 1770s brought short-lived spurts. Until the 1790s progress was actually moderate, but then resurgence gathered momentum, as a result of changes in the international market. British West Indies production was almost entirely drained by Britain's own domestic consumption, and the rebellion in Saint-Domingue in 1792 put the leading producer out of contention. Brazilian sugar doubled its share in the European market to more than 15%. Between 1789 and 1796–1800, average sugar

exports from Portugal more than doubled in volume and, profiting from an exceptional rise in prices, grew 3.5 times in value. That opportunity prompted a real extension of the production capacity in the colony, and the number of *engenhos* grew extensively. That also shows in the volume of the slave trade (Alden 1987; Pedreira 2000; Schwartz 1985).

Sugar was not the only commodity in that drive towards prosperity. However, tobacco, which was for most of the century the second most important staple from Brazil, made only a minor contribution to such development. Most Brazilian tobacco exported to Europe fed the royal monopolies (*estancos*) of Portugal and Spain (which incidentally was farmed out to Portuguese merchants), and, like sugar, although in much smaller proportion, the distributing centres of Hamburg and Italy. Until the 1780s, tobacco exports from Portugal corresponded to about one-fifth of those of sugar, but in a decade that ratio was down to 10%. Yet, as mentioned, in Africa there developed another market associated with the slave trade and contraband that almost matched the one in Europe. Furthermore, in contrast to sugar, tobacco was mostly grown in medium and small farms that combined slave and family labour, so it could be slower to respond to market opportunities but had a strong impact in the regional economy, particularly in the Bahian *Recôncavo* (Acioli 2005; Alden 1987; Nardi 1996; Schwartz 1984).

Cotton was the success story of diversification attempts made after mid-century, especially in Maranhão, where growth had been promoted by the *Companhia*. Exports from Portugal rose from a yearly average of 388 metric tons in 1776–1777 to 4,443 tons in 1796–1800, reaching 3.3 billion *réis* (as against 5.3 billion for sugar and 3658 million for tobacco). In the last decade of the eighteenth century, as much as 30% of British cotton imports came from Portuguese America. At the time, sugar, cotton, and tobacco made up almost 90% of the re-exports of Brazilian commodities from Portugal (Pedreira 2000). The only other staples were hides (6.5%) and cacao (3%). Rice was a different case, as it accounted for 3.5% of imports from Brazil but was largely destined for Portugal's own consumption. In terms of production for the Brazilian domestic market, one must not forget produce such as manioc and dried meat, but also pork, beans, and corn, which fed most of the rapidly rising population (Bergad 1999; Boxer 1962; Carrara 2007).

Increasing diversification of agriculture over the eighteenth century was common to Spanish America as already mentioned. Cash crops

such as tobacco, sugar, and cocoa became increasingly important. Exports of cocoa from El Callao (Lima) increased seven times between the 1740s and the 1770s, for example. The Caribbean islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico embarked late, but fatefully, on the path of those in the British and French Caribbean and became full-blown, slave-based plantation economies. Even Peru counted by the end of the eighteenth century 90,000 enslaved Africans, though employment patterns were more diverse than on the islands (Newson 2006, 157). Plantation regions were by definition not self-sufficient in food stuffs and the Cuban elites were the first who negotiated an opening of the staple system in order to guarantee the supply of foodstuffs as well as the sale of sugar. Only in New Spain did the transformation of the primary sector occur largely without slavery.

Demographic expansion and productive diversification meant that by the eighteenth century in the more densely settled parts of the Spanish Americas conflicts over access to land became more important again. Indigenous communities in New Spain and the Andes had in fact managed to keep control over substantial land resources (Owensby 2008). Even where land was communal property as in many parts of the Andes, peasant families produced for their own consumption on their assigned plots and obtained cash for the payment of tribute and forced purchases under the *repartimiento mercantil* (Chocano 2010). The latter constituted the right of royal officials in rural regions to force indigenous families to purchase a series of goods, mules, textiles, and ironware mostly, that expanded fast in the second half of the eighteenth century. While in some cases the goods might have satisfied existing demand and *repartimiento* provided much needed credit (Baskes 2000), in many they just turned de facto into another form of taxation, often more important than either *mita* or tribute (Golte 2016). By the eighteenth century the rural sector in most of the Spanish Americas was thoroughly monetised and markets had widened and deepened. Indigenous populations offered wage labour as a consequence of a mixture of monetary incentives and needs caused by increasing tribute payments.

What did the development of the productive sector mean for the standard of living of the majority of Spanish and Portuguese American populations? As in all premodern societies, inequality was largely a function of status, as defined by race, gender, free or slave status, and social category, though some of these categories were more malleable than others. We thus have only a sketchy picture of inter-group inequality, leave alone that within various segments of society.

Nevertheless, a broad comparison of wages is instructive to place Spanish America within a global context and understand better differences between regions. Economic historians use the concept of the “welfare ratio” for that purpose, a simple measure that looks at prices and wages and determines a consumption basket that represented the minimum consumption for subsistence. This is presented below in [Figure 28.3](#).

Figure 28.3Welfare ratios for Spanish America and select European cities

Source: Arroyo Abad, Davies, and van Zanden (2012)

An index of one means that workers were barely at subsistence level: above one, the index represents multiples of that level. Territories are indicated by modern nation states and for comparison the arguable richest city in Europe, London, and a poor one, Leipzig (Saxony) are included. To begin with, trends seem hardly coherent. For Upper Peru (Bolivia), Mexico, and Columbia strains are showing in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, while in Lower Peru and Chile the opposite is true.

Yet more interesting are the differences in levels. What has often been affirmed – namely that labour relations in Peru were overall more coercive than in New Spain (Assadourian 2006) – seems to be borne out by the low welfare ratios in the former, which were barely above subsistence. The Rio de la Plata stands out for its high wages, consistent with most of the historiography. Maybe more surprising overall, welfare ratios were not low by global comparisons, though we need to keep in mind that slaves, many of whom received no wage (some did), are not represented at all in this picture. With the important exception of Peru, welfare ratios were higher compared to what we know about Asia (not shown in the [Figure 28.2](#)) and comparable or higher than poor European regions, including most of peninsular Spain. Data on heights and real wages recently have confirmed this impression of overall living standards that were tough, but probably not tougher than in many other places of the eighteenth-century globe (Arroyo Abad, Davies, and van Zanden 2012; Challu 2007; Dobado González and García Montero 2012).

Unfortunately, data and studies are scarce regarding prices and the standard of living in late colonial Brazil. Acute regional, racial, and social differences make any general assertion on this matter at least adventurous. Gold mining made fortunes but produced poverty as well (Souza 2004). The debate on slave conditions has been lively, but not much oriented towards quantification. An example is the criticism

drawn by Mattoso (1995). However, even among slaves, inequality between those who were allowed to work for themselves and save enough to buy their manumission and most others makes averages and common measures essentially misleading. As much as the large proportion of slaves might bring down wages and the status of workers, it seems that for skilled labour, which was in short supply, pay was comparatively good. In the second half of the century nominal labour remuneration grew considerably, both for *escravos de ganho* (slaves hired out by their masters) and for other workers. Rises of one-third between 1750 and 1802 and of more than 150% between 1763 and 1821 have been registered, mirroring the upsurge in the price of slaves (Johnson Jr 1973; Schwartz 1985). However, sharp inflation in late century seems to have engulfed those rises, and at least in Bahia the standard of living for most people was under severe pressure (Mattoso 1973a, 1973b). Anyway, for many Portuguese, and not exactly for the poorest, Brazil promised new opportunities and the perspective of a career in trade was an enticing perspective that attracted thousands every year (Pedreira 1998–1999).

States and markets

What was the role of the state in the market? Many economic historians (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Coatsworth 2006; Mahoney 2010) have argued that Iberian colonial institutions were contrary to long-term economic development and especially in long-term comparisons the “colonial legacy” is singled out as an explanation for Latin American countries woes in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Much of that assessment points to a state that sought to increase revenue, but often did so by turning over a share of its sovereign rights to private entrepreneurs. Tax-farming and the concession of royal privileges were part and parcel of the same colonial system, but this is not to say that they always worked in unison. The recurrent struggle of royal or colonial authorities to enforce tax collection and get vassals, otherwise mindful of their state-protected rights, to fulfil their fiscal obligations stands as inescapable evidence for that disagreement. By the same token, it should not be forgotten that breaches to vassals’ privileges and to tax requirements, which are often confounded under the all-inclusive notion of contraband (at the time they were set apart in Brazil by the use of the term *descaminhos*, usually referring to royal duties), were different in

nature and had rather dissimilar economic and political consequences. An assessment of the performance of the state has to start from questions such as how much state there actually was, how much local versus metropolitan decision-making, how burdensome was the state for its colonial subjects, how much was extracted from America to the coffers of the central state, and how the polity spent its money.

Over the course of the eighteenth century the “state” came closer to its colonial subjects. Spanish American reforms to the administrative structure saw the introduction of new Viceroyalties in New Granada (1739 after an aborted attempt in the 1717–1723) and the Rio de la Plata (1776), and Captaincies General of Caracas (1777) and Chile (1789). They were cut out of the old Viceroyalty of Peru, while that of New Spain (Mexico) remained largely intact. The number of treasury districts multiplied. The fiscal system in Spanish America had been localised from the early days of conquest, and new districts were rolled out as economic activity increased or abolished where it had declined (Klein 1998). In the 1730s there were about 40 treasuries in the Americas and by the end of the century the number was closer to 100 (Grafe and Irigoien 2012).

In Brazil, expansion of mining, more compact occupation in the peripheries, and intense population growth also dictated significant changes in the administrative structure. The importance of mining determined the creation of new captaincies in Minas Gerais, Goiás, and Mato Grosso and ultimately led in 1763 to the transfer of the viceregal seat from Salvador (Bahia) to Rio de Janeiro, which served as the chief port for the mining region. The crown also decided to grant the status of *vila* to several towns which had been established during the “gold cycle” and which thus gained their own municipal institutions (*câmaras municipais*) (Boxer 1962; Russell Wood 1984).

From the beginning of the century the Portuguese crown’s main concern lay in the prevention of smuggling and on the maximisation of revenue within the limits of people’s consent, that is to say without triggering rebellion. Protest was not infrequent as the people of São Paulo and Minas Gerais were known for their restlessness, and fiscal regimes were often amended not only to improve fiscal efficiency, but to placate local reaction as well. The role of the *câmaras* as representative of the local elites in the negotiation with the crown and their officials was of the utmost importance. Next to the new institutions expressly created to collect and manage the royal revenue, such as the mints, the intendants, the boards of finance, the *câmaras* played a major part in the fiscal administration. After 1716 they lost

the capacity to collect directly the royal duties and taxes, but the rules of collection continued to be negotiated with them and based on assessments they produced (Carrara 2009, 2010; Costa 2013).

The state in Spanish America expanded massively if we take the revenue of all the Spanish treasuries as a measure. In the early 1730s the sum of receipts of all districts for which data survive was about ten million *pesos* per annum, by the late 1780s that had risen to over 40 million and in the late 1790 to 70 million. The corresponding expenditures closely matched those numbers (Grafe and Irigoin 2012, 619 and Table A2). Most of the revenue was spent within the Americas. Figure 28.4 shows that remittances to Spain accounted for less than 12% of expenditure of Spanish American treasuries in the early 1730s and 5% or less late in the century. The total windfall that the Madrid treasury received from the Americas, on average about 12 or 13% of the total receipts of the peninsular treasury, rose in line with peninsular Spanish receipts, both of which expanded spectacularly over the eighteenth century (Merino Navarro 1987). However, transfers to Spain rose at a slower rate than revenues in the Americas until the trend was reversed in the last two decades (Irigoin and Grafe 2008).

Figure 28.4 Transfers of fiscal resources to Spain and to other Spanish American districts as percentage of total expenditure of regional treasuries (1729–1800)

Source: Grafe and Irigoin (2012)

Figure 28.4 also illustrates a feature of the interaction between state and economy in the Spanish Americas that has recently become better known. The governance structure of the empire relied on extremely large transfers between Spanish American treasury districts. These so-called *situados* were traditionally mostly seen as a means to finance the defence of the empire in border-regions such as the Caribbean (Marichal and Souto Mantecón 1994). Yet, defence was just one of the objectives and often not the crucial one (Grafe and Irigoin 2012). Intra-colonial transfers between treasury districts guaranteed that the empire could sustain itself without support from the metropolis. The rolling out of the state was financed within the empire itself. More important still, the transfers lubricated in the internal markets within the Americas since moneys were employed in economic transactions on their way from one treasury to the other.

The complex web of redistribution is still only partially understood (Grafe and Irigoin 2012). It is clear, however, that local elites in the treasury districts played a fundamental role in determining the

direction of redistribution between sectors and regions. Involvement with the treasury was an increasingly important business opportunity. Furthermore, the Spanish American treasuries fed an unusually large share of expenditure directly back into the American economies in the form of wages and services paid for out of revenue. By the standards of the eighteenth century military expenditure as a share of Spanish American treasuries' expenditure was about average while expenditure on the interest of debts was very low, at least formally (Grafe and Irigoin 2012, Table 5).

In Brazil, the expansion of the state was perhaps not as spectacular as in Spanish America in terms of revenue collection. Using the same benchmarks mentioned above, and in a very gross estimate, annual receipts grew from about 1500 million *réis* in the 1730s to over 2000 in the late 1780s and between 2500 and 3000 at the turn of the century, a much smaller increase than in the neighbouring colonies. The sharp decline of gold remittances helps explain such development. However, the expansion of the institutional apparatus—fiscal, administrative, judicial, military—was certainly impressive, allowing for the consolidation of colonisation and normalisation of political and social life on the fringes of the territory. This of course implied the faster growth of expenditure, which, except under exceptional circumstances, should be funded by locally raised receipts (Carrara 2009; Costa 2013).

Contrary to Spanish America, transfers within the colony seem to have been relatively small. Of course, frontier territories and communities often had to be helped in meeting their, mostly military, needs. But the really significant transfers took the form of gold remittances to Portugal. These consisted not only of the proceeds of the royal duties on gold extraction (the royal fifth or the head tax), but also of the revenue of several other taxes and monopolies. Among these, the most significant were no longer the taxes on the production and export of the traditional staples, but the customs duties collected on European imports from Portugal. Income growth generated by mining turned consumption into an obvious target for the fiscal administration, which, as shown in [Figure 28.5](#), displayed a strong capacity for tax collection.

Figure 28.5 Gold production and state remittances

Source: Martins de Sousa 2008; Costa, Rocha and Sousa 2013

In fact, a sizeable proportion of gold produced in Portuguese America during the eighteenth century found its way to the Lisbon

treasury. In one way or another, Brazil made a major contribution to the royal revenues: 40% in mid-century and still more than 20% in 1762–1776 (counting remittances alone) (Costa, Rocha, and Sousa 2013; Pedreira 2007; Tomaz 1988). The efficiency of the fiscal apparatus improved in the time of Pombal, when, despite declining gold production, remittances reached their peak, which means that in addition to a more effective collection of the royal fifth, other taxes produced larger returns as well. Rationalisation at the centre, with the institution of the centralised treasury (*Erário Régio*), which adopted more watchful procedures of control and modern techniques of bookkeeping and accounting, combined with the creation of local boards of finance (*Juntas da Fazenda*) which reported to the treasury but at the same time kept the doors open for the participation of local elites in the fiscal administration. The fact that the juntas replaced the Overseas Council in putting out for bidding and awarding the contracts of tax collection apparently extended the opportunities for that participation, even if the most valuable contracts were largely held by the Lisbon merchant elite that Pombal deliberately helped to engender (Carrara 2016; Figueiredo 2015; Pedreira 2016).

Merchandise and capital moved between Portugal and Brazil through a vast transatlantic network of merchants and other commercial agents (Costa, Rocha, and Sousa 2013). Mining, domestic trade, and the revival of export agriculture in the last decades of century opened up the possibilities for accumulation in Brazil. Although most merchants in Brazil were recruited among the very recent immigrants, merchant communities took root in the chief seaports, and grew in wealth and social status, gaining an important representation in the *câmaras*. However, at the top, and in the financial arrangements of the Portuguese Crown, reigned a narrow elite, to which the most lucrative contracts were awarded and which advanced money to the treasury when it needed it most. A system of exchange emerged between the crown and that elite, which became part of the imperial system of power (Costa 1992; Pedreira 1995).

Instead of separating governance and private economy more the eighteenth century saw an even deeper intermingling of the two. In Spanish America, the most important institutions structuring this relationship became once more the *consulados*. The merchant guilds had long administered part of the tax system as tax farmers. By the mid-eighteenth century Bourbon reformers had tried to lower the corporations' share in tax administration, the Consulado de Mexico, for example, lost the right to collect the *alcabala* (the most important

trade tax) in 1754. Yet, that weakening of the ties between commercial elites in the Americas and the Spanish monarchy went decisively into reverse as wars in the last third of the eighteenth century increased the *hacienda's* needs. On the one hand, the monarchy rebuilt its relations with the existing *consulados* by turning over the collection of new taxes to these bodies. On the other, the Madrid councils allowed the creation of a large number of new *consulados*, which empowered mercantile elites in their home towns, but also competed with the existing ones (Mazzeo 2012).

The *consulados* were instrumental in financing the war effort in the late colonial period, while in the process also negotiating commercial exemptions. They essentially turned into investment banks and syndicated large loans. Lending to and supplying the American treasuries was good business because their debt was religiously serviced until the wars of independence. Loans were usually backed by either existing or new taxes that were earmarked for the purpose and collected by the lending body itself. Yet this increased elite control over the regional governance structure also gave the upper strata of colonial society the possibility to offload a larger share of the increasing fiscal burden on those less powerful. One pattern that is repeated in many regional Spanish American treasuries is that what we would expect to be the strongest sector in each region often did not shoulder as much of the revenue burden as would seem to be justified. Elite control in seaports, for example, meant that powerful merchants had an interest in making sure trade was lightly taxed, rolling over the cost on consumers or agriculture or any other sector.

Equally, it stands to reason that the evident increase of the burden of Indian fiscal contribution in Upper Peru in the late eighteenth century was not just about the overall increase in taxation. It reflected the ability of the overwhelmingly white elite to roll over the fiscal burden on mostly indigenous peasants. Within Spanish American governance that risked breaking a political economy contract that had evolved over centuries. Rebellions in the late eighteenth century were, from this perspective, one reaction to excessive pressure exerted by increasingly powerful regional elites (Golte 2016). There, much in the same way as in Brazil, a balance had to be found between the desire to obtain a higher revenue, the authority of the king and his officials, the efficiency of the fiscal regime, and the interests of the local elites and the people. Under the extremely unstable circumstances of the time, such an equilibrium was not easy to establish.

Conclusion

The making of colonial empires had an inbuilt economic *rationale* that supposed the privileged access, ensured by some form of political and military control, to overseas resources (such as land and its productions, mineral deposits, labour, markets, trade routes). For the early-modern European states, it meant taking hold of riches and reserving economic opportunities for themselves and their vassals. But there were important differences as to who in the end reaped the benefits, and the reforms of the eighteenth century led to important changes. Both empires drew from a tried and tested tool kit of political economy measures. But they also often diverged, and the impact of similar attempts was different across empires and regions. The above discussion is far from conclusive, but it does suggest a few tentative comparisons.

In the Spanish system trade was regulated by a form of merchant guild with staple ports rather than a monopoly, a system that benefited the members of these *consulados* and their international business partners. The colonial exclusive was always weak and subject to outsiders easily using guild members as intermediaries. As the eighteenth century progressed, intra-American trade with, first, the Caribbean colonies of other European states, then with Anglo-North America and with Brazil increased dramatically. By contrast, the role of the metropole in the Portuguese trading system was at least partially reinforced by the Pombaline reforms which strove to make Lisbon the hub of its empire east and west, though direct trade between Brazil, Africa, and Asia also expanded.

Production in both imperial spheres expanded dramatically in the eighteenth century and underwent significant structural changes. Mining expanded everywhere till the later eighteenth century, but while this was a new sector in Brazil and went along with an expansion of slavery, in Spanish America, it was a revival of an old sector and indigenous forced labour became less important and slavery remained the exception in the larger mining regions. Nevertheless, slavery expanded dramatically in Spanish America, too, as a consequence of the expansion of plantation agriculture in the Spanish Caribbean and elsewhere. Brazil and Portugal were important actors in the slave trade. Spanish Americans and Spaniards relied mostly on supplies from other European and American traders, one of the reasons why the Spanish Atlantic became increasingly integrated with the British, Portuguese, Dutch, and French.

The traditional picture of a massive expansion of the state in colonial Latin America is clearly visible. Administration became more professional over the eighteenth century as a result of reforms. The economy grew, the state grew faster, and in Spanish America it grew even faster than in Brazil. But it would seem that more of the larger revenue remained in Spanish America, while Portugal succeeded in channelling a three to four times larger share of the smaller total receipts to the metropolis. It stands to reason that that made for significant political economy differences. In the Lusophone case the spoils of empire went to a larger extent to the crown and a relatively narrower elite, often, though certainly not exclusively, in the peninsula. In Hispanophone America the pie was a lot larger, shared by larger and more diverse elite actors, who were more often in the Americas. Much more research is needed to understand better what this meant for standards of living, inequality across race and social status, and in particular how much responsibility Latin America's colonial past bears for economic distress and inequality in the present.

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Part 4

The Iberian world in the age of revolutions





CHAPTER TWENTY nine

Protest and resistance against colonial rule in Iberian America



Hal Langfur and Charles F. Walker

Introduction

In the second half of the eighteenth century, Spain found itself frequently at war with Great Britain and at odds with its erstwhile partner, France. It lost territory in Europe and the Americas and began to see its global empire crumble. Under the rule of the Bourbon Kings Ferdinand VI (1746–1759), Charles III (1759–1788), and Charles IV (1789–1803), the crown implemented a series of reforms domestically and abroad, many initiated in the prior half century, that sought to centralise power and shore up Spain's administration and defence. They ranged from long-term efforts to modernise the bureaucracy to emergency war taxes. These measures prompted a variety of reactions, largely negative, in Spanish America.

Throughout the eighteenth century, Spanish America witnessed growing agitation and subversion. The discontent took many forms: riots, rebellions, conspiracies, mutinies, open *cabildos* (municipal councils) or *cabildos abiertos*, and more. Not all regions witnessed these disturbances, as some remained calm and manageable in the eyes of the Spanish until the beginning of the wars of independence. Furthermore, not all the protest or even most of it sought independence from Spain. Many of the revolts punished an official deemed cruel or craven and demanded rights presumably granted under Spanish rule. What most characterises these social movements are their heterogeneity in terms of plan, actions, leadership, and membership. Nonetheless, taken together, they express a growing opposition to the Bourbon Reforms and, towards the nineteenth century, Spanish rule in the Americas.

Even more vulnerable to European power politics, Portugal sought to maintain its unequal alliance with Great Britain without exacerbating tensions with Spain and France. England's commercial ascendancy in Atlantic trade and Spain's territorial rivalry in South America presented simultaneous challenges. With its Asian seaborne empire reduced to a remnant, the Portuguese Crown had already redirected its attention to the Americas, a shift completed during Brazil's gold- and diamond-mining boom in the first half of the century. The towering figure of Portuguese absolutism was Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, named marquis of Pombal while serving King José I (1750–1777) as chief minister. Like Spain's Bourbon reformers, Pombal strove to regenerate the metropolitan economy by tightening administrative and fiscal control over Portuguese America. These reforms provoked resentment similar to, although less disruptive than, the reaction in Spanish America.

Elites born in Brazil did not diverge as sharply as their Spanish American counterparts from European elites. No major urban plebeian riot attacked royal officials and property, as in Quito. No cross-class tax rebellion sparked clashes with government troops, as in New Granada. No massive rural uprising of native peoples shook the foundations of royal authority, as in Peru and Mexico. Nor did the colony's dependence on the coerced labour of peoples of African descent, who were far more numerous than in Spanish America, result in widespread bloodshed of the sort that congealed into Haitian independence. Despite this absence of organised mass dissent, Brazil achieved independence in 1822 as if on schedule, just a year after Mexico, the same year as Gran Colombia, and two years before Peru.

The break with Portugal clarified that the transatlantic consensus that curtailed the most destabilising forms of social and political unrest ultimately had its limits in binding colony to metropolis. Analysis of anticolonial agitation in Portuguese America must therefore contend with the colony's apparent quiescence.

Image 29.1 Mexican guerrilla supporters, from Theubet de Beauchamp, *Trajes civiles y militares y de los pobladores de México entre 1810 y 1827*

Source: Real Biblioteca, Madrid, Spain, Sig: Grab: 261. © Patrimonio Nacional

The Americas featured awe-inspiring social and geographic diversity in the period of study. In addition to the core indigenous population, inhabitants of Spanish America descended from Asia, Africa, and Europe, and spoke dozens of languages. Across the hemisphere every type of ecosystem could be found, from bone-dry desert to dizzying mountain peaks. Even if the analysis limits itself to social protest in the countryside, the population and labour arrangements varied enormously. Any analysis of rural colonial Spanish America has to consider missions, semi-autonomous indigenous communities, haciendas, small estates, mixed rural villages, free slave communities, plantations, and much more. Labour regimes included slavery, sharecropping, “free” labour, labour drafts, migratory systems, and, in any single region, combinations of these. Mining cannot be left out of any survey of the colonial economy and neither can the presence of the Catholic Church, which forged deep roots in many areas where the colonial state barely reached.

Geographic, demographic, and economic diversity similarly conditioned changing responses to Portuguese rule. Portugal's vast American colony had evolved into distinct regions, tenuously tied to one another, each with its unique natural environment, history, and relationship with the imperial centre. The immense Amazon basin, sparsely populated by native peoples and their *mestizo* descendants, attracted comparatively few Portuguese settlers. Wild cacao and other forest products accounted for its primary exports. Southeast of the Amazon delta, Maranhão successfully developed cotton and rice production after mid-century. Increasing numbers of African slaves supplemented the region's *mestizo* peasantry. The fertile coastal strip where sugar plantations clustered around the port cities of Recife in Pernambuco and Salvador in Bahia remained the colony's most productive agricultural region. Africans and their children born into American captivity had long since eclipsed native peoples as the primary workforce.

Displacing Salvador as the seat of the viceregal government in 1763, the entrepôt of Rio de Janeiro expanded rapidly over the eighteenth century. It owed its growth and economic diversification to the discovery of gold and diamonds in the southeastern interior. Minas Gerais boasted the richest of the alluvial mines and, by the final quarter of the century, the largest regional population. Enslaved and free persons of African descent accounted for nearly 80% of its inhabitants. Finally, Brazil's far south, more focused than most regions on domestic markets, became a livestock-raising area, supplying mules, hides, and salted beef, along with wheat. Like the far north and west, its proximity to Spanish America made it the object of royal concerns about smuggling and security. In short, regional differences left certain areas more densely inhabited than others, unevenly integrated into the Atlantic economy, and variably favoured or imperilled by changes in specific royal policies. The crown viewed such geographic, economic, and political fragmentation as advantageous, never deviating, as one scholar notes, from the "essential object" of keeping its captaincies "divided, isolated, and dependent" (Barman 1988, 39).

Given this variability, it is not surprising that the relationship between the changes emanating from Iberia—the Bourbon and Pombaline Reforms—and growing discontent in the Americas has long vexed historians. Undoubtedly, these administrative, fiscal, and military reforms prompted dissatisfaction and nudged some towards questioning Iberian rule and even a search for alternatives. Yet historians have shown the pitfalls of mechanical arguments that posit the reforms and the revolts as cause and effect—the relationship is much more complicated. For example, some regions that were centres of the implementation of the reforms did not rise up against them. On the other hand, protests emerged that had little to do with the reforms. Part of the challenge lies in the fact that the reforms affected administrative and economic realms and thus altered both politics and economics in distinctive local and regional contexts. The most decisive commonality, across regions and empires alike, was the wariness of American-born elites. They hesitated to risk their privileged positions by pressing claims against colonial rule to the point of provoking instability. There were, however, exceptions, particularly in the early nineteenth century.

Spanish America

While taxes rose (and thus prompted discontent), the Spanish also changed how taxes were collected, who served in the military, who ran city councils, and much more. Displeasure at the changes (never understood at the time as the “Bourbon Reforms”) could be targeted at the tax collector but also at an incoming Spanish authority or the king himself. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the reforms was only a partial cause—not only can other grievances be found, but ideological issues (what platform was used, what alternative invoked) need to be taken into consideration. While most Spanish Americans, from the plebe to the aristocracy, felt that taxes were on the rise, many also believed that the Spanish were encroaching on their political rights. The imposition of an increasing number of Spanish-born authorities infuriated many. Nonetheless, very few of the uprisings or revolts sought to break with Spain. Instead, they typically targeted a single official or practice and rose up in the name of their community and even Spain.

This brings us to a question that has long marked studies of eighteenth-century rebellions: their relationship to independence in the early nineteenth. Various generations of historians have shown that a revolt in rural Mexico in 1760, a riot in Arequipa in the 1780s, or other social movements were not early signs or “precursors” of the wars of independence. The rioters or rebels were almost certainly not fighting in the name of independence from Spain (they were perhaps, instead, fighting in the abstract name of the King of Spain) and they had vastly different platforms and goals than rebels in the 1810s and 1820s. The world changed radically in these years: Atlantic Revolutions in the United States, France, and Haiti and overwhelming transformation in Europe with Napoleon and his Iberian Invasion (1807–1812). Furthermore, political culture evolved in Spanish America as well. While analyses of the wars of independence in Spanish America disagree about whether the focus should be on Spain itself (Napoleon and the decline of the Bourbons) or in the Americas (growing discontent and an expanding anti-imperial ideological arsenal), the best historians have looked at both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to explore how politics changed throughout the eighteenth century and beyond. Revolts and rebellions were both a reflection and cause of these changes.

The relationship between eighteenth-century social movements and the Bourbon Reforms and the wars of independence are not the only questions that motivate historians. The role of the lower classes has become another leitmotiv. While few scholars dismiss the role of

Indians, slaves, free blacks, *mestizos*, and others of the lower orders as significant participants in social movements, they continue to disagree about these groups' standing in the uprisings and their ideological depth. The question of whether the lower classes fought due to coercion, as a reaction to change and/or abuse, or deeper political motives will not go away.

Subversion took many forms. Slaves banded together to improve their conditions or even to gain some form of freedom. As political tensions increased in the latter decades of the eighteenth century, they also aligned with political groups (Blackburn 2011). Individuals also struggled to improve their lot by less collective efforts, improvising different methods to make work more bearable and dominance less absolute. In this regard, the concept of resistance highlights a variety of tactics that, although often (but not always) marginal to collective action or social movements, undermined the powers that be, particularly locally. And finally, religion proved an important component of many subversive movements, some of them seeking a radical rupture from the status quo (Castro Gutiérrez 1996; Di Meglio 2012; Van Young 1986).

The corporate nature of Iberian rule complicated political relations and protests. Throughout the period, the Bourbons sought to rein in the Catholic Church, assuming some of its responsibilities, limiting its vast autonomy, and even expelling the Jesuit order in 1767, following a Portuguese decision to do the same in 1759. Priests and nuns would play a role in political disturbances in the period and the question of religion and the status of the Church played out in fascinating ways. Indigenous people also witnessed the weakening of their autonomy, as the Bourbons sought to impose outsiders as authorities, increase taxes, and permit the encroachment of communal land. Taxes and autonomy, more than land, proved crucial in rural protests.

Nonetheless, patterns emerge. William Taylor found that the vast majority of eighteenth-century village uprisings were "spontaneous, short-lived outbursts by members of a single community in reaction to threats from outside; they were 'popular' uprisings in which virtually the entire community acted collectively and usually without identifiable leadership" (Taylor 1979, 115). They felt closer to the revolt rather than rebellion side of the spectrum.

In most cases, villagers attacked outsiders (usually state authorities or priests) who imposed new or increased taxes or other impositions on them. They also confronted them, often quite violently, if these outsiders threatened a village's autonomy, specifically the historic

right to select authorities, to oversee daily business, and to maintain local culture. Taylor also underlined the argument made by other historians that population growth prompted political tensions between subject towns and the head towns or *cabeceras*, often sparking short-term violence. Unlike events in many of the same areas of Mexico in the early nineteenth century or in the Andes in the 1780s, these revolts did not spread into multi-village or regional uprisings that threatened the colonial state. They remained local, but as Taylor shows, they were at least initially quite violent, with highly charged actions and rhetoric, indicative of the deep tensions in rural Mexico.

Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy found a similar pattern in eighteenth-century revolts in the Andes (Peru and Bolivia). She uncovered 140 local uprisings concentrated in three "conjunctures" that targeted both civil and religious authorities for abusive behaviour such as overcharging taxes or making demands on free labour or not respecting local autonomy. Although overwhelming rural, they were not solely indigenous uprisings as *mestizos* and creoles had important leadership roles in many. These cases seemed to follow the Mexican pattern, though pursuing with greater frequency and hostility new fiscal policies imposed by the Bourbons, particularly after 1777. This difference can be explained by the greater reliance in Peru on the Indian head tax and other exactions by the Peruvian Viceroyalty. In order to shore up viceregal finances, the "Bourbon Reformers" had to greatly increase pressure on the indigenous population (O'Phelan Godoy 1988). The parallels between Mexico and Peru ended in 1780, however, with the massive Andean uprisings known as the Tupac Amaru and the Katarista Rebellions.

The Tupac Amaru Rebellion raged across the Andes from 1780–1783. Centred in southern Peru, from Cuzco to Lake Titicaca, it also allied with the Katarista uprisings in Upper Peru (Charcas, soon-to-be Bolivia). In addition, revolts inspired by Tupac Amaru took place in what became Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. José Gabriel Condorcanqui was a *kuraka* or ethnic intermediary in three small towns 60 miles south of Cuzco and a merchant who worked the Cuzco to Potosí circuit. Well-educated and bilingual (Spanish and Quechua), he claimed lineage from the Incas, thus the Tupac Amaru (e.g., Tupa or Túpac, Amaro) name. His wife, Micaela Bastidas, was an important commander in the uprising, overseeing the rebel base in Pampamarca and logistics. The rebellion began in November 1780 when Tupac Amaru seized and executed a local authority, the corregidor Antonio Arriaga. Tupac Amaru organised his indigenous followers and

attacked other corregidores, ransacked haciendas, and razed the hated *obrajes*, or textile mills. He claimed to be fighting in the name of the King of Spain.

He and Micaela sought a multi-ethnic and multiclass alliance, recruiting not only Indians but also *mestizos*, blacks, creoles, and “good” Spaniards. Tupac Amaru returned from the Lake Titicaca region in late 1780 to lay siege to the city of Cuzco, Peru’s second largest city and still considered by many to be the “Inca capital”. Although he surrounded Cuzco with tens of thousands of troops, the rebels could not take the city. The royalists received important reinforcements from Lima in early January. After three months of intense fighting, they captured Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, and much of their inner circle in April 1781, executing them in a gruesome public ritual in Cuzco’s central plaza on May 17. Led by Tupac Amaru’s cousin, Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, their son Mariano, and another relative, the rebellion continued for two years, centred in the area around Lake Titicaca. The rebellion became more of a caste or total war as neither side took prisoners. The exhausted rebel leaders signed an armistice in early 1783, but hardline royalists broke the treaty and executed Diego Cristóbal on 19 July 1783, in even more horrific fashion than Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas. Up to 100,000 died in the massive uprising (Serulnikov 2013; Walker 2014).

Two primary answers emerge to the puzzling question of why this mass revolt erupted decades before the wars of independence and major insurgency across the continent, particularly in Mexico. First, the level of state extraction of resources was higher in the Andes than in Mexico. The Peruvian viceregal state depended more on the head tax and the infamous labour draft, the *mita*, than in Mexico, which had a larger *mestizo* population and a significantly more dynamic economy. To fulfil demands imposed by the crown (and to fill their own pockets), Church and state authorities had to lean more on the indigenous population in the Andes (Coatsworth 1988; O’Phelan Godoy 1988). Economics, however, were only one side of the coin. Andean people had developed different strains of Inca utopianism in the eighteenth century, the belief that a return to Inca rule would bring greater equality and social peace. José Gabriel Condorcanqui stressed his Inca lineage and used this as well as other elements in patching together an anticolonial ideology that sought to bring different social groups together. Not only were economic or fiscal tensions greater in the Andes than in Mexico, but a cohesive discourse that prompted indigenous unity, notions of local sovereignty, and

opposition to the Spanish had taken hold in the decades prior to the mass Andean uprisings (Flores Galindo 2010; Thomson 2003).

Spanish American cities also witnessed an increase in political mobilisation in the latter half of the eighteenth century, leading up to the full-scale crisis sparked by the Napoleonic Invasion of Iberia in 1807. Despite great variation in timing, organisation, and social base (every city and perhaps even town has a different history), certain contrasts with the rural uprisings can be seen. The urban confrontations often protested political and administrative changes, particularly the efforts to limit the power of creoles and other American-born, as well as tax increases. They also featured internal class tensions that almost invariably weakened the movement. Throughout the Americas, creole critics of the Spanish would support street demonstrations but then watch warily as the lower classes became more belligerent and presented their own agendas. These divisions would mark not only rebellion and resistance in the late colonial period, but also the long wars of independence.

Residents of Quito took to the streets massively in 1765 to protest the crown's efforts to impose a monopoly on *aguardiente* (cane alcohol) and to take control of the *alcabala* sales tax. Both reforms weighed heavily on a broad selection of Quito society, including producers, sellers, and consumers of the ever-popular *aguardiente*. Authorities sought to inflict the *alcabala* on a wider sector of urban society, including the lower classes. Crowds filled Quito's Santa Barbara Plaza on 22 May and 24 June, with the latter event turning into a full-scale riot. The vehemence and potential violence of the lower classes intimidated many creole and middle-class protesters, sparking a divide that would characterise the pre-independence social disturbances. Despite this division, however, royalists backtracked on both plans and protesters received an amnesty and largely saw their demands fulfilled (McFarlane 1989; Andrien 1995).

The Upper Peruvian city of La Plata (today's Sucre) witnessed a series of disturbances from the 1780s into the wars of independence. Throughout 1781, rumours spread about an anti-tax mutiny, anonymous broadsides attacked authorities, and numerous open *cabildos* were held. As Sergio Serulnikov has deftly shown, these (and non-events as much as was based on unfounded rumours) indicated the possible unity of the upper and lower classes against those associated with Spain and its administration. Although fraught with tension and discord, vertical or multiclass alliances were by no means impossible. Decades later, after the Napoleonic Invasion of Iberia in 1807 and the

crisis in Spain, the city's lower classes showed a heightened interest in politics and the firm belief that they deserved to be active participants and not mere followers. La Plata demonstrates how the practice of politics in Spanish America evolved over the decades and did not merely follow or react to events in Europe (Serulnikov 2012).

The case of La Plata and many others underlines that participation in the urban uprisings was not limited to the middle and upper classes. The lower classes or the plebeians contributed, their incentives and role changing over time. While historians previously assumed that the lower classes participated due to their patrons' encouragement or coercion, studies in recent decades have shown that in the cities as well as the countryside the masses had their own motivations or inspiration. This line of inquiry has revealed how the lower classes shaped urban protest and how this political mobilisation changed over time.

Groups that fought to maintain Spanish control recruited widely. While upper-class support for the royalist causes seemed logical, particularly if the rebels promised or enacted radical reform, the lower classes also could throw their support behind royalists. This could be the result, as it has traditionally been understood, of coercion, payment, or ignorance. In other words, the lower classes were forced to do it or did it for money, with little understanding about the political dynamics and implications of the fighting. However, the case of Indians and slaves who backed royalist forces in northern South America, what became Colombia, from 1780 to 1825 questions this simplistic interpretation. This support did not emerge out of ignorance or coercion but instead years of negotiation and fighting, in which the royalists ultimately offered greater benefits than the different waves of insurgents. In some cases, royalists offered freedom to slaves while the patriot armies failed to do so (Echeverri 2016).

In the eighteenth century, slaves most commonly struggled against oppression through plantation insurrections (involving slaves and non-slaves) and marronage rather than full-scale insurrections. Mass rebellions proved nearly impossible, as slave-owners had crucial advantages: monopoly on weapons, regional security systems that pursued runaways and rabble-rousers, and an insidious labour system that divided slaves on various fronts (above all field and house and American- and African-born) as well as slaves and free people of colour. The Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) had petrified beneficiaries of the slave system, encouraging them to heighten repression and to collaborate across the Caribbean and the Atlantic.

Nonetheless, slaves resisted in numerous ways, many of them off the archival record. They ruined machinery, pilfered supplies, ridiculed the plantation owner, and employed countless other tactics that weakened what seemed like a rigidly secure exploitation system. The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba showed that categories such as mutinies, conspiracies, rebellions, and resistance overlapped and are not mutually exclusive. It also showed that solidarity between slaves and free people of colour was possible.

Since the late eighteenth century, Cuba's slave-based sugar economy had expanded rapidly due to the 1789 Spanish decree that facilitated the slave trade, the Haitian Revolution that had ultimately crippled Haiti's previously vast sugar production, and the burgeoning European sweet tooth. In March 1812, slaves and free people of colour attacked numerous plantations near Puerto Príncipe (today's Camagüey), in some cases burning down the fields and the mills and killing whites. At the same time, free blacks aligned with slaves, creoles, and others to conspire against the Spanish in Havana, small towns, and the countryside. José Antonio Aponte, the apparent leader, was a free black artisan and militia member who envisioned in a set of drawings lost to history a Cuba free of Spanish rule and slavery. A former member of the black militia of Yoruba descent, Aponte invoked symbols of freedom that included Ethiopia, Haiti, and the United States (George Washington). Authorities repressed the uprisings brutally. Aponte and his accomplices, for example, were hanged and beheaded, their body parts displayed as a gruesome warning of the cost of subversion. The Aponte Rebellion indicated both the deep disgruntlement with slavery and Spanish rule in Cuba and the tremendous obstacles to slave insurrection (Childs 2006).

Portuguese America

An expansive conception of protest and resistance is required to identify emerging tensions between Portugal and its American colony, particularly when comparing the more turbulent Spanish America. Brazil provides fertile ground for rethinking standard measures of such discontentment. Its history reveals subtleties of the colonial experience less evident in places riven by open tumult. The decades preceding independence witnessed traditionalist retrenchment alongside modernising thrusts. Individual opportunism competed for primacy with nascent group consciousness. Despite a willingness to criticise

royal government and even plan its overthrow, reformists and potential revolutionaries commonly continued to consider themselves Portuguese even when born in Brazil. At the same time, their local allegiances outweighed proto-nationalist yearnings. These tendencies intermingled as economic and racial divisions produced contrasting diagnoses of social ills and limited commonality of purpose. So profound and durable were the social hierarchies, moreover, that scholars often failed, as with the Spanish American context, to recognise the full significance of the challenge to the colonial status quo mounted by marginalised peoples of indigenous and African descent.

Unlike in Spanish America, Brazilian-born elites who participated in acts of insubordination against Portuguese rule did not commonly refer to themselves as creoles, eschewing the term's implied differentiation from Europeans. Their Portuguese critics sometimes used the pejorative *mazombo* to disparage them as non-Europeans, especially those born in the northeast. The Brazilian-born occasionally employed descriptors such as *filho de Minas* (son of Minas Gerais) or *natural da América* (American-born). The term *crioulo* described an individual of African descent born in the colony.

No sustained, large-scale uprising against Portuguese rule materialised prior to the independence struggle. However, two foiled plots, two unproven conspiracies, and one short-lived insurrection sharpened concerns about the loyalty of Brazilian vassals amid the revolutionary upheaval arching over the wider Atlantic world. All five episodes occurred in urban settings in the dynamic colonial core bounded by Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro in the southeast and Bahia and Pernambuco in the northeast, home to more than two-thirds of Brazil's population, which reached two million by century's end, excluding independent Indians. Prompting draconian repression in all but the two cases in which proof was lacking, they left no doubt that to scheme against the crown was to place property and life at risk.

The anticolonial sentiments expressed in these "conspiracies", as royal authorities preferred to describe them, were rooted in a decades-long transformation in Brazil's position vis-à-vis Portugal and the Atlantic system. In his drive to increase state revenues, Pombal created new monopolies to bolster trade with the Amazon, Maranhão, and Pernambuco; transferred the capital to Rio de Janeiro; enhanced the viceroy's power over captaincy governors; and consolidated control over frontiers and borderlands. He crafted particularly severe

fiscal reforms for the mining region, sharply increasing the tax burden on local notables, a jarring policy considering gold production waned rapidly after 1760. More so than the Bourbon Reforms, Pombal's regalist and nationalist agenda allowed for flexibility alongside ruthlessness. If absolutist measures fell flat or provoked excessive opposition, he sometimes adjusted or even relented. Partly in the interest of fostering consent, partly out of necessity, given Portugal's tiny governing class and Brazil's vast territory, he did not systematically dismiss Brazilian-born elites from high-ranking military and administrative posts as the Bourbons did in Spanish America. Despite his fall from power upon the king's death in 1777, many of his initiatives formed the basis of even stricter mercantilist policies maintained into the 1790s by Queen Maria I (1777–1816) and her overseas secretary Martinho de Melo e Castro (1770–1795). Neither the queen nor her minister possessed Pombal's shrewdness regarding the value of colonial co-optation and cooperation.

A primary target of Pombal and his successors' efforts to raise revenues, the captaincy of Minas Gerais was also the site of the first collective expression of anticolonial ire in which republican sentiments emerged. Under Pombal captaincy officials investigated a number of localised verbal and written attacks against the monarch, but none rose to the level of calling for a break with Portugal. The need for vigilance seemed obvious. From the early decades of the gold rush, the fortune-seekers congregated in the fractious mining camps of the mountainous interior asserted their autonomy, including a willingness to react violently against tax levies and other royal impositions (Catão 2007; Figueiredo 1999). In the late 1780s, Melo e Castro devised harsh new fiscal policies, convinced that colonial negligence, smuggling, and fraud explained collapsing revenues from gold and diamond production. Local dissenters, among them some of the region's foremost intellectuals, clergy, administrators, and jurists, plotted to take up arms against the crown and declare an independent republic in early 1789. Alerted by several informants, the governor imprisoned the separatists before they could put their plan into action.

The subsequent trial, conducted in Rio de Janeiro, took place in the shadow of the French Revolution, which redoubled Lisbon's determination to impose exemplary punishment. More than a dozen plotters received death sentences, their sentences commuted to prison terms and exile in all but one case. The exception, Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, was a dentist and former dragoon officer of modest means known by his nickname Tiradentes (tooth-puller). Assuming

full responsibility for the movement, a preposterous claim, he was hanged then drawn and quartered. His limbs and torso were placed on pikes along the royal road to the capital of the mining zone, Vila Rica, where his head was displayed in the main square. His home was razed, and his lands salted so that they would never again be productive.

Known as the Inconfidência Mineira (Minas Conspiracy), this intrigue long captivated historians seeking the roots of Brazilian independence. Contemporary scholars have proven more sceptical. They note that behind its activist core stood a group of self-interested wealthy backers, mostly born in Portugal, who owed huge debts to the crown and stood to profit from a tax rebellion. The Brazilian-born participants never seriously planned to extend their revolt beyond Minas Gerais. Their narrow conception of a republic did not presuppose a representative democracy and allowed for a possible restoration of monarchical rule if the queen or an heir to the throne were to relocate to Brazil. The absence of a university in the colony meant that many of the genteel conspirators had completed their education at Portugal's University of Coimbra, where they immersed themselves in Enlightenment texts forbidden in Brazil. Their educations distinguished them, upon their return, as members of a small, overwhelmingly white male minority of literate colonists. Some maintained personal libraries stocked with censored tracts decrying Europe's *ancien régime* (Villalta 2007). Stirred also by the American Revolution, they admired Thomas Jefferson and other founders of the United States not only because they freed themselves from British rule, but because they did so without abolishing slavery.

Their concerns reflected fears, shared by regional oligarchs throughout Brazil, that any push for political independence could unleash social upheaval and provoke a race war, dislodging them from their privileged positions. The slave uprising that transformed the wealthy sugar colony of Saint Domingue into Haiti, reports of which reached Brazil as the plotters stood trial, only deepened such anxiety and its attendant conservatism. Despite these limitations, the episode stands apart from earlier actions. "The planned revolt did not materialize", observes one of its leading historians,

but this could not conceal the fact that an important segment of the social group that the metropolitan government needed to trust to exercise its power at a local level—in one of the most important, populous, wealthy, and strategically well-situated

Brazilian captaincies—had the daring to think that it could live without Portugal.

(Maxwell 2001, 408)

Historians debate whether the resolutely public execution of Tiradentes slowed or exacerbated opposition to Portuguese rule. They also question the degree to which it set the stage for subsequent incidents in Rio de Janeiro and Salvador. From the vantage point of a later era, the cases seemed sequential, a series of tremors presaging and building toward national independence. Yet each event emerged from local circumstances, involved different social configurations, and drew on specific combinations of ideas. Each occurred at a time when affiliation to *pátria*—the region in which one was born and lived—rather than to an imagined nation or to one's status as American-born, determined communal identities. In royal and viceregal chambers, however, worrisome parallels could not be missed even if their cumulative outcome could not be known (Barman 1988; Villalta and Becho 2007; Furtado 2014).

Just two years after sentencing the Minas conspirators, the viceroy jailed leading members of the disbanded Literary Society of Rio de Janeiro and others, European- and Brazilian-born alike. He accused them of engaging in subversive discussions concerning the French Revolution, the Church, and the cause of liberty. In the course of this inquiry and a related Inquisition investigation concerning alleged blasphemy, the city's High Court uncovered networks of city residents apparently exchanging antimonarchical and anticlerical sentiments. Eleven defendants spent more than two years in prison before they were released for lack of proof of concrete plans to defy the government, led by the future João VI (1816–1826), his mother struck down by mental illness. Given the heavy-handed tactics used to track down and interrogate 120 individuals questioned in the two cases—among them rentiers, merchants, artisans, lawyers, doctors, clergy, and government functionaries, including a handful of *pardos* (men of colour)—it is difficult to separate official fears from popular opinion, fact from rumour, candid testimony from fabrications meant to divert blame. Nevertheless, it seems clear that certain circles resident in the port city—notably individuals who were neither especially wealthy nor desperately poor—had begun to level routine criticism at the crown and Church during the 1790s. The limits of such criticism are just as evident. The ready reintegration into urban society of the accused at the conclusion of the inquiry suggests the power of the

combined forces of repression and co-optation to decelerate dissent (Higgs 1984).

Significantly greater social diversity and more radical objectives characterised what became known as the “Tailor’s Conspiracy” in Salvador in 1798. This plot again was quashed before it advanced beyond the planning and recruitment stages. The conspirators made their presence known by posting anonymous handbills advocating revolution. They called for the founding of a Bahian republic in which all men would be equal, regardless of colour or class, some foreseeing an end to slavery. As the plotters sought adherents to their cause, they were denounced to authorities. Drawing primarily on Brazilian-born middle and lower-class plotters, most of whom were men of colour, this movement defied the social and racial order of a city ruled by a white minority. Of the dozens arrested, most were self-employed artisans, including many tailors. Others were soldiers. More than a dozen were slaves or former slaves. Five were women.

The conspiracy occurred in a port city well informed about events in revolutionary France and its rebellious Caribbean colony. A period of economic growth, after decades of decline, brought prosperity to some sugar mill owners and especially to Portuguese-born traders, but not to the urban population as a whole, which suffered inflationary prices and shortages of basic foodstuffs. The free coloured population appears to have expanded faster than any other sector during this period, contributing to white anxieties. Such growth resulted from long-term miscegenation and increasing manumission rates, especially of women and children, often through self-purchase. While a degree of economic mobility characterised free men and women of colour in the urban sector, most remained poor. Caste laws barred coloured individuals from high posts in captaincy or municipal bureaucracies, the military, or the Church. Resentment caused by this discriminatory treatment stood out in testimony gathered by High Court officials prosecuting the Bahian plotters.

The court proceedings framed the episode as a conspiracy of a handful of impoverished, coloured malcontents and played on fears of a possible slave uprising. Under interrogation, the tailor Manuel Faustino described a plan to set a building ablaze to create confusion. An artillery regiment with sympathisers would then seize the city’s remaining garrisons. If the captaincy governor could not be convinced to assume the presidency of an independent Bahian republic, he would be killed, although violence was to be minimised. Faustino and three others, all of them poor mulattos, were made scapegoats for the larger

plot. Like Tiradentes, they were sent to the scaffold and quartered. A number of others suffered exile, prison terms, or floggings. Minimal punishment fell on any men of means, even though the evidence pointed to their collaboration in making free trade one of the movement's demands. The extent to which the military was involved presented further cause for concern. By underscoring the city's all-too-obvious racial hierarchy as the basis of discontent, authorities found a convenient, simplifying explanation for the sedition. The governor and court in this way cautioned wealthy whites, whether born in the colony or the kingdom, of dire consequences if they failed to remain united. The lesson resonated. More than two decades later, when the planter class joined the independence cause, they orchestrated a break with Portugal that rejected the egalitarian precedent of the Tailors' Conspiracy (Ramos 1976; Kraay 2001).

Two more events took place in Pernambuco that historians consider when assessing disgruntled colonists in the years before independence. The first, known as the Suaçunas Conspiracy, occurred in 1801 in the port city of Olinda. The region was then benefiting from an expansion of sugar production, its traditional source of wealth, along with a boom in cotton exports tied to British textile manufacturing. Named for a sugar plantation where a few notables were alleged to have discussed revolutionary ideas, including founding a republic, the affair produced a secret investigation but no convictions. Scholars once saw seeds of nationalism, but they now consider such an interpretation teleological, shaped by what was to happen decades later. Local rivalries and tensions pit reformists, rather than revolutionaries, against those whose identification with traditional values and royal policies remained unshaken. Such tensions characterised Portugal no less than Brazil at the turn of the nineteenth century. They did not necessarily indicate a growing divide between colony and metropole (Neves 1999).

The second event, the Revolt of 1817, was far more disruptive, the only outpouring of dissent in which rebels managed to establish a provisional government, albeit for a brief two months. A decade earlier the Portuguese Crown, in flight from Napoleon's Iberian invasion, had crossed the Atlantic to begin a 13-year sojourn in Rio de Janeiro. The presence in the colony of the queen, Prince Regent João, and their retinue of ministers and courtiers tended to mollify Brazilian elites, especially in the southeast, even as their Spanish American counterparts took decisive steps toward independence. No crisis of monarchical legitimacy occurred in Brazil as it did in Spanish America

when Napoleon placed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. From his arrival in the colony, the prince regent liberally dispensed privileges, favours, and sinecures to cultivate allies among local elites. The opening of Brazilian ports to trade with friendly nations (namely England) in 1808, the elevation of Brazil to the status of a kingdom equal to Portugal in 1815, and the tropical acclamation of the prince as João VI upon his mother's death in 1816, placed the very distinction between colony and metropolis in question. To the degree this distinction most mattered, it did so in reverse, leaving Portugal dependent on Brazil, not only economically, which had long been the case, but politically and administratively.

In the southeast, local merchants, landholders, and literati focused on the benefits of making Rio de Janeiro the empire's new centre of gravity; however, for oligarchs in distant Pernambuco and other northeastern captaincies, these changes provoked resentment stemming from the conviction that they were being excluded, their needs subordinated to those of a new centralising power. It was in this context that accusations of seditious gatherings, directed at a handful of Recife's native sons, led to an initial round of arrests. The fatal shooting of a military commander when he attempted one of the arrests prompted the governor to seek protection in a fortress, clearing the path for a local junta to seize control. The rebels declared a republic, limited geographically to the captaincy. They wrote a draft constitution based on French precedents that left slavery in place, encouraged neighbouring captaincies to join the rebellion as separate polities, and sought support from the US and England, which was not forthcoming. To win troops to their cause, they increased military salaries, but they could not withstand a naval blockade and ground assault by royal forces. Internal dissent and difficulties recruiting partisans—both among traditionalists suspicious of republicanism and among the popular classes—also doomed the movement. The political autonomy and economic liberalism espoused by well-to-do whites stopped well short of the relief from oppression sought by the poor, slaves, and free persons of colour, whom they derided as *cabras* or half-castes. With its authority re-established, the crown tried the conspirators, jailing more than 150, among them bureaucrats, military officers, sugar and cotton planters, professionals, merchants, and clergy, many of whom were members of Masonic lodges. Some 20 convicted of leading the plot were executed (Costa 1975; Barman 1988).

If the perceived threat of social revolution by Brazil's marginalised,

non-white majority restrained most American-born elites from attacking Portuguese hegemony, the general inattention to native peoples and slaves in the literature on anticolonial discontent seems deeply problematic. Scholars typically acknowledge the racist fears harboured by officials and planters, and they bemoan the difficulties of documenting the political consciousness of illiterate masses. Studies of slave resistance have multiplied, and historians belatedly have recognised the sustained determination of native peoples late in the colonial period to retain their lands and shape their own histories. Yet these impediments to unchecked Portuguese domination are rarely considered in their own right as constituting significant anticolonial opposition in the decades preceding independence.

Compared to Spanish America, indigenous populations were much smaller, and they included no great sedentary agriculturalists like the Aztecs or Incas. To meet labour demands, therefore, African slave imports were much larger. Even late in the colonial period, both native raids on frontier settlements and slave resistance usually focused on local grievances, not the politics of empire. For most Indians and slaves, it mattered little whether their oppressors were American- or Portuguese-born. Internal divisions, moreover, hindered Indians and peoples of colour, even more than whites, from taking collective action. Native peoples were separated by great distances, linguistic and ethnic fragmentation, and their degree of interchange or conflict with colonial society. Peoples of African descent likewise came from diverse ethnic origins and differed according to whether they were African- or Brazilian-born, black or *mulatto*, Christian or Muslim, enslaved or free.

Such differences notwithstanding, the combined challenge presented by these populations to the crown's unfettered control far exceeded that of the late-colonial elite conspiracies, whether measured in lives lost, property damaged, production diminished, or profits denied. Great swaths of territory remained in the hands of unconquered, seminomadic peoples. While many sought accommodation with colonial authorities, others fought fiercely against settler incursions. From north to south the Mundurucú, Mura, Kayapó, Xavante, Bororo, Guaikurú, and Kaingang were only the most notorious of the indigenous groups impeding expansion into remote territory after 1750. More centrally located—in the coastal forests bounded by Bahia, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro—autonomous groups including the Botocudo, Puri, and Pataxó frequently outwitted military patrols dispatched against them, leading the prince regent to

declare a war of conquest in 1808 as one of his first acts upon arriving in the colony.

To the degree that indigenous armed defiance can be said to have constituted rebellion against centrally imposed crown policy, the culprit was the *Diretório dos índios*, or Indian Directory legislation, promulgated in 1757, aimed first at Amazonian Indians, then extended to the rest of the colony. Although formally abolished in 1798, its principles continued to guide interactions in many regions. While reasserting earlier laws declaring Indians juridically free, the decree subjected those living in mission villages to the rule of lay directors appointed by captaincy governors. Those maintaining their nomadic ways were pressed to accept sedentary life. Indians were to be Christianised, “civilised”, and taught the essential skills of trade and agriculture. Marriages with colonists and use of the Portuguese language were encouraged to promote assimilation. Such policies inevitably disrupted native practices, prompting reactions ranging from negotiated compliance to violent opposition.

Slave resistance, meanwhile, remained the constant it had always been. So pervasive was the fear of insurrection that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between white paranoia and concrete plans by captives. Authorities investigated slave conspiracies, for example, in Minas Gerais in 1756, São Paulo in 1809, and Pernambuco in 1814. In Bahia more than half a dozen plots and open revolts occurred between 1807 and 1818. Fighting what historians have deemed a “war” against slavery, the Bahian rebels envisioned an end to their bondage informed less by the French and Haitian revolutions than by African ethnic and religious foundations, including Islam. At times under the appearance of Catholic piety, the spirit of rebellion coalesced in lay brotherhoods associated with urban churches. Flight, however, often proved more practicable than open rebellion. More than 150 runaway slave communities, most of them small and short-lived, have been identified in eighteenth-century Minas Gerais alone. Between 1810 and 1830, police registers listed more than 5,000 recaptured fugitives in Rio de Janeiro. Again, African precedents mattered, as runaway communities adopted modes of social and military organisation found in Angola and other regions of origin (Schwartz 1985, 468–488; Reis 1995–1996; Silva 2001b; Klein and Luna 2010, 199–200).

The abolitionist currents that gradually took hold in the Atlantic world exerted an early inspiration for these stirrings. When Pombal banned the slave trade to peninsular Portugal in 1761 and then ordered the phased ending of slavery itself in 1773, some Brazilian

slaves and free people of colour hoped the measures would extend to the colony. In the early years of the nineteenth century, coloured militiamen in Rio de Janeiro made officials nervous by wearing pendants bearing the portrait of the Haitian leader Jean-Jacques Dessalines. In every region slaves, both male and female, struggled, often against impossible odds, to affirm cultural traditions, familial and religious bonds, and even limited legal protections vis-à-vis personal property, self-purchase contracts, and physical punishment so excessive it might result in death (Silva 2001a; Schwartz 1985; Klein and Luna 2010). The slave trade would not end until 1850; slavery itself, not until 1888. But taken as a whole, such activity proved extremely costly to individual colonists and the state, requiring the maintenance of corps of bounty hunters, militia, and regular troops, as blacks and mulattos asserted more expansive conceptions of liberty than most whites at the time could ponder.

Not to factor this endemic pressure from below into the strains on the colonial system in the years before independence seems short-sighted at a minimum. When João VI returned to Lisbon in 1821, leaving his son Pedro behind, with much of Spanish America already declaring independence, the separation from Portugal that regional oligarchs quickly came to embrace left the existing social hierarchy all but intact. The always partial, contradictory character of anticolonial resistance again became evident the following year, when Pedro, elevated as monarch, assumed the throne of an independent Brazil. The new nation would be ruled by a scion of the same Bragança dynasty that remained on the throne of Portugal.

Conclusion

Although the diversity of demographic, geographic, and historical circumstances tempers any sweeping conclusions about mounting resistance to colonial rule across the multiple regions of Spanish and Portuguese America during the half-century that preceded independence, parallels are readily apparent. Both Iberian empires struggled to maintain their bearings in the face of rising northern European hegemony and the spread of revolutionary ideas and economic liberalism. They sought to control the arrival of the set of ideas that became known as the Enlightenment, censoring French texts and controlling the distribution of publications. On the other hand, they fostered or permitted scientific expeditions, intellectual

societies, and a growing number of publications. A fascinating combination of intellectual currents, both new and old, animated the protests and uprisings summarised here (Brading 1991; Rosas Lauro 2006). In both cases, metropolitan reformers imposed new administrative and fiscal measures that upset the colonial status quo, even more so in Spanish America than in Brazil. The resulting discontent did not always open gaping rifts, because traditionalist currents determined to preserve the colonial compact almost everywhere coincided with and offset liberalising tendencies.

In both Spanish and Portuguese America, a fast-growing population of non-elites, mostly peoples of colour, pressed their claims unequally distributed resources and unfairly apportioned opportunities for well-being and social advancement. Consequences differed, however, not least because the vast proportion of labourers in Spanish America were of native descent, while in Brazil they were of African origins and widely enslaved. This piece of the puzzle remains one of the most challenging for historians. Emphasising modernising American-born elites, scholars traditionally ignored the masses in analyses of increasing colonial restiveness during the decades before independence. No longer satisfied with such a limited vision, they now seek ways to understand the individual and collective consciousness of largely illiterate masses. As a consequence, elites are now seen as more united in their conservatism and their open fear of social revolution than in their willingness to ponder separating from their metropolitan masters.

As the final collapse of the colonial system neared, a profound divergence in transatlantic trajectories opened up when the two monarchies suffered the effects of Napoleon's Iberian invasion. The toppling of Spain's Bourbons and the flight to Brazil of Portugal's Braganças made distinctive reactions inevitable, with regal legitimacy undermined more rapidly and violently in Spanish America. This difference proved decisive in the post-1808 prelude to independence and in the years following separation, the subject of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER thirty

War and revolution in the Iberian Atlantic



Jeremy Adelman

Introduction

After exterminating swaths of native peoples of the Americas, Iberian rulers and their allies created elaborate, stratified, loosely integrated, societies dependent on extensive coerced labour. Yet, they were remarkably stable, better known for their loyalty to monarchy than rebelliousness. When order did break down, as it did in spectacular fashion in the 1780s in the Andes, the fight was over venal governors, not bad monarchical government.

By the 1810, however, *Pax Iberica* was no more. Flames of violence had spread far and wide. Within a few years, entire regions, like Venezuela and the Banda Oriental, were depopulated. Colonial estates lay ruined. Countrysides were mobilised in fratricidal civil war. Many of the mines and silver trails were flooded, destroyed, the labour systems that buoyed them shattered. Three centuries after conquest and incorporation, European control had collapsed. Even where colonial elites managed to avoid the maw of civil war, as in Brazil, there was carnage and turmoil. The monarchy and territorial integrity of the colony hung on by their teeth while slave sedition spread in the northeast and warfare in the southern borderlands forced the court to bulk up their armies and go into debt. Their costs became important drivers of the dissolution of formal ties between Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro and strained Rio's ties to Brazilian provinces. Violence remade the Iberian Atlantic.

This presents us with a paradox on the eve of the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. Never had the Iberian colonies been so economically buoyant, populated, with growing cities, thriving estates, and confident merchant capitalists. The fledgling press, much of it hitched to the printers of the merchant guilds, exuded loyalty to the crown.

Whereas external threats and warfare—as Linda Colley (1992) has famously shown in the case of the British empire—tended to embolden political subjects to their wardens, the effect in the Iberian Atlantic dissolved the bonds of deference. Why?

Of the many explanations, this chapter focuses on one: how the transition to a militarised social and political order on the eve of the dissolution of the Spanish and Portuguese empires turned relatively combat-free colonial societies into warzones *before* they broke away from Lisbon and Madrid. It argues that the Iberian Atlantic became a theatre for the circulation of revolutionary impulses and the mobilisation of societies for war on a mass scale fuelled by a wider, global, war. It did so because rival imperial belligerents fastened their sights on Spain and Portugal's relationships to the Americas. This global war over colonial spoils folded inwards, setting off civil wars within empires. In turn, these civil wars put more pressure on Iberian *Ancien Régimes* to change—and eventually set off a cascade of secessions. This chapter accents the global, systemic, disequilibrium that swept up the Iberian empires, which led to the militarisation of politics up and down the late imperial chains. Imperial decomposition was the effect, and not cause, of a set of prior institutional transformations rooted in the way that modern military forces became instruments of power and of state-making, marking a sharp shift away from patrician rule to constitutionalism. In short, it was not declarations of independence that set off the violence. In this sense, war presaged debates about sovereignty and not the other way around.

While war and revolution had effects on the Iberian Atlantic at several scales at once, from imperial governance to local social conflicts, they were fused by a blow to the *Ancien Régimes*: Napoleon's invasion of Spain and Portugal in 1807, which ricocheted across the empires. The crisis of the *Ancien Régimes* began at their cores. Capitals (whether Madrid, or Lisbon, or viceregal Mexico City or Lima) struggled to preserve monarchy as the ballast of the empires; in so doing, governments contrived new methods of mobilisation and released new sources of strife. This meant that even after Napoleon's defeat and the restoration of monarchy in 1814, growing conflict in colonial fringes placed unprecedented demands on monarchs and ministers, boxing them into policies that escalated the conflict—and made any thought of returning to a reconditioned *pax Iberica* increasingly impossible. In contrast to the post-Napoleonic restoration of aristocratic, non-constitutional, rule in Europe, there was no

turning back the clock in the Iberian Atlantic.

Historians and their labyrinth

War and revolution have loomed large in the making of the Iberian Atlantic. This is true above all for the period known as the age of revolution, which has been understood as an era of possibility and as a cataclysm at one and the same time, of lofty proclamations about the principles of states and primal bloodshed over who spoke for their members. Notions of fraternal citizenship coexisted with—some might say fed off—the increasingly ritualised clashes between feuding cousins of the Iberian empires. Observers were fond of evoking the breakdown and breakup of Spanish rule as creating “anarchy” or its threat, the spectre of dissolving norms and rules into an orgy of wanton bloodshed. If the Portuguese-Atlantic is spared this narrative of failure and inevitable violence, it is only because it was seen never to have emerged from an ancient, patrimonial, mould; there was no downward spiral because—goes the familiar story—there was no concerted pressure to change.

There has been a fundamental ambiguity sown into how historians have grappled with the role of violence in the remaking of states in the Iberian Atlantic. Warfare and revolution were central to the birth of Iberian nations and the historians who assumed the mantle of creating foundational narratives for fledgling countries. They provided the dramatic elements of the first epics of patriotic nation-writing and nation-building. And yet, political violence was often seen as the scourge—warfare and revolutionary struggle brought down the pillars of the *Ancien Régimes*, or threatened to; political violence was necessary to pull down the old orders but it also thwarted the efforts to build new, constitutional, orders and played into the hands of personalist caudillos and tyrants who made political careers out of abilities to field armies and operate as spoilers. If the Brazilian counterpoint got idealised for conservatives, it was because the monarchy and ruling bloc managed to contain the furies of war and revolution. But this often meant that Brazil lacked emblematic, self-sacrificing icons and heroes for later patriotic narratives, the stuff of nation-building, triumphal mythography.

There is not much left of this patriotic hand-wringing nowadays—at least not among academic historians. The view among historians is that the crisis of the old imperial orders sired the idea of national

successors; the idea of Mexico, Brazil, or Spain emerged as a result of imperial decomposition instead of causing it. What is more, the breakdown of empire was the result of a crisis of the *Ancien Régimes* at the heart of empires, not in colonial efforts to break away. For instance, François-Xavier Guerra and Jaime Rodríguez O. emphasised the shocks to the old system coming from the Napoleonic invasion of 1807, which smashed the institutional bulwarks of the monarchy which—until then—had served remarkably well as defences of legitimacy (Guerra 1992; Rodríguez O. 1998). For Guerra, precocious expressions of modern political life—such as public opinion—were thrust upon the Hispanic monarchy from without, upsetting its organic chemistry. To Rodríguez, French aggression shattered the basic harmony of the regime. They differed in some basic ways; to Guerra, the intrusions were necessarily destabilising and set in motion the course of revolution, while Rodríguez accented a plausible compromise to rescue the Hispanic nation in the form of the Cádiz Constitution of 1812—which was spoiled by “extremists” in the colonies and in Spain who could not reconcile themselves to a more inclusionary imperial system.

There was an additional, modern, “shock” to Iberian systems that frequently got overlooked in the revisionist turn, but which the patriotic narrative once emphasised: the shock of escalating warfare and revolutionary violence. This chapter turns the spotlight back to a key theme of the patriotic narrative. But instead of presuming that violence was the expression of nations and nationalist pioneers coming into being through self-sacrifice and martyrdom, this chapter emphasises the political and institutional dimensions of violence which spawned a plethora of political practices and identities, many of them transcending and destabilising the drive to national self-determination and cohesion. Seen in this light, we can treat the origins of alternative forms of political communities—and the struggle over which would prevail—free of the normative deadweight of failed nations or fractured states.

Global war

It is important to begin the analysis at a scale above the imperial structures that were thrown into crisis. The global conflagration, fuelled by intensified rivalries of a European imperial inter-state system, did less to dislodge the appeal of empire than to shatter the

foundations of legitimacy that held them together, exemplified by the majesty of royal power that enjoyed supreme authority within imperial territories. What global war did was produce a fiscal crisis of empire and the molecular decomposition of political authority. The demise of the *dignitas* of the monarch and his power to exempt himself from the very rules of state he was expected to enforce translated into a full-blown crisis of sovereignty. A time-honoured response to emergencies, the power of rulers to invoke a “state of exception” that subordinates the wills and rights of subjects in order to enforce state authority, ceased to work. Even more: the efforts of rulers to uphold sovereignty by recourse to this method backfired and brought the sovereign to his knees (in Spain) or to flee (in Portugal). In this convulsion, a space opened up that enabled subjects to imagine anew the principles and practices of state power (Adelman 2006; Agamben 1998).

The crisis of the monarchies took place against large-scale efforts to give them new ballast. In the wake of the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), which firmed up the denominational lines in western Europe and settled some basic boundaries, European empires turned their rivalries more and more overseas, to the Atlantic and Indian ocean contests for spoils and colonies. Alexandre de Gusmão, the Portuguese imperial minister likened empires to bodies, and the flow of resources with trade was their lifeblood. What was needed was an “active” model of empire to replace the “passive” one, a system of commercial colonisation to supplant the spoils of conquest (Adelman 2006, 36). This led to a spiral of mercantilist wars, more treaties to manage the quarrel over possessions, especially in the New World, and outward concerns with territorial possessions and colonisation—no longer restricting imperial designs on commercial or predatory policy. This added pressure on the imperial pioneers, Spain and Portugal, as the targets for the newcomers. They also ramped up the rivalry between them, especially over the coveted River Plate gateway. In 1776, Charles III ordered an assault on Portuguese positions with a substantial fleet, 12 battalions of infantry and 12 companies of cavalry. The result handed Sacramento to new viceregal authorities in Buenos Aires, but also sowed the seeds for ongoing strife in future years.

Transatlantic competition and escalating mercantilist warfare motivated a round of deep imperial reform—with the aim of creating economic and fiscal structures that would withstand empires in an age of greater competition over markets, territories, and eventually the

loyalty of subjects. Various described as the Bourbon (for Spain) or Pombaline (for Portugal) reforms, they had multiple means to pursue a broad objective: to reconstitute the empires so that private rents and public revenues flowed more effectively to support and defend the territorial contours of imperial states. José de Gálvez, Minister of the Indies, proclaimed the military reforms because “the defence of the King’s rights is united to the defence of their property, their families, their patria, and their happiness” (McFarlane 2014, 16; Fradera 2005; Elliott 2006).

By tethering defence and loyalty, the reforms had important implications for political life within the empire. And this would contour the mechanisms of breakdown and breakup. The pressures of inter-locking rivalries, especially after the humiliation of the Seven Years War, and the fall of Havana and Manila to the British navy, compelled Spanish reformers to devise new means to enforce laws with the hope of generating revenues to defend the realm. Lumbering convoys were suspended in favour of licensing systems for trading ships. Viceregal habits ceded space to a multitude of new legal districts and officers, further pluralising the spatial layers of public authority. And scarcely patrolled frontiers were militarised, fortifications built, and militias trained, comprised of plebeian colonial populations, often free blacks and mulattos. Of course, the motivation for change was defensive, a reaction and response to the compound pressures of rivalry with other empires and with each other. But the effect was palpable and was meant to be palpable: to widen and deepen royal authority throughout the realm, and to couple territorial power to the concept of royal justice for a *populus Christianus* in the remaking of Spanish sovereignty. In Portugal, the rising costs of imperial defence pushed the monarchy into the waiting arms of British forces to act as wards, which meant in practice that Lisbon would follow London’s dictates and let local militias bear even more of the responsibility for colonial defences—which created a lasting legacy of fusing local rural powerholders with local commanding officers. The two monarchies diverged; if Spain sought to centralise its defences and governance, Portugal de-centralised (Fisher 1985; Kraay 2001; Stein and Stein 2003; Weber 2005). The struggle to preserve a central fabric in the Spanish realm would lead to popular mobilisation, increasing civil war, and finally an end to monarchy and the *Ancien Régime*, while in the Portuguese realm, the transatlantic ties finally snapped in the 1820s, but Brazil remained intact, slavery expanded, and monarchy became ever more important to the regime’s

legitimacy on both sides of the Atlantic.

In different ways, these measures, especially the new fiscal demands, risked tarnishing the king's character *angelicus*. Reconstituting the regimes provoked a riptide of opposition, less to the principles and more to the practices of new imperial sovereignty, both within the metropolises and more ominously in the colonies. To be sure, this was not unique to Iberian dominions, as British North American colonists revealed in the 1770s. In Lisbon, the Marquis de Pombal had always faced some formidable detractors, especially among the interests who were squeezed out by his preference for a new breed of merchant and investor. So, when his patron, King José I, died in 1777, the minister was soon exposed to his many critics and deposed. This did not scupper reform, but simply slowed it down. The reforms also provoked unrest in the colonies, albeit not as much because incumbent interests easily adapted to the new opportunities presented by commercial incentives. Still, hikes in taxes did signify a departure from the older colonial pacts, which had left so much colonial extraction outside the purview of collectors. The foiled Tiradentes revolt in Minas Gerais (early 1789) was one such episode, though it is worth adding that it was more of an exception to prove a rule about the ways in which Brazil adapted itself to new policies. The Túpac Amaru revolt in the Peru, Comunero uprisings further north, and seditious activity across New Spain testified to local opposition to fiscal demands and commercial privileges. Still, a resilient political theology of sovereignty remained an indispensable feature that legitimated the quest for revenues; it largely fell to local caciques and political brokers, like Mateo García Pumacahua in Cuzco—and their gendarmes—to restore order. Indeed, since so many of the “rebellions” arose under the banner of a *populus Christianus*, defending it against corrupt officials and venal merchants, it was easy for authorities to claim they were on the side of the rebels—in spirit, if not always in deed (McFarlane 1983).

The king's envoys could thus shroud themselves in his angel wings. It was when the king had his wings clipped that the extractive machine of the *Ancien Régime* lurched into a legitimacy crisis of imperial proportions. To rush to this endpoint, however, skips some crucial steps in the passage to crisis. Indeed, the pace and process of reform did not let up; popular local resistances merely redirected the focus of reform. As the eighteenth century unfolded, all Atlantic empires contrived measures to combine more thoroughly labour with natural resources. This intensified after the fiscal stalemate of the

1770s; thereafter, reformers impressed upon the crown the necessity of expanding the regime's commercial rents to its merchant classes as a precondition for enlisting more revenues flowing into imperial coffers. To the defence of the territorial reach of their domains were added greater efforts to promote the traffic in African slaves and the release of Indians from their villages to create a substratum of labourers upon whose shoulders the fate of trading empires would rest. The result was an increasingly autonomous and lucrative business that expanded the pool of commercial rents into which imperial authorities could dip for revenues, and a puissant class of merchant capitalists in the colonies to whom monarchs and ministers could turn for loans and loyalties. A renewed pact was in the making, of merchants and monarchs, allied to partition the spoils of an extractive economy and plough resources into the business of sacralising authority. The effectiveness of the rents-for-revenues arrangement—the exchange of loyalty to crown authorities in return for protection of merchant trading rackets—gave the empire a buoyancy that came in handy when times got very tough (Adelman 2006; Gelman 1998; Marichal 1999).

World in revolution

The outbreak of the French Revolution intensified the changes under way. As it spread outwards into a struggle over the future of monarchy in Europe and empire across the Atlantic, it pushed the Portuguese government to the mercies of the British and caught Spain in a vice between a revolutionary neighbour and the British navy overseas. Wars, especially Spain's with France from 1793 to 1795, and then more crippling with England from 1796 to 1802, and then again from 1804 to 1808 after the failure of the "Peace" of Amiens, intensified the pressures on the Iberian empires, especially Spain. Charles IV's favourite advisor, Manuel de Godoy, had to flip flop between opposing and aligning with the French. Unable to intimidate neighbouring revolutionary armies and Napoleonic successors, Madrid was forced into crippling wars with Britain. The one solace for the Portuguese Crown was not having to face a direct threat from France over land. The problems were increasingly clear in the 1790s, for the more insightful imperial analysts of the time worried about the sustainability of their regimes under duress.

Should the global situation deteriorate, some worried, extreme

measures had to be considered. One, the brainchild of the influential minister to the Court in Lisbon, Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, who had handled the treasury's growing debts with some skill, involved a recognition that Brazil was as important to the future of the imperial monarchy as the metropole. If the court were to run into a serious crisis, the monarchy should consider relocating the centre of the empire to a New World capital, Rio de Janeiro. Similar plans were considered in Madrid but were quickly squelched (Silva Lisboa 1804; Maxwell 1973).

Global war produced contradictory effects. As warships prowled the sea lanes eyeing Spanish cargos destined for European ports, the globalisation of the conflict crippled Iberian merchant houses who were already under pressure to bankroll defences at home. Furthermore, metropolitan merchants also had to endure colonial merchants' demands for rights to trade with neutral partners. While peninsular trade often suffered, American commerce surged in new directions. The slave trade, for instance, boomed. Indeed, trade flourished *within* the empires, though not necessarily (unless there was a pause in the fighting) *between* the metropolises and their possessions. The result was a commercial blow to merchant capitalists of Spain and Portugal—which was important, because when the fighting would finally settle down at the end of the bellicose cycle in 1814, battered peninsular merchant capitalists sought to claw back their commercial rents, even if it meant alienating the increasingly autonomous merchants in colonial outposts. As with the distribution of imperial rents, so with imperial revenues; the metropolises faced growing fiscal crises as defence costs spiked, but revenues from trade dwindled, while in the colonies, there was a similar rise in expenditures, but treasury income also rose, though not always at the same pace. From the 1790s, the metropolises leaned ever more heavily on the colonies for remittances; the Indies became the single largest source of income for the imperial treasuries, but subject to wild shifts and vulnerabilities to attacks along the sea lanes. The result was a turn to greater borrowing, which grew increasingly coercive as warfare ravaged public accounts. This was a story about a double dependency of imperial sovereignty: the centres of empires on their peripheries, and the state upon merchant capital to buoy it through years of inter-imperial warfare (Barbier 1980; Garner 1993).

Warfare and revolution also had the effect of redoubling anxieties. Especially the grand fear of slave insurrection in the wake of the uprisings on Saint Domingue, rumours of slave unrest in Bahia, and

snuffed sedition in Venezuela and Nueva Granada led rulers and ruled to pull back from any revolutionary temptations lest they lead to “race war.” “I confess”, wrote the Venezuelan creole Francisco de Miranda in 1798,

that much though I desire the independence and liberty of the New World, I fear anarchy and revolution even more. God forbid that other countries suffer the same fate as Saint Domingue ... better they should remain another century under the barbarous and senseless oppression of Spain.

(Pagden 1990, 12)

Adaptations to global war had important effects on the internal balancing of empire. Dependency on the fringes gave to local brokers an important role in maintaining the equipoise within empire that was being ravaged by conflict between them. Increasingly, the primary sites in the governance of colonial affairs were merchant guilds and municipal councils. Viceroy and high courts still weighed in, but there was a notable devolution of authority to the delegated authorities of colonial ruling blocs and their assemblies of local potentates (Paquette 2007). Governance and extraction became more complex, sovereignty more hybrid and fluid. The Spanish empire was hardly a feeble or brittle regime lying in wait for the last blow to bring it down (Lynch 1985; Brading 1983).

One of the implications of the summary above is that we cannot point to increasingly outdated notions of sovereignty as the source of the problem, as if imperial sovereignty were contained within a mould out of which it could not change or adapt. The breakdowns did not occur as prophesied (by Abbé Raynal, Adam Smith, and other figures of the Enlightenment), as an affliction that would sweep the older empires of Spain and Portugal away for being relics of a by-gone era. These empires were not doomed to collapse; nor were they cracking from within. Still, there was plenty of anxiety, stoked by a global context of instability and uncertainty. For the time being, at least, the prevailing discourse of public affairs was steeped in loyalism. Indeed, global pressures emboldened efforts to accommodate within inherited allegiances and ideas of imperial political economy of empire a new balance between merchants and monarchs (Pocock 1985; Root 1994).

The problem was that the dynamics of the French Revolution could not be contained. They could not be contained because they unfolded within an empire—that remained intact even after the execution of

the French king and queen in 1793. Napoleon was committed not to restore the *Ancien Régime* but the empire that it had created. He sent troops to Saint Domingue to put down the slave revolt. That did not go well, and after his defeat there in 1804, he set his sights on alternatives. In the wake of Britain's botched efforts to invade the River Plate in 1806, once Russia got knocked out at the Battle of Friedland (secret clauses of the Treaty of Tilsit gave France a free hand to take over Iberia while St Petersburg would get what it wanted from the Ottomans), and cued by some reformers in Madrid and a few in Lisbon (the so-called *afrancesados*), Napoleon turned on the Iberian peninsula, hoping to strap it to his wider ambitions to export the revolution. In October 1807, he manoeuvred the unpopular and increasingly desperate Godoy into an agreement (the Treaty of Fontainebleau) to allow French troops to cross Spain en route to Portugal to prevent the Braganza court in Lisbon from throwing its fate to the British. In return, the Luso-Atlantic gains would be partitioned between the victors. It was a gambit that failed. Instead, Napoleon's armies marched on Lisbon, though not in time to prevent the royal family, treasury, retinue, and library from being escorted by British warships out of the harbour and on to Rio de Janeiro to set up a new capital, and a new world monarchy, in Brazil. Napoleon also immediately pivoted on internal affairs in Spain, deposed and gaoled Charles IV and his son, Fernando VII, and replaced them with his brother Joseph, who promised to bring peace and constitutionalism to the Spanish empire. The result was to shock the pillars of sovereignty in the Spanish and Portuguese empires and export Europe's conflagration.

Revolutions in sovereignty

The Spanish reformer, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, observed that the breakup of the Spanish empire was a civil war contained within and unleashed by a broader, global conflagration (cit. Alvarez Junco 2001, 121). What sealed the fate of Spain's empire was not the rigidity of sovereignty, nor the refusal to deal with local claims, nor the inability to find new means to embolden loyalty to king and country. It was the inability to escape the maw of "total war" as it spread to far reaches of the Atlantic world. The difference about total war, a fundamental change in the nature of organised armed conflict as an all-encompassing struggle of annihilation, was that victory was no

longer limited to contested borderlands in the fringes, but over how regimes would be ruled at home and abroad. David Bell cites Clausewitz:

the war of the present is a war of all against all. It is not the King who wars on a king, not an army which wars on an army, but a people which wars on another, and the king and the army are contained in the people.

The future of monarchy itself, the integrative emblem of imperial sovereignty, was at stake; and as the stakes rose, the conflict between systems escalated—and in the end folded the violence between empires into carnage within them (Bell 2007, 241).

In effect, global imperial war turned inwards into a revolutionary war that took on increasingly lethal, and fratricidal, features. Napoleon also brought on local, guerrilla, insurgencies, which afflicted his cause in what he called his “Spanish ulcer”. Immortalised by the doomed uprisings of the second of May 1808—which spawned Francisco Goya’s haunting portrait of French firing squads shooting civilians—the war grew ever more brutal. By 1810, large pockets of Spain had turned into killing fields. When the French Marshal Suchet cleared Upper Aragon of guerrillas, he seized the local insurgent, known as Pesoduro, to make an emblem of the futility of resistance. French soldiers cut off his hands while Pesoduro was still alive and nailed them for public viewing, then they dragged him, bleeding, to a scaffold. The rope broke three times, and only on the fourth try did the French manage not to cockup the execution and kill their captive. Pesoduro’s death presaged a style of warfare that would fan out across the Spanish empire and in some cases spill into the Portuguese (Tone 1994, 126).

What exported the local carnage was the monarchy’s double dependency on merchant capitalists at home and local power brokers in the fringes to bankroll the regimes’ defences. Under conditions of total war, fiscal demands rose while commercial orientations splintered. Peninsular merchants resented concessions to open trade in the colonies, while merchants in the colonies made these concessions the *quid* for their fiscal *pro*. In the Portuguese empire, the problem was less acute because peninsular merchants already had to accept their junior partnership to Brazilian and British magnates; besides, the war at home and conflicts in Brazil paled beside the mobilisations across the Spanish empire. In effect, Iberian colonies were thrown open as

markets to “friendly” or “neutral” trading partners. The Portuguese were the first to announce this as a principle for the new imperial political economy; Souza Countinho, while still aboard the flotilla crossing the Atlantic en route from Lisbon, drafted an “Open Ports” decree which the Prince João VI announced to great fanfare when he disembarked in the tropics. That it was the ruler who announced the decree would make it hard for merchants back home to disobey. In Spanish American ports, the openings were more halting; there was greater resistance because the agents of peninsular houses feared that this would be the death knell to Cádiz (with good reason). Meanwhile, the struggling Spanish government, retreated to Cádiz, couldn’t easily open colonial ports without alienating the merchants in the peninsular port upon whom the government was increasingly dependent for loans to sustain itself. What this meant was great friction at the top of the ruling class of the empires, unravelling the ties of dependency between merchants and monarchs. But as some colonies proclaimed their autonomy within empire in the absence of a ruling king, the interests of colonial and peninsular merchants diverged; the imperial ruling class split (Adelman 2006, 238–246; Costeloe 1981).

It is important to note, however, that the growing weakness of state structures after 1808 did not provoke secessionist movements when it would have been easiest for colonies to “exit”. Indeed, for more years than the patriotic historiography is comfortable admitting, colonial and metropolitan ruling classes wrangled over the crisis as rival claims over “loyalty”. However, warfare, and the need to squeeze resources from sources across the empires did compel a radical shift in the conduct of public affairs—pushing *Ancien Régimes* to new modes of representation to legitimate fiscal claims and exactions. It is for this reason that, in provinces of empire that most spiralled into war (in the River Plate, Venezuela, and Nueva Granada), the shock of modern politics most upended old, patrician, practices that sustained the old, colonial, pact. It also explains why, as in Brazil, the shock of war and modern politics were less dramatic, more easily absorbed within fabric of the old order. The politics of discussion, debate, and in some quarters confrontation about managing the crisis, yielded to changes in sovereignty because they created room for people to disagree about their ideas and their interests about the future. In the prolonged improvisation after 1808, old coordinates gave way; the principles and practices of rulership were compelled to change before the actual rulers themselves.

A search for new means to legitimate the old order ensued. Striking

at the cores of the Spanish empire, French armies forced ruling cliques on both sides of the Atlantic to improvise to rescue the empire. These improvisations were hardly home-spun inventions. Nor were they random. Indeed, there has been an unsettled debate over whether the first instincts of interim rulers were to remit to ancient Natural Law in the case of emergency—which supposed that in the absence of the kind, sovereignty reverted to an ancient concept of “the people”. Most historians would now concede that there some feudal precedent may have been on the minds of some. But overwhelmingly it was the example of other regimes’ search for legitimacy, premised on practices of public representation, that provided the models (Rodríguez 1998; Chiaramonte 1994).

The first shock was the transformation in “voice”, a transformation, it was hoped, that would embolden the love of subjects for the monarch, even if he was out of the picture. Subjects had to accept as legitimate those who spoke on his behalf. The printing press burst to life to broadcast the loyalist cause. Instructions flowed forth to lift restrictions (in Mexico, Lima, Buenos Aires and elsewhere) or allowed printers to operate where they did not yet exist (Caracas, Chile, and elsewhere) to re-sacralise monarchy and restore confidence in ministers. While Fernando languished in French captivity, the interim government in Spain fled the pursuing French armies to Andalusia. From there, it abolished the inquisition and declared an end to censorship. The printing press, once treated with suspicion, became a key instrument in the campaign to promote colonial loyalty to the king and Spain—and resistance to French and France’s promises. The Venezuelan journalist and jurist, Miguel José Sanz, argued that public opinion was indeed the only true force capable of containing political passions and ensuring that good laws got passed. Good laws, after all, are the only ones that patriots can love. “The state and political force of law is the result of this opinion”, he noted in late 1810 (Sanz 1988, 89).

With time, however, the very instrument that was unfettered to legitimate the Spanish government gave way to more and more lurid accounts of colonial administrators’ misdemeanours and eventually a means to broadcast bad news from the metropole. Perhaps the most notorious was Camilo Torres’ *Memorial de Agravios* which catalogued grievances against imperial authorities after they suppressed an uprising in Quito calling for more radical reforms. He insisted that Americans were not “strangers within the Spanish nation”, but sons, “descendants of those who spilled their blood to acquire new

dominions for the Spanish crown". Instead of gratitude and recognition, Americans were now getting the opposite. After denouncing the Spanish governor, Torres trumpeted "equality, sacred right of equality; justice that rests on you and gives what belongs to each of us, may you inspire European Spain with these sentiments of Spanish America" (Torres 1977, 29). Governments and governors had to cope with the birth of public opinions; this meant contending with dissent with inquisitorial zeal or indifference was likely to produce much more than mere consent of the governed. To be sure, public opinions were free in degrees: it was more open in some corners, like Buenos Aires and Bogotá, but was muzzled in Mexico and in Peru, where Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal greeted the new liberal degrees with dismay. But even these holdouts against public opinion opened up (Guerra and Lempérière 1988; Uribe-Uran 2000; Guedea 2000; Peralta Ruiz 2002; Silva 1988).

What followed cannot be simplified or reduced to "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary" mobilisation. Calls for independence were scarce. It is true, Paraguay bolted, and Caracas and Cartagena considered following suit; there were also republicans in New Spain, especially following the parish priest, Father José Manuel Morelos. Mostly, republicans got crushed. Paraguay aside, the call for outright independence did not resolve itself with secession.

For the most part, a feud erupted over how best to cope with the crisis of the empire, using new means to legitimate it in order to revive it. There were areas where early triumphs of autonomism and even secessionism took the political reins but crumbled under the weight of internal dissent and opposition from loyalist circles who loathed the liberating decrees—as well as the taxes and the turmoil. This was clear all along the northern belt of South America. Caracas' "liberators" soon faced opposition from loyalists in Maracaibo. The magnates of the city, who liked home rule, inspired the wrath of plebeian *llaneros* who bridled at the aristocratic contempt that many creoles, like Francisco de Miranda and Simón Bolívar, felt for the rustic folk in the countryside, where, among other things, men from the Canary Islands, or provincial Asturians—like José Tomás Boves—had assimilated into the fabric of rural life. An earthquake in March 1812 brought all the roiling tensions to the capital: the bishops thundered that this was God's gesture of opprobrium against the liberal pretenders who were building their Tower of Babel where once the edifice of loyalism and Christian belief stood proud. Venezuela became a bleeding ground. So, did the north coast of Nueva Granada,

where the ports of Cartagena and Santa Marta—outposts of autonomism and loyalism respectively—glared at each other across the slave belt that seethed with runaways, armed bands of *libertos*, and where Bolívar offered his revolutionary services after the Caracas regime collapsed in the rubble of its seismic justice. There were a few cases of survival. For instance, home-rulers within empire on one shore of the River Plate got the upper hand and kept it. They immediately found themselves embroiled in conflicts with loyalists all around—from the Andes to the Banda Oriental, with Brazilian armies bolstering royalism from the north. The provinces of Paraguay and Buenos Aires were lonely outposts of secession that had not folded back into the Spanish regime by 1814, and Buenos Aires did not declare independence *per se* until 1816.

The crisis over the meaning of membership in empire cascaded into new domains of public life, especially the nascent electoral activity and public opinion. In so doing, it ushered new social actors on to the political stage. These included hitherto marginalised sectors of freed subjects of African descent and increasing numbers of slaves seized the opportunity to break the chains of bondage. It also included members of Indian communities who seized their opportunity to expand the range of voice. For both, the summons for subjects of the crown to choose their deputies to constitutional assemblies provoked a debate—and a fight—over who got the right to play the new political game. Across the region, direct elections became mechanisms for legitimating new orders and the means to choose representatives to constitutional conventions to draft them. Ballot-casting (or hand-raising) rituals were often the first time communities celebrated public events that were not organised directly by the Church (Ternavasio 1995; Drake 2009).

The invention of a rights-bearing citizen had profound effects on older understandings of race and ethnicity and reveal how a universal rhetoric of liberalism erased the formal ascriptions and restrictions of caste conjugated within the old regime's ornate, particularising practices of social membership according to bloodline and place in a social hierarchy. Beyond capital cities, the official meaning of Indian referred to membership in a particular landholding community governed by the colonial *República de Indios* and the traditional place of the Church. But rather than throw off tradition, Indians poised themselves simultaneously as *miserable*, endowed with ancient rights and as citizens with liberal ones.

A generation of Indians began to make effective political careers

out of juggling several legal claims and political identities. Even in the smallest hamlets, little “*repúblicas*” sprang to life—and it would be from these wellsprings that indigenous political leaders would emerge to shape future republics. In some cases, liberalism activated a shift in local indigenous rule. Andean *kurakas* or ethnic chiefs with inherited rights claimed by noble lineage made way for rotating authorities and arriviste leaders, many of whom cut their teeth as veterans fighting on both sides of the independence wars. Far from ancient aristocrats, these men were rough around the edges, muleteers, petty *hacendados*, and cattle rustlers. To outsiders, it seemed as if village politics had been thrown into turmoil and the provincial space shattered into microcosmic communities after generations of control from above. For villagers, convening the people spawned new practices of local citizenship that gave the fledgling order elements of much-needed legitimacy. At the same time, as warfare deepened, it mobilised indigenous communities to fight on all sides. Some communities aligned with royalists, seeking to defend or restore an ancient colonial pact. In some cases, and in increasing numbers, they tilted to the side of revolutionaries. It was in this way that warfare moved up and down the scales of the polity, from the formation of imperial armies in Spain and Portugal, to local villages riven by rival loyalties.

A similar dynamic also mobilised Afro-Latin Americans, especially in areas where the feuding got increasingly militarised. In Brazil, for instance, the conflict was contained; insurrections in Bahia and in the southern Platine provinces got snuffed out. The Republic of Pernambuco got crushed. Before they had any chance of unleashing widespread mobilisation of slaves, Brazilian elites managed to patch their differences—in part because of a shared *grand peur* of a Haitian-style crisis. In many Spanish American provinces, meanwhile, mixed-race peoples, free blacks, and emancipated slaves rallied to more radical ideas of emancipation and even questioning fealty to monarchs and empire if they would not embrace more equal concepts of citizenship. Rebel leaders like José de Artigas in the Banda Oriental, or the *mulatto* Manuel Piar in Venezuela, promised freedom outright to any slave who joined their armies. It was for this reason that Simón Bolívar eventually embraced, after many defeats, the abolitionist cause in 1814. Even the royalist general, Pablo Morillo, saw the same light five years later as the empire was finally cracking up—but by that time, his was a concession that was too little, too late (Blanchard 2008; Lasso 2007).

Everywhere, the splintering and feuding took its toll. Campaigns to

liberate Upper Peru from royalists who obeyed Abascal in Lima destroyed the colonial labour recruitment systems for the silver mines. In Mexico, the massive uprising led by Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla also disrupted the old colonial economic structures and forced the viceroy to field large armies to put down the rebels—with an ever-tighter budget.

In spite of the splintering, the upheavals after 1808 left loyalists and their armies in control of most of the core Iberian possessions. This was hardly the fall from power that so many Enlightened prognosticators would have predicted for Spain. On the other hand, nor was this prolonged status—seven years of limbo—buoyed by a shared sense of basic norms and political practices. Voice and representation did not fill the void of a hobbled sovereign but gave rise to a spectrum of civil conflicts within the international one. Some swept autonomists into local feuds. Some contained the friction within the vessel of an *Ancien Régime* controlled by astutely pragmatic, if staunchly conservative, viceroys. Abascal, having crushed insurgencies from Ecuador to the Altiplano, became the architect of viceregal continuity in Lima; only a few surviving *republiquetas* remained, clinging to legal ideas of equality and freedom from ancient tithes. General Félix María Calleja accomplished the same in New Spain after his armies crushed Hidalgo's and Morelos' forces. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the king himself kept a lid on rumblings on the northeast and southern borderlands.

There may have been a breakdown, but not a breakup. The empires shook, but they did not fall apart when their centres were at their weakest. Portuguese and Spanish armies and guerrillas, supported by a British expeditionary force, drove the French out of the peninsula in a gruelling war; colonial armies put down rebels and insurgents. Only the fissiparous River Plate provinces had successfully defected by 1814, though still without having declared independence (Paraguay being the only provincial exception—and there is some debate about whether Asunción's break away was directed more against Buenos Aires than against Madrid). In that year, Ferdinand returned to power in Spain, determined to reassert control over his fragile empire.

It was then, when the restored regime tried to restore the *status quo ante*, that frail systems began to go up in flames; Fernando's counter-revolution begat a revolution and took the violence to new depths.

From civil war to revolution

In June 1814, at a critical gateway to Caracas, the royalist forces under José Tomás Boves clashed with and crushed the crumbling republican armies. The warlord Boves took special delight in slaughtering his opponents and public desecration of their corpses. After the battle, he took morbid delight with his victory, mixing the festive with the funereal: he dined with a captured commander Col. Diego Jalón, then publicly humiliated him before his fellow captives, ordered 200 lashes, then they all watched him be executed; his head shared the fate of others at the end of a pike for all to see (Pérez Tenreiro n.d., 91–92; McFarlane 2014, 126–129).

No side monopolised the escalating ritualisation of violence. Boves' atrocities echoed Bolívar's own infamous declaration a year earlier to wage a *guerra a muerte* campaign to consolidate Venezuela's freedom. In fact, his promise to exterminate the region of Spaniards and Canary Islanders exemplified the new logic of total war. He offered rewards for Spanish severed heads, and promotions to soldiers who had executed *peninsulares*. In Mexico, José Vicente Gómez began, around late 1812, to castrate his Spanish captives; indeed, assassinations had become routine as hatred simmered below the surface of the restored viceroyalty. The turn from gentlemanly debate to bloody score-settling was perhaps best captured by one of its apostles: Mariano Moreno. As the Secretary of the First Junta in Buenos Aires, he issued a blueprint of revolution in which he wrote that "moderation is a weakness when a system is adopted in circumstances that do not require it. Never in a revolution has moderation and tolerance been adopted with success." In a gruesome passage outlining the practicalities of securing the revolution, he advocated "cutting heads, spilling blood and sacrificing at all costs, even when it means adopting means that look like the customs of cannibals and Caribs" (Moreno 1915, 307; Adelman 2010).

What happened? The implosion of the Spanish empire grew more lethal as it reverberated from the metropole where it began. In so doing, the principles of sovereignty that enforced exploitation and legitimated social inequality yielded to a vacuum—and the vacuum divided and separated groups of people into rival camps whose disagreements cascaded into localised civil war, understood as "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities", occasioned by a break in legal authority, the fragmentation of juridical spaces, and intensified by efforts to restore an old order. It is important to underscore that animosities produced group divides; the divides and differences followed the conflict and

carnage. The stepped-up conflict shaped political choices over who was the enemy, and how to rid it in an effort to restore, or create anew, a model of sovereignty. So, even where loyalism prevailed or triumphed, there was nonetheless a spectre of a crisis of sovereignty—the consequence of accumulated years of global warfare and the shock of the French invasion (Kalyvas 2006).

But that is only the first step; after all, civil wars can be, and often were, contained within local boundaries. What happened after 1814 was that, in an effort to impose order, the restored king promised to “pacify” his unruly provinces in the Americas. Ferdinand VII wanted nothing to do with compromises or legalised improvisations. Unaware of just how precarious the legitimacy of the crown was, he wanted to restore the image of the Christian Rex, with all his glory—and might. Despite several counsellors arguing that the political conflict could be resolved with mediation and conciliation, Fernando was determined to avenge the monarchy and exterminate the critics. In part, he was driven by pride after the humiliation of French captivity. In part, he was prodded by Spanish merchants, bruised by war at home, the loss of American markets, and the destruction of their trading privileges, to restore their old grip on Atlantic commerce. They promised to finance the king’s pacification campaign in return for the restoration of their old monopolies. Thus it was that both sides of the merchant-monarch pact sought to roll the clock back. This turned local feuds into a full-blown revolution.

The intensification of civil war, especially after 1814, “endogenised” the crisis of sovereignty, meaning that it deepened the rifts, made them un-reconcilable, increasingly divorced from the original causes of discord, and the butchery made all sides retreat to near-extremist sides. Politics had become a matter of life or death—not just justice or rulership. Total war was not something restricted to the battlefields of revolutionary Europe but determined the fate of cousins within the Spanish realm itself, relatives now “reimagined” as enemies. Ten years earlier there were proclamations of fealty organised around coalitions forged by the apportioning of rents and revenues. This was all gone.

Fernando sent instructions to his most reactionary officers to restore a fictive absolutism, dissolving the Cortes, and ordering the mass arrest of liberal reformers at home and in the colonies. Where he ran into fierce resistance and insurgents, he dispatched tens of thousands of troops now released from the peninsular campaign. The largest army to cross the Atlantic set sail for Venezuela and Nueva

Granada under General Pablo Morillo to “pacify” the colonies. Fence-sitters were frightened. And plebeian forces that had become champions of local autonomy and the abolition of slavery were outraged. Morillo was forced to drive a scorched earth campaign across vast swaths of territory; his lieutenants resorted to atrocity to drive Venezuelans and Nueva Granadans back into the fold—which had the effect not only of emboldening opponents to Spanish restoration but demolishing the economy upon which imperial merchants had hoped to make renewed fortunes. Henry Wellesley, the British ambassador, sent a confidential memorandum to Lord Castlereagh warning that the returning king threatened to shatter the “nation” which had finally rid itself of French occupiers: “The King will be in difficulties if he rejects the Constitution.” The words were prophetic, though not necessarily because the charter had endeared itself to citizens but because they were not prepared to slide back into vassaldom, especially if citizenship had promised to deliver them from feudal or colonial-extractive burdens (Fraser 2008, 469; Blanchard 2006; Lasso 2007; Guardino 2005).

If he wanted to impress his character *angelicus*, one of Fernando’s preferred methods was the justice of an avenging angel. When Pumacahua, the loyalist cacique from the Peruvian highlands, heard that the constitution had been abrogated and that old colonial tithes might be restored, he cast off his allegiances to the crown. Here was a sign that the monarch was willing to sever his commitments to the ancient colonial pact, which many numbers of Indian loyalists in the highlands fought to defend against republican and creole forces. But their condition for subaltern loyalty was a reformed colonial pact sanctified under the 1812 Constitution; Pumacahua’s loyalty to that charter made him an enemy of the king. For this, he was hunted down and became one of the “revolution’s” names on a growing list of martyrs. By 1816, one of the few *republiquetas* to survive the savagery of Spanish repression was Ayopaya, whose guerrillas, based in the towering highland hamlets of Palca, Machaca, and Inquisiui, menaced the roads—and silver caravans—around La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro (Adelman 2010; Arnade 1957).

Violence of this sort and scale had the paradoxical effect of revitalising secessionist coalitions to include many who embraced home-rule or autonomy within empire or the Constitution of 1812. Whereas Bolívar had all but given up on his cause by 1815, Spanish revanchism gave him a new lease on life, for it spurred many corners, classes, and castes of colonial society to resist turning the clock back.

Now the civil war intensified, and in doing so accelerated the mobilisation and militarisation of Indians, slaves, and plebeian populations. By 1820, Ferdinand's ambitions were not just losing him loyalists in the colonies: unrest shot through the very pillar of authority upon which he most rested. The army, exhausted from years of fighting, unpaid, on foul rations, had had enough. When the discontent finally broke out in military revolts in the peninsula itself (specifically among troops gathered in Cádiz for a second punitive expedition, this time bound for the River Plate), the logic of restoring the *Ancien Régime* collapsed, bringing down the power of the monarchy in the metropole. There was no *mysticum* left of the king's body. There was little to remain loyal to. The armies of empire folded up their tents, joined secessionists or went home. It is at this point that "declarations of independence" spread as responses to the shakeup of empire at the core; if in 1807 Napoleon issued the first blow to the image of royal authority, by 1820 the blows were self-inflicted (Anna 1983; Woodward 1968).

It is worth contrasting Fernando's strategy of restoration to the policies taken in Rio de Janeiro—to reinforce the point that the fate of the Spanish Atlantic was not foreordained. In Brazil, mercantile elites had joined forces with the ennobled slavocracy to give new ballast to the Braganza dynasty which, in fleeing to the New World, had "Americanised" itself—and became more visible to colonial subjects. Rio de Janeiro had become a kind of tropical Versailles. Royalist pageantry and the dispensation of noble titles to rich colonists was the symbolic cover for a recalibration of sovereignty, defined above all by the decision in 1815 to make Brazil a "Kingdom" in its own right, to accompany Portugal and Algarves. This was no longer, therefore, a "Portuguese" empire, but a Luso-Atlantic one—a formulation that Souza Coutinho had recognised was a fact before a decree. The shift inspired the empire's jurists, legislators, and political economists to celebrate the sagacity of the monarch. There was no one more euphoric than Edmund Burke's Portuguese translator, José da Silva Lisboa, soon to be ennobled as the Viscount of Cairú for his efforts to give intellectual and legal principles to the new regime. He celebrated the king's promotion of open trade: echoing Montesquieu's idea of *doux commerce*, he noted that "where there is commerce there is *doçura* (softness) of customs, and where there is *doçura* of customs there is commerce". The slave trade boomed, exports prospered, and British capitalists lined up behind the modified *Ancien Régime* (Silva Lisboa 1810, iv; Schultz 2001).

But not everyone shared this New World royalism with the same enthusiasm. The proximity of the monarchy, and the burdens of war back in Portugal, as well as chronic fighting against rebellious forces in the south, foisted much of the fiscal burdens of continuity on Brazilians. Some provinces felt more aggrieved at being strapped tightly to Rio de Janeiro than the old, looser, bonds to Lisbon. There was a major uprising in Pernambuco against Rio de Janeiro's new powers, and the conflict in the southern borderlands also accentuated localist feelings. And then there was the cost of Portuguese reconstruction after the French occupation. Combined, reconstruction and simmering civil conflict left the government hobbled with massive debts and undermined the new pact of co-dependency between merchants and monarchs. Garrisons in the south of Brazil seethed with resentment for their campaigns appeared to be fruitless; many defected. Meanwhile, in the north, in Bahia particularly, discontent in the ranks broke into the open with mutinies. This was not a comforting context for big sugar planters in a province where slave uprisings were endemic. In the end, though, the strongest opposition to a New World monarchy came from the old metropole, Portugal, where liberals clamoured for a constitution to limit governance from Brazil and merchants seethed over their loss of old privileges. It was to prevent Portuguese secession that João made his fateful decision to return to Lisbon to preserve the strained bonds between "two kingdoms" (Barman 1988, 43–55).

Conclusion

An important shift in the nature of conflict over sovereignty had taken place. The effort to strengthen a delicate sovereignty by force blew what was left of its legitimacy and shattered the unstable compromises of previous years. Civil war within empire took the place of global wars between empires as the source of disequilibrium. The sequence is important to underscore because it addresses how the invention of politics, from the printing press to the public desecration of bodies, created a vacuum, and the vacuum created possibilities that were hitherto unimaginable—virtuous and horrible. Secessions were responses to crises of sovereignty, produced first by international and subsequently by civil war. They were not home-grown exit options maturing within empire and associated with a "self-evident" different model of national sovereignty, announcing themselves into existence

when the oppressions of empire grew too onerous or the opportunities to secede too tempting to dismiss. Indeed, disequilibrium within empire wrought by warfare toppled incumbent regimes long before successors could fill the void. This is important because declarations of “independence” in the name of nations yielded to the very same propensities to breakup as the empire they rejected. As the Spanish empire imploded on itself, incipient understandings of sovereignty inheriting the same complex traits of regionalism, racialised labour systems, and models of representation improvised during the struggle to shore up empire.

Warfare did more than make enemies out of cousins and add butchery to the arsenal of politics in Spanish America. It also overturned the social order that once provided the spinal column for old colonial worlds. As the forced labour systems became ravaged and plebeian folk flocked to armies and guerrilla forces on all sides (half the foot-soldiers of liberating armies were manumitted slaves), the plurality of notions of sovereignty was hard to contain in a single mould—whether national or imperial. Subaltern actors, from Indian villagers of Oaxaca to the free blacks of Cartagena, asserted their own views of government, adding to the disequilibria that pushed former colonial peoples further from the possibility of any restored empire. They also nurtured popular conceptions of sovereignty.

But popular did not necessarily imply national. There were plenty of plebeian declarations of fealty to the old regime—too many to presume a primordial horizontal break between the ruled and rulers declared in the name of popular nationhood. Slaves sought freedoms under regal justice; Indians fought to defend traditional immunities from civil law under viceregal banners. And they often fought each other across ideological lines as the war decomposed into civil strife.

One last stage of this process needs to be mentioned. As the tensions and violence turned inward, and warfare and politics became more and more “irregular” (in the sense that partisanship became more bellicose, and armed conflict lacked front lines), the geographic fundamentals that had been packed into the adapted notions of imperial sovereignty—that is, jurisdiction over territorial spaces up to definable limits—fractured deeply. It was not just the Spanish empire that broke up. So did the legal spaces that once governed the outposts in the New World. Viceroyalties and captaincies-general, once the bounded units of governance, fought among themselves and within each other over the cartography of sovereignty. So, with the collapse of the social hierarchy dominated by merchant elites and colonial governors, there

was also a crumbling of the territoriality of sovereignty. Should the successors to imperial formations be made of self-defining provinces, confederations, autonomous villages of Indians, or runaway slaves, or centralised nation-states ruled from capital cities? When constitutional delegates gathered over the course of the 1820s—truly, the Iberian Atlantic's decade of constitutionalism—it was precisely this variety of models and concepts that had to be reconciled in new arrangements.

In the end, there was little of the past that could be redeemed, no shared memory of a set of virtuous practices or understandings to which the delegates could turn as precedent. This would have been hard to invent in the best of times. But the violence of civil war did little to create a sustainable memory or shared principles organised around the myth of an ancient *pactum subjectionis* to which citizens could return like a legal promised land. And what did survive after 1814 was quickly eclipsed by Ferdinand's decision to adopt the persona of a character *angelicus* with an avenging streak. War and the brutality eviscerated much of the invented tradition of metropolitan constitutionalism premised on an equally invented tradition of a pact between sovereigns and subjects from feudal days (Hamnett 1977; Chiaramonte 2000).

With no redeemable past to which lawmakers could refer to frame postcolonial politics or the geographic boundaries of polities, it is no wonder that, when Restrepo took time away from his ministerial duties at Bolívar's aide, he would compose a major part of his epic around a rekindled Black Legend. First, the Spanish had done little to tutor American subjects in the art of responsible governance. Then, when they had the chance, they despoiled it when moderate self-rule did issue fledgling roots. This kind of tyranny justified regicide. And regicide, so went Restrepo's lament, unleashed the furies of vengeance bent on destroying what they disliked without a well-defined, never mind shared, sense of what they did like.

This was, to conclude, an unpromising context in which constitutionalists set about their business of creating something new. Amid polarised factions, militarised societies, economies brought low by the taxations and dislocations of war, and bereft of models—from their own past, or from the examples of others (in this regard, the influence of North American constitutionalism has been altogether exaggerated)—lawmakers had their work cut out for them.

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En el nombre de Dios Todo-poderoso, Padre, Hijo,
y Espíritu Santo, Autor y Supremo Legislador de
la Sociedad.

Las Cortes generales y extraordinarias de la Nación
Española bien convencidas, después del mas detenido con-
senso, y madura deliberacion, de que las antiguas leyes
fundamentales de esta Monarquía, acompañadas de las
oportunas providencias y precauciones que aseguren de un
modo estable y permanente en todos sus cumplimientos, po-
drán llenar debidamente el grande objeto de promover la
gloria, la prosperidad, y el bien de toda la Nación, decretan
la siguiente Constitución política para el buen gobierno,
y recta administracion del Estado.

Título 1.º

De la Nación Española y de los Españoles.

Capítulo 1.º

De la Nación Española.

Artículo 1.

La Nación Española es la reunion de todos los Españoles
de ambos Hemisferios.

Artículo 2.

La Nación Española es libre é independiente, y no es, ni
puede ser patrimonio de ninguna familia, ni persona.

A CONSTITUIÇÃO DE 1822

COMENTADA E DESENVOLVIDA NA PRÁTICA.

TÍTULO I.º

Dos direitos e deveres individuaes dos
Portuguezes.

CAPITULO UNICO.

Artigo. 1. *A Constituição politica da Nação Portuguesa tem por objecto manter a liberdade, segurança, e propriedade de todos os Portuguezes. Veremos no decurso desta obra, se a Constituição corresponde ao seu objecto.*

Art. 2. *A liberdade consiste em não serem obrigados a fazer o que a lei não manda, nem a deixar de fazer o que ella não prohibe. A conservação desta liberdade depende da exacta observancia das leis.*

Apparecem neste Artigo tres cousas notaveis: a primeira he dar da liberdade a mesma idéa que dá Fleury nos Costumes dos Israelitas, e pelas mesmas palavras! a segunda he, que para os fautores da Constituição ha outra liberdade; porque dizem *a conservação desta*: e a terceira he fazer depender a conservação da liberdade dos Portu-

chapter thirty one

Portugal and Spain under the newly



António Manuel Hespanha and José M. Portillo

Introduction: singularities of Iberian crisis among the Atlantic revolutions

Recent historiography has persisted in its inclusion of the revolutions that took place in the Spanish Atlantic from 1810 to 1825 in the larger cycle of Atlantic revolutions initiated in 1776, in British North America (Rodríguez 1998). However, in the case of the Spanish monarchy it is virtually impossible to identify a *revolutionary moment* comparable to 14 July 1789 or to 4 July 1776 (Breña 2012). In 1837, when the nation's representatives for the second time in 30 years set about drafting a national constitution—Spain was in many ways a very different country than it had been in 1807: its territory had been drastically reduced, and after two long periods of absolutist governments, liberals were about to definitively establish a constitutional government. Yet, no Spaniard in 1837 could point to a specific date or event if asked to identify the “Spanish revolution”.

To explain this non-revolutionary transformation, the peculiarities of the Spanish crisis must be considered, and set in a comparative context with the Atlantic crisis of the European monarchies. In the British Atlantic, the crisis originated in the overseas colonies, and did not affect the metropolis. It is true that in 1783 Britain lost a considerable part of its territory, but it is also true that the monarchy's political constitution and form of government remained the same after the American Revolutionary War (Armitage 2012). The constitutional changes occurred in America, not in Europe. On the other hand, in the case of France the situation was exactly the reverse: the crisis originated in the metropolis and only later reached the colonies, above all with the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution. Unlike in the British case, the French Revolution began with the constitutional transformation of the monarchy and ended with the abolition of the monarchy itself. In this case, constitutional changes initiated in Europe were extended to Haiti as a consequence of the neo-colonial

program of the Consulate (Fradera 2015).

The Atlantic crisis of the Iberian monarchies clearly differed from these two experiences. As we explain in this chapter, the Portuguese monarchy avoided most of the consequences of the crisis by doing something unique in the history of empires: the royal court—and with it, in a sense, the metropolis—were transferred to the colonies, where the royal government was recreated in Rio de Janeiro. The Spanish royal family had contemplated something similar, planning to take refuge in Mexico after the French army entered Spain, but in the event they abdicated their dynastic rights in favour of Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte.

This pivotal event took place in May 1808, and was remarkable because it brought about confluence of an imperial and a dynastic crisis, something that never happened before in any of the Atlantic empires. Since the peace of Basel (1795) that put an end to the war between the Spanish monarchy and the French Republic, the Spanish empire had been in a downward spiral of decline. In Basel, Spain ceded to France the remainder of the island of Hispaniola (the western part of Saint-Domingue had been French since the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697), a territorial loss that was also symbolically important because Hispaniola had been the first Spanish colony in the New World. In the years that followed, Spain signed a series of treaties with France that allowed the latter to mobilise Spanish resources for its own imperial projects. With the signing the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1797) and the Subsidy Treaty (1803), Spain put its navy and its monetary resources, the two cornerstones of empire, at the disposal of the French.

The battle of Trafalgar (1805) finally set the seal on Spain's imperial crisis. The British destroyed a significant part of the Spanish navy—along with the French—but above all Trafalgar made it clear that the Spanish monarchy was no longer able to protect its empire. The British invasions of Buenos Aires and Montevideo in 1806 and 1807, and the expedition commanded by Francisco Miranda to Venezuela in 1806 reflected the gravity of Spain's imperial crisis.

In Portugal, the pre-revolutionary context was quite different, although also singular (Hespanha 2012). Since the final decades of the eighteenth century, liberal literature was secretly imported from France and England, mainly via secret societies like the Freemasons. Invaded by Napoleonic armies under the command of Junot in 1807, and thenceforth deprived of its Royal Court, which had relocated to Brazil, the kingdom was left open to plunder, but also to the influx of

French revolutionary ideas. A meaningful part of the Portuguese intelligentsia—some of whom were already involved in Freemasonry—saw the arrival of the French as an opportunity to modernise the country, and install a constitutional regime undergirded by the Napoleonic *Code civil des Français*. The Code was even translated into Portuguese, while a Portuguese deputation made its way to France to ask the emperor to grant them a constitution, similar to that of the Duchy of Warsaw, yet adapted to the Portuguese ancient usages. The retreat of the French troops thwarted the initiative, which in any case would have introduced some constitutional innovations—like the separation of Church and State—that would likely have produced some dissension, and would not be adopted in Portugal until the end of the monarchy in 1910 (Hespanha 2004).

Furthermore, Portuguese civil society would have been deeply convulsed if the imposition of a constitution was supplemented by the Napoleonic Codes. Traditional social orders would have been suppressed and civil equality introduced. A representative system—albeit a Napoleonic one—would have replaced royal absolutism, with the introduction of two representative chambers, a Council of State, a *Cour de Cassation*, and a responsible ministry. Seigniorial rights (*direitos de foral*, *direitos banais*), entailed property (*morgadios*) and grants of crown land (*donatarias*) or *comendas* of the military orders would have been abolished, freeing up land for the open market. Corporative organisation would have given way to industrial and commercial freedom. All this explains why the ruling class, once the French were gone, hastily abandoned the constitutional project. Nevertheless, in academic and intellectual circles, especially among jurists, a great deal of this ideological legacy survived, and formed the basis of future political agendas. Meanwhile, the country had to endure an ambiguous political situation, theoretically governed from the distant royal court in Rio de Janeiro, through an Anglo-Portuguese Junta de Governo, appointed by the absent king. But the government in Portugal was ideologically divided between two factions, the traditionalist and anti-revolutionary (anti-French), and Enlightened reformists and protoliberal Masons and *afrancesados* (pro-French liberals).

Towards the Cortes

In the spring of 1808, the Spanish imperial crisis entered a more

complex phase affecting the monarchy itself (Portillo 2006). As Charles IV and his son Ferdinand VII—both of whom claimed to be the legitimate king of Spain—transferred their dynastic rights to Napoleon, instead of a peaceful transition of sovereignty, a profound political crisis was unleashed. A significant portion of Spanish public servants—army officials, bureaucrats, clergy—chose to accept the new Bonaparte dynasty and the new king José I. It must be said that when compared to Ferdinand it was not the worst possible choice. In addition to being much better prepared for government (he was a lawyer and had previously served the dynastic interest of his family in Naples), José I came to Spain armed with a constitution. It was essentially a Napoleonic constitution adapted to Spanish circumstances in two important respects: it guaranteed the primacy of the Catholic faith and the integrity of the American empire. It was called the *Constitución de Bayona* (officially *Constitución para la monarquía española*), and it was and it was the first Spanish Constitution that considered the possibility of American representation in the Cortes (parliament) as well as in other relevant institutions, like the Council of State.

However, many other Spaniards led by local and provincial elites resisted the dynastic change, appealing to the fact that it implied that the Spanish monarchy ceased to be independent. They first formed emergency councils (*juntas*) in towns and provinces that proclaimed the Spanish king's sovereignty, and the representatives of these local governments gathered in September 1808 in a general assembly called *Junta Central Gubernativa del Reino*. Among the representatives of the Junta Central the opinion gathered supports that the solution of the crisis required not only the expulsion of the French from Spain, but also redesigning the government of the monarchy. In other words, the members of the Junta Central arrived at the conclusion that the crisis was not only dynastic, but above all political and constitutional. The debate—both in the Junta Central and in the press—was centred on the issue of how the Spanish nation could be correctly represented.

In Portugal, mounting opposition to the English protectorate, but also the desire for broader political reform, lead to the civilian coup of 24 August 1820—headed by a bourgeois group, mostly jurists, merchants, and military officers from Oporto, many of them members of Masonic lodges. It referred to itself evocatively as the *Regeneration*. Its central claims were a wholesale return to a previous state of political affairs: (i) the return of the Royal Court to the metropolis, Lisbon; (ii) the “restoration” of the old constitution of the realm, based

on the regular gathering of a representative parliament (*Cortes*); and, on a more immediate level, (iii) the re-imposition of the commercial monopoly with the colonies, and (iv) the recovery of military autonomy from the British. However, the central claim—that of the installation of a constitutional monarchy—was anything but a “regeneration,” because the national representative body that was being demanded had nothing to do with the ancient parliament, which symbolically embodied the realm (Hespanha 2004; Pedreira and Costa 2008).

The success was dazzling. The Junta do Governo do Reino, headed by William Beresford, was dismissed and replaced by a Provisional Junta, charged with organising general elections to a national constitutional assembly, whose task would be to draw up a new constitution. However, the break with tradition was already apparent in the electoral procedures and the form of the new *Cortes*. After a heated though brief debate on the procedure for the election of representatives, the old system of electing, as well as the old structure of the *Cortes*, were replaced by a brand-new one—direct election to a unicameral parliament—modelled on the Spanish Cortes of Cadiz. The outcome was an assembly in which the opposing forces were quite evenly represented, although the democratic wing was more vociferous on the key issues. Due to the imminent arrival of the king and royal court, a draft of the constitution (*Bases da Constituição*, 1820) was prepared so that it could be solemnly sworn by the returnees before they had even disembarked.

Constitutional guidelines

The new Spanish representatives had to resolve two constitutional issues of crucial importance. The first question was whether the American part of the monarchy should also be represented in a common assembly (the *Cortes*) along with the peninsular territories. In January 1809, the Junta Central called on the Americans to elect their own representatives to the junta. In its summons, the junta declared that the American territories would no more be considered “colonies or miserable factories” but provinces of the Spanish monarchy. As we will see, one of the main problems of early Spanish liberalism was rooted precisely in this moment. In their dealings with America, Spanish liberals used a language of equality but they practiced inequality. Indeed, they envisaged only nine representatives for all the

American territories while the peninsular provinces had two representatives each at the Junta Central.

The second point of the debate was about the kind of parliament that would represent the Spanish nation. Moderates, like Melchor Gaspar de Jovellanos—the most influential Spanish intellectual of the time—thought that it should be some kind of corporate body gathered in two different chambers, one for commoners organised by cities and provinces, and an upper chamber for the nobility and the clergy. Like other moderate leaders—for instance, the Catalan Antonio de Capmany—Jovellanos thought, following Montesquieu, that the English constitutional system was the most suitable to be imitated by the Spaniards.

Notwithstanding the fact that the British model of constitutional organisation had been successfully implemented in other parts of Europe—specifically the Mediterranean islands where it was reproduced—in Spain it was not seen as fully congruent with a liberal perspective that conceived the nation as constituted exclusively by householders gathered in towns and provinces (Garriga and Lorente 2007). Promoters of this idea of national representation managed to impose a unicameral Cortes composed of four different types of representatives: ancient privileged cities, provincial juntas, and a majority of representatives of provinces designated by local and provincial electoral colleges. The fourth type of deputies were those representing the American and Asian territories who were elected by town councils following specific regulations.

Although Portugal's constitutional experiments began ten years later, the public debate would be framed in very similar terms. The first issue concerned the representative nature of the *Cortes*. The wording of the constitution was a clear symptom of the misunderstanding between two competing political discourses—the one proposing constitutional continuity (*regeneration*) and another committed to the creation of a brand-new constitutional polity based on the supremacy of the national will. Both ideological groups tried to compromise in the process of writing a constitution. The “preamble”, for example, combines references to citizens' rights with the veneration of the “fundamental laws of the Monarchy”; the constitution is deemed to be a decree of the *Cortes*, but dedicated to “the name of the Most Holy and Most Sacred Trinity”; the king is considered a representative of the nation, but also empowered “by Grace of God and by the Constitution of the Monarchy, etc.” cf. art, 121) (Hespanha 2004, 2012).

Was this the result of ideological misunderstanding or was it a genuine political compromise? Traditionally, the ambiguity of the Portuguese constitutional text has been seen as a reflection of a very difficult political moment, with opposed ideological groupings constantly forced to negotiate and compromise. However, it is likely that the political deadlock was made even more complicated by an epistemological confusion: the coalescence of seemingly incompatible ideas about concepts like the constitution, among others. The constitution, for example, as it was understood on both sides of the ideological divide, was viewed as representing both a natural institution, and being the product of the people's will. In addition, certain old ideological categories endured in a new ideological context, and there were remnants of old rhetorical formulae and concepts (like *potestas a Deo per populum*), as well as the persistence of traditional social hierarchies.

In the study of constitutional and political practices in this period, other unanticipated contradictions emerge: transfers of traditionally royal prerogatives to the "sovereign Congress" (like the concession of graces, revision of judicial decisions, and acts of government); preservation by jurists and judges of a substantial power to interpret the law (even beyond the limits of the constitution); absence of any formal procedure to guarantee the primacy of the constitution, which depended solely upon the civil servants' sense of duty to comply with the formal oath of allegiance to the constitution; submission of citizens' rights as if the natural law which dictated individual rights was erased by positive law.

A second issue—at the time probably considered as secondary—was the extension of the constitutional regime to the overseas territories, a constitutional conundrum that the influential Jeremy Bentham considered as unsolvable. In principle, the constitution was considered as a universal pact between all the Portuguese and, consequently, the colonies had just as much right to be represented in the *Cortes* as the metropolitan provinces. The constitution was envisaged as being valid in the colonies without limitations or exceptions, in matters concerning parliamentary representation, the organisation and balance of powers, and the civil and political status of the inhabitants. The Portuguese nation was defined by the Constitution of 1822 as "the union of all the Portuguese of both hemispheres". Colonial territories were listed (art. 20), along with the metropolitan provinces, although under different denominations. The constitution granted citizenship to all Portuguese, born or

permanently resident in the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil, provided that they were born of a Portuguese father (art. 21). However, recent studies have shown that this “universalism” was not reflected in political praxis or in the content of legal norms below the constitutional level, which both imposed restrictions on the political rights of the colonists (namely relating the electoral weight of colonies), and entailed the governmentalisation of colonial rule as well as racial discrimination against native populations or the overriding of their constitutional rights.

The ambiguity concerning the *status civitatis* was even greater, however, considering that (i) slavery still existed in the overseas territories, and that (ii) the political status of the native population inhabiting the colonies remained uncertain, so that as general rule it can be said that—excepting the assimilated urban elites—the native people were generally deprived of political rights and subject to their native authorities and law. Native chiefdoms occupying zones that were only tenuously under Portuguese influence were often bound by separate “treaties” more than by straightforward ties of sovereignty.

When the Spanish Cortes finally met on the 24 September 1810 near Cadiz there were about a hundred deputies representing different parts of the monarchy, but most of them were *suplentes*—that is, they had been locally elected in Cadiz among natives of the territories that were unable to send their own elected deputies. With the exception of Puerto Rico, that was the case for all the American territories (Silva 2009).

Towards the constitution

The congress met in Cadiz from September 1810 to September 1813. It could be said that the constitution began to be implemented from the very first day. On 24 September 1810, Diego Muñoz Torrero, deputy from Extremadura, proposed a law to be passed by the parliament containing several constitutional principles: national sovereignty, a new proclamation of Ferdinand VII (as king) negating the dynastic change agreed with Napoleon by the Spanish royal family, and a provisional division of powers aimed at restricting and controlling the political capacity of the Regency (the acting government during the king’s stay in France). It also secured the deputies’ indemnity for their political activities.

The making of the first Spanish Constitution may be divided into

two distinct phases. From March to August 1811 a commission drafted a project to be submitted to the *Cortes*. The second phase was the congressional debate of this project during the latter half of 1811. It is important to remember that the *Cortes* acted as a constituent parliament and at the same time as a sort of Council of the Regency. Assuming the role traditionally performed by the Council of Castile, the *Cortes* intervened in practically every relevant function of government, especially if related to taxes or war. In addition, from the beginning the congress also legislated to dismantle some of the traditional structures of the political and social order that were seen as the biggest obstacles to constitutional innovation.

Image 31.1 Political constitution of the Spanish Nation, 1812

Source: Public domain/Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid, Spain

From the beginning of the parliamentary sessions, partisans of liberal constitutional reforms dominated the debate. It can be said that the text produced in March 1812 was largely a reflection of Spanish liberal ideology as it had been configured since the final decades of the eighteenth century. Both moral philosophy and political economic ideas contributed to the definition of the peculiarly Spanish early liberalism and constitutionalism. Long before Cadiz, moral philosophers had grappled with the possibility of reconciling modernity with Catholicism. Key concepts of modern philosophy—such as interest, self-love, tolerance, or individualism—traditionally considered contradictory to the true essence of the Catholic faith were considered and to some extent accepted by Catholic intellectuals like Manuel de Aguirre or Jovellanos. On the other hand, political economy offered a vast field of arguments for the necessity of a constitution granting some essential civil rights like property, freedom, and security. Victorián de Villava, from a moderate point of view, and León de Arroyal or Valentín de Foronda, from a more progressive standpoint, were among those intellectuals who by the last two decades of the previous century had proposed to implement a constitutional text based on rights as a limit to monarchical power.

It was the following generation that imported all these debates into the constitutional design. The best-known liberals of the *Cortes*, like Agustín de Argüelles, the count of Toreno, or Evaristo Pérez de Castro were politicians more than intellectuals and they fought for implementing a political regime according to the ideas developed by Spanish Enlightenment. The Cadiz constitutional experiment reflected most of these ideas, making the resulting constitution a product of the

Enlightenment more than a truly liberal document.

The structural elements of the Cadiz Constitution reflect that character (Clavero 2007). Following a theory of emancipation (based on the traditions of *ius commune* and *ius gentium*) the constitution declared Spain “free and independent” and, accordingly, assigned sovereignty to the nation. The first peculiarity of early Spanish constitutionalism resided in the definition of the Spanish nation as a collective body of all the Spaniards from both hemispheres. This (in 1812) was not the first time that a European parliament had admitted people from the former colonies (this had been the case in France during the Republican Convention) but it was certainly the first occasion on which a constitution declared the former colonial space to be part of the nation.

This is crucial because the constitution, rather than opening with a declaration of the rights of man and citizen (individual subjects) instead proclaimed the rights of a collective subject, that is, the Spanish nation. Other sections of the constitution—specifically section five on the tribunals and administration of justice—guaranteed due process, but the constitution did not include a specific declaration of rights. The only reference to individual rights as such is Article 4 that obliges the Nation “to preserve and protect by wise and just laws the civil liberty and the property, besides all other legitimate rights of all individuals belonging to it”.

Significantly, the wording of Article 4 is very similar to that of Article 12. This article has been one of the most controversial of the constitution since it was promulgated in 1812, and continues to be debated among historians. Astonishingly from a liberal point of view, Article 12 summarised a very characteristic attitude among early Spanish liberals towards religion: “The Religion of the Spanish Nation is and shall be perpetually Catholic, Apostolic and Roman, the only true religion. The nation protects it by wise and just laws, and prohibits the exercise of any other whatsoever.” Besides the evident contradiction with one of the most basic liberal principles—that of tolerance and freedom of religion—this article expressed the conviction of Spanish early liberalism that Catholicism was an essential part of the Spanish identity. As anti-liberal Catholic critics of the constitution—like the priest José de Vélaz—pointed out, this article also advocated for a national and not monarchical religion. The immediate consequence of declaring religion to be under the protection of the sovereign nation in the same way it protected the rights of individuals (by wise and just laws) was the abolition of the

Inquisition in 1813.

During the debates on the constitution liberals also sought to impose their points of view on two decisive questions. First, against the opinion of moderates, the constitution enshrined a unicameral system of representation. As many scholars have pointed out, the Spanish text of 1812 generously granted the right to vote to every male householder living regularly in any parish. There were no franchise restrictions based on income or taxes paid and elections were to be held at three levels of electoral colleges (local, district, and provincial). Technically it was a democracy of *patri familiae*, referred to as *vecinos*, that is, householders regularly living in a parish. Exclusions from the franchise were based on sex, race (those of African descent were excluded from citizenship), and, in some cases, occupation (domestic servants). According to liberal ideology such an electoral and representative system made it possible for the nation to be represented in a single assembly so that it could take a more active part in politics.

Such a representative system was in turn rooted in the notion of an ideal society managed by Spanish early liberals. Even if they never expressed a desire to abolish the nobility, they were convinced that a just social order should be also structured based on merit. Jovellanos had written 15 years before the constitutional debates the most influential text on civil order and political economy in Spain. Known as *Informe sobre la ley agraria* (1795), the first pages of this text described a social order based on an individual's freedom to determine one's personal interest. As a prerequisite for the proper functioning of this principle, the *dominium* over things (land) should be freed from legal restrictions and, as a consequence, a substantial class of medium-size proprietors would structure society. It is not an accident that the Cortes adopted Jovellanos' text as a manual for schools.

However, Spanish societies on both sides of the Atlantic were much more complex and far from this ideal social type. Notwithstanding the fact that the Cortes vehemently opposed the use of terms like Indian or *criollo* that denoted a racial difference among Spaniards, they remained current in speech and in literature. Similarly, among European Spaniards language that depicted an individual as merely a *vecino*, or citizen, and nothing more was very rare. The status of nobility, clergy, notables, officers (both civil and military), but also territorial or corporate attributes, were still of the greatest relevance.

The political activity of the *Cortes* was one of the most debated points of the constitution. The liberal leader Argüelles argued that the

constitution was conceived as a complete system in which every single element acquired meaning as part of the whole. From this perspective, the *Cortes* was conceived as the highest authority since it was a truly *national* representative assembly. Moderates (and of course the absolutist opponents of the constitution) rather preferred a functional assimilation of the *Cortes* to the former Council of Castile. They did not envisage the *Cortes* as a parliament or national assembly, but as an advisory body whose role was to help the monarch in the government of the kingdom. Liberals instead imposed their vision of a system in which the parliament strictly limited the political capacity of the king. To start with, the constitution specified what the king could and could not do and how any of the royal prerogatives should be exercised in agreement with a secretary of state, who remained responsible to the parliament. It is very important to note that there was nothing resembling a cabinet system of government since the king had to deal separately with each one of his secretaries. The only council envisaged by the constitution, the Council of State, was composed of 40 members (four members of the clergy, four nobles, and 32 of the “most distinguished by their intelligence and education”, at least 12 of them from America) appointed by the king from a list provided by the parliament. It is not surprising at all that conservative European thinkers labelled this constitution as “republican”. The Swiss thinker Ludwig von Haller pointed to this section as the most dangerous of the Spanish constitution because in his opinion it opened the door to a political neutering of the monarchy.

Constitutionalist culture in Portugal initially developed in the shadow of the Western European one, cast under the influence of Montesquieu, Bentham, Condorcet, and Rousseau, disseminated by a vibrant underground literature, the freemasonry and, later on, encouraged by the presence of the French and British armies, during the Napoleonic war and its aftermath. This was the context of the initial revolutionary upsurge, in 1820, followed by an intense period of indoctrination. Opposed to the new political ideas was traditional political thought, both corporatist and absolutist, fuelled both by political scholasticism (Iberian Second Scholasticism) and, on the other hand, by the political theories of enlightened absolutism (S. Puffendorf, J. G. Heineccius, de Vattel), dominant in the last decades of the *Ancien Régime* at the University of Coimbra (Hespanha 2004).

The influence of the Cadiz Constitution on the Portuguese has yet to be studied in detail. From the parliamentary discussions, one can see that the Spanish example was continuously present, either as a

radical turn to be shunned or as a paradigm to follow. The model was attractive given the imperative, in the Portuguese context, of accommodating within the revolutionary movement the democratic sensibility with those traditionalist elements that were open to a certain degree of modernisation of the political regime. Actually, in spite of its progressive democratic framework, the Cadiz Constitution claimed that it merely represented the fulfilment of a constitutional development whose beginnings could be traced back to the most ancient political traditions of the realm. These ideas, as well as that of the primacy of positive law over natural rights, were at the root of both constitutional texts, which bear resemblance to one another both in their organisation of the political powers and in the very wording.

In the Portuguese text, the organic features of the new constitutional system appear less important: patriarchal suffrage without franchise limitations but with certain occupational exclusions (servants, monks and nuns, civil servants; however, no explicit reference to gender, race, or serfdom), a single chamber, merely provisional royal veto, free nomination and dismissal of ministers by the king, royal irresponsibility but ministerial responsibility (although never formalised in a statute), three-rank judicial system resembling the *cassation* system.

The constitutional debate was also quite similar to that which took place in Cadiz, although almost a decade later. The constitutional solutions were therefore fundamentally similar. The Portuguese Constitution included a list of guaranteed citizens' rights. The list was in line with contemporary constitutionalist norms. Even the freedom of religion was included, despite the existence of a state religion. However, in every clause a formula was repeated which characterised the whole conception of citizens' rights as guaranteed by the State—"pela maneira que a lei declarar" ("according to the law") or similar wording. That is: rights were only guaranteed in the terms configured by infra-constitutional positive law. The idea was that natural individual rights abated with political association, so that State law preceded and articulated individual rights—and not the other way around, with individual rights preceding the state and constituting it, as a radical liberal conception would have it. Oddly, this legalist conception of citizens' rights contrasted with the prevailing doctrinal ideas about natural law, individual rights, the liberal State, the liberal constitution, and positive law. Actually, Christian doctrine cultivated a rather literary and philosophically eclectic discourse, according to which, in a liberal State and Constitution, liberty and individual rights

—namely liberty, security, and property—were above all positive laws and State powers and institutions. By contrast, the free will even of parliamentary legislators was strictly curtailed by the paramount validity of such supra-positive values and rights. The contradiction can be explained in historical terms. The legalistic impulse followed the trend to formally articulate and to put limits to the vagueness of the juristic theoretical declarations; and, at the same time, followed the Lockean safeguard against the dangers of a direct enforcement of individual rights without any reference to positive law. Moreover, the dignifying of positive law was compatible with the political prestige of the new democratic and representative institutions, as well as with the Rousseauian definition of law as *volonté Générale* (Hespanha 2004).

Image 31.2 Portuguese Constitution, 1822. Faustino da Madre de Deos, *A Constituição de 1822 Comentada e Desenvolvida na prática*, Lisbon, Typografia Maigrense, 1823

Source: © The British Library Board, London, UK

On the contrary, the exaltation of supra-positive law, rights, and values corresponded to the fear of the “tyranny of the majority” (or “legal absolutism”) of the period of the French Convention and Terror, and the desire to set limits on the will of the majority, it also reflected the appeal to a higher law (grounded in reason, drawn from tradition, from the spirit of the people, or the genius of the nation, from learned opinion) in line with the jurists’ century-long doctrinal self-confidence, a belief in a law based not upon the *imperium* of the State, but on the *auctoritas* of the jurisconsults. This idea was tirelessly promoted by law professors in their symbolic struggle with the new legislators and politicians (Hespanha 2009, 2017).

To be sure, the list of citizens’ rights corresponded to liberal political ideas, although old-fashioned clauses are still present (e.g., the right to public graces, or *mercês*, Const. 1822, art. 15), as well as conjunctural ones (e.g., the payment of public debt and of state civil and military salaries, Const. 1822, art. 15). Conversely, State agency was more praised than feared. The trend of demanding more and more from the state government and administration is linked to several factors. The first was the need for swift and yet profound transformations at the political, social, and economic levels. However, this model of reforming society also corresponded to the statist reformism associated with Enlightened despotism, which had been a feature of Portuguese policy since the Marquis of Pombal. The example of the post-revolutionary and Napoleonic global reshaping of French society was a second and consistent source of inspiration.

Some lessons were also drawn from England, where William Blackstone outlined the use of the king's prerogative as a means to modernise society, an issue that was picked up and developed further by his American commentators. State interventionism was also embraced by public law experts during the Romantic period, both in France and in the German-speaking countries. In Portugal, this idea of a complex State responsible for providing social needs is well established in legal doctrine by the 1840s.

Crisis and fall

Liberalism and constitutionalism were short-lived in Spain. From 1812 to the death of Ferdinand VII (1833) the Cádiz constitution was in force for only five years. Napoleon released Ferdinand from his golden (and voluntary) captivity in France in 1814. After the battle of Vitoria (23 June 1813) the French army left the Iberian peninsula while Napoleonic hegemony declined drastically in Europe. In December 1813, Napoleon and Ferdinand VII agreed the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in Spain, and the Spanish monarch entered Catalonia in March 1814—ironically, only a few days before Napoleon's own abdication. He had no sooner set foot in Spain when he declared the constitution abolished and proscribed its liberal authors and supporters. As will happen again in 1823, parliamentary deputies and other liberals were imprisoned and most of them fled into exile. A majority went to France and England, but some liberals reached America where they continued fighting for liberty, like the former guerrilla leader, Francisco Javier Mina, who fought against the French in 1808 and was executed in 1817 in Mexico for supporting insurrection.

During the two long periods of despotic government (1814–1820 and 1823–1833) the exiled liberals kept alive the ideas of civil liberties and representative government. But, above all, in exile Spanish liberalism was nourished by and integrated into the mainstream of political debates in Europe and thus evolved, something that was highly unlikely to happen in Spain, since not only the freedom of the press but the press itself was quashed by Ferdinand VII. In fact, the first critical approaches to the Cadiz constitution came from exiled liberals who considered it excessively attached to the idea of national sovereignty and consequently believed that the system of powers it envisaged was not very well balanced.

Liberals returned to government in 1820 after a military uprising led by Rafael del Riego. The *pronunciamiento*, or military intervention, would duly become one of the favoured mechanisms for political change in nineteenth-century Spain, as well as in Latin America. This three-year period of liberal governments was indelibly marked by two facts. On the one hand, it was the first time that the Cadiz constitution was implemented with the king present and exerting all his prerogatives. Predictably, Ferdinand VII used his wide prerogative powers to permanently block the implementation of the constitution and slow down every legislative project aimed at overhauling the vestiges of the Old Regime. That was especially the case with regard to legislation concerning the entailment of Church property, the religious orders, or the definitive abolition of the seigniorial system.

On the other hand, during the so-called *Trienio*, Spanish liberalism split into two main groups that subsequently gave birth to the two main liberal factions of the nineteenth century, *moderados* and *progresistas*. During the *Trienio* these ideological groupings were known as *doceañistas* or *moderados* and *exaltados*. They essentially differed in their conception of the division and balance of powers, the *exaltados* proposing a revision of the constitution to more clearly articulate and bolster the supremacy of the parliament as a national assembly. They also insisted more vehemently on limiting the prerogatives of the Catholic Church and the nobility, and in going further with the new legal order (civil and penal codes). Moderates instead preferred a more circumspect implementation of new social and political institutions and wanted to keep the monarchy as a significant part of the system.

The radical government appointed in the summer of 1822 was unable to manage a very complicated situation resulting from the confluence of both internal and external opposition to the constitutional regime. Led by the king himself, several military units (including the royal guard) and armed provincial groups (*voluntarios realistas*) plotted against liberal governments practically from the very first moment of the *Trienio*. They found support among local clergy and some local elites, as in the Basque Country, where they formed groups that ten years later would support the candidacy to the throne of Carlos María Isidro, the brother of Ferdinand VII, and his neo-absolutist project. European powers, or more specifically, the Holy Alliance for its part considered the Spanish liberal government as a danger to the stability of the monarchical principle in Europe, especially after the *furor civile* (as labelled in 1825 by the ultra-

moderate Italian composer Gioachino Rossini in the opera *Il viaggio a Reims*) spread to Portugal and Italy. Even if they never decided to intervene in Spain collectively, due to their own contradictory interests, Bourbon France intervened unilaterally in the spring of 1823 to restore despotism. The army commanded by de Duke of Angoulême encountered practically no opposition from the Spanish people on his way to Cadiz where, symbolically, liberalism was again defeated by despotism.

It is a historiographical commonplace to emphasise the lack of popular support for the constitutional system in 1823. The same may be said about support for absolutism in 1820, when liberals took over the government of the monarchy. Thus, rather than revealing the pro-absolutist tendencies supposedly characteristic of Spanish society, the events of 1823 should be seen as evidence of the popular indifference, and disengagement of the common people from high-level politics. One of the farsighted policies of the constitutional system of 1812 was precisely to foster the spread of literacy along with medium-size landholdings as a means to creating a new citizenry that was better informed, and had a greater vested interest in local, provincial, and national politics. By the end of the century, Joaquín Costa—one of the greatest intellectuals of the post-imperial generation—still complained about the lack of both popular literacy and a just distribution of landed property. As a matter of fact, the structure of Spanish society did not change significantly during the first decades of the nineteenth century, and it was only after Ferdinand VII's death (1833) that liberalism definitively established itself in Spain. By then, following the European mainstream, Spanish constitutionalism renounced the vision of a politically active community of *vecinos propietarios* and substituted the idea of national sovereignty with the concept of *Administración*.

Something similar could be said about Portugal, where the consensus around politico-constitutional reform was only fictional. Dissension among members of the royal family (for instance the queen's refusal to swear to uphold the constitution) reflected the dramatic tensions existing within the ruling groups and the population in general. The political implications of the debates in the *Cortes*, as well as the social and institutional consequences of effective constitutional solutions—the refusal of the royal veto, the lack of a separate chamber for the formerly privileged social orders, or the granting of religious freedom—and legislative reforms—the extinction of feudal *corvées*, the suppression of seigneurial jurisdictions, the

reversion of crown land and *comendas* of the military orders to the Public Treasury, the abolition of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, the close oversight over religious orders, monasteries, and convents, the hostility to seigniorial taxation (*forais*)—all these proposed and effected changes impinged on vested interests and on deeply rooted social imaginaries, both of which were further roiled by the often radical discourse of the reformers. To this may be added the independence of Brazil—which was also triggered by the intransigence of a radical wing of the Cortes—which hurt important commercial interests and wounded Portuguese national pride. The reactionary opposition made its move in 1823, through a military coup headed by the Infante Miguel, which forced king João VI to suspend the constitution, although promising that it would be adapted to the traditional political order of the realm. The king passed away shortly after, in 1826. His first-born son, Pedro, the self-proclaimed emperor of Brazil, took the crown as Pedro IV, granted the *Carta Constitucional*, arranged the marriage of his daughter to her uncle, the absolutist leader Miguel, thus reuniting the two political branches of the family, and abdicated his royal power in favour of his young daughter, who became Queen Maria II (b. 1819–1853; queen in 1826). The solution did not appease Miguel, who once again resorted to military force to seize the crown as absolute king (acclaimed by the Cortes on 23 June 1828), sparking a six-year civil war (*Guerras liberais*) against his brother. In reaction, Pedro reassumed the Portuguese Crown, formed an army of liberal émigrés, invaded the metropolis, lay siege to Oporto, and, after a surprise landing in southern Portugal, defeated the royalist army, forcing his brother's capitulation (Convention of Évora Monte, 1834) and his definitive exile in Austria. Pedro died not long after, after restoring his young daughter Maria to the throne (Santos 2006; Hespanha 2004).

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VUE DE LA PLACE DU FARGES, À PARIS.



VUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA VILLE DE GENÈVE, EN SUITE DE LA VUE.



chapter thirty two

Independence in Iberian America¹



Anthony McFarlane and João Paulo Pimenta

Introduction

The dissolution of the Iberian empires originated in the external shocks that emanated from the Napoleonic wars in Europe. The first occurred in 1807–1808, when Napoleon dispatched armies into the Iberian peninsula to take control of Portugal. The resulting upheavals hit hardest in the European centres of the Portuguese and Spanish monarchies, where French invasions and occupations led to devastating wars and considerable political upheaval. But dislocation at the centre also spread to the Iberian empires overseas, as the repercussions of Napoleon's coups reverberated across the Atlantic and, sooner or later, upset the equilibrium of the Portuguese and Spanish empires (Adelman 2006).

The crises of the Iberian monarchies

The subversion of the Iberian monarchies began in late 1807, when Napoleon ordered Junot to invade Portugal and remove its royal family. To avoid capture, the Prince Regent Dom João (ruling instead of the incapacitated Queen Maria since 1792), abandoned Lisbon and together with the Braganza royal family and court, fled to Brazil. By this drastic expedient, D. João saved his throne, kept control of Portugal's richest possession, and left the British to support Portuguese local resistance against the French. Portugal became a battleground but Brazil remained secure, with its territory and trade protected by the British navy.

Crisis in the Portuguese monarchy was swiftly followed by crisis in the Spanish monarchy too. In early 1808, Carlos IV's prime minister, Manuel Godoy, was removed in a palace coup and the king was forced to pass the throne to his son, Prince Fernando. This did not, however, save the Spanish Bourbons. Fernando VII was lured to France, where he was compelled to abdicate in favour of Napoleon's brother Joseph Bonaparte, who became King José I. The Bourbons were thus unable to follow the Portuguese example of defending the dynasty by moving to American territory, and, unlike the Braganza Prince João who kept his throne and ruled the Portuguese empire from Brazil, the Bourbon King Fernando VII lost his throne, was forced into exile in France, and saw his authority pass into other hands.

This decapitation of the Spanish state caused huge political upheaval. Throughout Spain, juntas sprang up to reject the

Bonapartist king, claiming that in the absence of the true sovereign, Fernando VII, sovereignty reverted to the 'people'. They justified themselves as temporary repositories of the king's sovereignty, invoking Spanish political ideas and an historic Spanish constitution, rather than challenging the divine right of kings and creating republics in the manner of British American and French revolutions (Portillo Valdés 2006). However, although their purpose was to conserve rather than innovate, their actions opened pathways to a political revolution. In September 1808, these juntas united their resistance under the authority of a Central Junta, to which they all sent delegates, and the Central Junta called on the American colonies to send elected representatives to join them. To further strengthen the union of all parts of the Spanish monarchy, the Central Junta decided to convoke a Cortes, or parliament, to express the will of the "Spanish Nation", now defined to include those on both sides of the Atlantic. The new parliament (inaugurated at Cadiz in March 1810, after the Central Junta had passed its authority to a Regency Council) was to be the instrument of further, more far-reaching change. Its foundational reform was to affirm the principle of representation for Spanish citizens throughout the empire, a principle that promised Spanish Americans the formal share in government they had always been denied. The Cortes that met in 1810 therefore included representatives for all the main American regions, and, although the American deputies were outnumbered by Spanish delegates, their presence and activity at the heart of Spanish government signalled the end of the old regime and a major change in relations between Spain and its colonies (Chust Calero 2007).

Napoleon's intrusions into the Iberian peninsula thus had very considerable consequences for Portugal and Spain, as the ensuing turmoil broke down barriers to political change. However, the character and pace of change in the Iberian monarchies differed significantly. For Portugal, crisis in Europe changed the location of the monarchy without immediately undermining D. João's claim to authority or damaging the continuity of traditional rule in Brazil. The Spanish monarchy, by contrast, had much greater difficulty in preserving its unity. The Cortes sought to defend the monarchy by reform, turning the old regime into a constitutional monarchy where the king shared power with the people, parliament prescribed laws and shaped policy, and the American colonies became equal parts of the "Spanish Nation" represented in the parliament. But, as many places had already broken with Spanish rule in 1810, these changes

came too late to preserve imperial unity. Spain was, moreover, plunged into a bloody war against French occupying forces, which not only did great social and economic damage but further damaged the relationships that had bound the Spanish world under one monarch. Spain's political revolution was, then, much less effective in preserving colonial stability than the continuity of absolutist Braganza rule was for Portuguese rule in Brazil. By refashioning Portuguese imperial government around the new focal point in America, D. João kept Brazil relatively united under the authority of Portugal, until in 1817 it faced its first serious threat of regional secession in Pernambuco (Bernardes 2006; Paquette 2013). Spain, on the other hand, saw its empire start to fracture and fail during the interregnum of Fernando VII (1810–1814), when the governments of major regions of Spanish America splintered into many parts, sundered by political conflicts and civil wars.

The fracture of the Spanish monarchy, 1810–1814

The first attempts to establish autonomous governments in Spanish America took place in Quito and Upper Peru, where, in 1809, local elites established juntas modelled on those in Spain. They were quickly suppressed, but the trend towards political change did not stop. For, when Napoleon's military successes in the peninsula cast doubt on the future of Spain's government in early 1810, juntas sprang up throughout Spanish America. The movement against existing colonial governments started in the city of Caracas, where leading creoles, drawn mainly from the rich landowning, merchant, and professional elite, overthrew royal officials and replaced them with a junta in April 1810. Many other towns and cities followed, as creole patricians removed royal officials and set up autonomous governments. Most important were those in the capitals of major regions: in May, the Viceroy of Río de la Plata was overturned by a junta at Buenos Aires; in July, the Viceroy of New Granada suffered the same fate in Bogotá; in September, the governor of Chile fell in Santiago. Royal officials were also replaced by juntas in secondary towns and cities throughout these regions, as they followed the example of their capitals. There were important exceptions: the Viceroy of Peru remained in power at Lima, and the Viceroy of New Spain in Mexico City (Hamnett 1978). In Cuba and Puerto Rico, Spanish officials also remained firmly in control, thanks mainly to the

powerful interests involved in the sugar trade and plantation economy, reinforced by fears among whites that political division might provide an opening for social rebellion of the kind that overturned slave society in neighbouring Haiti.

At first, the Spanish American juntas shared the ideological roots of those in Spain. They acted in the name of the captive Fernando VII, and, rather than claiming independence, justified their claims to self-government by the doctrine that sovereignty reverted to the people in the absence of the king (Guerra 1992). The juntas installed in colonial capitals and leading towns also sought to preserve the territorial unity of the governments they had replaced, by uniting provinces under leadership led from the capital. The junta of Buenos Aires, for example, sought to impose its authority over the whole of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata (from Montevideo on the Atlantic to La Paz in the Andes, encompassing the modern countries of Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and Bolivia); the junta in Bogotá attempted to do the same for the Viceroyalty of New Granada (modern Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama).

Unity was unattainable, however. For, once the traditional framework of authority was undermined, the urban centres that had been the hubs of government under Spanish rule tended to divide into autonomous seats of power, led by local elites. Sovereignty, in short, became polycentric as claims to power multiplied. The primary divide was between those who remained loyal to Spain's government and those who supported the American juntas' claims to sovereignty, and their opposition produced a series of fissures both within and between Spain's principal colonies. In Río de la Plata, the junta of Buenos Aires met resistance from several cities and regions: Montevideo's elite recognised Spanish authority rather than cooperate with Buenos Aires; the Banda Oriental (later Uruguay) and Paraguay wanted independence from Spain but also from Buenos Aires, whose government they rejected (Halperín Donghi 1975; Chiaramonte 1997). Upper Peru was also wrenched away from Buenos Aires, though by different means: armies sent by the Viceroy of Peru prevented Buenos Aires from establishing any alliance with the cities of these Andean provinces. The Viceroyalty of New Granada was another region that quickly fragmented into competing cities and regions (Martínez Garnica 1998). Important pockets of loyalism remained on the Caribbean coast and in the southern interior, which provided bases for attack on the areas that defied Spanish authority. Neighbouring Venezuela split along similar lines. When the city of Caracas moved to

independence in November 1811 and claimed to be the capital of an independent republic with sovereignty over the territory of the defunct Captaincy-General, its authority was challenged by the cities of Coro, Maracaibo, and Guyana, which remained faithful to Spain (McKinley 1985).

Division between those loyal to Spanish rule and those who advocated autonomy or independence was the principal, but not the sole source of disunity. There was a strong tendency to identify the “people” with a specific city and its associated jurisdiction, leading to a multiplication of claims to sovereignty among those who broke with Spanish rule. In New Granada, for example, provincial capitals proclaimed their independence and competed with each other; secondary towns asserted their autonomy and broke away from provincial capitals. There was also division between advocates of a single, centralised government, and proponents of a federation of equal and independent governments, based on provinces and held together by a general congress with responsibility for matters of common interest, such as defence and international relations (Gutiérrez Ardila 2010).

This fragmentation of authority led to fratricidal wars. While the Viceroy of Río de la Plata and New Granada both fell in 1810, the loyalist governments of New Spain and Peru survived and fought back against the forces of change, as did royalists in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Viceroyalty of New Spain came close to collapse when, in September 1810, Father Hidalgo and other creole leaders raised a great insurrection that fed on peasant and plebeian discontent and unleashed a struggle with strong racial undertones. However, the Viceroy of New Spain survived the threat: Hidalgo was defeated in 1811 and, although insurrection continued in the provinces, Mexico’s major cities remained loyal to the Regency and continued to fight against provincial insurgents led by Hidalgo’s successor, José María Morelos (Van Young 2001). Spanish rule remained firm in Peru, too. There, the royalist regime faced fewer challenges, possibly because memories of the Túpac Amaru rebellion of 1780–1782 discouraged creoles from political agitation (Walker 1999). Lima and other leading cities sustained loyalty to Spain, and, until the rebellion of Cuzco in 1814, rebellion against royal authorities was localised and easily contained (Fisher 2003). Indeed, the Viceroy of Peru not only defended their own territory successfully; they also helped to uphold Spanish rule in neighbouring Upper Peru, Chile, and Quito.

The strength of conservatism in such regions owed much to the

loyalty of creole elites, which arose from anxieties about the social risks of overturning Spanish rule. In Mexico and Peru, Spanish American whites feared that political division would weaken their domination of Indian and mixed-race majorities; Caribbean elites were anxious to avoid cracks in the power structure that might provide openings for slave rebellion. Creole loyalism was also encouraged by fundamental change within the imperial system. From 1810, the Cádiz Cortes sought to strengthen ties to Spain by offering Americans rights to representation in an elected imperial parliament, equality before the law, and the prospect of prosperity through economic liberalism. The Cádiz Constitution of 1812 brought major political reforms, which promised to transform American relations with Spain. It abolished the viceroalties and turned viceroys and governors into *jefes políticos* (political chiefs) of their territories, and shifted authority to the provinces, which now connected directly with government in Spain. At the regional level, provincial government was given to the *diputación provincial* (provincial deputation), which included elected members, while towns and cities provided for local participation in the *cabildo constitucional* (the popularly elected town council). Enacted in regions which remained under Spanish rule, the Cádiz Constitution gave Americans a greater say in their own government than ever before, voiced in the Cortes at Cádiz and enacted in the new institutions of home government (Rodríguez O. 1998).

The Cádiz Constitution was not, however, a universal panacea. The reforms enacted at Cádiz failed to satisfy many Americans, and did not win back regions which had broken away. One major source of dissatisfaction was the fact that, although the Cortes promised equality among the members of the “Spanish Nation”, it restricted citizenship in the Americas in order to ensure that Spain, which had a smaller population than its American possessions, retained a majority of deputies, and, with it, control of legislation and policy for the empire. The Cortes’ ability to rebuild a united monarchy under the new constitution was further impeded by a growing sense of separateness among the Spanish Americans who had created independent governments. They began to see a future for separate states which might strike up independent relations within the international community, free from Spanish dominance. Thus, unlike Brazil, which remained relatively united under Portuguese rule, Spanish America fragmented into a mosaic of regions with competing allegiances. And, as division spread and deepened, political conflicts led in turn to violence and war.

The wars that broke out in Spanish America in 1810–1811 exposed and reflected conflicts of many kinds, as social and political rivals took advantage of Spain's crisis to vent their grievances and pursue their own interests. However, the fundamental conflict was between the defenders of Spanish rule and the advocates of autonomy and independence, and was played out in several theatres of war. In the old Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, for example, the junta of Buenos Aires built armies to impose its authority over the interior, especially over the silver-rich Andean provinces of Upper Peru. This led to war with the Viceroy of Peru, who were determined to suppress the challenge from Buenos Aires and restore royal authority there. The juntas set up in Venezuela and the Viceroyalty of New Granada also fought loyalist enemies, who defended royal government from towns and regions where they retained control. In New Spain, the viceroys held Mexico City and other cities, which they used as bases for military campaigns against the various provincial insurgencies which for several years posed a significant threat to royalist rule.

There were also some minor wars within and between the new political entities created by the juntas and their successors. Such wars reflected the many conflicts which surfaced when Spanish rule collapsed: they arose from disputes over constitutional issues, from local and regional rivalries, and sometimes from social and economic grievances. In New Granada, for example, disputes between advocates of a centralised government based in Bogotá and those who, in cities such as Cartagena, wanted independence within a loose confederation of independent governments, turned into minor wars. Chile was divided by similar conflicts, notably between leaders in Santiago and their rivals in Concepción (Collier 1967; Ossa Santa Cruz 2014).

Warfare varied considerably in scale and intensity (McFarlane 2014). In South America, wars usually began as rather restrained “civic wars”, in which rival cities manoeuvred small armies with the intention of intimidating rather than annihilating their rivals. However, such conflicts tended to become more violent civil wars, in which allegiances cut across social and ethnic groups. In central New Spain, conflict was from the outset driven by social rebellion: the creole leadership of Hidalgo's rebellion immediately mobilised Indians and *castas* by promising to improve their condition, and sought to use weight of numbers to overcome the royalist government. In Venezuela, “civic war” was soon superseded by greater violence: in 1812, the republican leader Simón Bolívar decreed a “war to the death” against Spaniards; the royalist chieftain José Tomás Boves

retaliated by mobilising his *llaneros* (mounted herdsmen from the Orinoco plains) in murderous campaigns against whites in towns and cities. Upper Peru was another region where the spread of war destabilised social relations: Buenos Aires sent several major military expeditions to take Upper Peru in 1810–1815, creating circumstances in which dissident groups, particularly indigenous communities, were able to rebel against Spanish authorities and create local insurgencies (Soux 2010).

The early wars in Spanish America differed significantly from Spain's concurrent war against the French, which was fought on a greater scale, was infused with hatred of an occupying power which differed in language, culture, and history, and, as it involved British forces, was part of an international war. Wars in Spanish America, by contrast, were not aimed against a foreign occupier; they started as conflicts among neighbours who mostly shared the same language, institutions, and religion, and did not become arenas for foreign military intervention (the sole exception was Portugal's invasion of the Banda Oriental from Brazil). They were essentially civil wars (or conflicts over who should hold public authority within a given state), which increasingly became secessionist revolutions, steered by liberal leaders who not only sought release from Spanish rule, but aimed to create modern, progressive societies, based on citizens' rights.

The first phase of war closed shortly after the return of a general peace in Europe. In Spain, the victory of the Anglo-Spanish alliance against the French brought the restoration of Fernando VII in 1814 and ended Spain's constitutional monarchy. In Spanish America, the changes inaugurated in 1810 also went into reverse. Between 1814 and 1816, all the alternative governments created during Fernando VII's absence, with the exception of Buenos Aires and Paraguay, were defeated by royalist forces and replaced by military and civil powers imposed by Spain.

These reversals revealed the weaknesses that undermined the first attempts to break with Spain. Although they deprived Spanish government of the monopoly of violence, the new governments failed to concentrate power. They had experimented with liberal constitutionalism, strongly influenced by Enlightenment rationalism and the republican models of the United States and France, and most had promulgated written constitutions which proclaimed the citizens' rights to liberty, legal equality, security, and property, while protecting these rights by the separation of powers between executive, legislature, and judiciary. These liberal forms of government attracted

some support outside the elites—among pardos and Indians, for example, who saw the chance for political equality—but popular loyalism was strong in some regions (Guardino 1996; Walker 1999; Helg 2004; Méndez 2005). Belief in monarchy as the “natural” form of government remained widespread, and slaves, Indians, and other subalterns had greater confidence in royal justice than the new governments which claimed to supplant the king (Echeverri 2016). These governments also failed in crucial areas: they did not create states capable of offering obvious benefits to citizens, nor did they wage war effectively. Their military weaknesses were compounded by lack of external political and military support from foreign powers, especially from Britain which, instead of nurturing Spanish American independence, gave priority to supporting Spain against France.

Spanish reconquest and Spanish American insurgency

In 1814, after the restoration of Fernando VII, Spain seemed set to rebuild the unity of the monarchy. The end of the Peninsular War made available large armies which, no longer needed at home, could be sent to fight against American rebels. Spain also had maritime power, even though its navy was small. Unlike the British North American rebels, who were supported during their war of independence by the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, Spanish American rebels had no such maritime support. Thus, when in 1815 Fernando VII dispatched an amphibious military expedition to Venezuela, led by General Morillo, he had both large forces and the tactical advantage of surprise, since the Spanish navy could strike wherever it chose.

Changes in international conditions also assisted the resurrection of empire. By 1815, the prospects for revolution had receded throughout Spanish America and, with the Holy Alliance intent on restoring the European monarchies to the dominance they had enjoyed before the French Revolution, Spain seemed set to rebuild its absolutist monarchy at home and throughout its overseas territories. Even Britain, which had strong commercial ambitions in Spanish America, was ready to support the restoration of Spanish authority in America, as long as Spain proved capable of reimposing peace and stability.

Spain was, however, unable to sustain recovery for long. Its economy was badly damaged by war, and its American territories had

also suffered serious economic disruption. Colonial commerce remained largely in the hands of foreigners, especially the British, and colonial treasuries carried huge burdens of debt incurred in fighting the insurgents (Fontana 1987). The need to sustain a continuing military effort against insurgents placed fresh demands on Americans, who were required to provide money, recruits, and supplies for royalist armies fighting insurgent forces. At the same time, the restored monarchy failed to win back political ground: Fernando VII wiped out the political gains which Americans had made during his interregnum by abolishing the Cádiz Constitution. Thus, although many Americans welcomed the return of a king who promised political certainty and social discipline, they also felt the loss of the autonomy they had enjoyed during the constitutionalist years. In New Spain especially, where the experience of new political practices and a greater degree of self-government had left a strong mark, Fernando VII's ultra-conservatism did nothing to strengthen his standing. Indeed, when he was later forced to restore the Cádiz constitution by the Spanish liberal revolution in 1820, the Mexican elites welcomed the return to constitutional government (Anna 1978; Ávila, 2002).

Fernando VII's return to the throne in 1814 promised a new beginning, but could not rebuild Spanish hegemony in America. That had been broken by the experience of greater freedom during his interregnum, whether it was under the Spanish constitutionalist regime or under independent governments. Fernando VII's regime was also unable to extirpate the remnants of the rebellions which had started in 1810. For, while serious military opposition had been suppressed in most regions, Spanish forces did not have complete control of the countryside. In Mexico and Peru, scattered groups of insurgents and bandits continued to threaten the peace of rural areas; in northern South America, small but important enclaves of insurgency remained in the llanos of Venezuela and New Granada; in the Southern Cone, Buenos Aires and the Río de la Plata remained outside Spanish rule and increasingly committed to independence.

When the armed struggle reignited, it brought a second, decisive, phase of warfare. From around 1816, the challenge of insurgency diminished in New Spain, but took on a new vigour in South America. Despite Fernando VII's intention to send a military expedition against Buenos Aires, Spain failed to use its maritime advantage in the southern Atlantic, and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata opened a new front for warfare, prepared by General José de San Martín. From Cuyo, San Martín revived ambitions to penetrate the

realms of royalist Peru, employing a new army and implementing a new strategy. Rather than continuing to attack Spanish armies in Peru in Upper Peru, he launched a surprise attack on royalist Chile. After victory at Maipú in 1818, San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins proclaimed Chilean independence and used the new state as a platform from which to attack the royalist stronghold of Peru. After landing on the Peruvian coast in 1820, San Martín began the military campaign that was eventually to prise Peru from Spain's grasp (Lynch 2009).

The challenge from San Martín in the south was paralleled in the north of the continent by the emergence of another "liberator" and another army. From exile in Haiti, Simón Bolívar returned to Venezuela in 1816, and, from his headquarters in the Orinoco plains, built a well-trained army of volunteers and conscripts who became increasingly capable of facing veteran royalist infantrymen. After uniting disparate caudillos under his command, Bolívar used his new army to implement a fresh strategy. His surprise attack on New Granada produced victory against the viceroy's army at Boyacá (1819), and allowed Bolívar to found the republic of Colombia as a union of New Granada and Venezuela. Like San Martín, Bolívar had outflanked royalist forces from a rural base, seized control of royalist cities and their regions, then used them as a platform to pursue military campaigns in neighbouring regions. And, again like San Martín, he believed that no revolution was safe until the Spaniards had been defeated throughout South America. He therefore returned to Venezuela to defeat royalist forces at Carabobo in 1821, then carried his campaigns southwards to Quito and Peru. After San Martín withdrew in 1823, Bolívar became the supreme commander of forces in Peru and moved to finalise independence. With an army built around a core of veterans from Venezuela and New Granada and supported by resources provided by Colombia, he amassed sufficient military power to overcome the last major bastions of Spanish rule in Peru and Upper Peru, thereby consummating South American independence (Lynch 2006).

Spanish American independence

The achievement of independence throughout South America owed much to the extraordinary leadership of the revolutionary generals and their lieutenants. Bolívar and San Martín played key roles in

overturning Spanish power: they created strategies for taking war from the local to the continental level, built armies capable of combating Spanish forces, forged systems of command, administration and supply, and formed political alliances which ensured that military advances secured lasting change. Their activities were important in other ways too. They promoted the development of American identities by polarising politics into a conflict of Americans against Spaniards, turned their armies into symbols of incipient nationhood, and recentralised authority which had dispersed in 1810–1815 (Thibaud 2003).

Spain also played its own part in the collapse of the empire. The military strategy pursued by the “liberators” placed sustained constant pressure on Spain, draining its fiscal resources and damaging its political standing on both sides of the Atlantic (Anna 1983). Debt and disenchantment led to a reaction against Fernando VII, and in 1820, army officers who were assembling forces in Andalucía for a military expedition against Buenos Aires rebelled against his government, and joined with liberals to force the king to restore the Cadiz constitution. The return of the Cortes in 1820 opened another phase in Spain’s efforts to unify the divided Hispanic world. Now, Spanish politicians again tried to bring Americans into the “Spanish Nation”, by restoring constitutional government in regions under Spanish rule and opening negotiations with revolutionary governments which had seceded from Spain. Neither was successful, however, because government in Spain was too politically unreliable to command authority and too militarily weak to inspire fear.

Spain’s inability to regain control was evident even in regions where threats of insurgency were relatively slight, such as New Spain and Central America. There, the return to constitutional government was enthusiastically embraced and elections held, but Spain failed to solidify new relations. American deputies proposed the creation of three kingdoms, each a constitutional monarchy with a Spanish prince and its own Cortes, and bound by special political and economic ties to Spain. However, to Spaniards this looked too much like independence by another name, and it proved impossible to find a compromise between Spanish interests and American aspirations.

In Mexico, distrust of the Spanish Cortes’ commitment to liberal reforms, which threatened the privileges of the Church and army, propelled a new movement towards independence, directed by the elites with little popular participation. Some of its leaders hoped to sustain ties with Spain, with New Spain as a distinctive and self-

governing kingdom under a Bourbon prince, but the Cortes refused to compromise. The Mexican opposition turned to Colonel Agustín de Iturbide, a renowned army commander, to bring the royalist army to their side, and, in a political coalition supported by the Church and some surviving insurgents, Iturbide succeeded in displacing the last viceroy and establishing an independent state in 1821. The conservatives aimed at constitutional monarchy and, when the Spanish Bourbons refused to provide a king, they established a Mexican Empire. Iturbide was installed as its first emperor, Agustín I, in 1822, until replaced by a republic in 1823 (Anna 1978).

The Cortes did no better in other regions, where Spain's military weaknesses undermined its effort to revive loyalty by compromise and negotiation. In Peru, the attempt to negotiate with San Martín not only showed the insurgents that Spain's strength was ebbing; it also divided the royalist generals, leading to a coup against the viceroy which further weakened a royalist regime already in military retreat. The royalist cause lived on, with a new capital at Cuzco and an army capable of defending the southern Andes, including Upper Peru. However, Peru's viceregal government became increasingly vulnerable when Bolívar advanced from the south, having refused to accept any agreement short of independence. In 1820, Bolívar had accepted a truce with Morillo in Venezuela, but did not contemplate re-joining the Spanish monarchy under the terms offered by Spain's liberals. For Bolívar, the truce simply provided a chance to regroup and rearm, and, after defeating the Spaniards at Carabobo in 1821, he turned all his attention to defeating Spanish forces in Peru. Faced by a divided royalist army, he accomplished this goal at Junín and Ayacucho in 1824, and then consolidated his hold on the continent by eliminating the vestiges of the royalist army in Upper Peru. These victories cleared the ground for the foundation of the republics of Peru and Bolivia, where Bolívar aimed to reproduce his preferred political model of a centralised republican state governed by an enlightened elite.

Thus, by 1825, the defiance of Spanish government that had started in 1810, without any clearly articulated sense of national identity or intention to create nation-states, had brought into power a group of independent governments which demanded recognition as separate states in the international concert of nations.

The independence of Brazil and the Spanish-American revolutions, 1808–1822

The events that led from crisis in Spain to independence in Spanish America were paralleled by a similarly decisive phase in the history of Portugal's Empire. Following the flight of the Portuguese royal family from Lisbon to Brazil, events on both sides of the Atlantic created conditions that eventually allowed Brazil to become an independent sovereign nation state, a possibility that virtually no one had envisioned at the beginning of the century.

The events taking place in the Spanish Empire provided the Portuguese Empire with both warnings and lessons. One of the great challenges facing the government of Prince Regent D. João when he established his court in Rio de Janeiro, was to avoid the trajectory followed by the Spanish American colonies, where the creation of the first *juntas* in 1809–1810 opened up the possibility of independence (Pimenta 2015). From its new headquarters, his government promoted changes within the political-administrative-economic structure of the Portuguese Empire intended to maintain and strengthen the integrity of the Portuguese dominions throughout the globe. In general, these changes followed the lines laid down by Portuguese enlightened reformism since the last decades of the eighteenth century—to transform the empire in order better to preserve it—but in circumstances where European wars and the monarch's exile placed Portugal and its dominions in a very vulnerable position (Alexandre 1993; Lyra 1994).

Before they were definitely installed in Rio de Janeiro, D. João and part of his Court spent almost a month in Salvador where, in January 1808, he opened Brazil to trade with countries other than Portugal. In practical terms, Great Britain was the biggest beneficiary of this measure (later formalised by a cooperation and friendship treaty with Portugal in 1810), as it helped to compensate for the losses to its industry and trade caused by Napoleon's Continental System. In Brazil, the greatest and most immediate changes occurred in Rio de Janeiro, a city of around 45,000 people which suddenly had to accommodate 3,000–4,000 émigrés, including the Royal Family, their servants, and many high- and middle-ranking Portuguese officials (Schultz 2011). Their arrival initiated a period of urban reform, a rapid increase in commercial activity, and many improvements in communications between Rio de Janeiro and other parts of Portuguese America. The Royal administration also required institutions that did not exist in Brazil (Alexandre 1993; Malerba 2000; Gouvêa 2005). One was the government press. Brazil's first newspaper, the *Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro*, was founded in September 1808. In London, the *Correio*

Braziliense, another, more independent journal, circulated, and had great impact on Luso-American politics until its extinction in December 1822. The press played a vital part in the development and dissemination of political discussion throughout Brazil, and helped to intensify the politicisation of public spaces that had been taking place, to a limited extent, since the end of the eighteenth century (Jancsó 1997; Morel 2001).

Image 32.1 View of the Royal Palace square, Rio de Janeiro. Jean-Baptiste Debret, 1839

Source: Public domain/The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print Collection, The New York Public Library Digital Collections, New York City, USA

In this new context, Portuguese rulers in Brazil closely followed events in Spanish America, fearing that the weakening of Spain's monarchical power would be replicated in the Portuguese Empire. In public, the Portuguese Court contrasted the stability of Brazil to the turbulent situation in Spanish America, but at the same time it took steps to ensure that instability did not spill into Brazil from its troubled continental neighbourhood. The court of Rio de Janeiro thus attempted to interfere in the political situation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de La Plata through diplomacy, espionage, and the strengthening of networks of interest. Between 1808 and 1814, the Court also endorsed the claims of Carlota Joaquina—wife of the Portuguese Prince Regent, and sister of the Spanish King Fernando VII—to be recognised as ruler of Spanish America. In 1811 the Portuguese court sent a military expedition to the territory of the Banda Oriental, to take advantage of conflict between loyalist Montevideo and independent Buenos Aires; it also acted on other borders, strengthening its military outposts, and in 1809 organised an expedition to conquer the French colony of Cayenne (subsequently returned to France in 1817). In order to reinforce its position within the complicated arena of European politics, the government of Rio de Janeiro also kept diplomatic representatives in Spain and Britain (Pimenta 2015).

The Portuguese empire based in Brazil faced new tensions and conflicts in both its internal and external relationships. The signing of treaties with Great Britain, on 19 February 1810, caused dissatisfaction and protests in Portugal—then ruled by British forces fighting against France—and in Brazil, where the new treaties undermined an emerging industry and some local trades (Alexandre 1993; Slemian 2006). Regarding the slave trade between Africa and

Brazil, which had increased since 1808, powerful interests came into play, involving groups in Brazil whose actions would be decisive in the immediate events of South American history (Marquese 2005; Alencastro 2006). Portuguese diplomats had always demonstrated goodwill towards the British anti-slavery movement, trying to preserve the alliance established in 1807. However, in 1815, the Court of Rio de Janeiro yielded to British pressures and agreed to sign a treaty that limited the slave trade to regions south of the Equator. This agreement did not diminish slave imports, however; the trade moved to Angola, outside the banned area. Meanwhile, in the regions near Rio de Janeiro, the government of the Prince Regent João carried out a policy of extermination of the indigenous population, of groups generically called the *botocudos*. Other tensions and struggles emerged from the regions of Brazil that were forced to pay taxes to the government of Rio de Janeiro, but whose political-economic groups felt they had not benefited from the presence of the Court. The news from Spanish America and the convulsed political situation of Spanish territories bordering Brazil exacerbated these differences.

Thus, the transformation of a colonial territory into the headquarters of the Portuguese empire—an unprecedented experience in the history of the modern age overseas empires—created a contradictory situation. On the one hand, it reinforced the unity of the empire; on the other, it increased tensions and conflicts within that empire. Other factors sharpened these contradictions. First, the Portuguese Court decided to stay in Brazil after the official end of the Peninsular War in 1814 (due in part to well-grounded fears that, in the absence of the Prince Regent, Portuguese America could follow the same course of Spanish America); second, the elevation of Brazil to the status of Kingdom, on 16 December 1815, and the consequent transformation of the empire into the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarve ended the traditional political hierarchies on which the empire had been based for nearly 300 years; third, a new military intervention in the Río de La Plata region in 1816 resulted in the occupation of Montevideo and the establishment of an enduring Portuguese government in the region, placing Brazil even closer to the political struggles of its Spanish American neighbours; fourth, in northern Brazil, the Pernambuco Revolution of 1817 established a republican government that opposed the monarchical government of Rio de Janeiro for three months before its violent repression by royalist forces; and finally, in the same year, the conspiracy led by Gomes Freire de Andrade in Portugal clearly echoed the discontent of

Portuguese political and economic interests caused by the perpetuation of the Portuguese Court in America and the establishment of an imperial management perceived as biased towards Brazil (Araújo 1992; Bernardes 2006). Portuguese discontents were further aggravated by the acclamation in Rio de Janeiro of King João VI in 1818, and in such circumstances, conflict between Portugal and Brazil seemed increasingly unavoidable.

Nevertheless, in the late 1810s, the idea of independence for Brazil was still not taken entirely seriously. The examples of, and contact with Spanish America were still very alive, and were part of a broader historical experience that included the independence of the Thirteen American Colonies, the French and other European revolutions of the time, as well as the Haitian Revolution. From public spaces that were increasingly politicised and facing the internal contradictions of the Portuguese United Kingdom, the need for future projects and plans became increasingly urgent and complex, amidst a general perception of an acceleration of historical time, an anxiety about the unknown, and a concern to address troubling uncertainties (Jancsó 1997; Araújo 2008; Pimenta 2015). However, the idea of a political separation between Brazil and Portugal would only effectively materialise with the Porto Revolution of 1820.

The Porto Revolution acted as a political catalyst because it merged several key discontents, concerning the permanence of the Portuguese Court in Brazil, the maintenance of the British influence over the Portuguese United Kingdom, and the effects of an economic crisis that particularly affected Portugal. Like the Spanish liberals of 1810 and 1820, the Portuguese Revolution demanded a constitutional monarchy that subjected the monarchical power to a congress of elected national representatives, who would be responsible not only for legislating, but also for drafting a constitution (Ramos 2010). The liberal movement quickly gained strength in the peninsula and spread to Brazil. In February 1821, the *Cortes Gerais, Extraordinárias e Constituintes da Nação Portuguesa* (General, Extraordinary, and Constituent Cortes) were installed, composed of representatives from Portugal only. In the following month it approved a decree calling for the election of representatives in Brazil. Several juntas of government were formed and joined the revolution, as had previously happened in Spain and Spanish America. In Brazil, the first was formed in Pará, in January 1821, even before the opening session of the Lisbon Cortes. It was followed by the juntas of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Minas Gerais, Montevideo, São Paulo, Maranhão, Goiás, Rio Grande do Sul,

Rio Grande do Norte, Piauí, Alagoas, Espírito Santo, Mato Grosso, Ceará, and Paraíba. The election process for the representatives in all these regions increased political unrest everywhere (Berbel 1999). At the same time, the decrees of the Portuguese Cortes of 21 September 1821, 13 October 1821, and 2 March 1822 established the freedom of the press in the United Kingdom, significantly increasing the number of regular and periodic publications devoted to political issues in Brazil (Morel 2001; Neves 2003). In obedience to the Cortes, in April 1821, King João VI finally returned to Portugal. As a precaution, D. João left behind his son, Prince Pedro, in the hope of sustaining dynastic unity and preventing Brazil from following the Spanish American example.

Between 1820 and 1822, Brazil was still not a political unit. The deputies to the Cortes in Lisbon were elected by each province separately, and for different reasons not all provinces sent representatives to Lisbon. Nevertheless, the works carried out in the Cortes soon created antagonisms between peninsular and American deputies, crystallising a difference of identities between the “European Portuguese” and the “American Portuguese”. These divergences were rapidly politicised, demonstrating that the deputies were able to support different political projects, which, although previously existent, were now made much clearer (Jancsó and Pimenta 2000). The decrees issued by the Cortes on 29 September and 1 October 1821, contributed to this antagonism because they demanded the immediate return of Prince Pedro to Portugal, and ordered the replacement of all government institutions created in Rio de Janeiro since 1808 with new forms of government. These measures met with strong opposition in Brazil, especially among economic interest groups that had benefited from the installation of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808 and become increasingly active in the political sphere (Dias 2005; Oliveira 1998). The idea that the Cortes were aiming at a “recolonisation” of Brazil spread quickly and, widely used as a rhetorical weapon at the time, would later be uncritically accepted by many historians (Barman 1988). On 9 January 1822, in a clear demonstration of his political prestige, Prince Pedro publicly announced his decision to disobey the Cortes in Lisbon and to stay as head of a government in Brazil. The prince reorganised his ministers on 16 January, including José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva at Foreign Affairs: he would subsequently become a central character in the process of independence (Dolhnikoff 2012). On February 16, the prince called a *Conselho de Procuradores das Províncias* (a board of

Provincial Attorneys) to review all decisions concerning Brazil made by the Portuguese Cortes; on June 3, he announced the upcoming establishment of a Constitutional Assembly in Brazil; and on 6 August, he issued a manifesto addressed to the “foreign nations”, in which he justified his conduct in government and called for supporters (Oliveira 1998; Souza 1998).

While in Lisbon some of the deputies from America abandoned the Cortes in protest against actions considered harmful to Brazil, events were evolving towards the implementation of a project for independence, that is, not only a project of self-government in relation to Portugal, but the creation of a sovereign state. The famous “Proclamation of Independence” of 7 September 1822, which occurred in the province of São Paulo, would later be elevated to the greatest moment of Brazilian independence. However, in practical terms, the acclamation of D. Pedro I as Emperor of Brazil on 12 October and his coronation on 1 December 1822, were more important for consolidating independence (Oliveira 1998; Souza 1998).

In all regions of Brazil, societies were strongly marked by miscegenation, and it is thus not surprising to find native Indians, African slaves, and their descendants participating in the struggles that characterised the process of independence. There are clear examples of the strong presence of Afro-descendants in the conflicts that occurred in Bahia and Pernambuco, and of indigenous people in Maranhão and Pará (Kraay 2001; Machado 2010), fighting either in favour of independence or against it, or even defending alternative political projects. Although there have been many recent historiographical advances, the traditional and mythical image of Brazilian independence as a supposedly peaceful and conservative process still hampers a more profound understanding of this type of social activity.

By the end of 1822, the independence of Brazil was not yet fully assured and the infancy of the new empire would be troublesome and violent. Nonetheless, 15 years after the events that led the Portuguese Empire to take a radically different road from that of the Spanish Empire, their paths converged again, when, like almost all its continental neighbours, Brazil became a national State, separate from its former European metropole.

Iberian America after independence

The establishment of independent states in Iberian America during the 1820s was one of the most significant political events in the Atlantic world. The emergence of independent sovereign states ended two historic empires, relegated Spain and Portugal to the ranks of minor European powers, and created a group of new states which, as they were mostly republics, stood in strong contrast to the reactionary monarchies of Europe. Neither Spain nor Portugal had withstood the shocks of war and revolution in Europe, and, although their monarchs managed to survive in a changing world, neither was able to sustain unity between the old metropolises and their American territories. Portugal did better, perhaps: it shared monarchs from the same dynasty and, although it became increasingly dependent on African colonies after Brazilian independence, continued to share a powerful economic connection through the slave trade. Spain, on the other hand, refused to recognise the new states and harboured hopes of restoring parts of its lost empire, through schemes for retaking colonies which came to nothing and gradually forced it to reconfigure the empire around Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines (Fradera 2005).

Image 32.2 Map showing the independent states in South America

The independent states in Spanish America and Brazil showed both resemblances and differences. Brazil was perhaps more coherent as an independent kingdom than it had been as separate provinces under Portugal, and in this it also differed sharply from most of the new states in Spanish America. Nonetheless, in Brazil, independence also gave birth to a national unit that was built on the desires and actions of specific groups from certain provinces, rather than on the will of the majority of the population. Disagreements were found even within the provinces that had immediately become part of the empire—Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul—but the most serious conflicts would be in regions such as Bahia, Maranhão, Ceará, Piauí, Pará, and the Cisplatine Province (the region governed by the Portuguese in the Banda Oriental since 1821). These conflicts resulted in wars that were fought over two basic positions: either allegiance to the new Empire of Brazil, or the maintenance of political ties to Portugal and the Lisbon Cortes (Holanda 1962; Jancsó 2005; Frega 2015). Although the wars of independence in Brazil were smaller and less destructive than those in Spanish America, they were nevertheless episodes of collective violence that left important marks on the new nation. By the end of the independence wars in 1824, the

territorial definition of the empire was well underway, though not fully resolved.

Another essential aspect of consolidating the empire concerned its legal foundations. In April 1823 in Rio de Janeiro, representatives from various provinces of Brazil met for the first time. They were responsible for honouring the promises made by D. Pedro I in the previous year—when he was still Prince Regent—and for drafting a constitution for Brazil. After all, although it opposed the Lisbon Courts, the empire had been created under constitutional guidelines. During seven months, the *Assembleia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil* (General Constituent and Legislative Assembly of the Empire of Brazil) legislated and produced a draft for the constitution. However, conflicts between the Assembly and the emperor, especially concerning the definition of national sovereignty and of boundaries between national authorities, led D. Pedro I, who was being publicly accused of despotism, to violently dissolve the Assembly. As a result, the monarch himself and a select Council of State drew up the first Brazilian constitution, promulgated on 25 March 1824. The detailed definition of the legal and legislative framework of the Brazilian empire would be designed in subsequent years (Carvalho 1980; Mattos 1987).

The so-called First Empire (1822–1831), under the government of D. Pedro I, faced serious opposition from the revolt in Pernambuco and adjacent provinces, the “Confederation of the Equator” (1824). They demanded that D. Pedro I kept his constitutional commitments made in 1822, which were partially broken when he dissolved the Constituent Assembly (Silva 2006). Between 1824 and 1825, however, this internal instability was compensated by recognition of Brazil’s independence, necessary for the admission of Brazil into the international relations system of the time—first by the United States, followed by Portugal and Britain. Even so, the situation deteriorated again during the Cisplatine War (1825–1828) between the Empire of Brazil and the government of Buenos Aires, which had refused to recognise the incorporation of the Banda Oriental into the United Kingdom of Portugal, and did not recognise it now as part of the new empire. There was no clear winner in this war. It aggravated the economic crisis caused by the empire’s internal wars, and when British mediation went against Brazil, resulting in the establishment of the Republic of Uruguay, the empire entered another political crisis. D. Pedro I, accused of being a despotic monarch, more “Portuguese” than “Brazilian” (after all, he was a member of the Portuguese dynasty of

Bragança), fell on 7 April 1831, reflecting a process of political nationalisation of the empire that took place as it also adjusted and consolidated its institutional bases (Ribeiro 2002; Pimenta 2002).

It is not surprising that many regional revolts occurred in Brazil during the Regency periods (1831–1840), before the recognition of the young Pedro II as the new emperor. Although these events were violent and impactful, they did not present clear separatist contours or challenge the national project put in place at independence. Independence would thus produce a profound, lasting, and revolutionary legacy: the creation of a sovereign Brazilian state and nation that did not exist before 1822. For decades, the nation would retain Brazil's slaveholding social basis, for both slavery and the slave trade were reconfigured at independence. In economic terms, Brazil kept close to Britain, in a relationship established at the beginning of the century. However, it also diversified its production, trade, and partnerships, and consolidated an unfavourable insertion into the expanding capitalist world. In the Americas, relations between Brazil and its neighbours continued to foster reciprocal influences, as they had in the independence period.

Throughout Iberian America, change was tempered by strong continuities with the past. Neither the Spanish nor the Portuguese empire was overthrown by revolutionaries who aimed at a completely fresh start. Spanish and Portuguese remained the primary languages and Roman Catholicism the dominant religion throughout the successor states, and, although new political leaders aimed to replace traditional institutions, their Iberian antecedents continued to affect social, cultural, and political life. In Spanish America, some key resemblances remained. In the first place, the new governments aimed to retain the territorial structure of Spanish America, even as they changed its institutions. Leaders of new states invoked the legal principle of *uti posseditis* to claim that independent states should have the same borders as those of previous rulers. Thus, the Spanish Viceroyalties provided templates for Iturbide's Mexican Empire, Bolívar's Republic of Colombia, the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, and the first Republic of Peru. These all subsequently split into smaller entities, usually along lines caused by competition among regional social, and economic elites: Bolívar's Republic of Colombia (Gran Colombia) split into three republics in 1830 (New Granada, Ecuador, and Venezuela); Mexico lost Central America in 1823; the Provincias Unidas del Centro de América subsequently became the independent states of Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica,

and Honduras. Peru was initially based on a truncated version of the old viceroyalty, though without Upper Peru, Chile, and Quito: their status as autonomous units of Spanish government underpinned claims to become separate republics. But the shape of Spanish jurisdictions still marked the political geography of Spanish America: at the end of the nineteenth century, the borders of most republics matched the boundaries of colonial audiencias and major provinces.

The persistence of Iberian influences is also evident in other areas of political life. Post-independence innovation drew on Enlightenment ideas and attitudes nurtured under Pombal in Portugal and various ministers in later eighteenth-century Spain: these provided inspiration for post-independence reforms in administration, public order, education, the dissemination of news and “useful knowledge”, as well as in policies aimed at stimulating economic activity (Gallo 2006). On the conservative side, Catholicism was universally acknowledged by all new constitutions as the religion of the people, and the institution of the Church remained a key institution, often in ambivalent relations with republican governments (Lempérière 2004). Spanish law remained in force, too, in varying degrees, just as parts of colonial legislation persisted in Brazil for decades after independence.

On the other hand, the Spanish American republics broke with the political systems of the past, by introducing modern institutions and policies that were conducive to the goals of promoting the liberty of citizens and the security of their property. Most post-independence political leaders embraced modernity, embodied in a liberal agenda of constitutional government, equality before the law for all citizens, freedom of speech, and freedom for production and commerce. Some liberal intellectuals and statesmen regarded the United States as a paradigm, and had high ambitions for social change: they hoped for economic progress through freedom to trade, and, amidst greater prosperity, aimed to create an educated, responsible citizenry, free from slavery and other forms of racial inequality. Such goals suggest that liberal standards were higher than in much of Europe, where many states were still deeply conservative, repressive monarchies.

If Spanish American political leaders generally embraced the idea of constitutional government, they differed widely over the forms it should take. A few (in Río de la Plata in 1815–1818, Chile in 1818, and Mexico in 1821) wanted constitutional monarchies headed by Spanish Bourbon or other princes recruited in Europe, but such schemes gained scant support. None followed Brazil along the path to constitutional monarchy, except for the very brief experiment in

Mexico. Nonetheless, the major constitutional formulas adopted by the early republics show the shadow of monarchy, especially the Napoleonic-Bolivarian republic invented by Bolívar and embodied in his Bolivian Constitution of 1826. Based on British constitutional monarchy and Napoleonic consular constitutions, this constitutional model aimed at a “republicanised monarchy”, a paternalistic republican government of elected legislatures curbed by life-presidents and hereditary senates. The other major constitutional blueprint came more directly from Spain: the centralised republic, similar to that framed by the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz, was adopted in the Río de la Plata in 1826, Chile and Peru in 1828, and New Granada, Venezuela, and Uruguay in 1830 (Safford 1985).

Throughout Iberian America, considerable obstacles still stood in the way of social and political change during the transition to independent statehood. In Spanish America, war had undermined respect for old hierarchies, brought new groups into politics, and turned violence into an instrument of politics, all of which made it difficult for new states to stabilise. Second, the removal of Spanish economic monopoly did not inaugurate a new era of prosperity: British investment soon dried up, and international markets remained generally unfavourable until the later nineteenth century (Halperín Donghi 1975). Without the support of economic growth, new institutions and liberal reforms struggled to overcome the drag of the Spanish past. Poor communications, deep cultural divisions, widespread illiteracy, and the influence of corporate identities and clientelist networks undermined respect for law and citizenship, and authority frequently moved from elected representatives into the hands of strong, personalist leaders ready to use armed force. “Caudillos” of this kind (who might be military officers, local chieftains defending their own power and representing local elites, or leaders of subaltern groups who wanted citizenship on their own terms) appeared in several regions, including Mexico, Central America, Peru, Bolivia, and the Río de la Plata, complicating the functions of the republican legal-constitutional order (Lynch 1992). And, as privileged groups clung to their wealth and power, republican constitutions did not benefit all citizens: republican and liberal values were not incompatible with deep social inequality and even slavery, which persisted in Venezuela, New Granada, and Peru until mid-century. On the other hand, subaltern groups—Indian communities, blacks, and free coloured—entered into political debate and action with an unprecedented vigour, claiming their rights as citizens and

struggling to shape the republics to their advantage (Méndez 2005; Lasso 2007; Sanders 2004).

Everywhere in Spanish America, the empire had given way to successor states that faced difficult transitions. The tensions between liberal and conservative politicians that emerged in the 1820s and 1830s were generally unresolved; economic growth was invariably very limited; governments had heavy debts and small incomes, which induced several to revive colonial taxes and even the quintessentially colonial Indian tributes. The achievement of independence had started some great political projects—republicanism, federalism, ideas for continental cooperation—but the Spanish colonial past continued to weigh heavily in some key respects: the persistence of racial hierarchies; values of honour, patriarchy, and paternalism; the Catholic Church; illiteracy, and a limited public sphere (Brown and Paquette, 2013; Zahler 2013). In Brazil, the colonial past was even more evident in the persistence, indeed the continuing expansion of slavery. So, as Bolívar sensed when he commented that he and his compatriots had achieved independence but little else, the successors to Spain and Portugal faced great challenges and considerable conflict as they moved beyond independence into the modern world of the nineteenth century.

Note

¹Professor Pimenta's contribution translated by Juliana Jardim de Oliveira.

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